Postagreement Negotiations

Following Khrushchev’s acceptance of Kennedy’s proposal, the two principal issues left to be resolved were how to verify the agreed Soviet missile withdrawal and what to do about the Soviet IL-28 bomber aircraft still in Cuba. The United States regarded them as “offensive” and wanted them removed, while the Soviets insisted they had been a gift to Cuba that Castro refused to return. Also the October 28 informal agreement between the leaders still needed to be codified in a more official fashion.

The resolution of these issues fell to the negotiating teams led by McCloy on the American side and Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy foreign minister, for the Soviets (Figure 6). In the two months that followed there were many meetings, some of them facilitated by Thant. Though little is known about them, they initially took place in Secretariat conference rooms with Thant shuttling back and forth between the two negotiating teams or hosting the teams in his thirty-eighth floor conference room. Moreover, as General Rikhye, Thant’s military attaché, recalls, it was Thant’s presence that often blunted the sharpness of McCloy’s belligerent approach to the discussions.¹³⁹

Castro’s refusal of UN inspections was a setback. The earlier Soviet agreement to UN inspectors had encouraged the United States to think that a missile withdrawal could be verified. Moreover, to the Soviets, UN inspectors were certainly preferable to American ones, as is evident from the enormous pressure applied on Castro by Moscow to accept UN teams on its territory.¹⁴⁰ Castro’s refusal necessitated finding another way.

Thant originated the idea of using ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) personnel to inspect Soviet ships at sea.¹⁴¹ Though it did not transpire, both superpowers initially agreed to it, which removed the immediate impasse regarding how to verify the missile pullout without UN inspectors. Another possibility considered was using observers from Central American countries.¹⁴² Thant’s efforts in this regard kept the negotiations alive by providing reassurance that verification would take place.

Verification was finally accomplished at sea by U.S. ships and planes, which came near Soviet vessels as the canvas covers over the missiles were removed to allow them to be counted.¹⁴³ These bilateral verification measures were worked out at the UN-sponsored talks, where the Soviets also shared information about their ship departures.

After extensive negotiations, on November 19, Castro finally told Thant that he would agree to the removal of the IL-28 bombers.¹⁴⁴ The next day Kennedy announced Khrushchev’s decision to remove the IL-28 bombers and ordered the quarantine lifted. In an effort to formalize the agreement between the leaders, the “UN negotiations” produced a Soviet-Cuban draft protocol and an American draft declaration on “the settlement of the Missile Crisis,” as well as several draft joint statements, but these were never finalized or signed, despite pressure from Khrushchev.¹⁴⁵ In the end, the Soviets and especially the Americans were content with informal understandings and public declarations rather than a binding document. Most importantly, war had been avoided.

U Thant was unanimously elected to an extended term as secretary-general on November 30. On January 7, 1963, he received a joint letter from Stevenson and Kuznetsov that expressed “appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.”¹⁴⁶