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UNSUNG MEDIATOR: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis

 

U Thant’s Mission to Cuba

Thant’s Cuba Talks Fruitful;
He Will Fly to Havana Today;
Blockade Halted during Trip.130
Front page headline, New York Times, October 30, 1962

Throughout the crisis, Thant had been communicating with Premier Castro. On October 26, he sent a cable urging Castro to suspend work on the missile facilities while negotiations were under way. Castro replied on October 27, stating that Cuba was prepared to accept these compromises only if the United States desisted from threats of aggression against Cuba and lifted the blockade. Castro invited Thant to visit Cuba for direct discussions, which Thant quickly accepted.131

The U.S.-Soviet understanding of October 28 angered Castro. He had not been consulted or even informed by the Soviet Union prior to the agreement. The UN inspection and verification principles adopted by the superpowers now required implementation in Cuba. Castro’s consent and cooperation were necessary but in his rage he now demanded five measures. The United States was to cease the economic blockade, all subversive activities, piratical attacks from Puerto Rico, and the violation of Cuban airspace, as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Guantanamo.132

Thant now faced a monumental challenge: how to mollify a humiliated Castro and secure his cooperation in the inspection and verification measures agreed to by the United States and the USSR. Thant’s first meeting with Castro in Havana on October 30 was discouraging. Thant made a strong plea for UN supervision of the dismantling of the missile sites, as agreed to by Khrushchev, stressing the U.S. pledge to lift the blockade and not take military action against Cuba. Castro reiterated his vitriolic accusations against the United States and refused to accept any UN supervision, dismissing it as an unacceptable invasion of sovereignty. After about two hours, the secretary general suggested that he and Castro meet alone the following day, and Castro accepted (Figure 5).

Good news awaited Thant upon returning to the villa where he was staying. The Soviet ambassador to Cuba brought the Soviet general in charge of the missile installations to explain the significant dismantling efforts under way. Thant asked the general when the missiles would be completely dismantled, and the latter replied in three days, on November 2.133 Specific details added credibility to the claims: the exact number and status of rockets, launchers and Soviet forces, and the withdrawal timetable over the next few days.134 The Soviets invited Thant to visit a missile site, but Thant declined, on Rikhye’s advice, saying that the verbal reassurances were sufficient.135

The next morning, Thant met Castro again, this time accompanied only by his interpreter. Castro was still bitter and told the secretary general that he was going to broadcast his account of the crisis. At Thant’s urging, Castro promised to delete from his speech the parts criticizing Khrushchev for agreeing to UN inspection of the missile sites. Castro would not, however, agree to allow Thant to leave behind one or two UN aides for direct liaison between the Cuban government and the secretary general. He did agree to return the body of the U.S. pilot who had been shot down on October 27.136 General Rikhye later passed the pilot’s remains to U.S. authorities.

CMC Figure 5

Figure 5: U Thant departs for Cuba, waving good-bye to well-wishers as he boards the UN-chartered Varig aircraft on October 30, 1962 (UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata).

 

Thant returned to New York with these achievements, limited but significant, especially regarding the Soviet assurances that the missile dismantling was almost complete. Former Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland later stated, “We never thought Castro would agree to inspection . . . it was important that the question be put and that it not be put by us . . . Thant was anxious to get things calmed down . . . So we got him to—he actually sent three messages, as I recall, to Castro reiterating different proposals for inspection.”137 Thant’s three messages to Castro and his earlier message to Khrushchev, all on behalf of the United States, led Cleveland to conclude, “how extremely useful to American foreign policy the UN could be if we were skillful about it.”138

 

CMC Figure 6

Figure 6: Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan confers with Secretary General Thant on the Cuban situation. Left to right in front row are: Ambassador Valerian Zorin, Vasily Kuznetsov (Soviet team leader); John McCloy (U.S. team leader); Anastas Mikoyan (visiting); U Thant; and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. In the second row, on the right is Brigadier I. J. Rikhye (UN Military Adviser) (United Nations/MH, cropped photo).

Figure 6: Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan confers with Secretary General Thant on the Cuban situation. Left to right in front row are: Ambassador Valerian Zorin, Vasily Kuznetsov (Soviet team leader); John McCloy (U.S. team leader); Anastas Mikoyan (visiting); U Thant; and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. In the second row, on the right is Brigadier I. J. Rikhye (UN Military Adviser) (United Nations/MH, cropped photo).

 

 

 

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130. New York Times, October 30, 1962, 1.

131. Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961–1971, 31.

132. Ibid., 32.

133. Ibid., 34.

134. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 73.

135. Rikhye, interview of October 15, 2006.

136. Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961–1971, 35.

137. Interview with Harlan Cleveland by James Sutterlin, Part II, April 22, 1990, 26, UN Oral History, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, United Nations, New York.

138. Ibid., 29.