

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

ATP-3.4.1.1

PROMULGATION

ATP-3.4.1.1

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

TECHNINIQUES AND PROCEDURES

AUGUST 2001

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO STANDARIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

[April 2002]

1. ATP-3.4.1.1 - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES is a NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2496.

2. ATP-3.4.1.1 is effective upon receipt.

J.H. Eriksen
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director NSA

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CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
1	The Danish Forces have the following reservations: • In paragraph 0125, it is described that only minimum use of force should be used. Experience has shown that this is not always appropriate. It is proposed that the paragraph be rephrased to “Physical use of force should only occur when demanded by the situation. It should be executed swiftly and in a controlled manner, however by employing the means necessary”. • Denmark finds that subparagraph a. should be deleted. According to the Geneva Convention, civilians are to be protected in any circumstance. The commander’s duty is to stop any atrocity against civilians without considering the present ROE.
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	The Spanish Army will perform the crowd control techniques and procedures when riot control weapons and trained units in that task are available
Abbreviations	
Terms and Definitions	
	Danmark has some reservations see enclosed paper.

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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Change Date	Date Entered	Effective Date	By Whom Entered

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FOREWORD

0001. The successful execution of peace support operations requires a clearly understood and widely accepted doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by allied, multinational or coalition forces. The primary objective of Allied Tactical Publication-3.4.1.1 (ATP-3.4.1.1) is to provide techniques and procedures for the execution of Allied Peace Support operations. Although ATP-3.4.1.1 is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, the tactics, techniques and procedures are equally applicable to operations conducted by a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations.

0002. The publication is intended for use primarily by commanders at the tactical level, but could be used at any level as a reference. As the Allied Joint Publications are still in a formative stage, and there is at present a lack of 'keystone' documents covering the functional warfare and support areas. However, when keystone publications are written such detail will be subsumed into this publication.

0003. It is not the intention that ATP-3.4.1.1 should restrict the authority of a commander. He will be expected to plan and execute operations in a manner he deems appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his mission.

0004. In this era of rapidly changing situations, a publication containing only ratified policy and doctrine would be out of date before it was published. To include policy issues that were not widely accepted or newly emerging doctrine would be equally unsatisfactory. In providing the Custodian with editorial guidance, the LANDOPERATIONS Working Group directed that while most of the content of ATP-3.4.1.1 should record agreed techniques and procedures, it could encompass some concepts which, while not yet fully agreed by all nations, were sufficiently mature to be usefully included for completeness.

a. Chapter 1 is an introduction of Peace Support Operations (PSO), including the principles, the conduct of PSO and ROE.

b. Chapter 2 to 7 covers the several techniques and procedures which were especially for Peace Support Operations.

c. A glossary of abbreviations and one of definitions has appended at the end of this publication.

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Peace Support Operations
Techniques and Procedures
ATP-3.4.1.1

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Chapter 1

Introduction to Peace Support Operations

Section I – General

0101. **Purpose**. The purpose of this Peace Support Operations (PSO) Techniques and Procedures publication is to set out the Techniques and Procedures of Peace Support Operations of NATO Land Forces. This doctrine fits within the conceptual framework for PSO endorsed by the Military Committee (MC) in MC 327.

0102. **Scope**. This publication focus's on providing guidance for commanders of major units and below of the techniques and procedures of PSO and for working with other nations and international organisations which may be necessary in the conduct of PSO.

0103. **Peace Support Operations**. The term Peace Support Operations is now widely used by many civilian agencies to describe their activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. PSOs are multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief (for definitions see Glossary of Definitions).

0104. This ATP uses the term PSO to encompass all military activities involving the provision of Alliance assets and capabilities in PSO; be they operations led by NATO or in support of the UN or OSCE.

Section II - Principles of PSO

0105. The conduct of PSO requires consideration of the following additional principles:

a. **Impartiality**. PSO must be conducted without favour or prejudice to any party determined by the mandate; this is essential to retain their trust and confidence. However, at some stage in a campaign a PSF may be accused of being partial and this may have a negative effect upon the credibility of the

force, consent and its ability to accomplish the mission. Whenever possible, such accusations should be refuted and all actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartial status of the PSF. Effective communications and transparency of operations are key to maintaining the perception of impartiality. Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality. Impartiality requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality does not. The conduct of PSO will be impartial to the parties but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

b. **Consent**. The promotion of consent and the willing and active involvement of the local people will be fundamental to achieving a lasting and self-sustaining peace in all PSO. Any military activities, which may result in a loss of consent, should therefore be balanced against this requirement. A general loss of consent by a Peace Support Force (PSF) only resourced and configured for PK may have serious consequences. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for PE should be manageable but will eventually need to be recovered if the operation is to progress towards the desired end-state.

c. **Restraint in the use of force.** Restraint should always be exercised when applying force in PS0. The appropriate and proportional level of force in relation to the aim must be used. The degree of force necessary may be defined as the measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Authoritative limits on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, Host Nation law. They will be reflected in the NAC's Initiating Directive and in approved ROE. The mere demonstration of the resolve and capability to use force may be all that is necessary.

d. **Objective/End-State.** Every military operation must be directed towards an attainable objective or end-state. In a joint and multinational PS0, involving civilian organisations and agencies, the military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the political end-state or an element of that end-state. These complex issues must be addressed in the formulation of the mandate and mission plan in order to achieve both unity of effort and purpose amongst all military and civilian organisations and agencies involved in the PS0.

e. Unity of Effort. The complexity of PS0 and the necessity for continual military interaction with a large number of International Organisations (IOs), NGOs, and PVOs will probably make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of an operation

f. Flexibility. Flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PS0 and a PSF must be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PS0 force structure. They may inevitably place limits on the extent of flexibility achievable.

g. Legitimacy. The legitimacy of the PS0 and the wider perception of that legitimacy will increase support within the international community, contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the JOA.

h. Security. Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection a command responsibility in all military operations. In its directive the PSF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. All military personnel involved in an operation must be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their tasks. Civil agencies operating within a JOA should be encouraged to make their personnel appropriately aware of the risks and dangers they may face.

i. **Credibility**. For the PSF to be effective it must be credible. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation. While the force should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties, there must be no doubt about its capability to fully carry out its responsibilities. Therefore, all national military components must be appropriately equipped, trained and prepared for the mission. The establishment and maintenance of credibility will require the military force to respond to all incidents and challenges in a professional and effective manner. All military personnel must consistently

demonstrate the highest standard of discipline, control and professional behaviour both on and off duty.

j. **Mutual Respect**. Mutual respect is clearly linked to credibility and is related to the perceived legitimacy of force activities. The military force should also acknowledge and respect the de facto position of the parties to the conflict and local laws and customs. Mutual respect will also depend upon the perceived professional approach and conduct of all members of the military force.

k. **Transparency of Operations**. The impartial status of the force, and thus the consent of the parties to the conflict and the support of the international community, would be easier to achieve and maintain if the requirements placed upon the parties and the operational intentions of the military mission were clearly communicated and understood. Failure to achieve this understanding may lead to suspicion, or be used by the parties as an excuse for non-compliance. However, the requirements of transparency may need to be balanced against those of force protection.

l. **Freedom of Military Movement**. Freedom of movement for the force is essential for the successful accomplishment of the mission. Any attempts to restrict movement should be resolutely and swiftly resolved using the most appropriate measures, including, if necessary, the use of force in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Thus, freedom of movement for PSF should be covered by the mandate.

m. **Civil-Military Co-operation and Liaison**. The multi-functional nature of PSO requires that, as far as possible, all the military and civilian agencies and organisations involved co-operate and that their activities are co-ordinated. This is the function of the staff involved with Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) duties, and is best accomplished by regular liaison and consultation.

0106. **The conduct of PSO.** PSO are designed to prevent or conclude conflict and prevent the resumption of hostilities by conciliation among the disputing parties, rather than a short-term and superficial termination of the conflict by force. Military activities in PSO therefore aim to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can more ably redress the symptoms and underlying causes of the conflict, and thus achieve a lasting settlement and self-sustaining peace. While a combat capable PE force can lower its operational profile and conduct PK, a lightly armed

force which deploys for PK only should not subsequently be given or take on PE tasks without reinforcement, the necessary training, re-deployment and a new mandate and ROE.

Section III – Operational Missions and Tasks

0107. **Observation and monitoring**. In PSO observation and monitoring may be conducted by strategic and operational maritime and air assets, including satellites, but ultimately will rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. observers on the ground. Traditionally, individual observer teams have acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the Security Council and other mandating organisations and their presence has often been sufficient to deter breaches of cease-fires and peace agreements. Their up-to-date reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by partisan interests at Security Council decisions. Observers may be deployed individually or in small multinational joint teams to observe, monitor, verify, and report and, where possible, to use confidence building measures to defuse situations of potential conflict. Specific tasks may be to provide early warning to trigger political initiatives, to observe a withdrawal or to monitor the movement of refugees and other displaced persons. Subsidiary tasks could be to provide liaison, investigation and negotiation, although unarmed observers would normally take no executive action with regard to violations. Observers are generally unarmed and have traditionally relied on their impartial status for protection and personal security.

0108. **Supervision of Truces and Cease-fires**. Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to the parties as part of a truce, cease-fire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty

0109. **Interposition operations**. A PSO force can deploy as an inter-positional force as a form of trip-wire either when consent exists or when consent is fragile, if supported by a credible external deterrent power or stand-off force. Troops deployed in interposition operations are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict.

0110. **Transition Assistance**. Transition assistance refers to all forms of military assistance to a civil authority or community rendered as a part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return or transition to peace and stability. In the aftermath of an intra-state conflict, and in the absence of effective government, transition assistance may initially take the form of direct help to civil

communities, before efforts can be made to rebuild a more effective government infrastructure. Transition assistance operations are generally a post conflict activity, however, their change of success will be enhanced if reconstruction and peace building efforts are conducted as a subsidiary line of operation throughout the duration of the PSO.

0111. **Demobilisation and Disarmament**. Demobilisation and disarmament operations will be generally only one phase of a wider and longer-term transition operation involving many civil and military agencies. Because the rehabilitation and integration of the warring parties in society is essential for success. There is, however, little chance of conducting a demobilisation and disarmament operation until peace has been restored. Without a rudimentary security framework there is little or no change of forces agreeing to disarm or to demobilise.

0112. **Establishing and Managing a Cease-fire**. Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp.

0113. **Humanitarian Relief**. Humanitarian relief is conducted to alleviate human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate support to the population. Humanitarian relief may be conducted in the context of a PSO, or as an independent task, and may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. Such operations may be in response to earthquake, flood, famine, and radioactive, biological or chemical contamination. They may also be a consequence of war or the flight from political, religious or ethnic persecution. The three principal categories of humanitarian relief are:

a. **Disaster Relief**. Disaster relief operations will generally be conducted unilaterally, however, they may occur within the framework of a PSO. Should the scope of a disaster exceed a nation's own capabilities, it may request international assistance. In such cases NATO nations will probably respond on a national basis, however, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) of NATO exists, among other things, to assist co-ordinate these efforts if called upon to do so.

b. **Assistance for Refugees or displaced persons.** Assistance to both refugees and displaced persons is oriented towards providing vital services to those

temporarily displaced from their homes. Military forces can assist these activities, but the principal responsibility for refugees and displaced persons rests with the Host Nation and specialised agencies such as the UNHCR.

c. **Humanitarian Assistance**. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialised civilian, national, international, government or non-government organisations and agencies. In dire emergency, NATO assets can take responsibility for specific humanitarian functions, however, more normally they will be used to support the overall relief efforts of the civilian organisations and agencies. Such assistance might include some of the same units as a transition assistance mission, with specific capabilities, such as medical and engineer support, reinforced to meet particular needs. Depending on the mandate, this support could include planning assistance, the protection of the aid agencies, as well as the creation and maintenance of aid routes. In extreme circumstances the PSF may have to take on direct responsibility for the delivery of aid in order to maintain the flow.

0114. **Explosive Ordnance Clearance**. Explosive ordnance, especially mines, pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and animals during and after the termination of a conflict. Although unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones the responsibility are of the party that laid them, the PSO force can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. They can also be deployed to train local forces to do the same. Monitoring of mine clearance by the local army, registration of the minefields, to install a military Mine Action Centre (MAC).

0115. **Restoration of Law and Order Operations**. Operations designed to restore or to maintain the peace will generally be necessary in the circumstances of chaos associated with a conflict and when there are no coherent parties, or the parties are ill disciplined and indistinguishable from the criminal elements of the local society.

0116. **Protection of Humanitarian Operations and Human Rights**. The foremost task for the military force may be to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely and human rights abuses are curtailed. But it may include Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs), but will normally apply to the protection of convoys, depots, equipment and those workers responsible for their operation.

0117. **Conflict Containment**. Conflict containment operations are designed to intervene into areas of actual or potential conflict and to use or to threaten force in order to prevent any further hostile acts and enforce a cessation of hostilities.

0118. **Forcible Separation of Belligerents**. Should political pressures fail to achieve separation and forcible military separation is the only option, the achievement of the mission may require the exercise of a large degree of force. In an intra-state conflict, the forcible separation of parties who are determined to continue fighting may require the deployment of overwhelming force.

0119. **Establishment of Protected or Safe Areas**. Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any PSO designed to protect or make an area safe is to demilitarise that area and this in itself may require enforcement actions.

0120. **Guarantee and Denial of Movement Operations**. These operations guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea and thus are joint and generally conducted at the operational level. Operations which guarantee or deny movement will not be credible if they rely for success on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Such operations will therefore need to be conducted by a PE force capable of escalation. Examples might include the enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone or no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population, or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees.

0121. **Enforcement of Sanctions**. The enforcement of sanctions may be synonymous with operations designed to deny movement. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Operations to enforce sanctions will be joint and conducted at the operational level. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a specific party or impartially over a wider area embracing all parties. Partial operations can compromise any subsequent PSO.

Section IV Rules of Engagement

0122. **General.** It is vital for a commander to know what law applies in a given set of circumstances and what it is that triggers any changes in the law to be applied. The

answer to this type of question relates directly to the sort of Rules of Engagement (ROE). In a PSO situation the ROE would have direct links with the States of Forces Agreement (SOFA) if one exists.

0123. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled; ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. In passing orders to subordinates a commander at any level must always act within the ROE received but is not bound to use the full extent of the permission granted.

0124. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. For certain countries ROE are orders not guidance. When they are issued as prohibitions, they will be orders to commanders not to take certain designated actions. When they are issued as permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain designated actions may be taken if the commanders judge them necessary to desirable in order to carry out their assigned tasks. The ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of freedom permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. The conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander's responsibility to use only that degree of force, which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

0125. **Practical issues surrounding ROE.** As a minimum, the ROE will always permit the use of lethal force in self defence, provided the amount of force used is no more than that required to achieve the aim of self defence. Beyond this, a commander should be aware of the following issues which may be raised:

a. Do the ROE extend to the use of force in any circumstance when life is endangered, thus enabling civilians to be protected?

b. Where the situation mentioned above does not apply, are there persons, such as members of humanitarian organisations or an international police force, who are accorded protection and so if threatened, can the use of lethal force be justified? It must be made quite clear who holds responsibility to nominate such individuals, who they are and where they operate.

c. Can lethal force be used to prevent escape after life has been threatened?

d. What are the criteria governing the use of lethal force in the event of the theft of property or equipment?

0126. Physical use of force should only occur when demanded by the situation. It should happen swiftly and in a controlled manner, however by employing the means necessary.

0127. There are occasions when troops in a multinational force will be applying different (national or UN) ROE during incidents and in the course of their duties. Commanders should be aware of the potential difficulties that could occur.

0128. **Use of weapons not associated with self-defence**. Control of the use of weapons not associated with self-defence, such as artillery, fire from the main armament of an armoured vehicle and crew served weapons such as mortars is always retained at the highest appropriate level. Delegation for the use of such weapons can be given but subordinate commanders should be familiar with the means by which their release would be secured. This equally applies to the firing- of illuminants and the use of all types of riot control weapons.

0129. **Training**. All troops should be familiar and conversant with the ROE that apply to them and should have briefings and instruction to complement this knowledge.

Chapter 2

Operating Techniques and Procedures

Section I - Introduction

0201. For a lightly armed PK force the techniques which it can employ will be limited by the need to keep consent for the operation. However, many techniques are common to all of the different PSO missions, but require different emphasis. For example, just as the use of combat techniques may be required in PK, but limited to self-defence, so techniques designed to promote co-operation and consent will be required to achieve a long-term settlement in PE.

0202. A thorough knowledge of the techniques available allows commanders the flexibility to select the most appropriate approach in order to gain and maintain the initiative, especially when the use of force is not available, appropriate, or is restricted. Depending on force capability and profile, the key to success will lie in the selection and application of techniques designed either to promote co-operation and consent by persuasion and influence (PK) or a combination of consent promoting techniques and those designed to control, compel and coerce by enforcement (PE).

0203. **Categorisation of Techniques**. There are overarching operating techniques supported by consent and co-operation promoting techniques (see chapter 3) and control techniques (see chapter 4). Consent promoting techniques address attitudes and perceptions directly and are of critical importance in PK, and contribute to long-term success in all PSO. The employment of control techniques, however, will generally be beyond the capability of a PK force and, therefore, only options for a PE force.

Section II – Liaison, Communication and Information Systems

0204. **General.** Liaison in PSO is vital and there is a much greater need for emphasis on co-ordination at all levels. This will require additional manpower. The nature of such operations is that they tend to be:

a. **Multinational**. A military force will normally be both multi-national and multilingual. They will also tend to include contingents from nations outside NATO.

b. **Joint**. Operations will often be conducted by joint forces involving maritime, ground and air contingents of any of the nations involved.

c. Conducted in a theatre where no formal military structure of co-operation exists.

d. Conducted through a framework of Areas of Responsibility (AORs)

0205. **Liaison with Friendly Military Forces**. The requirement for liaison with friendly forces will be considerable. It will normally take one of the following forms:

a. **Cross Boundary Liaison**. Where units are conducting operations outside a framework of established AOs liaison with friendly forces will continue to be of the type conducted in a general war setting. However, most units as such conducting operations will normally be allocated an AO. As such there will be a need for considerable cross boundary liaison with neighbouring units. This liaison will aim to:

(1) Transparency of intentions and conduct.

(2) Ensure deconfliction of patrols and other operations .

(3) Encourage cross boundary support and medical assistance, particularly where a remote site in one area is adjacent to a friendly location across the unit boundary. In such cases movement of CASEVAC will often be more effective via the bordering unit.

(4) Assist commonality of force posture and military activity. A military force has to have the ability to be effective and consistent in all areas of operations.

(5) Ensure that cross boundary operations such as escorts or convoys can be conducted effectively.

b. **Liaison Across the Chain of Command**. The multinational and multilingual nature of a military force will often give chain of command liaison a greater significance than in a general war setting. This is particularly so if a military contingent is not familiar with generic operating procedures used by the lead military force such as NATO. Chain of Command liaison will also assist with two liaison difficulties:

(1) **Language Barriers**. In the case where a contingent speaks a language not used by a superior HQ, then the benefit to a commander who can brief or be briefed by an LO in person, who then relays orders to the unit in its own language, will be considerable.

(2) **Passage of Information**. Communication over the long distances will be a challenge. Radio and satellite communications will often be unworkable and long distance travel over poor routes will take time. An LO will often, therefore, be required at a superior HQ to brief, assist with planning or just to relay likely future intentions.

c. **Liaison with the Civil Authorities**. It is also essential, where appropriate, to effect good liaison with the Civil Authorities such as the local police, coastguards, air traffic controllers and any fire services and hospitals in the theatre of operations.

0206. **Liaison with International Organisations.** Military forces will rarely operate alone within a theatre of operations. They will usually find themselves working alongside numerous international organisations, many of whom will have been working there for a longer period and all will normally be working to their own independent agenda. In addition, a military force wills often work in conjunction with organisations established, for example, to monitor the police which may not be part of the same chain of command but working under the same mandate. Rather than work in isolation, the military force will normally benefit considerably from co-ordinating its activities with those organisations involved, and will often become the lead for all such co-ordination. A military force will also have to identify any commitment it has under its mandate for the security of any international organisations. Liaison with international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World Health

Organisation (WHO), UN Civpol etc., will generally allow a military commander to advise on:

a. **Security**. A military commander will often be responsible for the security situation - the provision of a secure environment - and any threat of evacuation if the security situation breaks down. This may require daily briefings on security given to international organisations and other contingency plans for evacuation or a break down in security. It will be necessary to establish whether responsibility for personnel from international organisations falls to the military force and where necessary to advise on mine threats, areas of conflict, cease-fires and other related activity.

b. **Shared Initiatives**. Operations will often involve contributions from international organisations. For example, an attempt to return refugees to their previous homes may well require the military force to ensure the situation is secure, the UNHCR to oversee the refugees, an organisation to oversee the civil police and a number of organisations to assist with the rebuild of the destroyed houses. Such operations will require a shared aim, with co-ordinated planning and negotiations to ensure success.

0207. **Liaison with Warring Factions.** All levels of command within the military force should normally attempt liaison with Warring Factions (WFs) host nations or other entities. Depending on the military structure, there may well be a Div LO, Bde LO, unit LO, G9 LO and UNMOs. All will attempt to meet and provide liaison with key civil, military and police commanders. A liaison plan has to be adopted to ensure deconfliction of responsibilities between different LOs and to ensure the timely and accurate passage of information up the chain of command. In particular, responsibilities for liaison with specific WF commands/levels of command have to be established. For example, a unit LO may provide liaison with WF Bdes; a Bde LO may have liaison with WF Div HQs and the Div LO liaison with WF Corps HQs. Foot patrols, if deployed, can be used for liaison with the civilian population and any local warring factions. Once confidence has improved liaison between individual staff branches can be established.

0208. Where such a framework is not established, then there is potential for different LOs to have meetings with the same WF commander several times in a short space of time: it is probably not necessary. In this case a Div LO wanting to verify information at a

lower level, and in person, should get the unit LO (or whoever normally deals at that level,) to arrange the meeting, accompany the Div LO and introduce him to the WF commander, thus retaining continuity. Generally liaison tasks with WFs are as follows:

a. **Negotiations**. The need to negotiate will depend on the mandate, the force structure and its level of dependency on host nation support or on WF goodwill.

b. **Cease Fire Violations**. The basing of LOs at WF HQ will assist in the resolution of any cease fire violations. Not only will it allow a rapid assessment of which party is the aggressor, but it will assist the military commander in preventing an escalation of the violation, or reprisals. Co-ordinated and timely negotiations can be conducted concurrently with opposing military commanders to bring about - a return to stability or a cease-fire.

c. **Protests/Briefs**. The requirement for briefings to host nations/WF of future operations and the requirement to protest breaches of any cease-fire or peace agreement will depend entirely on the nature of the mandate.

0209. **Communication and Information Systems (CIS).** A Communication and Information System (CIS) will need to be established using existing equipment commensurate with the mission and command and control requirements. Without such a system the effective use of communication will be diminished. CIS planning requires detailed assessment of the requirements, equipment and practices of the joint force, national contingents, civil agencies parties to the conflict and other legitimate but non-involved users of the electromagnetic spectrum. As such, issues of compatibility, inter-operability and connectivity will be significant concerns, as will the wider problem of frequency management. The establishment of an effective CIS will involve not just technical means but also the use of supporting communication infrastructures and means, such as an effective liaison system or at the political level possibly an exchange of ambassadors.

0210. **Communications**. The level and security of communications available to the liaison parties have to be considered. In delicate and urgent situations the LO may require guaranteed, secure communications with which to relay sensitive information or seek immediate direction or advice. On other occasions communications may be

deliberately absent to allow a suitable time delay, if required, while difficult situations are ‘relayed’ to headquarters.

Section III - Supervision and the Enforcement of the Mandate

0211. **Scope**. Supervision and enforcement of the conditions of the mandate will occur throughout all phases of PSO. Many of the PSO tasks and techniques could be described as being supervisors in nature, but, when appropriate, combat techniques may be required to contain and control any opposition and enforce compliance. Whenever possible, detailed supervisors tasks should be conducted by civilian police with the support of PSO forces. Subsequently, it may also be possible to delegate certain supervisors tasks to the former parties to the conflict. If linked to appropriate rewards and penalties, such offers could encourage their co-operation. Delegating supervisors tasks in this way is venturesome and requires tight control. However, if acceptable, it could contribute significantly towards the conciliation of the parties concerned.

0212. **Enforcement and Investigation**. The detailed investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive activity with political overtones and generally better left to specialist teams of investigators working directly to the authorising political body. However, military forces have a moral and legal responsibility to prevent violations and, when they have occurred, to ensure that all details and evidence are accurately and systematically collected, recorded and reported for subsequent investigations. Military involvement in such investigations should be precisely defined in the military mission and closely co-ordinated within the mission plan with human rights agencies and officers. Violations of the mandate and breaches of international humanitarian law should be the subject of a formal protest as well as a formal investigation.

0213. **Protest Procedure**. A protest is a formal notification of an act by one of the parties to a dispute, or by the PSF, which the originator considers to be a violation of the ‘status quo’ or international law. A protest indicates an elleged violation has been observed and that action to redress the grievance or an explanation is required as soon as possible. Protests may be communicated verbally but have to be confirmed in writing. While the full details of the protest will be sent to the offending party, the other parties, if formal parties exist, will normally only be told that a protest has been made without further elaboration. This procedure is to reassure all parties that the PSF will not, in the first instance, betray confidences. However, if the violation is not redressed the PSF may pass details to the other parties. All protests have to be recorded in accordance with the PSF standing orders.

0214. **Enforcement and the Investigation of Violations**. Every breach of the mandate, international humanitarian law or peace agreement which is witnessed by a PSF, should be dealt with immediately in accordance with its mandate and mission statement. A failure by a PSF to prevent violations will undermine its credibility and the effectiveness of the mission. Enforcement may require the arrest and disarmament of violators and their detainment until they can be handed over to an appropriate civil legal authority. ROE should be designed for such contingencies and to make legal provision for the PSF to use all necessary measures to enforce compliance. Such actions, which must be catered for in detail in the mission plan, may also require the deployments of reserves and reaction forces. Not all violations will be dealt with as official complaints. Those, which are minor in nature, can often be dealt with at an appropriate level, however, they should still be reported and recorded. Speed of reaction is also essential to secure evidence before it can be removed and to question witnesses before interested parties coach them to adopt a particular line. The procedure for enforcement interventions, investigations and reporting will be detailed in the appropriate standing orders in accordance with the mandate.

Section IV - Control Measures

0215. Close control may be exercised directly by physical measures or indirectly, by deep perception management techniques. Close physical control can be exercised by the routine presence of military units and troops, and the use of specific techniques and operations such as cordon and search operations, or other combat operations.

0216. **Sectors**. Control can be more effectively co-ordinated and executed if military sector boundaries are harmonised with in-place aid agency structures and deployments, political and civil authority boundaries and the locations and deployments of belligerent forces. When possible, headquarters and troop locations should be positioned within sectors to demonstrate the impartial and even handed approach being taken by a PSF.

0217. Control measures may take several forms such as **Restricted Air and Maritime Zones, Guards and Checkpoints**. Military operations will usually require control to be established either to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas. This may be achieved by the use of guards and guard ships, air exclusion zones (for the restriction of war supplies, for example) and checkpoints, including Vehicle Check Points (VCPs) to monitor the movement of displaced persons or refugees. Duties, procedures and the required tactics will depend on the authority of the mandate, any Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), ROE and the PSF Standing Operational Procedures. ROE must clearly define the orders for opening fire. At the tactical level, guards and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the contingent and local populace. It is therefore important that servicemen carrying out such duties should be aware of local customs, particularly in dealing with women. Restricted areas may include the following:

(1) Air and Maritime Zones.

(2) Significant or sensitive terrain (such as Cease-fire Lines, Zones of Separation and Control Zones)

(3) Installations.

(4) Built-up Areas.

(5) Stocks of war supplies.

0218. **Powers of Search and Arrest**. The delegated powers of the PSF to search and arrest civilians will depend on the mandate, ROE and SOFA. The conduct of searches and arrests, especially of war criminals, is covered in detail in Supervision Activities. Control may also need to be exerted over the passage of war supplies and preventative action needed to combat criminal activities and the smuggling of contraband items such as drugs. This may all be indistinguishable from more politically motivated violations. In the early stages of a demobilisation operation, forces may be empowered to board shipping, confiscate items and arrest offenders. In any military assistance programme civilians or faction members suspected of illegal activity should usually be handed over to the civil authorities. Checks on the personnel and vehicles of the PSF may also be used to demonstrate that the force itself is observing the law and to deter or detect any criminal activity among its own members.

0219. **Crowd Control**. In circumstances of widespread civil disobedience, the responsibility for the restoration of order and crowd control should, in the first instance, rest with the local civil authorities and CIVPOL. Should the situation deteriorate to such a degree that a PSF be tasked with providing assistance, such a task will require a PE force. The conduct of other techniques such as patrolling, cordon and search and other tactical measures designed to control the activities of populations in designated areas will also require a carefully balanced and resourced military force.

0220. **Weapon Control Measures**. Weapon control measures may be agreed to, or enforced by, a PSF. Such activities may include: exclusion from, or restriction within, a specific area; confiscation and destruction; weapon buy-back or receipt and control of all weapons or certain weapon types, generally heavy weapons. Control of weapons may be restricted to ensuring that those weapons are only used in self-defence.

0221. **Incident Control**. At the tactical level, where many hostile incidents are a reaction to a situation elsewhere, an understanding of the operational framework will guide which techniques may be most appropriate and where, within that framework, they can be applied most effectively. Faced with a situation of actual or threatened violence, service personnel and military forces should, at the outset, be capable of defending themselves, either by evasive manoeuvre, or fire**,** or a combination of both. Having reduced the threat to a manageable level, the resolution of an incident will generally follow a particular sequence of steps.

a. **Step 1**. Attempts should be made to identify the cause of the problem and to establish accountability for any hostile actions. However, the belligerents

involved and the weapons used, especially in the case of indirect fire**,** may not provide sufficient evidence to show at what level the incident was initiated and therefore at what level it should be resolved.

b. **Step 2**. The next step will usually require negotiations with the belligerents at the site of the incident in order to contain and defuse the situation. Typically in PSO, violent incidents cannot be resolved, but only controlled, at the level they are initiated.

c. **Step 3**. If an immediate local accountability for actions cannot be established or local negotiations fail to resolve the situation, but the belligerent forces have a coherent command and control infrastructure the answer may lie in raising negotiations higher in the belligerent party's chain of command. If the belligerent forces do not have a coherent system of command and control, a more robust response on the ground may be necessary from the outset.

d. **Step 4**. The resolution of the situation will often be beyond the immediate capability of the servicemen or forces involved in the incident and require the application of other techniques elsewhere and at a more senior level. If negotiations have failed, the key to resolution may lie in a combination of coercive measures of increasing intensity, and more substantive negotiations higher in the chain of command. Escalation may involve the use of threats, demonstrations, or the actual use of direct or indirect fire and longer range precision fire, should this be available.

0222. The resolution of every incident, at whatever level, should be viewed and judged within the wider context of the operation. Hence the significance of mission analysis, and the requirement for commanders to possess both lateral vision and an understanding of the long-term consequences of their actions.

Chapter 3

Consent and Co-operation Promoting Techniques and Procedures

Section I - Working with the media

0301. **General**. The journalist in an operational area has a tough, highly competitive and sometimes dangerous job. His primary purpose is to get a better story than his competitors and to get it in time for the earliest publication. The basic principles to be applied in dealing with the media are:

a. **Freedom of the media.** No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist's freedom to operate. It is in the interests of law and order that the press should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians.

b. **Rights of the media.** A journalist, like any civilian, has the right to speak to anyone, visit anywhere and photograph anything he wishes, provided this does not conflict with the law, does not involve any entry into prohibited areas and does not impair operations or endanger life.

c. **Access of the media to military personnel.** Any entry into army premises and any contact with army personnel should be in accordance with the prevailing instructions issued by the appropriate formation HQ.

d. **Accreditation**. Media representatives should normally be accredited in order to gain eligibility for official Media Ops support. The accreditation should require the representatives to abide by a clear set of rules that protect the operational security of the PSF. If the rules are violated, consideration should be given to excluding those representatives from access to further official public information services.

e. **Transparency**. Open and independent reporting is the norm. In most situations, unrestricted access should be allowed to accredited media representatives. Warnings of dangers specific to certain areas should be given but without precluding media access. Threats to personal security are an occupational hazard for media representatives. They are ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.

f. **Liaison**. Given the potential for political repercussions, commanders should be kept informed of all significant developments of potential media interest. Media Ops staff should be available for detachment to incidents at short notice when this is necessary.

g. **Quality of Service**. Media Ops support should be prompt, accurate, balanced and consistent. High quality officers with a proper understanding of the operation and the military capabilities involved should assist media personnel where necessary.

0302. In practice this means that members of the media may conduct their business subject to the following:

a. They have no right to enter military property without the permission of the officer responsible for that property.

b. The final decision as to whether or not to give an interview rests with the Media Ops staff. The journalist should be reminded politely that he should contact the Unit Press Officer or the appropriate Media Ops staff before conducting an interview.

c. Journalists may not photograph personnel, equipment or property within military premises without permission. If there is a security reason why the security forces do not wish a photograph to be published, e.g. an EOD team at work, this should be clearly explained to the photographer, together with the consequences of non-compliance.

d. If the commander on the spot believes that members of the media are prejudicing security he should deal with the matter by persuasion, admonition, or, as a last resort and only if a criminal offence is suspected, the police should be called to assist.

e. It is possible that a reporter may deliberately wish to expose himself to danger against the advice of the security forces. If he does not yield to persuasion, he should be clearly warned, in front of witnesses, of the possible consequences of h is actions and told that he must accept total responsibility for them.

f. The media may ask for priority at a checkpoint. They have no right to this but their livelihood depends upon deadlines and news is highly perishable. The local commander should where possible grant this priority having satisfied him that the request is bona fide and the operational situation permits.

0303. **Information for the Media**. All operational information for the media is to be given by the Media Ops staff or by those authorised to do so when accompanied by a member of the Media Ops staff.

0304. Commanders, or those authorised by them, may communicate directly with the media when the information given is strictly factual, where it relates solely to the commander's particular unit, and when it touches no ground which is politically controversial or operationally sensitive.

0305. Media Ops staff approval is required before any member of the forces agrees to give a statement or interview for TV or radio. Before considering any request the staff must know who will do the interview, which programme it is for, and the agreed scope and line of questioning of the statement or interview. Whenever possible the best spokesman, irrespective of rank, should be used, particularly if he can speak with first-hand knowledge of the subject in question. The Chief Media Ops officer or his representative should be present during any interview with the media.

0306. **Identification of the Media**. Any person claiming to be a member of the media should produce a press card of which there are many versions. Unless the military are satisfied that a journalist is bona fide, facilities should not be granted. In certain particular circumstances members of the media may be accredited to the security forces and have authenticated credentials.

Section II - Civil-Military Co-operation

0307. **General**. NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) policy is to be found in MC 411. Historically, this interface between military and civilian organisations has always existed, but in PSO it has become a central feature. CIMIC activities are carried out with a view to timely transition of those functions to the appropriate civilian organisations or authorities. CIMIC is also designed to enhance the credibility of the PSO force, to promote co-operation and consent for the operation and to persuade the parties to the conflict and the uncommitted members of the Host Nation that their best interests lie in peace. The immediate aim is to fully co-ordinate civilian and military activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition. The longer-term aim of generating sufficient stability and self-dependency is directly linked to the desired end state and exit strategy. This activity should reduce overall dependency on external aid. Civil-military considerations should play a significant role in a commander's estimate and planning process, both to identify tasks and operational constraints.

0308. At the tactical level the timely and effective harmonisation and co-ordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies is essential for success. Ultimately, co-ordination can only be achieved by consultation as these agencies have permanent mandates and agendas that may compete with each other and be different to those of the military force.

0309. **Civil-Military Tasks**. Civil Military Tasks designed to support the civil development programme provide the linkage between security, stability and peace building and, as a PSO develops towards the end-state, the emphasis will switch from relief to re-construction and civil development. Within the guidelines and priorities established within the overall aid programme, projects in support of the local community may be conducted independently by the military, but more usually in conjunction with and in support of civilian agencies, utilising local farms and facilities. Civil-military projects may cover a wide range of activities within local communities and, as such, should be controlled when possible by local authorities.

0310. **Limited Tasking.** Other potential tasks that could attract some form of limited CIMIC planning, depending on the circumstances, are as follows:

a. Civil Administration - particularly where none appears to exist.

b. Education.

c. Agriculture and food resources.

d. Control of Property.

e. Public Works and Utilities. Usually covered by work done in the Community Relations field.

f. Cultural Affairs. Usually associated with the protection of works of art, monuments and museums.

0311. Measures to be considered which could achieve the best results:

a. Establish a CIMIC-meeting centre for the local population, civilian agencies, NGOs and the military. Here they can work on the objectives to reach and by which means.

b. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the participating organisations which clarify the responsibilities and the objectives of the organisations.

c. Central consultation and tuning.

d. Co-location of staff-elements.

e. The exchange of liaisons and communication equipment.

Section III - Civil Affairs

0312. **Civil Representative**. The role of a Civil Affairs Representative is to provide, in any way possible, and within his capability, such assistance as a military commander requires in his dealings with the civil authorities and the civil community. This could include:

a. Ascertaining community attitudes in general and to specific events.

b. Establishing good working relationships with leading personalities and community leaders so as to be able to advise the Army on the likely effects of certain policies and/or operations.

0313. Relationships thus established could assist in solving or improving those problems which do arise and which could be prejudicial to communal stability.

0314. The Civil Affairs Representative would report and assess claims for damage arising from searches or operations carried out by the military forces. This includes:

a. Damage caused to houses.

b. Damage to fences and hedges.

c. Damage to crops and animals.

d. Damage caused by helicopters.

e. Damage caused by military vehicles.

f. Assisting the public with problems arising from civil disorders.

g. Providing assistance and advice to persons affected by explosive devices.

h. Monitor first aid repair scheme following insurgent explosions.

i. Refer matters raised by the military forces or police to the appropriate authorities and agencies and ensure that answers are received and passed on with the minimum of delay.

j. Investigate complaints of a non-criminal nature directed against the military forces.

0315. **Direct Tasking**. The following list outlines some of the potential tasks that can be considered for CIMIC planning purposes:

a. **Civil Defence Measures**.

(1) Ensure that an adequate civil defence structure exists.

(2) Advise, assist, or supervise local civil defence officials.

(3) Assess civil defence planning for emergency welfare services and emergency food, water, sanitation, and medical supplies.

(4) Co-ordinate civil defence activities of fire, police, and rescue services with those of the armed forces.

(5) Co-ordinate explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities in the civilian sector.

(6) Identify civilian evacuation routes and assess their adequacy.

(7) Possible plans in case of incidents involving toxic industrial hazards or insurgent inspired chemical attacks.

b. **Civil Labour**.

(1) Co-ordinate requirements for local labour support for military forces.

(2) Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of civilian labour, where appropriate.

(3) Direct local government agencies in planning, establishing, and administering labour programmes.

c. **Public Health**.

(1) Estimate needs for additional medical support required by the civilian sector.

(2) Co-ordinate acquisition of medical support from voluntary agencies or from military sources.

(3) Co-ordinate the use of civilian medical facilities and those applied from military resources.

(4) Aid in the prevention, control, and treatment of endemic and epidemic diseases of the civilian populace.

(5) Survey and provide assistance with civilian health care (medical personnel, facilities, training programmes and veterinary services) and provide guidance for provision of emergency services by Service personnel.

(6) Analyse, supervise, and/or direct civilian public health and sanitation services, personnel, organisations, and facilities.

d. **Public Safety**.

(1) Co-ordinate public safety activities for the military forces.

(2) Provide liaison between the military forces and public safety agencies.

(3) Advise, assist, or supervise local police, fire fighting, rescue agencies, and penal institutions.

(4) Supervise the enforcement of laws after the population has been duly informed.

(5) Take into custody all arms, ammunition, implements of war, and contraband items.

e. **Welfare**.

(1) Determine the type and amount of welfare supplies needed for emergency relief.

(2) Plan and co-ordinate for the use of welfare supplies from all sources.

(3) Advise and assist the state authorities.

(4) Establish and supervise emergency centres for distributing supplies and for housing and feeding civilians.

f. **Supply Resources for the Civil Population**

(1) Determine the availability of local supplies for civil and military use.

(2) Co-ordinate military needs for local resources and co-ordinate their acquisition.

(3) Determine the needs of the populace for emergency supplies and arrange for distribution in accordance with policy.

(4) Co-ordinate the movement of essential civilian supplies.

(5) Plan and supervise any rationing programmes.

(6) Arrange salvage of captured supplies that can be used by the civilian population.

(7) Advise and assist allied governments in the above tasks, when appropriate.

(8) Direct government and commercial supply activities.

g. **Commerce**.

(1) Determine the availability of local resources for military and civilian use.

(2) Direct support needed to keep key industries operating.

(3) Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.

h. **Communications**.

(1) Manage communication resources, both government and private, to include postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, and public warning systems.

(2) Co-ordinate the use of government and private communication resources for Service uses.

(3) Provide technical advice and assistance on communication systems.

(4) Recommend the allocation of civilian communication resources for civilian and military use.

i. **Transportation**.

(1) Identify the modes and capabilities of transportation systems available in the theatre of operations.

(2) Co-ordinate the use of locally available assets, to include railroads, highways, ports, airfields and airspace, and vehicles to support military operations.

(3) Prepare plans for the use of available civilian and military transportation assets for emergency civilian evacuation from the theatre of operations or transportation of relief supplies.

(4) Provide advice and assistance in establishing and operating transportation facilities.

(5) Direct civilian transport agencies and functions, where appropriate.

j. **Information Services**.

(1) Advise and assist civil information agencies.

(2) Operate some form of civil information service if none exists.

(3) Disseminate government proclamations, ordinances, and notices.

k. **Refugees/ Displaced Persons**.

(1) Estimate the number of refugees, their points of origin, and their anticipated direction of movement.

(2) Plan movement control measures, emergency care, and evacuation of refugees. Co-ordinate with military forces for transportation, military police support military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical activities, as needed.

(3) Advise on or establish and supervise the operation of temporary or semi-permanent camps for refugees.

(4) Resettle or return refugees to their homes in accordance with government policy and objectives.

(5) Advise and assist the host country and other agencies on camps and relief measures for refugees.

(6) Supervise the conduct of movement plans for refugees.

Section IV - Negotiation and Mediation

0316. **Introduction.** Negotiations take place when two or more parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences. When a neutral party assists by acting between the opposed parties in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. In practice, most mediation takes the form of negotiations between a mediator and one of the parties at a time, trying to find common ground. This Serial describes the characteristics of these activities and the techniques needed for success in negotiations of theatre level and mediation at lower levers.

0317. The parties in a complex emergency will want to discuss these questions with anyone representing the different elements of the international community. It is essential for those working to resolve the conflict to understand the scope of the negotiations that may be taking place and how their functions relate to wider efforts to achieve a negotiated solution. The aim of negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have concurred and which will help to contain, de-escalate and resolve the conflict.

0318. **The Wider Context**. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted independently but more normally as an adjunct to other conflict resolution activities. It is a skill required at all stages of a PSO and will need to be exercised at every level. Consequently, all service personnel could be involved, from senior commanders meeting with faction leaders, to individual soldiers at isolated observation points who may find themselves trying to control an incident or arbitrating in a local dispute. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process or as an immediate response to a life-threatening incident. In these cases, it is important to remember that the commander of the PSF involved at the incident is often perceived as part of the problem. He should, therefore, set the scene in order that his senior commander and, should one exist, the senior commander of the belligerent party, can solve the problem. When there is no chain of command, identifying other people of influence, such as the local mayor or religious leader, could be crucial in resolving the problem. Identifying and addressing the source of the incident and the most appropriate level of authority to deal with it lies at the heart of preventing further incidents.

Negotiating Issues

0319. **General Points**. Within each type of negotiation in the context of PSO, there are three broad areas that may be the subject of negotiations. Although these tend to follow the division of responsibility adopted by elements of an international response group, these divisions may not be recognised by the parties to the conflict.

a. **Political Issues**. The immediate priority may be to achieve a cease-fire, but the most important negotiations will be aimed at achieving an overall political agreement between the parties. Successful political negotiations provide the framework and direction within which humanitarian and military activities take place. As international agencies (military units, humanitarian agencies, or NGOs) arrive in the conflict area, they will have to negotiate with the parties for access to their territory and for accommodation and support. However, it may prove difficult or impossible to reach formal agreement if government has broken down or in territory where the de facto government is not recognised by the international community.

b. **Humanitarian Issues**. Representatives of humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate for access to assess humanitarian needs with a host government or with local military or police units. Having made a ‘needs assessment’, the humanitarian agency may need to agree with the host government or the local commanders on the assessment and methods of supply and distribution. The humanitarian agency will negotiate with donors to provide the types and quantities of relief that are required. Once the humanitarian agency has the supplies, it may have to negotiate with the parties on a case-by-case basis for access to supply relief to the target population. No matter what agreement may have been reached beforehand, actual distribution can take a great deal of negotiation as convoys can be halted locally on the whim of a local militia commander.

c. **Military Issues**. Although the decision to become involved may be political, military commanders may have to negotiate the terms on which they will deploy in support of political or humanitarian agreements. It is important for the military commander to ensure that he is not committed to an operation that is militarily untenable. Military representatives may be involved in negotiating cease-fires that can take three stages. First getting the parties to

reach an internal political agreement that they want a cease-fire. Second achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the cease-fire, and third negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground. Having deployed, military units will negotiate with the parties for freedom of movement to monitor and enforce political or military agreements, such as cease-fires or demilitarisation. Agreements made at a higher level may need to be renegotiated on a case-by-case activity or establish observation posts; to cross confrontation lines in order to hold meetings or resupply units; or to monitor troop deployments once a separation of forces from a confrontation line has been agreed, following a cease-fire or demilitarisation of a zone. Military units deployed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance will have to negotiate on a case-by-case basis for freedom of movement to escort convoys . This may lead to 'linkage' negotiations on other humanitarian issues and political problems that may be used as bargaining devices by local warlords.

d. **Related problems.** Also negotiations between elements of the international community on external or internal theatre related problems; for example between troop-contributing nations, between the civilian and military elements of a UN mission, and at local level between NGO convoys and their UN military escort.

0320. **Negotiators**. Commanding and negotiating are both critical functions, which may not be compatible. Although commanders will want to be fully involved in all negotiations that are central to the success of their mission. There may be scope for establishing a negotiating team to deal with routine matters and allow the commander to step in, either to add weight when negotiations are in danger of failing, or to finalise agreements. However, negotiators should have rank, status, and credibility; for example, a senior military officer should engage the commanders of the parties about a cease-fire, and a doctor should discuss medical questions with local health authorities.

0321. **Negotiating Teams**. Because negotiating can be very time-consuming and operational areas are spread out, dedicated negotiating teams should cover specific areas; negotiators who are divided between several different locations while dealing with different problems may be less successful. Negotiating teams may include experts from several specialisation's; in any case, large delegations should be avoided.

0322. **Co-ordinated Objectives**. Political, humanitarian, and military negotiators from different organisations or elements of a UN mission may talk to the same leaders of the parties. If they are going to have any success in their negotiations, individually or collectively, they need to be co-ordinated. This can be achieved by providing clear direction from the highest level on what objectives should be sought from negotiations and where it is possible to compromise. In addition, there needs to be regular liaison between the agencies and individuals engaged in negotiations at each level so that they are aware of progress or problems. The most efficient solution may be to create a separate negotiating organisation that is responsible for generating negotiating strategy following the directions of the commander and conducting the majority of negotiations at the spectral level.

0323. **Negotiation Standpoints**. There are no fixed principles for negotiation but there are several essential features of any negotiation that are useful guidelines for achieving results that can be further developed in the future. These are:

a. **Impartiality**. If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, co-operation, and openhearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.

b. **Long-Term View**. Negotiators should recognise that it takes time to change from opposing positions to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success, won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a long-term precedent; for example, paying tolls to get emergency aid through a hostile checkpoint may solve an immediate crisis, but also could set a precedent that results in all convoys having to pay increasingly extortionate tolls in future. Negotiators should plan ahead to exploit the impact of seasonal changes; for example, seeds and fertiliser for spring planting and fuel in winter as a source of incentives. They also should anticipate future crises and be prepared to react when they occur, but also remain aware that long negotiations may be overtaken by events.

c. **Imagination**. Imagination and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common ground between the parties, development of

incentives and disincentives, and finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.

d. **Acting with Determination**. The parties will have more at stake and may have fewer constraints on their actions than negotiators from the international community; for example a militia gunman at a checkpoint may have no rules of engagement, unlike a convoy commander. Faced with parties under emotional pressure, the negotiator or representative must also be prepared to act with determination.

e. **Cultural Awareness**. Negotiations are often conducted in unfamiliar languages between parties that follow idiosyncratic customs for greeting and meeting, and hold values that are peculiar to their culture. When negotiators themselves also have different cultural backgrounds, the possibilities for misunderstanding are great. It is above all the responsibility of the negotiators to understand the culture of the people they are talking to, so that they better understand the messages that they receive.

0324. **Process**. The selection of individuals, or groups of individuals, who are acceptable to the parties, is fundamental to the successful conduct of negotiations. Essentially there are three stages in the process of negotiation and mediation:

a. **Stage 1 - Preparation**. A clear aim should be defined to determine what is to be achieved. This will take into account many factors including the objectives and capabilities of the belligerents as well as a realistic appraisal of what is feasible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet, and future objectives may be discussed and refined during subsequent meetings. Specific preparations will include researching the background and history of the issue to be discussed so as to help the negotiator or mediator to identify those arguments that the belligerent parties may employ. Options, limitations, minimum requirements, areas of common interest, and possible compromises should be identified. If negotiating, the PSF representative should be clear on those points that must be won or protected and those that may be used as bargaining chips. He should also make a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting. This should include their cultural origin, personality, authority, influence, habits and attitudes. If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

(1) **Location**. In the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation the site should be secure and neutral. In the control of an incident those persons relevant to defusing the problem should be identified and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those more immediately involved in the incident.

(2) **Administration**. Administrative organisation should include such items as arrival and departure arrangements, and the provision of parking, communications,. meals and refreshment. The meeting should usually have an agenda, a seating plan and note-takers, perhaps supplemented with interpreters and other advisers on specialist subjects. Separate rooms will probably be required by each party to allow them to confer in private.

(3) **Attendance**. Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party should, where possible, be agreed beforehand. A policy on the carriage of weapons and bodyguards should be announced in advance. When appropriate, PSF commanders should also bring bodyguards. Attention to protocol and other courtesies should not be overlooked.

b. **Stage 2 - Conduct**. In the case of mediation, parties to the conflict will confer with the go-between in separate locations. Negotiations, on the other hand, will be held openly in one location with all the participants present. Although it may be extremely difficult, the first item on any agenda should be for the participants to agree the purpose of the meeting. If hosting the occasion, the PSF representative should offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesies and to ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be offered or received. Some introductory small talk is useful on such occasions to make everybody feel more at ease. The following negotiating ploys should be borne in mind:

(1) **Preserve Options**. The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his own position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate

stand and he should be wary of making promises or admissions unless it is necessary to do so.

(2) **Restraint and Control**. Belligerent parties are often likely to prove deliberately inflexible. They may distort information and introduce false problems to distract attention from discussions that might embarrass them. Nonetheless, visible frustration, impatience, a patronising manner, or anger at such. Antics, may undermine the negotiator's position. Cheap 'point-scoring' (even if valid) may achieve short-term gain, while in the longer term, it is likely to undermine or forfeit goodwill. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Face-saving measures by the controlling authority will probably serve the longer-term interests of all parties. Whenever possible, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should not normally be interrupted, however incorrect information and matters of principle should be corrected, if necessary, with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions. Whilst remaining impartial, the negotiations should be conducted in a firm, fair and friendly manner.

(3) **Argument**. If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and accurately with regard to facts and detail. It may be appropriate to remind participants that they cannot change the past but, if they wish, they could have the power to change the future.

(4) **Compromise**. Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.

(5) **Linkage**. Linkage of a point of negotiation with their wider ambitions is a technique frequently used by parties. Linkage is to be anticipated if subsequent actions and negotiating positions are not to be compromised.

Negotiation and mediation should be finalised with a summary of what has been resolved. This summary has to be agreed by all participants and, if

possible, written down and signed by each party. A time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed.

c. **Stage 3 - Follow-up**. Effective follow-up is as important as successful negotiation. Without a follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation could be lost. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation have to be promulgated to all interested parties. Background **files** should be updated with all pertinent information, including personality profiles of the participants. Agreements have to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible. The immediate period following a negotiated agreement is likely to prove the most critical. To preserve the credibility of the negotiating process, what has been agreed has to occur and any breach of agreement should be marked at the very least by an immediate protest.

0325. **Tasks.** Negotiating objectives should be set at the highest level and implemented by everyone involved. Although there may be clear directions about what can be negotiated it is important to note that many organisations will not be formally under control, and could conduct their own negotiations independently. The following negotiating tasks may be carried out at all levels:

a. **Mediation**. Negotiators identify common ground on which the parties can discuss and agree.

b. **Facilitation**. Negotiators provide practical assistance to their opposite numbers in the parties, for example, by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing a venue for a meeting.

c. **Communication**. Because negotiations can be affected directly by outside events, negotiators should stay in touch while negotiating and also pass on the results swiftly. If related military activity occurs while the negotiations are in progress or an agreement on a cease-fire is successful, it has to be communicated as rapidly as possible to all forces on the confrontation line.

d. **Education**. Negotiators may have to teach parties how to negotiate and to make genuine concessions. The parties may be unable to see that there are alternatives open to them. Negotiators also will have to ensure that the parties understand the meaning of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international community and the parties in implementing the agreements.

e. **Information Policy Development**. Manipulation of information can have a serious impact on negotiations. This may be countered by actively seeking international support for negotiations and by presenting the facts as seen by negotiators to diplomatic contacts, which will report to their capitals, and the local and international media. The local media may be influenced by the parties and need to hear the negotiators' points of view. The international media will influence both international decision-makers and those elements of the local population who have access to it and would be coached into not asking inopportune questions to the delegates.

f. **Identify Incentives and Disincentives**. Mediation and negotiation should be supported by a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives to the parties, so that they can be encouraged to take positive steps and dissuaded from taking action that will be detrimental to the peace effort. These incentives and disincentives will vary according to circumstances. Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the negotiating strategy.

0326. **Languages**. The ability to negotiate and mediate will place a premium on basic language skills. However, working through interpreters is currently more usual and therefore should be practised before deployment. The use of locally recruited interpreters may provide a short-term solution but reliance on such a source of linguistic support can have disadvantages. In the longer term, the demands of PSO and the effective conduct of negotiations and mediation requires that a greater emphasis is given to language training in general.

0327. **Location.** The parties usually dictate the venue for negotiations, particularly if negotiators have taken the initiative to go to the parties. In face-to-face negotiations, the selection of a venue may be very difficult, with each party perceiving advantages and disadvantages in each proposal and refusing to agree. The following locations are commonly used:

a. **UN Locations**. UN headquarters and locations have the advantages of being neutral territory thereby allowing the parties are to meet with some security and good communications. However, space is often at a premium, making protracted negotiations difficult. The headquarters of the parties are where most bilateral negotiations between parties will take place, with the negotiator visiting their opposite side's office.

b. **Embassies**, where parties can meet for negotiations hosted by a nation acceptable to all concerned, have the advantages of neutrality and providing status to the negotiations. However, security of the visiting delegations may be a problem, as can the availability of space at the embassy.

c. When the parties refuse to meet anywhere else, crossing points in no-man's land on confrontation lines or a prefab office at a UN checkpoint in no-man's land can be useful.

0328. The following factors should be considered when selecting a site:

a. **Security**. The venue should be physically secure, with protection provided by the host authorities or the UN if it is on UN controlled territory.

b. **Accessibility**. Time should not be wasted getting to remote venues unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.

c. **Communications**. As already mentioned, communications are vital. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide communications facilities that also can be used by the parties to liaise with their authorities.

d. **Comfort**. During protracted negotiations, a basic level of comfort may be useful to facilitate a successful outcome. There should be rooms for each delegation, large and small meeting rooms, facilities for providing food and drinks, and overnight accommodations if required.

0329. **Operational Techniques**. Military commanders will need to be aware of the complications created by certain features of a negotiation and will need to address and scrutinise the following issues before and during the process of any negotiations that occur.

a. The identification of decision-makers at the negotiations.

b. The use and exploitation of the media during and after the negotiations.

c. The security of decision-makers.

d. The use of two track negotiations.

e. Communications and mobility.

f. Maintaining secrecy and confidentiality.

g. The political recognition of parties to the negotiation.

h. The use of joint commissions.

i. The use of interpreters and translators.

Section V - The Use of Interpreters

0330. **General.** Language difficulties can arise at any stage in the conduct of operations in a theatre. This can also be a problem on combined operations, exacerbated by differences in doctrine, training, military culture and capability. These problems can be overcome by employing interpreters who may be military personnel or local nationals. The latter may be locally employed or provided as part of the Host Nation Support (HNS).

0331. **Military Interpreters**. Military interpreters will be required from the earliest stages of military planning, through any deployment info, and eventual withdrawal from, a theatre of operations. The scale of provision will depend on the requirement to interpret between the military force and other parties, on whether the environment is friendly or hostile, on the language of allied and coalition partners and on the nature of the operational theatre.

0332. The extent to which local nationals can be used will depend upon the nature of the operations, but it does not remove the requirement for some servicemen to speak the language(s) concerned. The deployed force should have a number of military interpreters on strength who can:

a. Assess the abilities, employ, deploy and monitor the performance of any local interpreters.

b. Replace local staff when security, military or political considerations require interpretation of sensitive information.

c. Deal with a military vocabulary beyond the scope of the local interpreters.

0333. In certain situations and environments the rank of the military interpreter may be important if he or she is to have credibility in the eyes of the local political/military leaders.

0334. **Use of Local Interpreters**. Before employing local nationals as interpreters it will be necessary to assess their capabilities and possibly their political affiliation. Employing local people as interpreters has security implications both for information and for the physical security of the persons involved. The use of local interpreters in policy making staff areas will generally be inappropriate. In any operation, knowledge of the

political/cultural/religious affiliation of individual local interpreters could be of vital importance in certain situations.

0335. Consideration has to be given to the basis on which interpreters will be employed, as it will be rare for their services to be required on a permanent basis. They may also have to be employed in other secondary roles, which will require them to demonstrate wider military skills and possibly some flexibility.

Section VI - Assisting in Elections

0336. **General**. A possible task for a military force involved in PSO is to assist in the election of a new government, whether at the municipal or central government level. The assistance may be given at a number of levels, but it is likely to focus on the support given to a central co-ordinating authority, such as the OSCE, for whom the responsibility lies for ensuring that the elections are conducted under the agreed conditions.

0337. **Tasks**. A summary of the likely tasks is as follows:

a. **Information Campaign**. The military contingent is likely to play a central role in publicising the elections, explaining eligibility to vote, how, where and when to vote. This may be done by leaflet or by the use of local radio, or both. The key is for the troops involved, to be seen as acting in an impartial manner.

b. **Maintenance of a Stable Environment**. A clear task for military forces in supporting elections is the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. This will be achieved in the first instance by patrols and by providing a visible deterrence to any form of aggression. However, the particular threat has to be assessed. If there is a possibility of voter intimidation then routes to polling stations should be identified and protected; the voting stations themselves should also be protected, along with those civilian workers involved in the management of the election.

c. **Communications and Logistic Support**. It is possible that the central co-ordinating agency for the elections will require a means of communicating to be established, along with the operators to pass information to central control. There may also be a requirement for logistic support, such as transport both for civilian co-ordinators, voting slips and ballot boxes as well as rations and water.

d. **Maintenance of Reserves**. (Sub) units should be ready to act as reserves at short notice. They have to be mobile, in sufficient strength and equipped to respond to the perceived level of threat, which could include internal security tasks.

0338. **Subsequent Procedures**. The consequences of the election results may be more difficult to judge, and the subsequent implementation of those results, particularly if these are likely to be controversial. Military forces should be prepared for public disorder in the aftermath of the announcement of the results. These could be anti government rioting or interfactional activity, which could degenerate into looting, chaos and anarchy. Special contingency planning may be necessary to support and protect isolated groups of troops during any disturbances of this kind.

Section VII - Humanitarian Relief

0339. A more recent feature of CRO and the use of troops in a PSO capacity focuses on humanitarian relief designed to ease the impact of conflict on civilians. The role of a military force in these operations will depend on its mandate, but the following points can be used as guidance:

a. Any humanitarian assistance, no matter how small or apparently insignificant, has to be co-ordinated and the policy and approach to these operations disseminated to all ranks. Uncoordinated assistance can result in claims of lack of impartiality by opposing forces and lead to false expectations by those suffering. Some humanitarian organisations, including the ICRC will actively avoid contact with the military in order to reinforce their status as impartial operators.

b. All soldiers participating in humanitarian operations have to be conversant with aspects of the Law of Armed Conflict and in particular the rights of women and children, civilians and other non-combatants.

c. There will probably be a number of disparate organisations operating in the theatre of operations. The precise relationship of such organisations with military forces has to be properly established. Many, such as UNHCR, will have their own logistic support and means of gaining information; other NGOs will have little if any support, and the level of support offered to such organisations has to be made clear from the start. Support will vary from providing threat information such as minefield traces through to providing food and accommodation, and ultimately safe areas and protection.

d. Some members of certain humanitarian organisations may be accorded special status as Persons of Designated Special Status (PDSS). Specific ROE and other instructions will be established in order to afford them protection, and close liaison has to be established in order to be aware of their location and operations. If the threat justifies it evacuation plans should be rehearsed. All troops have to be familiar with the ROE and in particular how they relate to the protection of aid convoys and civilian workers.

0340. Humanitarian relief will vary considerably from place to place, even within theatre and there can easily be misunderstanding about the overall purpose of these operations and the role of military forces within that purpose. Many agencies are usually involved and

the military commander will need to expend time and make use of manpower to put in place an effective liaison and co-ordination organisation to cater for these additional groupings.

Section VIII - Demarcation, Cease-fire Lines and Buffer Zones

Demarcation

0341. **Delineation Procedures**. The following procedures should be used when delineating a cease-fire line, ZOS or control zone.

a. The designated line or area should be clearly marked on a common large scale chart, map or air photograph.

b. Prepare an accurate, detailed description of the line using a common grid system. If the two parties use different grid systems the line must be recorded in both. The written description is the legal authority.

c. The line or area should, if possible, be physically identifiable.

d. The lines on the ground should be surveyed and marked or, if at sea, recorded by some form of recognised maritime marker.

e. Entry points to the zones should be agreed and clearly marked on the map and ground.

f. A record of the lines, signed by all sides, should be given to the parties concerned, with the original retained by the PSF. Alterations should be signed and promulgated in the same way.

0342. **Factors to be Considered**

a. The criteria used to determine critical terrain in war are not necessarily applicable to PK. A road, a road junction or a village in low ground may be of more significance than high ground overlooking the area. Securing the use of facilities is often more important than obtaining a good field of fire.

b. Appreciate the economic considerations when determining a line so that a farmer is not summarily denied access to water for his animals nor a route to market blocked without good reason.

c. A peacekeeping force needs to consider areas and places of high emotional significance to any of the WFs. These could include religious sites, relics, areas of historical significance, places of burial and sites of murders, assassination or massacre.

0343. **Records of Demarcation Lines**. A record, signed by both sides, is normally kept at company, sector (battalion) and force headquarters. Copies should be given to the parties concerned. With the comparatively short tours of units in a BZ, or AOS, and of staff officers in a force headquarters it is difficult to maintain up-to-date, accurate records of CFLs and demarcation lines and of the factors, arguments and considerations which led to the initial agreement and subsequent charges.

0344. **Changes**. Alterations to the fine must be agreed, signed by the parties concerned and sanctioned by force headquarters. Amendments must be recorded.

0345. **Disagreements**. If a party refuses to allow a survey of its CFL, it may be possible to establish its position by discreet survey. The use of air photography for this purpose will depend on the provisions in the force mandate and SOFA.

Controlling a Line or Zone

0346. **Agreed Withdrawal of Combatants**. The agreement to evacuate regular and paramilitary forces from the BZ must be implemented as soon as possible after the arrival of the peacekeeping troops. If the forces of either party are allowed to stay an unfortunate precedent may be set and their subsequent removal may prove impracticable.

0347. **Method of Control**. The peacekeeping force should establish OPs and positions as close to the edge of the BZ or CFL as possible in order to dominate the local area. Establishing section posts, which are directly controlled from a company base, usually effects a presence. This enables each company to rotate and rest sections, and to keep sufficient troops in reserve, at varying states of readiness, to meet emergencies. The deployment of complete platoons to positions could, in certain circumstances, prove to be a wasteful and inflexible misuse of manpower and resources.

0348. **Surveillance and Supervision**. A peacekeeping force is concerned with monitoring the following:

a. Cease-fire and armistice agreements.

b. The establishment and supervision of BZs and DZs.

c. The supervision of armament control agreements, when this is not the responsibility of an observer group.

d. Military deployment limitations.

e. Military withdrawals, disengagements and the return of territory.

f. Border infiltration and arms smuggling.

g. Prisoner of war exchanges.

h. Freedom of movement agreements for civilian farmers working in restricted zones. Farmers who can establish a claim to the ownership of land in a restricted area may be permitted to farm in daylight up to the median light in the BZ. A clearly definable feature, such as a track, a line of boundary stones or landmarks should mark the median line.

i. Refugee camps.

j. Plebiscites and elections.

0349. **Aids to Surveillance:**

a. During daylight the whole line or zone should be kept under observation.

b. By night the area should be kept under surveillance as far as possible with night observation devices and radar. Electronic and acoustic devices may cover sensitive areas.

c. When the presence of an intruder is detected, white light or illuminants may be used with advantage to confirm the sightings and warn the intruder that he has been spotted. This in itself has a deterrent effect. Care needs to be taken not to direct searchlight beams across the BZ boundaries to illuminate the parties' CFLs. This may be interpreted as unfriendly and hostile or be perceived as activity by another warring faction. Searchlights fitted with dispersion screens may be used to floodlight areas up to 100 metres without risking an infringement of the agreement near the edge of the BZ.

d. Patrols, both foot and vehicle mounted, may be used to supplement observation and investigate incidents. They must maintain radio contact with their base and always be easily recognisable as peacekeeping troops.

e. All incidents must be logged and reported to sector and force headquarters.

0350. **Controlling an Area of Operation at night**. In situations where parties to a dispute infiltrate armed elements or weapons through a BZ or AO under cover of darkness contrary to an agreement, it may be necessary to devise a system of surveillance,

patrolling and an illumination plan to stop it. Radar may be used to detect vehicle infiltration's. When the vehicles arrive within the range of the weapons the intruding vehicle is illuminated. Usually the driver turns back. To stop a driver who persists, or infiltrators on foot, standing patrols block routes in depth while reserves are held in readiness in company positions either to move to pre-determined points on routes not already covered or to act as cut-off parties. Standing patrols should be of not less than section strength. They should be equipped with hand-held illumination flares, hand torches, night vision aids and a radio. Early warning of an infiltration party may be obtained by radar and passed to the patrol over the radio. On the party's approach it will be illuminated, called upon to halt, drop weapons, raise hands and freeze. If the party attempts to escape, Action will be taken according to standing ROE's. If it still fails to halt a shot may be fired into the ground near the escapers in an attempt to halt them. However, fire will not normally be opened for effect without prior permission from higher authority, which will rarely be given. Fire will only be used for effect in self-defence if the infiltration party fires on the patrol or attempts to overrun it. It may be possible to position a cut-off party further down the route to intercept the escaping infiltrators, using the same procedure. To succeed, such a system required discreet reconnaissance, rehearsal and a well co-ordinated illumination plan. Captured infiltrators and their weapons will be brought in for questioning. Force headquarters will issue orders concerning the return of infiltrators to the host country and the disposal of their arms.

Agreements with the Host Nation

0351. **Peacekeeping force movement**. While the force may move at will throughout its BZ or AOS there may be restrictions on:

a. Approaching one or both of the parties' CFLs, even from within the BZ.

b. Movement within the host country. It may be necessary to obtain a pass or clearance certificate and to drive through a recognised access point on the BZ boundary where the host nation's police are entitled to stop the vehicle to check the pass. In militarily sensitive areas the host nation may require peacekeeping personnel to be accompanied by a liaison officer.

c. If a host country checkpoint stops a peacekeeping force vehicle contrary to regulations the driver, or senior passenger, will not attempt to force a passage but will inform his headquarters to initiate the protest procedure.

0352. **National and local forces in BZ**. No armed forces will be permitted to enter the BZ. The host nation's civilian police, including armed police, may be allowed to enter the zone under the terms of a special agreement.

0353. **Powers of search and arrest**. Regulations vary from force to force but in most circumstances only an intruder or law-breaker will be searched. In the case of civilians suspected of illegal activity they will usually be handed over to the force civil or military police who, in turn, will hand them over to the host nation police. At check-points reading into a BZ the peacekeeping troops on duty will observe civilians passing through for any obvious attempt to smuggle arms, ammunition and explosives. Civilian traffic will only be stopped and searched on the orders of the force commander when the situation warrants such action. In some peacekeeping forces the troops are not allowed to confiscate weapons and ammunition, only to turn the carriers back. In some contingents, their own vehicles and personnel will be searched on entry and exit from the BZ to deter smuggling of arms, contraband, drugs, etc. The aim is as much to convince the host country that the force is observing its laws as to catch or deter criminal activity among its members.

0354. **Host Nation's powers of stop and search**. Host nation authorities are allowed to stop a peacekeeping force vehicle to establish the identity of the occupants but are not normally permitted to search them. Should the host nation's police or army insist on searching a vehicle or individual the latter will protest, but not resist forcefully. If he is able to contact his headquarters he will ask for the help of the force military police. Should the authorities still insist on a search, the individual will request that the force military police carry it out, witnessed by the host nation authority. On return, the individual will report the matter so that a protest may be lodged.

0355. **Checkpoints**. A checkpoint is a self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe and control movement into and out of a BZ. Permanent checkpoints are established on the main access routes and they cannot be moved or closed without the authority of the force commander. Temporary checkpoints may be set up on minor routes, usually on the authority of the sector (battalion) commander, although authority may be reserved to the force commander. Checkpoints should be well marked with the force's colours and insignia.

a. **Tasks**.

(1) Control movement and entrance to a BZ, particularly during a crisis.

(2) Prevent the smuggling of arms, drugs and contraband.

(3) Control refugees.

(4) Act as an OP as part of the peacekeeping force's observation plan.

b. **Conduct**. Soldiers manning checkpoints must be careful to observe local customs to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the local population.

Relations with the Civilian Population

0356. **Jurisdiction**. Some peacekeeping forces have jurisdiction in their BZ but most do not. In the former case it is unusual for either the force or its military police to have powers of arrest over the host nation's subjects. Incidents involving civilians should be dealt with by the force's civil police or, if there is no such element, by the host nation's police, who should be summoned immediately.

0357. **Action to be taken in an Emergency**. Should a civilian be found in a dangerous area, e.g. a minefield, he should be requested to leave. To obviate the language difficulty, a card warning the individual to leave should be shown. Should the individual refuse to leave, be committing a criminal offence or taking photographs in a forbidden area the peacekeeping force may have powers to detain him until the police can be summoned. The procedure to be followed will be laid down in Force SOPs.

0358. **Evidence in Court Cases**. Peacekeeping personnel do not normally appear as witnesses in the courts of the host nation. Their evidence is usually accepted in a written statement. The legal branch at force headquarters must be consulted in such cases.

0359. **Civilian Rallies**. Political rallies might be held at a peacekeeping checkpoint at the entrance to the BZ. The host nation's police are responsible for controlling political marches and demonstrations. The peacekeeping force headquarters will use all its influence with the civil authorities and police at both national and local levels to provide an adequate police presence, including reserves, to deal with the situation in order to avoid the direct involvement of the peacekeeping force. Sector commanders and the force headquarters will monitor plans for rallies in case the local police are unable to prevent a crowd of demonstrators entering the BZ or threatening a force checkpoint or installation. In this eventuality the peacekeeping force's PSTF police contingent, if it has one, will be prepared to back up the host nation's police. Only if this fails will peacekeeping troops be committed to turning the crowd back. Whether a

large number of troops is used in an unarmed role, backed up by armed troops, or whether arms are used will depend on the situation and the force commander's decision. In either case timely and effective warning will be given and only minimum necessary force will be used.

0360. **No Fly Zones**. A no fly zone is designed to prevent a warring party from flying military aircraft of any sort within the zone and to conduct surveillance on any military movement on land, particularly with regard to air defence resources. The control and conduct of operations in a no-fly zone is beyond the scope of this AJP.

Section IX - Demilitarisation and Arms Control Issue

0361. **General.** Demilitarisation or arms control may be one of the tasks given to a military force under the terms of its mandate, or they may be local, tactical initiatives attempted to reduce tension in a specific area. In general, demilitarisation and arms control measures will only be possible once a cease-fire or peace agreement is in place.

0362. **Methods of demilitarisation and arms control**. Demilitarisation and arms controls will normally be a progressive process in those targets will be set and achieved in recognised steps. Steps which will require considerable verification and policing by the military force are likely to be as shown in the following paragraphs:

a. **Withdrawal from front lines**. Following a cease-fire agreement military forces will normally be deployed along the old front lines - the CFL. The first stage or demilitarisation will be a withdrawal from these wartime positions either to barracks or more usually to behind a ZOS or BZ. The aim of these zones is to move belligerent's back, beyond small arms range and ideally outside line of sight.

b. **Withdrawal of heavy weapons**. The withdrawal of heavy weapons a specified distance from the cease-fire line will offer a significant confidence-building measure. Heavy weapons should include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, mortars and all types of armoured fighting vehicles.

c. **Decommissioning of Air Defence (AD) Weapons**. A military force has to be aware of the AD capability of former belligerents. Active AD systems will pose a high potential threat to all types of aircraft and helicopters and should be neutralised and then removed as soon as possible.

d. **Return to barracks/cantonment sites**. Having separated the former belligerents, the next step is to return the troops to barracks, or to new cantonment sites. The aim of this is to move troops into peace-time locations that can be monitored and from which a potential belligerent will have to deploy from. Such a move will also assist with the demilitarisation of the civilian population as weapons are collected. It is likely that there will be insufficient tailor-made military barracks available to accommodate all troops and equipment in the appropriate areas. Ad-hoc cantonment sites will

therefore have to be established. These may be based around large public buildings, factories or tented camps. Sites that utilise the civilian infrastructure may in the long-term cause problems for community recovery if they continue to be occupied by military forces, and thus denied for the primary purpose. Depending on the mandate or the peace agreement, the military force may or may not have authority to allocate sites to be used.

e. **Force levels and restructuring**. The next stage in demilitarisation and arms control is the agreement of force levels and the restructuring of former belligerents into peacetime organisations. Force levels will normally be agreed at the national level - often as part of any cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. The restructuring will generally follow direction from the senior military HQ and involve suitability assessments, verification and advice from units at the tactical level.

f. **Note**; A no-fly zone can also be incorporated into any BZ or CFL.

Restructuring

0363. **General**. Restructuring will normally include the following elements:

a. Setting a ceiling on military personnel by unit or location (or both).

b. The confinement of arms to designated armouries.

c. The separation of arms and ammunition.

d. Military approval for proposed sites with regard to the potential for a future threat.

e. The relocation of heavy weapons to authorised sites.

0364. **Verification**. Verification will depend on the mandate. If the situation allows then the military force may restrict all military movement and training to that which it has authorised. In such cases it would be normal to monitor those authorised activities to ensure compliance. Similarly, the military force may inspect and monitor activities within barracks and cantonment sites. This would provide an assessment of readiness, capability, intent, morale and any attempt to deploy forces.

0365. **Enforcement**. Enforcement will also depend on the mandate and may involve restrictions on a faction’s military activity, training or movement; it may involve punitive inspections or even confiscations of weapons or equipment.

Section X - Information Operations

0366. **Information Operations**. For the purposes of this manual Information Operations is a term used to cover both Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA) and the media operations aspects of Public Information. The PSO force conducts PSPA directly at the population of the State receiving the mission and, indirectly, the military contingents and civilian agencies involved in the operation. Media Operations are designed to provide accurate information to the media. This includes both the local media, with its shared and cultural roots, and the international media. Information operations are an integral element of the manoeuvrist approach to the conduct of operations and should be fully co-ordinated with other activities and operations of the PSF, in order to reinforce the overall message that the commander wishes to portray in a credible, reasonable and consistent way. Information operations will be amongst the most potent weapon that the commander possesses and, as such, will require his personal direction.

0367. **The Principles of Information Operations**. The principles of information operations are laid in AJP-3.10 Information Operations. The following general principles should govern the conduct of any information programme:

a. **Impartiality**. The impartiality of the PSF, when appropriate, has to be repeatedly stressed. In PSO nothing should be communicated that might prejudice any perceptions concerning the impartiality of the PSF. However, that should not exclude statements concerning culpability when evidence is irrefutable. In PSO the real enemy is anarchy, atrocity and starvation.

b. **Timeliness**. To be effective, information operations must be timely. All activities and operations should be analysed from the perspectives of the media Host Nation and parties to the conflict so that appropriate responses are prepared. These responses, briefings or press releases should be designed to inform more accurately and, when necessary, pre-empt the potential adverse publicity or misinformation that may be propagated by the parties to the conflict for their own partisan purposes.

c. **Cultural Knowledge**. A thorough understanding of local culture, including linguistic dialects, is vital. Every effort should be made to gain this understanding. Social-cultural studies and opinion surveys need to be conducted to identify prevailing attitudes and expose any misconceptions

and misunderstandings that can then be subsequently addressed through any information programme.

d. **Harmonisation**. As activities that determine and influence perceptions, information projects have to be centrally co-ordinated with other activities that seek similar goals. These will include military intelligence, civil-military projects and community relation's projects.

e. **Honesty**. Unless the information promulgated is believed, information operations will serve no purpose. Obvious attempts at propaganda or lies that are exposed will impose serious damage to the long term credibility and viability of any operation. On certain occasions, however, force protection considerations may limit the extent to which operations can be open and transparent to potentially hostile factions.

f. **Style**. Information material should be presented to the local population in the most appropriate and culturally acceptable manner and should avoid being patronising, arrogant or blatantly manipulative.

0368. **Electronic Warfare (EW).** EW is essential to ensure the PSFs ability to use the electronic spectrum, and for immediate threat warning and force protection. Although the term EW suggests that it apply only to combat, EW has a crucial role to play in PSO. Commanders at all levels should consider the employment of EW assets to support their overall objectives. All sides to a dispute may have sophisticated electronic systems capable of monitoring, threatening, or disrupting the activities of the PSF and its partners. EW can provide early warning, which may prevent disputes from escalating into, armed conflict and can support diplomatic activity by monitoring compliance with agreements and sanctions. EW is a deterrent, especially if a potential belligerent knows that the PSF can quickly locate and neutralise threats. If hostilities do occur, EW can reduce the threat posed by certain weapons systems and provide commanders with other options than the use of physical or lethal force.

0369. **Peace Support Psychological Activities**. The aim of a PSPA in PSO is to reassure, persuade and influence the local community or communities within the operational area and local region, to consent to the PSO and to work with the PSF for peace. The population may have been subject to propaganda by the belligerent parties and is likely to be in urgent need of objective factual, truthful and credible information. The core message explaining the objectives and role of the PSF should be propagated in advance of the arrival of the force and updated in a consistent manner on a regular

basis. Any gap in information is likely to be filled with the propaganda of the belligerent parties. PSPA attempt, by emphasising the responsibility of various local groups, to persuade them to resolve their own differences. Additionally, it may undertake the more specific function of broadcasting warnings, the future intentions of the controlling authorities and any details of agreements reached between opposing parties. How best to do this will depend on local circumstances and culture. The use of hand-outs and leaflets or a radio and TV station manned by members of the force should be included in all PSO and be put into use as soon as possible. Such operations may require Electronic Warfare assets to locate and target information operations, to secure our own use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to reduce the usage of any party who may oppose the operation. Information activity planning should start early and form an integral element of deep operations within the overall campaign plan.

0370. INFO OPS when properly applied at all levels can be a very potent weapon for a commander to possess and a formation commander will probably focus the direction and thrust of information operations under his own control. However, because the target audiences for any information operations planning will vary enormously from theatre to theatre it is more appropriate for units and sub units to be briefed on any intended activities in-theatre when more detailed tactical planning can then take place. Targets for such information operations can include the warring parties, the community at large, international opinion and the media.

Chapter 4

Control Techniques and Procedures

Section I - Intelligence

04001. **General.** The successful conduct of PSO will always rely on the consent and co-operation of the populations directly involved. Greater priority and awareness will be needed to understand the motivation of the parties involved in the conflict and the population as a whole. Of particular significance is an understanding of the background and development of the conflict into which the military force is intervening. This may well require a close understanding of the cultural environment in which the military force will be operating and places a heavy reliance on the use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). In operations in which the promotion of co-operation and consent is paramount, the use of covert intelligence sources may be perceived as indicating a lack of trust which will have a significant negative effect on the goodwill of the community. Likewise the requirement for impartial status of any military force in PSO may limit the ability to conduct intelligence operations. In PSO the ability to deny the inevitable accusations of partiality and bias requires a degree of transparency in the conduct of operations which may preclude the more traditional means of intelligence gathering. In other situations this constraint may not be present, in which case all the traditional means of gaining intelligence can be applied.

04002. **Types of intelligence**. Intelligence is classified as Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and is described in the following paragraphs:

a. **HUMINT**. In PSO the most critical information and intelligence will come from the population and those in direct contact with them. Often from CIMIC Centres or in the form of reports and routine debriefings of observers, patrols and other elements of the force that passes through areas of interest and is in contact with the local population and human rights monitors. NGOs are particularly useful sources of information, but their information should be handled with care because they will be sensitive to any compromise to their neutral, impartial, independent status. Liaison teams will have a key role in meeting the commanders' intelligence requirements. The quantity and quality of this information and intelligence will be dependent, to some extent, on the credibility of the military force, the security that it can provide to the local population and also to the ability to understand and speak the local language. Every member of the military

force, whether on or off duty has to be aware of the overall intelligence requirements and how his interactions and observations may assist in the collection plan. This awareness can and should be developed by regular briefings and debriefings.

b. **IMINT**. Apart from aerial photography there are a large number of ground based systems ranging from the basic camera to highly sophisticated and specialised photographic equipment.

c. **SIGINT**. SIGINT is of value whenever there is any form of electronic emission, whether from communications, for example radio and mobile phones, or combat net radio, or for other purposes such as the radio control of explosive devices or use of radar for surface to air missiles (SAM) guidance. The easy availability of “high tech” communications and monitoring equipment now allows for most nations, whatever their state of economic development, a relatively sophisticated SIGINT capability. A Joint Force is likely to deploy with an Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) detachment. SIGINT materiel, especially that gathered by national strategic assets, may be sensitive and protected by particular national caveats.

04003. **Sources.** Information and intelligence may be gained from open source material, from the day to day interactions with the civilian population who may well make comments in a more benign operation from which local attitudes, public opinion and general acceptance may be assessed. Other information may come from deliberate observation and surveillance operations, both overt and covert, from local forces, informants, agents and interrogations, and from other technical means, such as IMINT and SIGINT sources. The sources are:

a. **Open source material**. Much basic background information and intelligence can be gained from open source information, for example on the Internet, concerning the particular theatre of operations. Academic interest and the involvement of the press and reporting about PSO will open up a large amount of historical and current data that could be useful for analysis and cross reference. Many civilian agencies may even be prepared to offer useful information and possibly intelligence if it is used sensitively and for the common good.

b. **Surveillance operations**. Observation and surveillance operations may be conducted by special or regular forces, technical means or a combination of all three. These may be conducted overtly, not only to gather information and intelligence, but also to act as a deterrent against hostile or unhelpful actions. Covert surveillance activity can also be conducted, but with central control and authorisation to avoid conflicting and possible embarrassment. They may be static, such as permanent Observation Posts (OP) or mobile patrols. There are a wide variety of observations and surveillance devices available, ranging from those on the open market, such as video cameras, to highly specialised and technical pieces of equipment usually only issued to Special Forces. Commanders, at all levels should be aware of the technologies and devices available and ensure that their subordinates are familiar with their usage.

c. **Informants.** If individual security cannot be guaranteed and the local population has little trust in its own security forces, consideration should be given to establishing an information conduit directly between the local population and military force. Confidential telephone numbers and Post Office Box numbers will permit anonymous reporting, but care should be taken to ensure that calls cannot be overheard by uncleared manned exchange operators.

d. **Agents and informers**. While all members of the military force may have a role to play in the initial identification of potential agents and informers, their handling will be the responsibility of specially trained personnel. Care has to be taken to ensure that, as far as possible all such activities are co-ordinated with any ongoing operations involving other security agencies, whether local or from other nations.

e. **Interrogation and debriefing**. Interrogation is used to extract information from an unwilling person, normal conducted by “specific specialist agencies”. Debriefing is used to extract information from a willing person, such as an expatriate worker who is familiar with the theatre of operations. The Joint Services Intelligence Organisation (JSIO) is responsible for providing interrogators, debriefers and advice on both. The usual operational practice is to deploy either Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFIT) or Defence Debriefing Teams (DDT) to formations or units in the field as appropriate.

f. **Captured material**. Captured documents and equipment may prove a useful source of information on some aspects of the theatre of operations and all members of the military force should be made aware of their potential intelligence value.

04004. **Intelligence considerations at unit level.** Success in PSO can be dependent on the acquisition of accurate and timely intelligence, in much the same way as other combat operations. A unit commander will usually be concerned about three specific areas:

a. **Area of intelligence responsibility**. An area allocated to a commander for which he is responsible for the provisions of intelligence, within the means at his disposal. (AAP-6)

b. **Area of influence**. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command or control (AAP-6)

c. **Area of intelligence interest**. That area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations (AJP-01)

04005. The process through which intelligence and targeting data is collected, produced and disseminated is known as the intelligence cycle. This is a dynamic and cyclical process designed to meet the commander's intelligence requirements.

04006. **Generic intelligence requirements.** The following list of generic intelligence requirements is by no means exhaustive and should be updated and developed as the situation dictates. These headings do represent a list of essential information about a theatre of operations which can provide the basis for intelligence purposes:

a. Location/ Historical Background/ General Facts.

b. Topography/ Population/ Climate/ Industrial Areas.

c. Internal Affairs/ Politics/ Economy/ Social/ Issues/ Threats/ Subversive Groupings.

d. Forces/ Posture/ Capabilities/ Procurement/ Assistance

e. Army/ Air Forces/ Air Defence/ Navy/ Other Maritime Forces/ Police/ Paramilitary Forces/ Special Forces.

f. Logistics/ Transport Infrastructure/ Ports/ Beaches/ Airfields.

g. Public Utilities/ Telecommunications.

Section II - Observation and Monitoring

04007. **General.** Observation and monitoring are fundamental techniques of both PK and PE. As a technique the purpose is to gather information, and monitor, verify and report adherence to agreements, thus deterring and providing evidence of breaches, should they occur. Observation teams may be deployed into the same theatre of operations from a number of political authorities. As far as is politically possible, their efforts should be co-ordinated with those of the deployed PSF and their product shared. The most common observer tasks are:

a. Supervision, monitoring, verification and reporting of case-fire agreements, separations and withdrawals of forces, and cessation of outside assistance.

b. Monitoring of checkpoints, border crossings, and entry/exit points.

c. Monitoring of the disarmament/demobilisation, regrouping and cantonment processes of military forces.

d. Assisting in the location and confiscation of weapons caches.

e. Maintaining liaison with and between, the belligerent factions, civilian or UN agencies, NGOs and neighbouring countries.

f. Assistance to humanitarian agencies supervising and conducting POW exchanges, food distribution points and distribution of medical supplies.

g. Assisting with and monitoring elections.

h. Monitoring and reporting violations of International Law.

04008. Observation teams will depend partially for their security on their impartial status which will be considerably enhanced by a credible and professional performance. At times of low threat, observation may be carried out by unarmed personnel in small multinational teams, often including civilian representatives. At times of higher threat and when the requirements of credibility are paramount, observers may be armed and grouped in national military teams, possibly drawn from Special Forces. Effective liaison with all parties involved is also a valuable supporting element of these methods. The success of observation activities depends largely on accurate, timely reporting using reliable communications. By their nature, observation and monitoring teams are normally limited in the scope of any action they may wish to take. However, they may act as a trigger for other more robust joint reaction forces.

04009. **Personal Qualities.** The military observer has to realise that he or she will be performing his duties in an environment foreign to that of his home nation, usually encumbered by difficult living conditions, in high stress situations, and often in a language not necessarily a ‘mother tongue’.

04010. Military observers have to understand the importance placed on ‘face’(i.e. the ‘personal’ perception of respect) that is important in many cultures - this is especially important in negotiations when, for example, a cease-fire is being discussed, if one or other of the combatants is seen to be losing ground in the negotiation and consequently will ‘lose face’ amongst his peers. Representatives of parties may be compelled to say one thing whilst meaning another in an effort to avoid being seen as the weaker negotiator in such circumstances, reading to contradictory positions becoming apparent at a later stage, to the detriment of the negotiations.

Individual Guidance for Observers and Monitors

04011. Some military points that an observer should be aware of are to:

a. Keep strictly neutral, and display impartiality to all parties in the dispute.

b. Impress upon local commanders that he is to be granted freedom of movement appropriate to the mandate applicable to your area.

c. Ensure that local commanders are aware of the provisions and requirements to report any breaches of applicable agreements and cease-fires.

d. Be aware of efforts to undermine his authority and impartiality.

e. Consider the likelihood that all radio communications will be monitored, and phrase messages accordingly.

f. Be aware that local employees and interpreters may have a vested interest in matters, which require sensitive handling.

g. Be aware of the possible loyalty of the host population to previous governments.

04012. An observer should not:

a. Criticise the host nation or the parties involved in the dispute.

b. Carry marked maps or documents openly across cease-fire lines.

c. Express political or military opinions to nationals of either party to a dispute.

d. Make unauthorised press or media statements (i.e. be aware of alleged ‘authorised’ persons enquiring about the progress of a particular matter).

e. Take, or allow photographs to be taken in areas which are subject to dispute, unless specifically authorised to do so.

f. Allow local gossip or hearsay to influence decisions or reports to their superiors, unless they can certify all the facts expressed.

Section III - Separating Hostile Forces

04013. **Means of separation**. Some explanation of the types of zones and lines that have been used in the past in peacekeeping operations is necessary as a preliminary to providing guidance on their use and value in separating opposing forces.

04014. **Interposition Tactics**. As in a preventive deployment, an interposition force should have sufficient combat power available to match whatever might be offered. The geographical separation may be delineated in any environment by one, or a combination, of the following:

a. **Cease-Fire Line (CFL)**. The lines mark the forward limit of the positions occupied by the troops of the opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. Of necessity ad hoc, they are often contentious and the subject of complaint whenever one side is left in possession of an important tactical or political feature. Moreover, the former combatants may not only dispute each other's CFLs; they may not even accept the peacekeeping force's interpretation of the cease-fire agreement as to where their own CFL runs.' While CFLs are eventually published openly, for example in the UN Secretary-General's periodic report on a peacekeeping force, each side maintains the principle of confidentiality on the detailed deployment of its forces behind them or outside an area of limitation in armaments. It is essential for any peacekeeping force to have detailed knowledge of all the lines claimed by any warring faction. For a peacekeeping force to disclose one party's dispositions to the other would be considered a gross breach of confidence.

b. **Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL)**. The agreement of cease-fire lines may pave the way for the establishment of a buffer zone and the withdrawal of an invading force. At some stage the parties may agree to an armistice demarcation line, perhaps reading eventually to a formal peace treaty.

c. **Zone of Separation**. A Zone of Separation (ZOS) is a neutral space or no-man's land between cease-fire lines. This is a term now being used in the context of intra-state conflict instead of the term Buffer Zone which was more appropriate to inter-state conflict. The width of the ZOS may be based on visual distances or weapon ranges. Out of visual sight is preferable as it reduces the temptation of ill disciplined soldiers to take casual sniping at one another. A ZOS may contain residents, farmland or other assets which

the force may need to patrol, monitor and protect. Access to a ZOS, and generally the air space above it, will usually be controlled and limited to the supervising authority. Any maritime zones should specify infringements to international shipping rights.

d. **Control Zones**. Control Zones are areas either side of a ZOS, the forward limits of which will be the cease-fire line. In these areas limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by calibre), mortars and missiles (rockets) permitted in the control zone at any one time, or during any particular period.

e. **Lines Demarcating a Buffer Zone (BZ) or Area of Separation (AOS)**. There is not always agreement on the location of the lines on either side of a BZ or AOS. This may be because the parties to the dispute do not use the same map grid or because one side refuses to give up a position near the line, which it considers essential to its security. A BZ or AOS is normally only a demilitarised zone (DZ) from which the armed forces of both sides are excluded. However, the zone is the sovereign territory of at least one of the parties whose rights of administration must be recognised. That party may still police the area.

f. **Marking**. These lines have to be marked by wire fences and signed wherever possible. There could however be political implications in doing this form of marking and clear instructions will be necessary to avoid disputes on the ground and disputes in the diplomatic and political arena.

Interposition - Stages in Deployment

04015. **Preparatory Work**. During the preparatory phase while a peacekeeping force is being mounted, the force and contingent commanders and their staffs must master the details of the mandate, any relevant understandings and the status of forces agreement, as soon as the latter is signed. Ideally, the force will be deployed with the agreement of both parties but should one of the parties' dissents, it must be prepared to deploy on one side only, behind the host state's CFL.

04016. **Cease-Fire Agreement**. During the preparatory phase a cease-fire will be arranged and then a cease-fire line will be agreed upon. Initially, it will merely be a line on a map. The next steps will be an agreement on the BZ, the separation of the hostile forces and an undertaking to withdraw from the BZ.

04017. **Control of Forces.** When a peacekeeping force moves into a BZ it is assumed that the governments engaged in hostilities have control over their forces and that the orders of the commanders in the field to their troops to cease fire and carry out agreed withdrawals will be obeyed. While the assumption is likely to prove correct insofar as regular troops are concerned, irregular troops may not accept the arrangements and continue to cause concern. A peacekeeping force may experience some sporadic resistance or opposition.

04018. **Establishment of a liaison system**. Before deploying a peacekeeping force between the contestants' armies it is necessary to establish a liaison system between the force, the host nation and the parties to the dispute. Good liaison is necessary to enable the peacekeepers to move into position in accordance with a timetable accepted by all parties and whose troops know what to expect. Failure to install the liaison system first risks misunderstandings, friction and perhaps outright opposition without the means to resolve problems.

04019. **Deployment of a force in the BZ**. The deployment of a force between the armies of the two sides, armies that have been locked in furious combat up until the moment of the cease-fire to secure an advantage at the negotiating table, is the most critical moment. It may be necessary to persuade one of the contestants to withdraw from a position captured beyond the agreed CFL. In the case of a refusal it would be beyond both the capability and the mandate of the force to tempt to compel compliance. The breach must be reported through sector headquarters to the force commander for reference to UNSG or OSCE.

04020. **Emergency response**. Interposition may also be used as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis. As with a pre-planned interposition, speed is a crucial factor in defusing such a situation. In the early stages of a crisis it is advantageous if commanders can promptly insert leading elements of an interposition force between the parties concerned, whilst concurrently conducting negotiations with the antagonists. While negotiations may continue to reduce tension the advance elements of the interposition force should be reinforced until it is sufficiently strong to regain control of the situation, should negotiations fail. Care should be taken not to escalate crises by such action.

04021. **Dealing with small infringements**

a. **Standing Patrol**. If action by one of the opposing forces is deemed by the sector (battalion) commander or force headquarters as likely to lead to confrontation, or to amount to a violation of the BZ, a standing patrol may be placed on the site until the offending party withdraws and the *status quo is* restored.

b. **Use of APCs and reconnaissance vehicles**. There is a natural tendency to deploy armoured vehicles whenever there is a need to interpose a small peacekeeping force to deal with an infringement or provocation. Care has to be taken to avoid alarming the parties to the dispute with the risk of escalation. Armoured vehicles should only be used in the following situations:

(1) When weapons have already been used in the incident, or there is a serious threat that they might be used.

(2) To patrol a notoriously hazardous confrontation area when the use of thin-skinned vehicles or troops on foot is dangerous.

(3) To provide a commander with mobility, protection and communications to observe a violation from a distance sufficient to avoid unnecessary provocation.

(4) As a calculated and carefully considered escalatory step to indicate that a peacekeeping force is not prepared to allow a potentially dangerous situation to deteriorate. Because the adoption of a higher profile involves risks, the decision to deploy armoured vehicles requires careful judgement.

(5) Force headquarters may impose restrictions on the use of armoured vehicles.

04022. **Liaison with the opposing parties**. While the peacekeeping force headquarters will set up a liaison system and communications with the commanders of the opposing forces it is equally important to establish contact and good working relations at battalion, company and, on occasion, platoon level. Officers must know the names of the commanders of the forces they are dealing with and form an assessment of their attitude to the peacekeeping force and the agreement. If an atmosphere of trust can be established it should be possible to arrange informal meetings for ‘off the record’ discussions. Contact points should be established where meetings can be arranged at short notice with local representatives of the parties. They may be located

at existing OPs or in huts conveniently sited near the BZ boundary fence. If possible they should be fitted with wire terminals so that a field telephone can be connected quickly. Alternatively, ‘hot lines’ may be established between peacekeeping force company commanders and their opposite numbers in the parties to the dispute. The aim is to ensure that incidents are dealt with quickly and effectively at the lower level before they escalate. Some form of hospitality usually eases the atmosphere at the meeting.

Section IV - Controlling Urban Areas

04023. **General.** Cities and towns are the focus of economic and political power. They are especially vulnerable to street violence and other disturbances both for this reason and because complex modern urban life can be so easily and effectively disrupted, with consequential widespread publicity.

04024. Urban operations are likely to continue to be an important feature of PSO in many areas of the world, therefore some suitable tactics needed for effective results are covered in this AJP.

04025. **The intensity of operations**. The intensity of operations may vary from a relatively passive policy designed to curtail hostile activities so that community life can continue, albeit under certain constraints, to a more active policy, which involves military forces, moving against activists and their supporters. The level of intensity at which operations are conducted will be the subject of careful consideration by the appropriate authorities.

04026. **Belligerent Tactics.** The broad range of potential tactics that could be adopted by an adversary in urban areas are:

a. Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.

b. Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the security forces.

c. Attacks against re-supply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links or air bases.

d. Provoking military forces in the hope that they may overreact and provide material for hostile propaganda.

e. Sniping at road blocks, static posts and sentries.

f. Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.

g. Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets, or indiscriminately to cause confusion, destruction and a lowering of public morale.

h. Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

i. Attacks against sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees.

04027. **Need for alertness.** A soldier in an urban area has to be constantly alert both to avoid exposing himself as a target and to protect those with him. Sentries, observers in OPs, foot and mobile patrols and administrative vehicles can all present attractive targets. Soldiers in static posts should be covered by fire, and the posts themselves properly protected. All movement should be carried out with fire support available.

04028. Troops have to also be aware of the danger of discussing anything of a military nature, whether it be names, locations or movements of themselves, their friends or their units, with casual civilian acquaintances.

04029. **The news media**. An urban area is attractive to the news media because action is concentrated in a relatively small and easily accessible area, the congregation of people ensures that there is likely to be a ready audience and the material for a good story, and hotels and communications facilities are usually available. The pressures on public relations staff are therefore considerable, and every member of the forces is constantly exposed to a critical appraisal of his conduct.

04030. **Deployment.** The two broad alternatives are to base troops outside the locality in which they are to operate, or to base them within their operational area: the advantages and disadvantages of the two are:

a. Bases outside the area.

(1) **Advantages**. A secure base can be set up where men off duty can relax and rest and possibly enjoy some recreational facilities. The protection of such a base can be assured with less sentries and probably less defences. It is reasonably accessible to administrative transport, thus re-supply and the repair and maintenance of equipment and transport could well be carried out on the spot.

(2) **Disadvantages**. These are that reaction time is much greater and reserves may therefore have to be kept at short notice and possibly deployed in anticipation of their being needed. Because troops may be unable to return to base between patrols etc. there could be a demand for sending some administrative transport forward into the operational area which requires an escort and possibly provides a target. The

journey time to and from the base eats into the period available for rest and personal administration.

b. Bases in the area.

(1) **Advantages**. Reaction can be speedy and reserves can be readily deployed in response to rather than in anticipation of events, thus reducing the need to hold a large body of men at relatively short notice. Troops become more closely identified with the area in which they live which improves their chances of getting to know the local population, the detailed geography and the habits of adversary groups. The ability to dominate the area is probably made easier.

(2) **Disadvantages**. Troops can rest but not relax, they are constantly exposed to the danger of attack and as more men will be needed for local protection their hours on duty will be longer. All administrative traffic should be escorted and this also puts a strain on manpower.

04031. **Inter-Unit Boundaries.** An operational area will usually be allocated to units and further allocated to sub-units. The boundaries between areas must be clearly defined, and should take account of civil police areas. Where a boundary runs down a street, that street should be the responsibility of one unit only. The command arrangements should be such that men of one unit can cross in hot pursuit into adjacent area belonging to another unit.

Tactics

04032. **General**. Troops employed in urban operations will need to be well rehearsed and practised in the following tactical procedures.

a. Guarding bases and installations.

b. Roadblocks and checkpoints.

c. Controlpoints.

d. Curfews.

e. Search operations.

f. Crowd dispersal and riot control.

g. Some elementary aspects of covert surveillance.

04033. **Snipers**. Because of the need for alertness, immediate action drills can usefully be devised for such circumstances as a patrol coming under fire from a sniper. This is always a particularly difficult situation as the source of the firing is seldom obvious. Depending on the situation it may be more suitable and appropriate to improve force protection procedures to prevent this occurring or mount a quick cordon and search operation if locations can be identified. In certain circumstances snipers may be deployed to reduce the risk of this type of action.

04034. **Control of movement**. Where activists are using explosives to terrorise and disrupt the general public it will often be necessary to ban vehicle movement and parking in shopping and other public amenity areas. It may also be necessary to require that all pedestrians entering such areas be searched. While this may well control movement and help to canalise hostile activity, it is expensive in manpower and increases public resentment at the curtailment of unimpeded movement.

04035. **Night operations.** Night patrolling may well be conducted on foot because vehicle movement may be too obvious in quiet streets. However a lot of built up areas are noisy and busy at night and mobile support could be a vital back up to foot patrol activity at any time. Street lighting may be an advantage but it does make unobtrusive patrolling difficult and the balance of advantage whether or not it is used has to depend on local circumstances.

04036. **Helicopters.** Helicopters must hover if they are to see into narrow streets and enclosed areas, which makes them vulnerable to missiles and sniper fire. They are, however, useful for observing crowds as these form and move; they can act as airborne command posts and rebroadcast stations, and they can re-supply and reinforce rooftop standing patrols, and evacuate casualties. It is now routine for helicopters to be fitted with surveillance devices, such as optical and terminal imaging sights, video cameras and night vision goggles, which have many applications in any role. However it should be noted that the prolonged use of helicopters over localised areas particularly at night will normally produce a large number of protests from the population.

04037. **Operations below ground.** Movement below ground is usually feasible in main towns and cities, it may also be possible in smaller urban and suburban areas and even in some country districts. Operations below ground are merely an extension of surface operations, and commanders have to be aware of their scope and significance.

Underground passages provide additional approaches and escape routes which must be taken into account in planning the defence of installations.

Underground Systems

04038. **General**. Most underground tunnels have a circular cross section so that if they carry any sort of roadway or rails there will be flat decking with a space beneath it. This space may be big enough for movement, it will certainly provide hiding places, for persons and their weapons and equipment. Tunnels have access points, usually at both ends and at intervals along them; these also allow fresh air to circulate: access points or fresh airshafts may, however, be sealed up in disused tunnels. There is always a danger from an accumulation of gases and foul air in any tunnel; respirators may not give protection, and men working in the area should be provided with breathing apparatus.

04039. The underground systems include:

a. **Sewers**. These are the most common underground systems, which exist in every large urban area; they may be as much as six metres in diameter and they always have frequent access points. Where they incorporate a roadway, speedy movement by quite large parties is possible.

b. **Railway tunnels**. There may be underground railways in some large cities, or tunnels to carry a surface railway into a city centre or under high ground in the country. Passage of trains and the presence of maintenance gangs make such tunnels more hazardous to anybody attempting to pass through the area. They will usually be most attractive as a means of access, at night or at weekends when activity will be less frequent.

c. **Pipeline subways**. Tunnels designed to carry gas, water and electricity services will often be too small to admit the passage of a man. They do have frequent access points and may be as much as four feet in diameter thus allowing for slow movement along them, and the opportunity to hide weapons and other stores.

d. **Cellars and connection passages**. Cellars are commonly found in urban areas, and even where connection doors and passages do not exist they can easily be constructed to make an extensive underground system. This of course requires the connivance or coercion of the occupants.

e. **Disused mine workings**. These may occur anywhere, and the access they permit will depend on the depth of the workings and the pattern and extent of the galleries.

f. **Subterranean rivers**. Any large town built in a valley will almost certainly include streams and perhaps small rivers within its boundaries. These may have been enclosed creating subterranean waterways, which may also be used to carry off storm water; for this purpose they will have frequent access points.

g. **Road tunnels**. Because they are usually open to the public they do not offer a covered approach for clandestine movement. However, road tunnels below key or vulnerable points may be used in an attack on them.

h. **Natural caves and catacombs.** In some areas there are extensive handmade and natural caves under most towns and villages.

04040. **Intelligence.** Maps of all underground systems, including details of accessibility, should be held in the surveyors or public works departments of the local government. The officials responsible for the services using the tunnels, and for their maintenance, should be able to give valuable additional information on physical characteristics, fresh air supplies, volume, rate and time of flow, useful control and blocking points etc.

04041. The information gained from civil sources may need to be supplemented by reconnaissance. Subterranean access to the area of key points should be ascertained and any pattern of use of underground systems by other individuals or groups needs to be checked.

04042. **Denial of access.** Access can be denied either by sealing entry points or by making the system unusable. The methods will vary considerably with the type of underground tunnelling, and their success may depend on the ability of the military forces to maintain a degree of observation. Some methods are:

a. Sealing access points, this is only possible where very occasional access is needed; they should be spot welded, as any other form of seal is relatively ineffective.

b. Installing remote sensors or intruder alarms which will, however, need maintenance and communications, and their existence will be widely known amongst employees using the tunnel system.

c. Sealing off parts of the system by erecting internal barriers; these have to be substantial and probably welded into place.

d. Flushing out the system with CS smoke at low concentration or by flooding with water: parts, at least, of a tunnel system can be neutralised permanently in this way.

e. Patrolling underground passages. This will always be necessary in any system, for example sewers or an underground railway, which cannot be sealed; it has the dual advantage of discouraging unauthorised use and of enabling the security forces to become familiar with the tunnel system.

04043. **Clearance operations.** If hostile groups use an underground system in spite of the precautions listed above, then operations may have to be mounted to clear the tunnels. The main points to be noted are:

a. **Locating unauthorised users**. Comprehensive maps are essential. If there is no indication of where to look then the tunnel systems must be searched systematically and each part which is cleared has to be guarded. Every subterranean patrol must be supported by co-ordinated surface patrolling.

b. **Flushing out**. Water, CS smoke at low concentration can be used selectively in different parts of a tunnel system; their aim must be to force those escaping into the open rather than into other tunnels. Strict control must be exercised over the use of riot control agents in confined spaces.

c. **Siege**. It may be possible to block all escape routes and then wait for cold and hunger to take effect.

d. **Physical assault**. This is a matter of applying ordinary tactical principles in a cramped and unusual environment.

04044. **Command and control**. It will be more difficult to maintain close command and control of operations underground. The following points should be noted and simple solutions considered.

a. **Communications**. Radio may not work well and line may have to be laid. There must be good communication between troops working underground and those on the surface.

b. **Orientation**. It is easy to lose all sense of direction when underground. The need for good maps has already been stressed; they should be supplemented by gyro compasses and overt signposting.

c. **Combat identification**. Good communication and strict control and the use of badges, insignia or special items of clothing will help only avoid clashes between different parties of the security forces.

Section V - Controlling Rural Areas

04045. **General**. The characteristics of rural operations are that:

a. The adversary has to rely more on force of arms, stealth or fieldcraft for his protection.

b. Rural operations are thus conducted in a similar fashion to those of conventional operations.

c. While there is the inevitable difficulty of distinguishing between neutral and hostile members of the population, once hostile groups have been identified by some aggressive act, they can, if necessary, be engaged less chance of involving innocent people.

d. The relatively open nature of the countryside, in comparison to the town, provides more scope for mobile operations and the use, where these are justified, of heavier weapons and aviation.

04046. Rural communities are often small and isolated, they are thus more vulnerable to local intimidation and are difficult to protect. For this reason it is often easier for hostile control to be imposed over a scattered rural community than over a neighbouring town. Also, even in areas where the authority of the elected government is recognised hostile groups may be able to operate with relative freedom because local people go in fear of intimidation and reprisal.

04047. This gives rise to two broad types of rural operations:

a. Those where control by the authorities still exists: in this case relatively minor operations can be used effectively to control if not eliminate the threat of hostile activity.

b. Those where authority has been so eroded that officials can no longer move freely about their business, and effective control of an area may even lie in hostile hands; this calls for a wider scale of operation with, possibly, the need for measures falling not far short of those employed in full scale military operations.

04048. **Minor operations**. The operational objectives of the operation to regain overall control in the situation are described in AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations. Tactics for rural operations usually involve relatively small bodies of troops, although

large numbers may be required if several mutually supporting operations are mounted concurrently. The techniques and procedures which are particularly applicable to a rural setting are described as:

a. Protection of personnel and guarding installations.

b. Protection of VIP and small convoys and large road convoys and rail movement and picketing a route.

c. Movement planning, roadblocks, checkpoints and curfews.

d. Patrols and covert surveillance.

e. Search operations.

Operations to Regain Control of an Area

04049. **General**. This section also describes the tactical operations that could be conducted by a unit, suitably reinforced, with the aim of imposing control in a rural area, which is cultivated and has some small villages and isolated farmsteads. In heavily forested, sparsely populated or generally underdeveloped terrain, the inevitably long distances and poor communications could well require the deployment of formations of several units.

04050. **Controlled areas**. A controlled area is one in which the civil administration and local police are able to work effectively. Hostile elements may still be able to infiltrate, and isolated security incidents may occur, but the forces in the area should be capable of limiting such acts.

04051. **Gaining control of an area**. In an area where the civil administration and the local police are unable to go about their duties because hostile forces prevent this, operations may have to be mounted to reintroduce control. The establishing of any secure base within a new area could have severe operational risk, and complicated logistic support arrangements, and it is better to plan for a worst-case situation. This would imply that there is a need for artillery units, air resupply, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and some degree of fortification and dumping of supplies. The conduct of these operations will be directly influenced by:

a. The strength and organisation of the hostile activity.

b. The support accorded to hostile forces whether this comes from outside the country or is self-supporting and dependent on internal assistance.

c. The nature of the countryside, its accessibility and density of population.

d. The forces available.

e. The operating mandate.

04052. **Land borders**. A land border beyond which hostile forces can expect sanctuary and over which arms and explosives are smuggled introduces some additional international factors which will need careful consideration before overt action is taken.

Concept of Operations

04053. **General**. The aim of rural operations is to create stable conditions where the law will be respected and observed, where the civil administration can function without the backing of enlarged security forces, and where the civil community can move and live freely without fear. This requires a dual approach, with the overall objective of separating the hostile element from the population. These tasks are normally complementary and require a careful assessment of priorities and allocation of resources, but their combined purpose is:

a. To achieve and maintain the neutralisation of the hostile forces.

b. To protect the population by denying free movement for hostile forces anywhere in the operational area.

04054. **Attrition**. The basis of successful attrition is the contact intelligence provided by constant close surveillance of suspected persons and their supporters. The surveillance plan should be co-ordinated with every agency at the highest appropriate level, and full use should be made of the entire range of techniques and equipment available including covert operations, covert patrols, and the use of attended and unattended surveillance devices. Based on the information the surveillance operations will provide, security forces can maintain a constant pressure on these persons by instituting specific search operations, and by using selective personnel checks, head checks, house and area searches and screening. Resulting from effective surveillance, activists can be tracked down, and if they are not neutralised, useful evidence can be obtained to assist the authorities in bringing about their eventual prosecution.

04055. **Denying free movement**. This task is of equal importance to that of attrition, and contributes to it by sealing off the activist from his support, forcing him to take risks, and limiting his ability to concentrate for aggressive action. It is achieved by

road blocks and vehicle check points, both in depth and covering main lines of communications, and on border patrols and special measures to combat specific tactics, for example train and vehicle hijacking. Towns have to be made secure using the normal techniques for urban operations, and security force bases should themselves be employed as strong points from which offensive operations can be mounted.

04056. **Approach to tasks**. The planning principles for rural operations are similar to those applying elsewhere, but because of the necessarily greater dispersion of forces and the larger distances, more emphasis has to be placed on the following:

a. **Planning and intelligence**. All operations should be carefully planned and controlled to make optimum use of resources, and have to be based on the best information and intelligence gained of hostile tactics and habits.

b. **Selectivity**. Operations whilst being firm, positive and effective, have to also be selective, and must be seen to be so.

c. **Strength and reserves**. Mutual support is often difficult to achieve, and security forces can easily become isolated. Operations therefore must always be mounted in sufficient strength to match the threat, and in addition adequate reserves have to be maintained at all times.

d. **Use of aviation patrols**. Recent experience in land based operations has shown that good use has been made of a separate Aviation Area of Operations (AO) being overlaid on one or more ground unit areas. In the event of an incident, the commander who is able to control the incident more clearly would take control. This is often the aviation patrol commander who can then move resources to suitable locations in order to achieve the task or resolve the incident.

Firm Base

04057. **Tactical Points**. All operations have to be mounted from a firm base which should be:

a. At either the site of the local civil administration, or an area from which it can operate initially.

b. Accessible by land over routes which can be secured without too much effort.

c. Able to provide at least a helicopter landing point if not a suitable air strip.

d. Easily defensible with the minimum of force; preferably surrounded by natural obstacles.

e. Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic support and transport, but not so large as to make local defence a problem.

f. Provided with physical protection commensurate with the prevailing threat.

04058. **Location**. Such a base should preferably be on the edge of an already controlled area so that its rear is secure. If it has to be set up outside a controlled area the requirements for local defence and securing communications will almost certainly be too big for a single unit.

04059. **Establishing controlled areas**. The methods employed to establish and expand controlled areas are launched from the base area and forward operational bases. Military forces are usually employed in the early stages of such operations, local paramilitary forces being moved in to consolidate and eventually take over the areas which have been cleared. The armed forces are thus freed for further operations designed to continue the expansion process. It will, however, be a great asset if the paramilitary forces with their local knowledge are sufficiently competent to carry out or assist with the initial operations. Although some activists will undoubtedly penetrate into and through controlled areas, their opportunities for doing so in strength and for achieving surprise will lessen progressively as the civilian population is won over to the government's side. The defence commitment for forward operational bases will be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared and secured, thereby freeing more troops for further operations.

04060. **Local defence.** The commander needs to concentrate on operations throughout the operational area; the responsibility for local defence should thus be given to a sub-unit. The maximum use must be made of defence stores. Any vantagepoints overlooking the base area must be secured and any ground from which an attack might be mounted must be covered by patrols. It is important that the local defence of the base should be effective and economical. Troops tied up on this task cannot be used in pursuit of the main aim of re-establishing control over the area; furthermore, hostile attacks on the base, even if they are unsuccessful, tend to undermine public confidence in the security forces.

04061. **Intelligence.** Closely-knit rural communities are difficult to penetrate and intelligence may be very hard to come by in the early stages of operations. The need to set up a firm base on the edge of an already controlled area may be helpful in this context because information on the operational area may initially have to come from sources within the controlled area. As soon as operations can be seen to be achieving success, information should become more plentiful: measures must therefore be taken to provide means for those who wish to get in touch with security forces to do so without undue risk to themselves.

04062. **Patrolling**. The basis of operations in a hostile area is patrolling, aimed at acquiring information and identifying and apprehending persons and neutralising hostile groups. The kind of patrol depends on the aim of the patrol. So there are:

a. **Reconnaissance patrols**. These play a major role. They will need to visit all outlying communities in order both to acquire information and provide the reassurance of a security force presence. These patrols may have to search areas and they may need to set up snap roadblocks.

b. **Social patrols.** This is a way of patrolling in PSO when the situation in the area is stabilised and there is no direct danger for the forces. The patrol is recognised as a unit of the PSF. The intention is to show the local people that forces are in the area and are alert. The patrol is armed; to the local people the patrol is acting friendly and at a frank way but is alert. The patrols are carried out by daylight.

c. **Fighting patrols**. In an area where formed groups of armed men may be encountered, it may be necessary to mount fighting patrols. In such circumstances it will usually be sensible to impose a curfew so that the security forces are not placed at a disadvantage.

d. **Standing patrols**. Covert surveillance is often a profitable source of information. In the early stages of operations, it may be difficult to establish covert operations without exposing them to unacceptable risks. This is not only a matter of placing men’s lives in jeopardy, it is also most important to deny activists any successes which may bolster their morale and call in question the efficiency of the security forces. Covert surveillance should therefore always be conducted under cover of both mutual support and a readily available reaction force.

e. **Aviation patrols**. Aviation patrols can be used to cover large areas and gain certain types of information quickly. The use of thermal imaging cameras can gain timely information, both day and night, for monitoring movement and activity. Aviation patrols should be given tasks similar to those of reconnaissance patrols.

04063. **Ambushes.** Ambushes are sometimes useful in rural operations. If they are conducted under cover of a curfew and the necessary precautions are taken to ensure that innocent people do not get involved, it should be possible to set a conventional style ambush designed to capture hostile persons.

04064. **Curfew.** A curfew, especially at night, may be very important to rural operations. Movement in the countryside takes place in the open, and hostile groups and individuals may need to move quite long distances to communicate, assemble and take hostile action. Such movement can be monitored by day using standing and reconnaissance patrols, and aircraft. At night it will always be difficult, and a curfew may be essential to give the security forces some freedom of action.

04065. **Resettlement**. Isolated hamlets and farmsteads can pose difficult problems because there will seldom be enough troops to stop their use by hostile groups, or to guard them if the occupants need protecting. Resettlement may be the only alternative, although as a last resort, because it is seldom popular. Re-housing should preferably be within reach of the land being evacuated so that farming and stocktending can go on. The measures will be devised and the decisions taken by the civil authorities, but it are important that security force commanders are aware of the implications and are consulted during planning.

Safe Areas

04066. The purpose of organising safe areas would be to:

a. Ensure control of the population.

b. Give inhabitants security from hostile action.

c. Prevent hostile elements assisting others with supplies.

d. Permit the security forces greater freedom of action.

04067. Initially, safe areas may have to be manned by military forces, but in the long term the aim should be to train and organise affairs so that the civil police are able to

take over. Any network of safe areas in a controlled area have to be supported by patrols and mobile reserves, also possibly by artillery and air support.

04068. The following may be needed for a network of safe areas within a controlled area:

a. The villages should be fortified and this could include perimeter wire, fire trenches with overhead cover, communication trenches, strong points and good fields of fire.

b. There must be a foolproof system of communication between safe areas on the one hand and mobile reserves on the other, including telephone, radio, coloured rockets, lights, sirens and locally improvised methods such as drums and flares.

c. Safe areas should be placed under the authority of an overall commander.

d. Regular military forces should assist the local authorities in training suitable guards to undertake the following tasks:

(1) Daylight patrolling of the area immediately surrounding the safe area.

(2) Checking people entering and leaving the area.

(3) Assisting the police in enforcing control measures.

(4) Patrolling at night within the safe area.

04069. **Local Forces.** A rural area is often suitable for the use of local forces. They will usually be deployed near their own homes where knowledge of the countryside may be an asset, but where they may also be vulnerable to intimidation. Local forces can form useful reserves in the earlier stages of operations.

04070. **Reserves.** A mobile reserve should always be readily available. It may be deployed by helicopter if flying conditions are right and enough force can be concentrated in this way. The availability of reserves and the speed with which they can be moved is a vital factor, which must be taken into account in planning operations.

Extended Operations

04071. It may be necessary to conduct concurrent operations in areas adjacent to those, which are brought under control, to relieve pressure on them, to prevent reinforcement

or to cut off an escape route. Such operations will usually have a limited objective, and the force committed will therefore be inserted, carry out its task and then be withdrawn, all within a comparatively short time. Good intelligence of hostile activities is essential; firstly to ensure that the target is worthwhile, and secondly, to give the maximum chance of success in an area which may be largely hostile. Holding ground may not be important as any position gained will have to be evacuated when the force withdraws.

04072. It will be usual for a separate unit or formation to carry out extended operations, and co-ordination will be needed at higher level. Communication between the units, which are establishing control, and those, which are conducting these operations, must be set up. Special Forces may be particularly suitable for this type of operation.

04073. Extended operations are often carried out by helicopter. This method of introducing the force saves time clearing a route and helps achieve surprise. Helicopters can be very useful for reinforcing or resupplying such a force, evacuating casualties and persons wanted for questioning, for extracting the force, and for local reconnaissance.

Control Measures

04074. Measures within an area, which has been brought under control, should be designed to protect the people, and enable the authorities to function. Account should be taken of the need to:

a. Redress grievances and, where necessary, improve standards of living.

b. Deter hostile activity, particularly subversion.

c. Encourage the provision of information.

d. Make the conduct of operations by the security forces easier.

04075. The decision to impose such control measures as the authorities allow will be taken by the local operations committee, who should consider the possible advantages and disadvantages of various measures. The reasons for imposing control measures need to be explained and the measures discontinued if they fail to produce the desired result.

04076. Some possible measures are:

a. Banning all political activities.

b. Registration of civilians.

c. Frequent inspection at irregular intervals of identity cards, permits and passes.

d. Control of food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs and medicines.

e. Restrictions on civilian movement.

f. Curfews.

04077. In this context a commander should not rule out the use of infantry support weapons, artillery, air power and possibly the availability of naval or marine capabilities. The ROE for the use of these weapons in a PSO situation would be provided by the Force commander and cleared by each nation contributing troops for the operation, but the tactical deployment and use of the troops concerned would be on the lines of those utilised in general war. Artillery for instance could be deployed to support patrolling activity, OPs and in larger scale operations.

Section VI - Controlling Border Areas

04078. **General.** Hostile forces often attract support from outside the country, either from international organisations or from other countries willing to embarrass the authorities. All external support of men and material must cross either land or sea borders, and if there is an adjacent land frontier, hostile operations may be mounted across it from the sanctuary of foreign soil. All states have the capability to impose some degree of frontier control and this may provide a suitable basis on which to build border security. Border operations generally take place away from urban areas, and the operating tactics for rural areas should generally be applied. Most of the problems, which arise, are influenced by local conditions.

04079. **Land Borders.** Land borders are seldom clearly defined unless marked by a river. The frontier may pass through dense forest, a chain of hills or mountains or cultivated farmland. Where there is no physical barrier, herdsmen, foresters and farmers may often cross the border to carry on their daily work. It will seldom be possible to seal such frontiers entirely, either with a physical barrier or with troops. However, if hostile groups are to be denied the supplies and support which they can obtain in the neighbouring territory then steps must be taken to control cross border movement on the main lines of communication. The gaps should be covered by observation and patrolling.

04080. The desired effect is to canalise movement through areas of government choosing. This in combination with good intelligence gained by constant surveillance could enable the security forces to impose control, inflict casualties, take prisoners, intercept supplies, or at worst deny access. Without the co-operation of security forces on the other side of the border such measures, while essential, will seldom show spectacular results.

04081. A policy of patrolling is usually necessary in a border area, the intensity of the patrolling being related to the threat. The adoption of other measures will depend on the political and security situation and the consequential degree of restriction on civil movement.

04082. **Restrictions on Civil Movement**. When, in the early stages of operations, there are no restrictions on civil movement in frontier areas, the two main problems are detection and identification. If the area is sparsely populated, detection of abnormal

movement will be relatively easy, and remote sensors, night vision devices and tracker dogs can all help. Interception and subsequent identification may be less simple, as a sparsely populated area is likely to be rough and wild, with few roads; by day an intercept force can be deployed swiftly by helicopter, by night successful interception may require an unrealistic number of patrols. In a well populated area with unrestricted civil movement, successful detection and interception of illegal border-crossers will depend largely on good intelligence.

04083. When operations have reached the stage where the government recognises the necessity of restricting the movement of civilians in frontier areas the task of the security forces can be made easier. The types of restriction which may be helpful are:

a. Imposing a curfew.

b. Establishing a prohibited zone, which is either cleared of all inhabitants or made accessible only to those with special passes.

Other Factors

04084. **Barriers**. Movement can be inhibited by various barriers which may be lethal or non lethal.

a. **Blocked Roads**. Movement by vehicles in areas away from official crossing points can be made difficult by blowing bridges and culverts, cratering roads and erecting obstacles. An obstacle not covered by observation is, as always, of limited effectiveness.

b. **Blocked Waterways.**

c. **Fencing**. Barbed wire fencing will deter innocent crossers but it will not withstand a determined attempt to breach it. Its main use is therefore to reduce the number of investigations which have to be made. A cut fence can of course be used to lure investigators into an ambush and this may influence the siting of any artificial barrier.

d. **Surveillance Devices**. An infra-red fence or seismic intrusion alarm is not a deterrent until it becomes known that crossing in certain areas covered by these devices is hazardous, leading to a strong probability of arrest.

e. **Minefields**. Lethal barriers, such as anti-tank minefields will seldom be feasible until the situation has deteriorated to something close to open

warfare. It usually require some sort of prohibited zone and should be supported by sensors to detect and locate attempts at breaching.

04085. **Artificial Barriers**. A man-made physical barrier should always be erected within friendly territory so that incursions detected by sensors, and attempts to breach the barrier, take place on ground within the authority of the government, where the security forces have freedom of action.

04086. **Curfew**. The main effect of a curfew is the removal of the difficulty of identifying innocent from hostile people, since anyone breaking the curfew may be assumed to be hostile. However measures for detection followed by investigation are still necessary. It will not usually be possible to make a big reduction in the effort put into detection, since 100 percent coverage of the border must still be the aim.

04087. **Prohibited Areas**. Establishing a prohibited frontier zone may have political advantages over the often-emotive imposition of a curfew. The degree of prohibition can be varied and may depend on the nature of the frontier, any natural or man made physical barriers and the nature of the threat. The more freedom of action needed by the security forces, the more necessary will it be to ensure that casualties to civilians are avoided by keeping them out of the way. The surveillance requirement remains the same but the number of investigations should be reduced.

04088. **Force Requirements**. With a sensor based surveillance system backed by a mobile reaction force, and in the absence of any civil population, stretches of border area covered by a surveillance force, backed up by a reaction force at immediate readiness could provide a reasonable degree of success against a single infiltration attempt. If multiple attempts were made, or if there was significant civilian movement in the area, the reaction force might need to be increased. A ratio of surveillance to reaction forces of between one to two and one to six can be achieved depending on environment.

04089. **Cross Border Operations**. If hostile groups are operating from sanctuaries outside the country it will be desirable for the governments of the countries concerned to discuss mutual arrangements which may include cross border operations. It is always better to apprehend a hostile incursion force before they escape over the border, and the reaction force should be poised to achieve this. If artillery, mortar or small arms fire is mounted from across the border it will seldom be possible to return this,

and passive measures such as the use of smoke may be necessary to cover withdrawal or conceal the target.

04090. **Coastlines**. The open sea beyond a coastline provides a near equivalent of a prohibited frontier zone on land, and comparatively simple controls within territorial waters can simplify the problem of identification. The degree of physical protection which is necessary depends on the ease with which landings can be made; a rugged coastline with inaccessible cliffs and treacherous offshore currents needs less protection than easily approached beaches with good exits. Physical protection of an indented coastline is difficult and use must be made of surveillance devices and reconnaissance. The four layers of coastal defence are:

a. Long range airborne surveillance.

b. Offshore seaborne surveillance.

c. Inshore seaborne surveillance and intercept measures.

d. Land based surveillance and intercept measures.

04091. **Intelligence**. Customs and coastguards services will have studied the problems of countering illegal entry by sea and their experience may provide a useful basis for intelligence operations.

04092. **Surveillance**. Long range surveillance carried out by maritime aircraft and naval craft can be used to alert inshore and land intercept forces. Identification may be a problem at sea, and an international mandate on questioning and searching foreign ships within territorial waters may be needed. Inshore surveillance by helicopters, inshore vessels, land based radar and look-out stations should be deployed to cover all likely approaches.

04093. **Interception**. Interception of unidentified craft or of vessels whose mission or cargo is suspect can be made at sea or on land. Civil police, coastguards or their equivalent may need to be embarked in inshore craft, or accompany detachments on land for this purpose.

04094. **Command and Control**. Coastal defence should be under the command of one headquarters, it should include elements from naval forces, air forces, civil police including maritime police, and those land forces given the tasks of surveillance and intercept. Communications are essential between all elements engaged in surveillance

so that targets acquired far out at sea can be passed successively to inshore craft, coastal surveillance and intercept forces. It may be necessary to co-ordinate not only the government and military agencies but also several different civil agencies which may all have a part to play but who are not always accustomed to working together. Civil agencies such as port and river authorities, customs, coastguards, civil police in coastal areas and fishery authorities may all need to be represented in the coastal command system.

Section VII – Controlling Civilian Movement

04095. **General**. Prohibitions and restrictions are always distasteful to the general public unless the need for them is clear and they are fairly and equitably applied. Control of civilian movement is likely to be particularly unpopular, and its introduction has to be correspondingly carefully planned and any likely causes of discontent anticipated. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing collective measures of control in accordance with the law, the military force commander is responsible for enforcing these, and should therefore be consulted in the planning stages.

04096. **The methods of controlling movement**. The principal methods of controlling movement considered in this Serial are by:

a. Roadblocks and Checkpoints.

b. Controlpoints.

c. Curfews.

d. Control of Border Areas.

04097. **Control measures**. The aims of applying control measures are to:

a. Improve the ability of the military forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in the civil authorities and, by so doing, encourage more respect and acquiescence for the legitimate authority.

b. Disrupt hostile groups by making the movement of individuals more difficult and subject to check.

c. Dominate an area as a deterrent to hostile action and prevent the unlawful assembly of crowds.

d. Prevent crowds, which do form from being reinforced.

e. Discourage the illegal movement of arms, explosives, medical supplies or food.

f. Seal an area in order to prevent the entry of arms, explosives and other subversive material.

g. Apprehend wanted persons.

h. Record movements to detect patterns and gain information.

i. Facilitate operations by the forces of law and order.

04098. **Manner of imposition**. Control measures should be applied firmly but with understanding. It should be made clear to the population that the inconvenience and hardship is not being inflicted with punitive intent, but in order to root out dangerous elements and to provide the law abiding with security and protection. Whenever possible, action taken and explanations given should consciously promote this attitude.

04099. **Lifting of restrictions**. Control should not be continued for longer than is necessary. The lifting of controls in one area may act as an incentive to the population in another area to isolate hostile forces and troublemakers.

04100. **Co-operation**. Control measures have to be planned and directed on a joint police/ military basis. Full co-operation is essential at all levels, as is co-ordination with heads of public services such as Public Information, Medical, Ambulance, and Fire.

04101. **Public reaction**. During planning, account should be taken of likely public reaction to controls, both to enable suitable information policy to be framed and to weigh the advantages of any particular measure against a possibly unpopular reception. Any adverse reaction will always be exploited by agitators, while ill conceived measures may cause the collapse of public services, food distribution etc. and so contribute to discontent. In this context, planning should take into account that:

a. The balance between the advantages and the objections is favourable; it should be appreciated that short-term military advantages may be cancelled out by other long term civil disadvantages.

b. A measure, once adopted, will actually produce the advantages claimed.

c. A measure should only be continued for as long as it produces the desired results, or until it is clear that such results are unattainable.

d. It is recognised that measures, which are ineffective, will probably undermine confidence in the security forces.

04102. **Planning measures**. The civil authorities will usually initiate planning, and it is important that the military forces are involved at an early stage. It should include:

a. The need for intelligence and for a good liaison by military commanders with the appropriate branches within any police force.

b. The need to establish joint police and military headquarters where this is appropriate.

c. The division of a large area into sub-areas, should normally coinciding with police boundaries.

d. The allocation of forces including military and police combined patrols.

e. The allocation and positioning of central and local reserves.

f. Establishing channels for requests for military help.

g. The sitting and control of surveillance devices, including radar's, security lights and other aids.

h. The reception, accommodation and maintenance of troops.

i. The preparation of any special information needed, for example photographs and descriptions of wanted persons or vehicles.

j. Arrangements to keep the public informed of the situation, and the preparation of PR briefs.

k. Rehearsal of control measures, and the testing of any new or joint communications.

04103. The use of control measures will invariably take place concurrently with the planning of the other types of operation in the overall campaign. Plans should be flexible so that military forces can always be ready to switch, wholly or partly, from one type of operation to another. The availability of central and local reserves should help to meet this requirement.

Section VIII – Roadblocks, Checkpoints and Controlpoints

04104. **General**. Roadblocks and checkpoints are a means of controlling movement on roads, tracks and footpaths. A road block is used to block or close a route to vehicle and/or pedestrian traffic, while check points may have a more limited and specific purpose usually apparent from their title, as vehicle check point, personnel check point etc. For simplicity, they are all referred to as roadblocks. For the definition of roadblock, checkpoint and controlpoint see Glossery.

Roadblocks

04105. Roadblocks may have one or more of the following aims:

a. To maintain a broad check on road movement, partly to reassure the local population.

b. To frustrate the movement of arms or explosives.

c. To assist in the enforcement of controls of movement both of people and material.

d. To gather information and data on suspected persons, vehicles, and movement.

04106. **Types of Road Block**:

a. **Deliberate**. These are of a permanent or semi-permanent nature and may be placed on a main road perhaps near a border, on the outskirts of a city or on the edge of a controlled area. They are a deterrent and are unlikely to produce spectacular results.

b. **Snap**. Snap roadblocks may be deployed by ground troops already on patrol or by a rapid reaction force deployed by helicopter.

(1) **Ground**. These are used for spot checks, sometimes acting on some item of intelligence. Initially they may achieve surprise and success, but once their position is generally known, in urban areas this is seldom longer than ten minutes, they quickly lose their usefulness.

(2) **Helicopter**. Primarily used in rural areas, VCPs may be used to dominate an area for a limited period of time. They can take the initiative away from hostile groups and help to suppress activity on the

ground. Deploying VCPs by helicopter has the advantages of maintaining initiative, flexibility of deployment and wide area coverage. The opportunities for capturing, interdicting or disrupting hostile activity is high. Unpredictability is essential to avoid pattern setting and maintaining the initiative.

c. **Triggered**. This is a variation of the snap road block, usually used in urban and rural areas in circumstances where it is often easy for anyone to take avoiding action on sighting a block in operation.

d. **Reactionary**. This is a version of the snap but is used in reaction to an incident or attack in another area. It may be ground or helicopter based and is useful in interdicting hostile activity following the occurrence.

04107. **Deliberate Roadblocks**. Tactical guidelines for setting up a deliberate road block are:

a. **Concealment**. The roadblock should be sited tactically where it cannot be seen from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide good positions provided that the requirements of road safety are met. There should be no room for an approaching vehicle to take avoiding action by turning, leaving the road or reversing.

b. **Security**. There must be enough troops to protect the roadblock, particularly during the initial occupation. Sentries should be sited as backstops on both sides well clear of the search area, to watch approaching traffic and prevent evasion. Where the threat of an attack on a roadblock is likely, then the block itself must have a back up force. A roadblock is liable to attack by car bombs, counters to this can be by stopping vehicles well short of the block, by using rock ramps to shake up vehicles, and means to puncture tyres. The likely roadblock sites must be checked against booby-trapping and ambushes, and a pattern of use of road blocks avoided.

c. **Construction and Layout**. A simple construction is two parallel lines of knife rests, each with a gap, across the road approximately 50 metres apart. The enclosure formed can then be used as a search and administrative area. Within the search area there could be:

(1) Separate male and female search areas.

(2) Vehicle waiting area.

(3) Vehicle search area.

(4) A cage for detaining persons prior to their being handed over to the local authorities.

(5) Road block headquarters.

(6) Administrative area.

d. **Manning**. The number of troops required will depend upon the number of roads to be covered and the expected volume of traffic. If persons are to be searched, there must be women searchers, and special accommodation should be provided. The military commander should be, where possible, of the rank of sergeant or above. At a military roadblock, whenever possible and always when military powers of search arrest or control of movement are limited, there should be a police presence. An interpreter may also be necessary.

e. **Surveillance Devices**. Early warning devices to give warning of an approaching vehicle may be of value. Use of surveillance helicopters may assist in triggering vehicles or warning of vehicles approaching the roadblock.

f. **Search Equipment**. For searching heavy vehicles or certain types of load, additional specialist search equipment may be required.

g. **Communications**. External communications are essential so that revised instructions may be given information about wanted persons passed quickly and incidents at the roadblock reported. Internal communications within a large roadblock can speed reaction time.

h. **Legal Issues**. Troops manning roadblocks must know their powers and duties under the law, with regard stopping to search, to arrest and the use of force.

04108. **Snap Roadblock**. This is essentially simple because it must be capable of being set up and dismantled very quickly. It may consist of two vehicles, which are placed diagonally across a road with a search area between them: the effectiveness of the block can be increased with rolls of barbed wire. In a rural area, a snap roadblock can be emplaced by helicopter, in which case an obstacle such as a narrow bridge a cutting or level crossing gates can usefully be improved with a single coil of barbed

wire. Or the snap roadblock and its covert protection force may be moved in and out on foot; in both cases a back up force should be readily available.

04109. **Triggered Roadblock**. This roadblock is particularly effective in defeating the use of convoys and ‘scout cars’ by hostile groups, since a suspected ‘scout car’ can be allowed to pass through the road block which is subsequently triggered to catch the target vehicle. Those manning the block must take up their positions unobtrusively, after which they may either lie low waiting for selected targets in what is in essence an ambush. Also they can stop and search people with the minimum of fuss, preferably conducting this off the side of the road out of the view of anyone approaching. As with snap roadblocks, a covert protection force and a helicopterborne reaction force are required. Insertion will usually be on foot, or by covert car from a carefully sited patrol base.

04110. **Searching**. See Chapter 5

Controlpoints

04111. **General**. Controlpoints are set up by the security forces to provide a military presence on the ground in a populated area where disturbances have taken or may take place.

04112. The tasks of a controlpoint are:

a. To control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so that large crowds cannot assemble, known offenders can be arrested and curfews can be enforced.

b. To dominate the area of responsibility around the control point. This includes maintaining law and order by local patrolling with a view to preventing damage to property or injury to persons, and dispersing groups of people before they have time to assemble into a crowd. Monitor or prevent the movement of contraband where applicable.

04113. The legal powers of troops in connection with controlpoints must be clearly defined and observed. It is particularly important that the legal requirement should be anticipated at an early stage in planning, as the need for controlpoints may arise with little warning.

04114. **Composition**. A controlpoint should normally be manned by at least a platoon, but the strength required must be related to the number of roads to be controlled and the anticipated traffic. The minimum scale should be:

a. **Controlpoint headquarters**. Commander, signaller and runner.

b. **Barrier Sentries**. One NCO for each road or lane of traffic blocked, and one sentry for each barrier.

c. **Covering party**. Two men covering each set of barrier sentries.

d. **Standing patrol**. Where possible, an OP should be manned on a nearby rooftop.

e. **Searchers**. The number can only be decided in relation to the policy on searching and the amount of traffic and pedestrians expected. Female searchers will be needed if women are to be searched.

f. **Relief's**. Relief's are required for all the above. A reserve will also be required to carry out patrolling and crowd dispersal when necessary, and this may be made up from the relief's.

04115. **Use of civil authorities**. Civil police at military control points are employed to:

a. Exercise their special powers of search, arrest and seizure where the powers of the military forces are insufficient.

b. Take into police custody any persons arrested or property seized by the troops.

c. Act generally as a link with the population.

d. Act as interpreters.

04116. **Layout**. The layout of every control point is likely to vary slightly but all control points should cover the following requirements:

a. **Barriers**. Each road or traffic lane should have two barriers, one at the beginning and one at the end of the control point. The barriers should be made of knife rests and barbed wire and should cover the width of the road or traffic lane so that a vehicle has to do an 'S' turn to pass. Red hurricane lamps should be hung on the end of knife rests nearest the centre of the road at night. STOP signs, in the local language if necessary, should be placed

ahead of all barriers, and must be illuminated at night. Vehicles should initially be stopped outside the control point in case they contain a bomb.

b. **Controlpoint headquarters**. The headquarters and covering party should be sited centrally where they can see and effectively control the barrier sentries. The headquarters should be constructed of sandbags and other suitable materials up to at least 15 metres from the ground to give protection against missiles. If possible, it should also be protected from sun and rain. A reserve of riot control agent should be held.

c. **Standing Patrol**. A controlpoint should be covered by a standing patrol, ideally on a nearby rooftop, to watch for hostile activity. The patrol may be armed with a riot control agent and an automatic weapon. The use of the latter must always be governed by the need for minimum necessary force, and firing other than single shots will be unusual.

d. **Rest and administrative area**. This should be as close as possible to the controlpoint and should be reasonably secure and out of public view. This will ensure that soldiers only appear to the public when smart and alert: this instils public confidence and respect.

e. **Transport**. The need for transport will depend on the role and location of the control point. In an open area, vehicle patrols may be needed, and in some situations a local reinforcement plan could require rapid re-deployment from one control point to another. There may also be a need for administrative transport and vehicles to chase a vehicle, which has evaded the checkpoint.

04117. **Method of operation**. Controlpoints should be operated in the following manner:

a. The commander or his second in command must be present at all times.

b. All vehicles and pedestrians should be channelled through the barriers, and checked in accordance with current orders. Checking will be carried out within the barriers by the civil police if available, otherwise by barrier sentries or NCOs.

c. The control point commander should ensure that the area around his control point is patrolled. The exact area of responsibility will depend on the type of area and the men he has available.

d. The commander must remember that the manning of his controlpoint is his primary task, and if an incident occurs in his area with which he cannot deal effectively, he must call for reinforcements.

e. The commander must maintain a log of all important events and incidents.

f. The commander must carefully assess the effect of his controls. For example during the rush hour, however efficient the controlpoint, a crowd of impatient civilians or a jam of cars and lorries can quickly build up and precipitate the very situation that the controlpoint is designed to prevent.

04118. **Orders**. The commander should be issued with written orders defining his responsibilities and particularly the degree of force which may legally be employed, including orders for opening fire.

04119. **Communications**. A simple and effective form of communication in the event of an incident in an urban area is a siren. On the alarm being sounded, all patrols in the area mount snap vehicle checkpoints, thus making insurgent vehicle movement more difficult. Communications will be needed from control point headquarters to:

a. The next higher headquarters.

b. Patrols.

c. Rest and administrative area.

04120. **Identity Documents**. An identity document may be an identity card, a driving licence or some other official document issued by a government department or a firm. In times of social unrest, many people will probably ensure that they have some means of identification, and those who have no official status may have to rely on personal correspondence etc. Documents should always be checked against each other where there are several and against any list of wanted persons. The following points may be helpful when checking documents:

a. **Photograph**. Compare the photograph on the card with the individual. When making such a comparison, try to recreate the conditions under which the photograph was originally taken, for example if a photograph was taken hatless then ask the person to remove his or her hat. A woman may have changed her hairstyle, it may help to place a finger across the photograph to hide the hair and compare only the features. A check of age will also assist in making the comparison.

b. **Stamp**. Careful examination of the stamp across the corner of the photograph will show whether the original photograph has been removed and another substituted. The authenticity of the stamp itself should also be checked.

c. **Finger Prints**. Experts can only make positive identification; for this reason a mark indicating a thumbprint must in the normal course of events be accepted. However, if for any reason suspicion has been aroused, it may be legally permissible to detain a suspect for further questioning, and for a finger print check to be carried out by the police.

04121. **Action on vacating a roadblock, checkpoint and controlpoint**. Before abandoning the position of a snap roadblock, a search should be carried out alongside the road in each direction to the limit of visibility. This should reveal any arms or other items, which may have been discarded by their carriers on seeing the roadblock.

Section IX - Establishing a Roadblock, Checkpoint or Controlpoint

04122. **Siting Criteria**. Experience has indicated that the criteria for siting a roadblock, checkpoint or controlpoint are to ensure that the:

a. Road party is in a position where a vehicle has sufficient time to stop (avoid bends, brows of hills, etc.).

b. Cut-offs are sited where a vehicle passes them before sighting the road party, but also has plenty of time to give early warning and enough time to deploy blocking equipment if needed.

c. The patrol is mutually supported.

d. The area is thoroughly checked before use.

04123. **Insertion Drill.** Assuming that the patrol is of at least 12 men, the insertion drill could be as follows:

a. Patrol goes firm, ideally with the commander watching the area of the roadblock. The Patrol commander sites the road party and cut-offs, and carries out a visual check of the area using binoculars. He can then make an appreciation as to whether to put all teams on the road, or have one in a watch location, or one conducting satellite patrol activity.

b. The patrol commanders' team, which will be the road party, remains in overwatch while cut-offs insert.

c. Cut-offs approach their locations, go firm and carry out clearance checks on their positions. Team commander and lead man occupy a position by the road. The remainder cover from an overlook position 50m away. Lead scout positions caltrops so they are ready to be pulled across the road. All should be concealed. (Depending on what tactic the commander decides to employ will dictate who remains there).

d. Road party carries out a check of their position. Detailed tasks include:

(1) **Patrol commander**. Remains off the road, uses radio to run a check of Vehicle Registration Number. Selects vehicles to be searched. Must have an alternate signal, eg a whistle, to trigger the cut-offs.

(2) **Stopper**. Stops vehicles, speaks to the occupants, completes appropriate forms.

(3) **Searcher**. Removes webbing and weapon once tasked to search a vehicle, leaving it with the cover-man. Targets areas of vehicle to search. Also searches the occupants.

(4) **Cover-man**. Covers the vehicle occupants, from a concealed position, and protects the searchers equipment. The road party should not close in to a small space, but stay spread out in case a problem should arise.

04124. **Extraction Drill**. Normal extraction drill could be as follows:

a. Road party moves off to an overwatch position.

b. Cut-offs regroup, collect road block equipment, and extract from their positions.

c. Consider deception when moving off as hostile persons could have pinpointed the patrol in the intervening period of disengagement.

Actions Drills at Roadblocks, Checkpoints or Controlpoints

04125. **Discovering of illegal items and persons**

a. Inform Ops Centre.

b. Arrest, search, bag, restrain, and reconsider the application of the use of minimum force.

c. Vehicle becomes a scene of crime. Consider forensic evidence preservation.

d. Cut-offs effect cordon of area until they can receive assistance.

04126. **Persons Refusing to Allow Search**. In the event of a person refusing to allow their vehicle to be searched the patrol commander should:

a. Inform Ops Centre and request police assistance.

b. If the police are unavailable then ask again for agreement to search the vehicle.

c. If a person refuses to comply with a legitimate search then action against that person has to be taken in accord with the SOPs prevailing at the time.

d. If nothing is found in the subsequent search, complete a report form (driver to retain a copy,) and allow the driver to continue on his way.

e. Report full details on return to base.

04127. **Persons Trying to Leave Vehicle Whilst Search in Progress**.

a. Ask to stay with vehicle.

b. Explain legal powers. Use common sense.

c. Minimum force to retain occupants with vehicle until search complete. Keep the Ops Centre updated.

d. Arrest only as a last resort.

Section X - Curfews

04128. **General**. A curfew may be general and imposed over a wide but clearly defined area such as a city, district or region, or it may be restricted to a small area such as a town centre, a housing estate or a particular series of streets. The size of the area and the duration of time for which a curfew is imposed will depend on the reasons for it.

04129. Curfews may be needed to:

a. Assist the security forces in re-establishing control after rioting and serious disturbances have taken place, by restricting civil movement and allowing tempers to cool.

b. Prevent civil movement in a selected area while a search or the investigation of an incident is carried out.

c. Disrupt hostile groups by making movement of individuals difficult.

d. Allow the security forces greater freedom of operation.

04130. A curfew should not be imposed for punitive reasons, or as a threat to impress on the civil population the inconvenience and hardship that could arise should hostile activities take place. The population will usually obey a curfew, but boredom, shortage of food, or even the feeling that the curfew is being unfairly or ineffectively enforced can lead to curfew breaking and consequential incidents. Good planning based on a proper understanding of local conditions is essential.

Guidance for Planning Curfews

04131. **Planning**. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing a curfew, but as the need is usually a military one, the security forces should always be consulted, especially as they will have to enforce it. A curfew always absorbs large numbers of police and troops if it is to be effective.

04132. **Area**. This must be clearly defined. In towns where houses are close together and streets narrow, it may be necessary to either enlarge the area under curfew until a clearly defined perimeter is achieved, or to prohibit movement into the street which constitutes the boundary. The integrity of the perimeter of the curfew area is essential if full control is to be exercised. The civil authorities in conjunction with the security forces must decide on the curfew area.

04133. **Timing**. A curfew can be imposed for short periods without hardship. If it is unduly prolonged, it can cause grave difficulties to innocent civilians. A study of the pattern of local conditions can be helpful in arriving at timings, which are both effective and workable. It will be useful to know:

a. The time that the inhabitants normally get up, go to work and return home.

b. The time that shops normally open and close.

c. The time it will take to implement the curfew after the public announcement has been made.

04134. **Security**. If a curfew is imposed unexpectedly, hostile groups may be caught unprepared without time to adjust their plans and these and their courier services may be disrupted. An unpredicted curfew, swiftly imposed, also avoids undesirable street gatherings where agitators may try to influence people to break the curfew. Security of planning is therefore essential.

04135. **Sequence of Events**. The likely sequence of events is:

a. The decision to impose a curfew is made by the civil authorities in consultation with the police and military commanders.

b. Plans are made to cover timings, area, boundaries, troops required and administrative arrangements.

c. Locals representative of the police and military make detailed plans: overt reconnaissance of the area should be avoided.

d. Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly into position.

e. The curfew and subsequent control instructions are announced by the appropriate means, e.g. press, radios, siren and police announcements by loud hailer. Helicopters and light aircraft can also be used as voice aircraft to make public announcements.

04136. **Imposing a Curfew**. The existing security force headquarters should control a curfew co-ordinating all aspects affecting the civil authorities, the military and the police. If no joint headquarters exists, one should be set up.

04137. **Curfew Passes**. The civil administration and the police are normally responsible for the issue of passes. Certain people such as doctors, nurses, clergy and workers in essential services need to be able to move about more or less freely, and a

pass system which can be easily understood by troops should be devised by the civil authorities well in advance.

04138. **Patrols**. Mobile patrols and static posts will be required to establish the curfew. Once it is operating, the number of static posts can be reduced and the curfew maintained mainly by mobile patrols. Standing patrols on roof-tops may be necessary to watch for illegal movement between houses and to help cover street patrols.

04139. **Surveillance**. Surveillance devices will assist in the enforcement of the curfew and will reduce the number of static posts.

04140. **Control of Visiting Vehicles and Personnel**. When a curfew is imposed on an area, it will usually trap a number of people who are normally resident outside it. A system of removing and checking such people must be prepared. They cannot, of course, be allowed re-entry into the area during the curfew.

04141. **Curfew Breakers**. The action to be taken by troops against curfew breakers must be clearly laid down. They will normally be arrested, searched and handed over to the civil police, care being taken to ensure that evidence of their offence and arrest is recorded for subsequent production in court.

04142. **Police Duties**. The police are responsible for:

a. Announcing the curfew to the general public.

b. The issue of any curfew passes.

c. The disposal of all curfew breakers, including any that may be arrested by troops.

d. Providing police patrols in conjunction with the military forces in the operational area.

04143. **Administrative Issues**. The civil authorities are responsible for devising measures to meet administrative difficulties, which will arise if a curfew is imposed for a long period, but military help may be needed. The sort of problems which could arise are:

a. Lack of water in houses.

b. Shortage of food in shops.

c. The need to purchase essential food.

d. Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops.

e. Clearance of refuse from houses and streets.

f. Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking and heating houses.

g. Treatment of the sick and maternity cases.

h. Care of animals.

i. Lack of indoor sanitation.

j. Homeless.

Section XI - Inspections, Searches and Confiscations

04144. **General**. Inspections, searches and confiscations will normally be conducted as part of the verification process and will often be linked to demilitarisation steps or arms control.

04145. **Inspections**. Inspections may be pre-arranged or at no notice. Their aim may be monitoring, verifying or punitive. Inspections will tend to follow a standard pattern and are likely to be expected and accepted by the faction being inspected. Because of this there will normally be little cause for confrontation and therefore of limited potential for trouble. Inspections will take place in stages and in the case of the inspection of a cantonment site, they may take the following form:

a. **Prior Warning**. Prior warning may or may not be applicable. It may be given via the chain of command to the faction and then disseminated to the site to be inspected. Alternatively, prior notice may be given at the tactical level by a patrol briefing the site commander on the day prior to the inspection.

b. **Planning**. When planning the conduct of an inspection, consideration has to be given to:

(1) Comprehensive briefings on the inspection site.

(2) Timings - to ensure prompt arrival, time on site, report writing and departure formalities.

(3) Force posture, both vehicle type and dress and weapons states for inspection troops.

(4) Communications from site to own Ops Room.

(5) Interpreter- acceptable ethnic origin.

(6) Parking - where vehicles will be left by inspecting troops.

(7) Inspection Equipment.

(8) Protocols.

c. **Liaison**. Liaison can be conducted with the site commander. The tone will be governed by the purpose of the inspection. If necessary, the inspecting troops should confirm access to the entire site and all buildings, and ask the

site commander if there have been any changes to unit or weapon holdings. Site plans and weapon registers should be requested.

d. **Inspection**. The time taken for the inspection will depend on the size and complexity of the site. If large then contingencies should be prepared for a relief inspection team. When conducting the inspection, the following considerations may be required:

(1) Actions on locked buildings or rooms.

(2) Whether a serial number check is required.

(3) Whether vehicle/APC interiors require checking.

(4) The inspecting team has to be capable of weapon recognition, including local weapon variants.

(5) Safety when handling old or unstable ammunition.

(6) Safety when handling weapons that may be loaded.

(7) Faction sensitivity to photography.

(8) Security of inspection information and faction OPSEC.

e. **Consolidation**. Once the inspection has been completed, the site holdings should be consolidated and any discrepancies identified. Once consolidated, discrepancies can then be clarified with the site commander for any explanation.

f. **Confiscations/Protests**. The response to any breaches or discrepancies in holdings following an inspection will largely depend on the purpose of the inspection and the mandate of the military force.

04146. **Searches**. Searches may be conducted for a number of reasons such as:

a. To prove security for a route, area or building.

b. To find contraband material, weapons or vehicles.

04147. Unlike inspections, searches will not generally be conducted in the same formalised manner - expected or accepted by those being searched. As such co-operation is likely to be less, if at all, and the threat state to searching troops consequently higher. The fact that a search will often be conducted without local co-operation and maybe of an unoccupied area or building, means that there could be a significant threat from mines, unexploded devices or IED. In order to minimise the risk

to searching troops, a cordon may be required to provide a secure, sanitised area and the area may require EOD clearance prior to any search taking place.

04148. **Confiscations**. The ability of a military force to confiscate arms, vehicles or heavy weapons from a particular faction will depend on the mandate under which they are operating. Confiscations will normally be either planned in nature or conducted on-the-spot. Planned confiscations will often be punitive in nature, in response to unauthorised activity by a particular faction. On-the-spot confiscations will generally be conducted by troops who come across a breach and are able to act immediately. There are a number of considerations to be considered when conducting a confiscation, whether of a vehicle, a weapon, or ammunition:

a. Confirmation of legitimate confiscation.

b. Explanation for confiscation.

c. A safe confiscation and force level of confiscating troops.

d. Removal of weapons, vehicles or ammunition.

e. Appeal procedure.

f. Destruction of weapons, vehicles or ammunition.

Chapter 5

Search Techniques

Section I - Search Operations

0501. **Concept**. Searches are one of the opportunities when the security forces have the initiative and can decide when, where and how to act. They therefore play an important part in operations. Constant pressure of hostile parties by searching forces them to move arms, ammunition, explosives and other devices so that they are placed at greater risk of discovery. The concept behind search operations has developed quite extensively over the years to take account of the clear evidence that:

a. Hostile parties have become more sophisticated in their ability to hide and conceal weapons and equipment and this requires a more complicated search response.

b. The effectiveness of search operations has risen markedly and can play a significant role in the capture of hostile weapons and equipment belonging to hostile parties.

0502. **Aim**. The aim of search operations is to:

a. Protect potential targets.

b. Gain intelligence and information.

c. Deprive hostile parties of their resources.

d. Gain evidence to assist subsequent prosecution.

0503. **Objectives**. Such operations are usually carried out jointly by military and police forces with a view to:

a. The capture of wanted persons, arms, radio equipment, supplies, explosives or documents.

b. The disruption of hostile activities such as bomb making or weapon manufacture.

c. Eliminating the influence of hostile parties in a specific locality, particularly with regard to expanding a controlled area.

0504. **Area of operations**. Before any formal search procedures can be established for a specific theatre, the AO needs to be assessed. The detailed procedures will greatly depend on the prevailing conditions. In general, this depends on whether the

environment is benign or hostile, and the technical threat. The following factors will need to be assessed:

a. Civil or military primacy.

b. The level of popular opposition to the forces of law and order.

c. The level of civilian support for active opposition.

d. The level of technical expertise and degree of extremism possessed by the hostile parties, including their aims and methods.

e. Access to manufactured or home made arms and other combat materials.

f. The civil authorities' ability to handle crisis and difficult situations during periods of tension or disturbance - particularly with regard to casualties.

0505. **Planning search operations**. Searches require a great deal of preliminary discussion and liaison with other units, and the success of most searches is dependent upon meticulous planning. This is to ensure that:

a. The operation is based on good intelligence.

b. Surprise based upon good OPSEC

c. Adequate numbers of search teams and equipment are deployed.

d. EOD teams can be alerted if it is believed the target is booby-trapped.

e. The search is sprung on the target at the most opportune moment.

f. Adequate cordon or protection troops are available to prevent the escape of insurgents and to protect the searchers from attack or distraction.

0506. **Avoiding rigid procedures**. It should be assumed that hostile eyes will observe every search made, and the techniques and procedures used will be noted. If searches are conducted according to a rigid pattern, traps will be set to catch those who use that pattern. It is therefore most important that every action, from establishing a cordon to the arrival of the search teams and their method of searching in the target area be considered from this point of view. Varying procedures and drills is useful but some procedures cannot and should not be varied to ensure consistency and against possible safety error.

0507. **Planning factors**. The main planning factors to cover when search operations are considered are as follows:

a. **The objective of the operation**. Once this has been decided it needs to be set in context with other military operations planned in the same time frame. This factor will usually provide the sort of time/duration of operation that can be allowed for the search operation.

b. **The 'Need to Know' principle**. This principle is probably the key to any successful search operation. Commanders and their staffs should be introduced to the plan according to a carefully calculated planning sequence.

c. **A deception plan**. The need for a deception plan to protect sources or to achieve operational surprise. It may well be necessary to conceal the true nature of any search operation or its timing from some of those taking part as part of the 'need to know' principle.

d. **Intelligence**. Where good intelligence is available this should be the main reason for a search operation. Where this is not possible, or difficult to acquire, then other intelligence assessment tools could be utilised.

e. **Tasking**. Clear direction covering the operational, legal and political considerations of any search operation have to be established before any searching commences.

f. **Training**. The AO will probably dictate the requirements for training and of the type of specialists needed for particular tasks. If the task is beyond unit resources then engineer advice and support should be obtained.

g. **Systematic work pattern**. This applies both to the planning of search operations as well as to the actual conduct of the search. The approach to any search operation has to be careful, detailed and completely systematic to avoid error or oversight.

h. **Thoroughness of work**. As the title implies search operations require a high level of thoroughness before, during and on completion of any task.

0508. **The sequence of planning a search**. Having covered the main factors which affect the overall planning of a search operation, it will be necessary to consider in logical sequence, the more detailed planning necessary to ensure that all points are covered. These are:

a. **Anticipation of hostile action**. Every searcher needs to know the methods of disguising and hiding objects by hostile parties in order to anticipate their actions and methods. He needs to assess constantly the adversary's aim in

order to pre-empt his actions. In addition, a commander should also determine the threat faced by the soldiers carrying out the operation and, whether by his action, they have become the targets. This should also include consideration of the effect of the operation on the local population and whether any action may antagonise them unnecessarily.

b. **Isolation of the target area**. Here the use of a cordon or other form of protection party will have to be decided. On no account should any person be allowed in or out of a search area once the operation has started.

c. **Co-ordination of action**. All actions must be co-ordinated to ensure a systematic and integrated search operation. This should include the following:

   (1) The inter-action of members within a search team and between different teams.

   (2) The co-ordination between search teams and other troops, the IED disposal operator and the local authorities.

d. **Minimising risks**. Normally the most dangerous part of a search is on or soon after arrival in the area. If activists are surprised or disturbed precipitate and violent action may ensue rapidly. Similarly if civilians are involved there may be some attempt to distract or delay the start of search operations. Once military control of the target area has been established then risks occur if searches move out of sequence or if a sudden “find” leads to loss or neglect of drills and procedures. “Find’s” may sometimes be decoys or ‘sacrifices’, in order to distract attention from more valuable targets.

e. **Maintenance of records**. These are invaluable in the case of finds and the provision of evidence in subsequent prosecutions - and more importantly in providing the intelligence staff with more information about the area and the way any hostile parties operate, which can be recorded and used in future operations.

f. **Evidence and arrest**. If a search uncovers anything, which may lead, to legal proceedings the evidence must be recorded and troops comply correctly with the law and procedures with regard to arrest.

A SEARCH OPERATION DIAGRAMMATICALLY



Section II- Search of Persons

0509. **General.** The search of a person is justified when there is some legal power held by the searcher so to do. Searches must only be conducted in accordance with the appropriate orders. Persons who conduct searches must be aware of the appropriate legislation. The sort of powers usually available for persons to be searched are as follows:

a. As a routine, where they voluntarily enter a building or area and the search is a condition of entry.

b. At a security or post incident checkpoint.

c. When reasonable grounds for suspicion exist, that the person is in possession of stolen or prohibited articles.

d. When a person is taken into custody.

e. As a precautionary measure whilst a person is in custody.

0510. Great care must be taken when carrying out body searches, as there is the inherent risk of alleged brutality, assault or unethical treatment. Hostile persons and their sympathisers often try to exploit such situations to discredit the military forces. Furthermore, as most people searched are innocent, the military forces must search in a manner, which demonstrates their professionalism and courtesy. These factors make it imperative that searches of people are:

a. Only conducted in circumstances, which can be legally justified.

b. Carried out to procedures, which minimise the risk of fabricated accusations against the military forces.

c. A female searcher should only search women and children.

0511. **Constraints.** The following are the principal constraints with regard to the search of persons:

a. A person of the same sex as the person to be searched conducts the search, in ideal circumstances, and that some theatres may require that the search of a child (under 14 years) only be conducted by a female.

b. Generally, there is no authority to require a person to remove clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves. Out of the public eye and if

not voluntarily done, there may be appropriate authority to require the removal of other outer clothing.

0512. **Categories of Search**. There are two categories of search for persons. These are:

a. Quick body search (In the public eye).

b. Detailed body search (Out of the public eye)

0513. **Quick Body Search:**

a. The quick body search is normally carried out:

(1) When dealing with a large number of people and a detailed body search is not warranted.

(2) As a preliminary to a detailed body search, when the immediate requirement is to detect anything which could be used to harm the searcher, the person being searched or anyone else.

(3) As a preliminary to a detailed body search when the immediate requirement is to secure any evidential material which could be jettisoned or destroyed before the detailed search.

b. **Procedure**. The search should be conducted as described below. If possible searchers should work in pairs, with one person doing the physical searching and the other observing both the searcher and the subject. The second person may act as a cover for the first. Other points are that:

(1) The searcher should not stand directly in front or behind the subject so as to avoid being kicked, kneed or butted with the head.

(2) The searcher should not be distracted or intimidated and should avoid eye contact with the subject.

(3) The observer should watch for non-verbal communications, e.g. increased nervousness or tension or silent gestures to others.

(4) When weapons are being used, the searcher should avoid crossing the line of fire of the covering man.

(5) Ideally the subject should be standing with legs slightly apart and arms extended 30 centimetres sideways. Do not spread-eagle the subject against a wall. Later it may be necessary to swab the subject’s hands for

forensic traces and no opportunity should be given for any remains to be rubbed off.

(6) The search should be conducted quickly in a systematic way from head to foot, down one side and up the other, covering all parts of the body, front and back. Attention should be paid to pockets and waist bands where weapons may be at hand. Care must also be taken to search quickly all external body depressions such as the small of the back, armpits, crutch areas and closed hands.

(7) The searcher should never pat the subject but use a stroking squeezing movement and thus feel for foreign objects through clothing. When searching limbs, both hands are used with thumbs and index fingers touching.

(8) Any baggage or removed clothing attributable to the subject must also be searched. Such items should be treated with respect.

(9) The use of equipment such as hand or archway metal detectors, explosive and baggage X-ray machines can be an assistance at times especially when processing large numbers of people at access control points.

0514. **Detailed Body Search**.

a. A detailed body search is normally carried out:

(1) When there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subject is in possession of illegal items.

(2) When a high degree of confidence is required that the subject is not carrying illegal items.

b. **Procedure**. A detailed body search should be conducted using the same procedure as for the quick body search but with the addition of the following points:

(1) Establish the identity of the subject and the ownership of baggage and other articles.

(2) Ideally the search should be conducted out of the public eye. The detail of the search depends on the suspicion attached and the time available.

(3) Invite the subject to empty all pockets and remove all items and papers being carried.

(4) If it is necessary to remove clothing, the subject may do so voluntarily (this fact should be recorded) or powers exist to require the removal of certain items in or out of the public eye. Typically, in the public eye only the outer coat, jacket and gloves may be removed. Out of the public eye, there may be grounds to remove other outer clothing. Note that only outer clothing may be removed.

(5) In conducting the search pay attention to every detail particularly: clothing seams, waist bands, belts, collars, lapels, padding, cuffs and turn ups (anywhere where small items can be secreted). Socks and shoes provide easily missed hiding places. Medical dressings are always suspect and a medical practitioner should be called to examine dressings and plasters if thought necessary. Information from clothing name tags, manufactures labels and laundry marks can be valuable.

(6) Unless there is some future interview advantage in doing so, no emotion should be shown upon finding articles and significant articles should not be set aside from others. All items should be saved out of reach of the subject.

0515. **More Detailed Searches**. Other more detailed types of search are possible but require special and particular procedures to conduct effectively. These are not covered in this section.

0516. **Records and Reports**. For all categories of search apart from initial searches a record should be maintained. This should contain:

a. Details of the person searched.

b. The aim of the search.

c. The grounds for the search.

d. The date and time of the search.

e. The location of the search.

f. Details of anything significant found.

g. Details of any injury to a person or damage to property, which appears to the searcher to have resulted from the search.

h. Identification details of the searchers, however, if searches are conducted in the investigation of offences, searches names are not to be included. Call signs or other means of identification should be used.

Section III - Vehicle Search

0517. **General.** In conducting their activity hostile parties are almost certain to use all types of vehicle to move their resources. The search of vehicles at VCPs deters movement and furthermore, when finds are made, they can be attributed to individuals thereby enhancing the chances of a successful prosecution. The large numbers of vehicles on the roads today can make the search of cars at VCPs appear a daunting task. If it is not to rely on chance, searching of vehicles must be backed up by an efficient intelligence system, which targets vehicles and enables data on them to be quickly verified. This involves close liaison with police records, vehicle registration authorities etc. Nevertheless, the alertness and intuition of the policeman or soldier on the spot can achieve much. He should be aware of the general characteristics of a vehicle's construction and the signs, which may indicate that the vehicle is, suspect and therefore not legitimate.

0518. **The conduct of searchers.** In conducting checks the searcher should note the following points:

a. **Search**.

(1) Be quick, thorough, and efficient. Know exactly what you have to do. This will reduce the possibility of complaint.

(2) The presence of children and babies, pets, old people young ladies, apparently sick or drunk persons is no reason to put off searching. If necessary, special assistance must be called.

b. **Care**.

(1) Be careful not to do any damage to the car, it is not necessary.

(2) Use your common sense. Look for anything unusual. Bright threads on bolts, scratched screw heads, fresh adhesive on upholstery, new work of any kind. Find an explanation.

(3) Try to remember details of cars you have searched. It could be useful in future searches.

0519. **Categories.** VCP search techniques are divided into three categories listed below. The categories vary according to the intensity of the search and are essentially a weeding process. Generally it is better to keep a person apprehensive, by looking quickly into

many vehicles rather than thoroughly inspecting a few. There is no clear boundary between the categories and the extent of the investigation at each stage depends on the suspicion aroused. The stages are:

a. **Initial check**. The initial check is the first part of the searching process and is carried out on all vehicles stopped.

b. **Primary search**. The primary search is carried out on vehicles selected for a more detailed examination, either because of intelligence received or due to suspicion aroused during the initial check.

c. **Secondary search**. The secondary search is a thorough search of highly suspect vehicles.

0520. **Avoidance of search**. Suspicious persons will try to avoid being searched and may be working in liaison with others. Those on duty at vehicle check points must watch for those trying to avoid being searched and beware of:

a. Signalling to the following vehicle (e.g. by flashing brake lights or the use of radios).

b. Pedestrians who may have left vehicles just before the check point.

c. Disturbances that cause congestion, thus encouraging more vehicles to be let through without being searched.

0521. **Initial check.** The initial check is carried out on all vehicles stopped. The decision on which vehicles to stop may be based on the following:

a. Stopping all vehicles.

b. Random selection.

c. Suspicion aroused.

d. Intelligence based.

0522. **Purpose of check.** The main aim of the initial check is to select vehicles for a more detailed examination but personnel carrying out checks at the entrance to barracks and other installations must also be aware of the threat from large vehicle mounted bombs. An initial check is normally carried out without the occupants dismounting from the vehicle, although the driver may be asked to open the boot and bonnet. One to three men are required to check the vehicle and it normally takes about one to three minutes per vehicle.

0523. **The sequence of checking.** It is not necessary for the full sequence to be completed on all vehicles. The parts applied should vary from vehicle to vehicle, to keep an insurgent guessing. It should be stopped once the integrity of the vehicle, passengers and contents are assured.

0524. **More detailed check.** During the initial check, if any of the searchers become suspicious for any reason, then a more detailed search may be conducted. Searchers work in pairs, examining the relevant section of the vehicle. The procedure for this is as follows:

a. The occupants are asked to get out of the car, and are searched.

b. The car is divided into five basis areas as follows:

(1) Interior - Passenger compartment - ensure searchers are clean.

(2) Exterior - Bodywork and trim etc.

(3) Boot - Load space of estate cars/hatchbacks.

(4) Engine compartment.

(5) Underneath.

DIAGRAM PASSENGER CAR

SYSTEMATIC SEARCH IS ESSENTIAL
TREAT VEHICLES AS FIVE AREAS

INSIDE BOOT

INTERIOR

ENGINE COMPARTMENT

OUTSIDE

UNDERNEATH

Check any large box sections or double skin area to which access can be obtained with minimum modification.



Saloon vehicles

0525. **Area 1.** Ensure searchers are clean. Areas to check include:

a. Roof Linings.

(1) Access gained by removing door sealing strips or if sunshine roof fitted by removing trim.

(2) Sun visors.

(3) Front, rear and centre window/door pillars.

b. Door Panels

(1) Wind down window first. Can you search without removing trim? Avoid damage to spring clips, etc.

c. Rear Side Panels. (2 door vehicles etc)

(1) Remove and check through boot.

d. Back Seat.

(1) Cushion - some spring in, some bolted in.

(2) Back Rests.

e. Front Seats.

(1) Space under seat.

(2) Check inside padding.

f. Dashboard Area.

(1) Check battery disconnected - take care of wiring etc.

(2) Behind dashboard panels.

(3) Ventilation and heater hoses.

(4) Radio, speakers, etc.

(5) Glove box - behind and above.

(6) Ashtray - contents.

(7) Centre tunnel console.

g. Front Foot Wells.

(1) Remove panels - access to wing space, door seals etc.

h. Floor.

(1) Remove carpets - mats. Should not be struck down.

(2) Check for signs of false floor - welding/mastic/etc.

(3) Check bung holes.

i. Camper-type Vehicles.

(1) Ideal for smuggling. How many natural spaces.

(2) Does timber/panels look unusually thick?

(3) Domestic fittings:

(a) Does refrigerator work - insulation intact?

(b) Gas (Butane/Propane) bottles adapted?

(c) Does water tank contain water?

(d) Is toilet in use?

(e) Any access to space between skins?

j. General Points.

(1) Check for smell of fresh glue, paint, etc.

(2) Smell of cannabis, etc?

(3) Towing trailer or boat?

0526. **Area 2 - exterior bodywork/trim**. Areas to check include:

a. Check headlights, sidelights, rearlights. Alignment- leaves as you find.

b. Bumpers and overriders.

c. Check wheel trims and hubs. Check tyre pressures. Bleed small amount of air-smell.

d. Examine under wheel arches, bolt-on mud deflectors.

e. Check for signs of welding, new underseal (soft?). Tampering with bolts on mud deflectors.

f. Does the shape of the inside of the wing conform to the outside?

g. Oblique looks at bodywork and roof for signs of adaptation.

h. Front and rear panels and spoilers.

0527. **Area 3 - boot.** (Including load space of station wagon, hatchbacks, etc.). Before searching stand back and look at the contents. Check the following:

a. That the contents are as described by the driver.

b. For any glue, mastic, underseal, pop rivets, etc.

c. For spare petrol tanks or false tank.

d. Spare wheel - deflate, check thoroughly.

e. Check floor, roof, back and sides of boot.

(1) Remove all mats, carpets, etc.

(2) Any signs of weld, mastic, new paint, lack of dirt.

(3) Check for double skins and carpet stuck down.

f. Check and take particular care over space between boot and rear seat.

g. Spaces in wings etc., of estate cars.

h. Natural false floor.

i. Space in tailgate.

0528. **Area 4 - engine compartment**. Areas to check include:

a. Under battery tray.

b. Windscreen washer bottle.

c. Heater and ventilation hoses and vents.

d. Heater and ventilation motor.

e. Air filter.

f. Bonnet.

g. Sound deadening material under bonnet or heat shield.

0529. **Area 5 - underneath.** Areas to check include:

a. Petrol tank - as previous.

b. Chassis box sections.

c. Drain holes in seals.

d. For new welding or underseal.

e. Exhausts.

f. Oil sump.

0530. **Petrol tank.** Beware of the FIRE RISK! (Hardest detection to make), but also:

a. How does fuel gauge behave, full tank?

b. Does the tank match the vehicle? Age, etc.

DIAGRAM TRUCKS



0531. **Commercial vehicles**. Search of commercial vehicles should follow the same process. In addition particular attention should be paid to the following:

a. **Fifth wheel**. Most trailers are constructed in such a way that there is a hollow compartment above the articulated joint where the trailer is connected to the tractor unit. This joint is commonly known as the fifth wheel. Access may sometimes be gained underneath the trailer and can be checked with torch and mirror. Fibre-optic instruments have been able to get into most of the fifth wheel spaces. It is simple to use and more versatile than torch and mirror. In some cases the only way into the compartment is to remove the floorboards inside the trailer which are usually held down by 2 screws at each end.

b. **Fuel tanks and side lockers**. Some trailers are fitted with belly tanks for extended range. There is usually a space between the top of the tank and the floor of the trailer and goods can be attached to the top of the tank. Also check the tank for recent welds or bolted panels. Similarly there is often a space between the back of the side lockers and the chassis member on which they are mounted.

c. **Spare wheel**. Can be used as a place of concealment and is usually mounted under the trailer. (Positions vary).

d. **Chassis cross-members**. Most trailers are constructed with 2 ‘U’ section girders running the whole length. A large concealment can be constructed by placing boards on the reverse ledges bridging the gap between the girders.

e. **Battery boxes**. There is usually a space behind the battery. To open the box, remove the wing nuts.

f. **Crash bar**. This bar at the rear end of most trailers is hollow and usually plugged at each end with rubber plugs. These are easily prised off to gain access to the inside.

g. **Open trailers**. Where the electric lines go from the tractor unit to trailer the connections on the trailer are into a triangular shaped plate.

h. **Refrigerator motors, refrigerated trailers**.

(1) Refrigerator motors usually consist of a diesel engine mounted outside the trailer in a cabinet on the front bulkhead. The motor drives a cooling unit mounted on the inside of the bulkhead.

(2) The engine cabinet can be opened for inspection. There is also a compartment behind the switch panel. These panels are held in place by studs, which require a half turn with a screwdriver to undo. The size of this concealment varies with the different types of refrigerator unit but some are fairly large.

(3) There is usually an inspection panel on the interior unit, which also reveals a space. Plastic trunking for distribution of cold air runs the length of the trailer and has been used for concealment of goods. WARNING: Always make certain that the whole unit has been switched off before search. These units are thermostatically controlled and switch on when temperature rises unless the motor is switched off. The exposed fan is particularly dangerous.

i. **Cab linings**.

(1) Door panels and side panels at the rear of the cab are easily removed and there is a lot of space behind them. Some cabs also have space behind the roof linings.

(2) Space behind console and glove compartment. Space behind speakers.

j. **Air filters**. Access usually from beneath the vehicles. Clips hold on the cover. Be careful because some filters are filled with oil.

k. **False floors and bulkheads**. Usually found in single units.

l. **Belly tanks**. Any signs of recent welds/clean area - tank and trailer.

m. **Loads**. Excess packing, use of pallet spaces. These are just some of the concealment's that have been used. There are others both under and inside tractor units and trailers.

DIAGRAM OF BUSES AND COACHES



Section IV - Search of Occupied Buildings

0532. **Approach and entry procedures**. When searching occupied premises the following procedures should be followed:

a. The search team must enter the buildings as quickly and with as little fuss as possible.

b. Assemble all occupants in one room.

c. Search all occupants and keep them under guard.

d. Team commander searches his team in front of the head of the house and then has a member of the team search himself.

e. From this point onwards the head of the house is invited to accompany the team leader.

f. The team commander draws a plan of the house and numbers each room, attic, passage and staircase, working from top to bottom and left to right.

g. A room suitable for holding the occupants under guard is searched and cleared, then the occupants and their guard are moved in.

h. The team commander then details his team in pairs to the first areas to be searched.

0533. **General**. Listed below are the places which must be searched in occupied buildings:

a. **Attics**:

(1) Roof area, skylights.

(2) Between eaves and slates.

(3) Water tanks and pipework (including gutters)

(4) Rafters, sawdust, felt and roof insulation.

(5) Attic junk.

b. **Rooms**:

(1) Doors. (remove fittings and handles)

(2) Furniture, interior fittings.

(3) Walls, air vents.

(4) Windows, outside ledges.

(5) Fireplaces and chimneys.

(6) Ceiling (compare texture and height)/fake ceilings.

(7) Floor coverings, floors.

(8) Lights and their fittings.

c. **Bathroom**:

(1) Cisterns.

(2) Panel surrounds.

(3) Behind and under bath.

(4) Hot water system.

d. **Stairway**:

(1) Staircase frame.

(2) Panels.

(3) Step treads.

e. **Kitchen**:

(1) Walls, especially ventilation bricks.

(2) Refrigerators, stove, domestic appliances (switch off gas etc.).

(3) Food containers, pots etc.

f. **General**:

(1) All tubular systems.

(2) False letter boxes.

(3) Prams (baby carriages), toys etc.

(4) Suitcases.

(5) Air inlet systems.

(6) Sewer, drainage systems.

(7) Outside areas.

(8) Electricity boxes.

(9) Televisions and other electrical goods.

0534. **Detailed searching of rooms**. This may be done in several ways, but the following method is recommended to ensure that no detail is missed:

a. Searchers always work as a pair. Hence if one is accused of theft, the other can give evidence on his behalf.

b. Search and clear furniture and reposition to allow freedom to search floor, walls and skirting boards.

c. Then search and clear the floor, remove the covering, check for trap openings, loose floorboards and loose skirting boards. Use a metal detector if possible.

d. Check doors, windows, pictures, mirrors, cupboards, fireplaces, computers etc.

e. Check and clear the ceilings for trapdoors or false ceilings.

0535. As each room is cleared, the searchers report to the team leader who will allocate them to the next room to be searched.

0536. **Exit procedures**. On concluding the search and before leaving the premises:

a. Accidental damage caused during the search should be repaired if possible. Deliberate disorder caused by uncovering caches, e.g. lifting floor boards or paving stones, removing wall paper, during a positive search does not constitute compensatable damage.

b. If no damage has occurred, or immediate repairs satisfy the head of the house, he should be required to sign a Form of Indemnity.

c. If the head of the house remains dissatisfied by immediate repairs or the damage is beyond the search teams ability to repair, a Search Damage Form is completed.

d. The team commander should search his team again in front of the head of the house, and submit to a search himself.

Section V - Search of Unoccupied Buildings

0537. **Preliminaries.** It is to be assumed that all unoccupied buildings being searched are booby-trapped. A booby trap, usually of an explosive and lethal nature, is designed to

catch the unwary. It is aimed at creating uncertainty, lowering the morale of the military forces and hindering their movements. A successful booby trap is simply constructed often from household items such as clothes pegs, mousetraps, torch batteries etc. It is actuated by a normal human action, e.g. opening a door, switching on a light or walking on the floor. To place it to gain the greatest chance of success, the operator must know the methods of working and habits of search teams and soldiers.

0538. The trap can be activated in many ways, such as:

a. Pull - opening a drawer.

b. Pressure - standing on a floorboard, or sitting in a chair.

c. Release/Anti-lift - picking up a book or bottle.

d. Tilt - turning an object on its side to look underneath.

e. Trembler - any vibration or movement will activate this.

f. Collapsing circuit - in an electrically initiated device, the action of cutting or breaking the circuit will activate the device. In addition it will go off when the battery runs flat.

g. Light sensitive - a device that functions when either exposed to light, for example a torch, or is hidden from light.

h. Anti-Submerge - placing the device in water will cause it to be activated.

i. Anti-Probe - this relies on a search probe or prodder completing a circuit.

j. Combination - a booby trap can have more than one means of initiation.

0539. **Approach and entry procedure**. On arrival at the scene of the search and before entry is made to the building, the team leader must carry out a visual reconnaissance of the building and surrounding area. A check must be made for wires leading to command detonated devices inside the building. A control point is then set up in a safe area and the team leader decides upon a place of entry. He details one pair of searchers only, to effect an entry to the building and check for booby traps.

0540. Entry is usually to be made through one of the main doors into the building. Although these may appear to be prime sites for booby traps, it saves time and makes subsequent access easier if they are cleared early.

0541. **Searching**. The searching of an unoccupied building takes place in two phases. The first is to check the building for any booby traps, and the second to carry out the detailed systematic search.

0542. One pair of searchers trained for these types of search only, having made an entry to the building, proceeds to check for booby traps. If the front door has not been used for entry they should clear a path inside the house to a door. The team leader clears the outside of the door, which can then be opened, preferably remotely.

0543. The searchers clearing for traps should observe the following points:

a. Never open any door, whatever size, until both sides have been cleared of traps.

b. All doors, drawers and cupboards must be left open after checking.

c. Use should be made of the pulling cable and weight dropper for remote opening of doors, cupboards, moving furniture or other tasks which may endanger the safety of the searchers.

d. Routes through the building, which have been cleared of traps, should be clearly marked using white tape.

0544. Search teams must be alert to the presence of booby traps, and the following is a list of clues to assist teams in their recognition:

a. Attractive items in the open.

b. Spoils, wrappings, sawdust etc. in unlikely places.

c. Presence of pegs, wires, lengths of cord etc. where they would not normally be expected.

d. Loose floorboards, window ledges or stair treads.

e. Fresh nails or screws.

f. Lumps or bulges under carpets, in chairs etc.

0545. When the house has been cleared of booby traps the team leader enters and numbers the rooms as for an occupied house. Then the detailed searching of the building then proceeds as for a search of an occupied building.

Section VI - Search of Rural Areas

0546. **General.** Open areas are often used as the sites for hides as they have the advantage that they can be watched from nearby houses without being attributable to individuals. Although normally associated with a rural environment, open spaces also occur in an urban setting, in the form of parks and gardens or even waste and derelict ground. Therefore the areas to be searched, using this procedure, may vary from the side of a hill to a back garden.

0547. **Planning**. Area searches are especially dependent on good planning for success and the following points are particularly relevant to the planning and conduct of this type of search. The use of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process within the planning of operations of this type is an essential part of the compilation of information needed before a search can be conducted. Where appropriate further planning should be re-evaluated as the search progresses:

a. The location of the centre of the area to be searched is indicated by an eight figure grid reference (with an address if possible). The boundaries are recorded as a series of eight figure grid references.

b. The identity of the owner or tenant of the land.

c. Information gained from aerial photographs or satellite images, even if only library material is valuable. An analysis may identify some hide locations.

d. Air reconnaissance may be useful but care must be taken to avoid giving advanced warning to the hostile parties.

e. Details of local known hostile parties and sympathisers.

f. Search dogs can cover large areas more quickly than men. Priorities for the use of available dogs must be decided.

g. The division of the total area into sub-areas to be searched by individual search teams requires care. Inclusive and exclusive boundaries must be clearly defined and should be marked by obvious features such as hedges and ditches. Each team area should be able to be searched in one day.

Section VII - Search of Routes

0548. **General**. Routes include roads, tracks, railways, air corridors and waterways. They provide obvious locations for hostile parties to stage ambushes as they could be widely used by the Security Forces, Civil Authorities and VIPs. Therefore the route search procedure described in this Serial is normally for use in defensive search operations and is designed to ensure that the route is safe. The procedure described is primarily for paved roads but the principles apply to the other types of route. If routes are searched as part of an offensive search operation, the area search procedure should be used.

0549. **Planning**. The likely methods and locations of a hostile attack must be given special consideration when planning and throughout the execution of route search operations.

0550. **Vulnerable points**. Vulnerable points are those point on the route where it is particularly advantageous for the adversary to position an ambush. Likely places are:

a. Culverts.

b. Bridges.

c. High banked stretches of route.

d. Routes dominated by high ground (possible firing points - see below).

e. Junctions.

f. Buildings and walls near the route.

g. Parked vehicles.

h. Prominent markers on the route.

i. Places where vehicles slow down.

0551. **Firing points**. The adversary’s choice of ambush position may be influenced by the availability of a suitable firing point. A firing point usually has a good view of the ambush position, but an observer may be employed to pass messages. A firing point is also likely to have a concealed approach and a fast escape route. Along the route approaching the ambush point, there are likely to be one or more aiming marks, which are clearly visible from the firing point or observation point.

0552. **Method of attack**. The adversary’s choice of ambush position is also influenced by the proposed method of attack. The options include:

a. **Bombs and off route devices**. These may be fired by:

(1) **Booby-trap**. The target activates a booby-trap device, so that the adversary does not have to be present and, therefore, there is no need for a firing point.

(2) **Command wire**. The adversary may choose to fire the device remotely using a command wire. The wire may be surface laid or buried, be run through underground service pipes or be strung overhead. It may be camouflaged by being incorporated into existing wire such as fences or telephone cables and often follows linear features such as ditches, streams, hedges etc. The distance from the firing point to the ambush point is likely to be between 100 and 500 metres in a rural setting but may be as far as 1500 metres. Consideration must be given to any permanent links, such as railway lines and fence wires, as an insurgent may also use these.

(3) **Radio control**. The adversary may choose to fire the device remotely using radio control. The firing point may be over 1000 metres from the ambush point.

b. **Direct fire weapons**. These include small arms and anti-tank weapons.

0553. **Categories**. The procedures for the search of routes are divided into two categories:

a. **Route checks**. Route checks may be undertaken by a foot patrol. As the name implies, they only provide a quick inspection of the route, paying particular attention to the vulnerable points. There is no guarantee that the route checked is clear of explosive devices.

b. **Route searches**. Route searches are detailed searches carried out by qualified search teams.

0554. **Route checks**. Depending upon the threat route checks can be carried out by foot patrols and are normally incorporated into the overall patrol programme. The check itself is carried out on foot by three teams, each usually of four men, grouped together to form a patrol. The operation is commanded by a patrol commander, who may be located with the road team or with local protection troops. Two teams work on the flanks and one team on the road. Team members may carry standard patrol Electromagnetic Counter Measures (ECM) equipment depending on the local threat. When deployed, there should be a minimum of 10 metres spacing between team

members. The make up and role of the team is given below. It is stressed that because of the limited training and equipment of the teams, route checks are not a substitute for route searches:

a. **Flanking teams**. The flanking teams are identical. The front man is the pathfinder/cable detector man and uses patrol cable detecting equipment. His role is to select a safe line for the team and to find command wires. The second man is usually the team commander and he and the other team members regularly scan the route using binoculars in order to identify vulnerable points and possible devices. They should also look for firing points. The third and fourth men act as escorts.

b. **Road team**. The road team consists of two roadside men and two road-men. The roadside men work on opposite sides of the road. They check the hedgerows, ditches and verges. The road-men are deployed on either side of the road and are each responsible for checking their side of the road and the verge up to the edge of the roadside man's area.

0555. **Procedure**. The procedure is as follows:

a. **Start point**. A start point on the road is identified. It should be at least 50 metres from any vulnerable point. If the teams are on foot, it is advisable for the start point to be approached from off the route.

b. **Flanking teams**. The flanking teams work in a series of bounds. They move out at right angles to the road from the start point for a minimum of 50 metres. They then move roughly parallel to the road but must avoid setting obvious patterns and not allow themselves to be channelled. At the end of each bound, a crossover of the road is made.

c. **Crossovers**. The flanking teams carry out crossover procedures every 80 to 200 metres, in order to detect cables running close to and parallel to the road. Normally the first crossover is made after the minimum distance (80 metres) in order to allow the road party to start. The cross-over drill is as follows:

(1) The flanking teams stop opposite each other, where possible approximately 50 metres from the road.

(2) The pathfinder and team commander from one team move across the road, clearly marking their crossing point. They move up to the other

team and the pathfinders interchange, ensuring that their paths cross in the process.

(3) The team commander then returns to his team, with his new pathfinder leading, ensuring that they cross the road at the same point. The two flanking teams then continue moving roughly parallel to the road.

d. **Vulnerable points**. As far as possible crossovers should not be made within 50 metres of a vulnerable point. A vulnerable point must not be approached closer than 50 metres, until it has been isolated by the flanking team completing crossovers before and after the vulnerable point. When the isolation is complete, one of the team commanders checks the vulnerable point to confirm that there are no devices. He selects a safe route to the vulnerable point, avoiding any obvious defiles. He approaches only as close as necessary to obtain a clear view, using binoculars if appropriate. Vulnerable points such, as culverts should be checked from both sides. Once he is sure that the vulnerable point is clear, he retraces his path back to his team.

e. **Road team**. The road team works a minimum of one bound behind the flanking parties and should never approach closer than 20 metres to a cross-over point until the following cross-over has been completed. While the flanking teams are completing their first bound, the road team checks the start point out to a radius of 20 metres. The road team:

(1) Checks the route, verges and sides of the road.

(2) Checks all vulnerable point out to a 20-metre radius.

(3) Recovers all markers left by the flanking teams.

0556. **Vulnerable point checks**. It is possible to check vulnerable points, using a four man team, without checking the whole route. The procedure is as follows:

a. The team circles the vulnerable point at a minimum of 50 metres radius checking for command wires and looking for possible devices and firing points. They must avoid being channelled and maintain a 10-metre spacing.

b. When the circle is complete the team commander checks the vulnerable point as described in paragraph 7 and also checks out to a 20-metre radius of the vulnerable point.

0557. **Route searches**. Two search teams carry out a route search. Whenever possible the flanks of the road being searched are secured by a cordon, whose commander retains overall command of the operation. One search team is divided into two flanking parties, each of three (possibly four) men. The second team forms the road party. The make up and role of the parties is as follows:

a. **Flanking party**. The role of the flanking parties are to find command wires, look inwards for vulnerable points and look around for possible firing points. The flanking parties are identical. Members of the party should maintain a 10 metre spacing when deployed. They are tasked as follows:

(1) The first man is the pathfinder. His task is to select a safe line for the party. He uses a trip wire feeler and a metal detector as aids to detect possible booby traps. If the party is of three men, he is also the party commander. If there are four men, the party commander comes after the pathfinder. Whoever is the party commander, he must regularly scan the route using binoculars to identify vulnerable points and look for firing points.

(2) The two rear men are cable detector men. Their task is to find command wires. They use cable detectors and carry shovels to dig for buried cables.

b. **Road party**. The road party consists of:

(1) **Dog handler** (if allocated). He leads with his dog searching the full width of the road, road sides and verges.

(2) **Two roadside men**. One man on each side of the road searching the verges, ditches and roadsides.

(3) **Search team commander**. He follows the roadside men controlling the road party.

(4) **Two road men**. They come after the commander. Each of them search from the centre of the road out to his allotted side and including the verge up to the edge of the roadside man’s area.

(5) **Search adviser** and **Note-taker.** The search adviser controls both flanking parties and the road party. The note-taker moves at the rear of the road party with a communication set.

0558. **Vulnerable point searches**. In exceptional circumstances vulnerable points may be searched without searching the whole route. A search adviser and one search team carry this out. Whenever possible the area around the vulnerable point is secured by a cordon. The search procedure is described below:

a. An isolation party, consisting of a pathfinder, commander and two cable detector men, all equipped as for flanking parties, circle the vulnerable point at a minimum of 50 metres radius searching for command wires and looking for possible devices and firing points. They must avoid being channelled and maintain a 10-metre spacing.

b. When the circle is completed the team commander checks the vulnerable point and checks out to a 20-metre radius of the vulnerable point.

0559. **Reports and records**. A Search Report form should be completed for each search team task, or combined teams task in the case of a route search.



Figure Route Check

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Chapter 6

Force Protection Measures

Section I - Securing an Operational Base

06001. **General.** Experience in past campaigns has indicated that there may be a need for military forces to deploy for operations in an area, which is deemed to be hostile, and where no form of law and order exists at all. The area may even be classed as a 'no go' area to the legitimate authorities in a particular country.

06002. **General requirements**. An operational base may be defined as an area providing a firm base from which military action against any hostile forces can be developed. Its establishment would generally be undertaken as a joint or multinational operation.

06003. The normal requirements and characteristics of an operational base are that:

a. It should be a base sufficient in size with easy access to the centre of local administration is essential.

b. It should be located in an area from which operations can be successfully developed throughout the allocated boundaries. Projected operations and operations in depth have to be within convenient helicopter range.

c. It should contain a suitable airfield site. In some circumstances a helicopter landing strip may have to suffice initially, but it should be capable of rapid development for use by tactical air transport aircraft for air dropping large quantities of engineer equipment or stores.

d. The immediate vicinity of the base should be at least temporarily free from interference.

e. It should be easily defensible. If it is surrounded by natural obstacles so much the better; if not, the ground of tactical significance that lies outside the immediate perimeter should be controlled.

f. The area of the base should be large enough to accommodate the logistic units and dumps necessary to support the military force being deployed, but as small as possible to facilitate its defence.

g. The base should be accessible by road or track so that tracked vehicles and heavy plan can be brought in, probably by road convoy. This requirement is not always possible to achieve, and more extensive use of air transport may

have to be made for bringing in vehicles and equipment . A secure land line of communication may well be impossible to maintain.

06004. **Occupation**. The occupation of an operational base may be entirely peaceful, but if it has to be achieved in the face of some opposition, careful consideration has to be given to the method of approach. If a combined air and land approach is employed, it is important to plan the correct balance and to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of both groups of forces. As an example, it may be necessary for the airfield site to be secured initially by troops inserted by aircraft or helicopter, followed by rapid build up with some forces air landed and some moving by road. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following factors should be considered:

a. There can be no question of seizing an operational base in the face of strong military opposition; this would be an operation of a different nature. The close defence of any airfield should be established as soon as possible.

b. It is likely that there will be hostile activity against the base within a short space of time.

c. In planning the build up, careful consideration has to be given to possible threats. Infantry supported by armour and/or artillery are likely to be the first requirement, but if there is an air threat some priority may have to be given to air defence. Engineer equipment and stores may also be needed early to develop the airstrip rapidly.

d. Both the air and land approach operations will need to be carefully planned and executed.

e. It is possible that some form of demonstrations against the arrival of military forces may take place during the occupation of the base and there should be a contingency plan to cater for this possibility.

Defence and Sequence of Build Up

06005. **General**. The measures outlined below envisage defence against hostile activity such as sabotage raids or military attacks, possibly supported by heavy weapons and indirect fire. The defence commitment for the base could be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared and as the controlled area is enlarged by subsequent operations. When planning defence arrangements, every man capable of

bearing arms should be included and has to be fit and trained for such duties within the base. This could apply to those in non-government agencies.

06006. **All round defence**. Every unit or staff of an administrative installation should be given a sector to defend with arcs of fire, weapon pits, obstacles and patrol areas. Installations should be protected from sabotage and attacks, special attention being given to items particularly attractive to an adversary, e.g. weapons, ammunition, explosives and parked aircraft. Maximum use has to be made of wire, anti-tank mines, alarm systems, illumination, surveillance devices and guard dogs, together with any locally improvised devices. [**Remark**: Most of the NATO members have ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (**Ottawa Convention, 3 December 1997**) and their armed forces have to act according this law] All main and isolated positions should be organised for all round defence, guard posts and detachments in isolated positions covering approaches to the base should be dug in, with overhead cover, be protected by wire, mines and improvised obstacles, and have reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. A duplicated system of communication between all posts in the base should be established.

06007. **Sequence of build up**. The build up of the operational base may take some time depending on the distances involved and the resources available. The sequence for land forces might be:

a. An air landing by an infantry battalion group or parachute forces.

b. The assumption of overall control of the defence by the battalion group.

c. A plan, which directs the deployment of units and installations to, selected areas.

d. Reception arrangements by the battalion group for the follow up troops and echelons.

e. Patrolling by the battalion in areas close to the base.

f. The hand over of sectors of the perimeter to follow-up battalion groups.

g. Frequent clearance searches of the base area and adjacent countryside.

h. The reception of any road convoys.

i. Follow-up battalions patrol within the base area and its surrounds.

j. The opening up of an airstrip.

k. The battalion group may still be primarily concerned with the defence of the base and the provision of any reserve force.

l. The establishment of a limited controlled area.

m. The expansion of the controlled area.

n. The introduction of local military and paramilitary forces to assist in the defence of the base, in the patrolling of the controlled area and the establishment of defended village's etc.

o. Operations in depth start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled area.

p. The progressive reduction of the number of infantry units required to ensure the security of the base. Initially this will be high, but as soon as the domination of the immediate surrounding area is successful the numbers can be reduced.

06008. **Defence**. The ideal defensive plan should ensure that no hostile small arms, rockets or mortar fire could damage anything in the base. This will seldom, if every, be practicable because of the size of the problem. Every effort has to be made to prevent hostile small arms from being able to engage aircraft approaching and leaving any airfield. If larger defence areas are needed to cover longer airstrips then further patrols are needed to protect against those with shoulder fired missiles.

06009. **Patrolling**. While the area of the base itself should be patrolled by any units located in the base the infantry battalions should be used for patrolling in the operational area in the following ways:

a. In general, patrolling should extend from the perimeter of the base out to the limit of the range of hostile mortars and rockets. This patrolling must of course be tied in with, or be part of, the controlled area patrols programme. A comprehensive and detailed random patrol plan will be needed, and maximum use must be made of listening devices, detectors and surveillance equipment.

b. Patrols should operate, when possible, within the range of artillery support.

06010. **Security measures**. In addition to normal security precautions the following require special consideration in connection with the defence of the base:

a. The declaring of prohibited and restricted areas for civilian movement.

b. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to stop all movement except patrolling within the base after dark to place the base itself under curfew.

c. Local labour, which always constitutes a major security risk, needs to either be carefully screened and supervised or escorted.

d. The timings and methods of patrolling, changing guards and detachments, and other routine matters has to be varied.

e. Guard dogs might support guards and patrols.

f. Depending upon the nature of the threat, full use should be made of all forms of illumination, including floodlights, searchlights if available, and illumination provided by mortars, artillery or aircraft.

g. The provision of earthwork protection for vulnerable equipment and stores.

h. Under certain conditions harassing fire can be used to disrupt the activities of insurgents.

06011. **Reserves**. In addition to the mobile reserve, which is held ready for use within the controlled area as a whole, a small central reserve for the defence of the operational base is essential. Tasks for this reserve has to be planned and rehearsed and should include a well co-ordinated fire plan. The infantry reserve might use helicopters or APCs. Helicopters are particularly vulnerable if there is a requirement to get behind any hostile forces and cut off their withdrawal. There is a danger of helicopter landing sites being ambushed though this can be reduced by a short period of precision fire from artillery or armed helicopters immediately before a site is used.

06012. **Armour**. Armoured vehicles provide valuable fire support whilst the base is being established; their presence alone often acts as a deterrent. Thereafter, they are likely to be required for both defensive and offensive tasks. These will need to be protected and incorporated into the overall plan for defence of the base.

06013. **Artillery and Mortars**. The defence of an operational base may require co-ordinated, massed fire support to counter a determined attack. All available weapon

systems have to be co-ordinated, usually by the senior artillery officer, into one plan, which will include the tasking of offensive air support, attack or armed helicopters and all indirect fire weapons deployed within range. Fortifications should be constructed so as to reduce the risk to own troops when fire is brought in close to the base. The artillery and mortars deployed within a base may be the only guaranteed fire support available to it. However, terrain limitations, the physical dimensions of individual forward bases and the minimum range, deployability and sustainability of guns may indicate that fire support can be better and more flexibly provided from other, mutually supporting and similarly established bases. Due weight has to be given to the early deployment of fire support assets.

06014. **Air Defence**. The possibility of air attacks from within the or from a neighbouring country, which is supporting these hostile parties, has to be considered in the threat assessment before operations to secure the base are mounted. Suitable air defence capabilities to counter the air threat will be part of the overall contingency planning. These capabilities will need regular review in the light of subsequent events.

06015. **Engineers**. Engineer considerations are likely to be critical both for the selection of the site for the operational base and for the timing of the operation, particularly the opening of a tactical airfield. Engineer tasks in the base may include:

a. The construction and maintenance of an airhead together with the necessary bulk fuel installations, maintenance facilities and protective defences.

b. The forward tactical air strip.

c. VSTOL sites, if necessary.

d. The improvement of port or beach exit facilities.

e. Combat engineer support.

f. The establishment of one or more water points.

06016. **Co-ordination and control of air space**. Flight operations in the vicinity of an operational base or landing strip have to be co-ordinated or controlled to avoid collision and to de-conflict with friendly fires. Especially in the initial stages, a base has to expect hostile air and ground activity from any direction. Therefore control of weapons and aircraft operations is essential. A Fire Support Co-ordination Centre

(FSCC), an Air Operations Co-ordination Centre (AOCC) and possibly the local Air Traffic Control unit could achieve the necessary co-ordination.

Section II - Protection of Bases against Attack

06017. Attacks may include the use of long range sniping or mortar attack on sentry posts, bombs in barracks that have been rolled into the cellar of a building, home made bombs left by individuals and suicide bombers who drive vehicles filled with explosives into a base. More recently the indiscriminate use of poisonous gas to kill people may foreshadow the use of this type of weapon on a military base. The use of helicopters or aircraft to drop bombs or explosives has been attempted and the use of a helicopter to rescue individuals from prison could easily have its parallel in a PSO situation.

06018. **Initial defensive precautions**. In ideal circumstances a base needs a secure buffer zone of space beyond the protected area sufficient to counter the effects of a home made bomb left by insurgents or a mortar attack. Distances should be commensurate with the threat. Roads to and from the base should be blocked or used to stop and check vehicles. Concrete blocks should be placed in all other areas to prevent vehicles from being placed in or near the base and screens erected at suitable points to mask the view of snipers High wire netting placed at appropriate points could prevent the passage of free flight or guided missiles.

06019. Inside the base certain vital areas need further protection such as the entrance to troop accommodation - any ammunition compound, the main electrical and telephone wiring systems, the main water stopcock, and any gas cylinders used for administrative purposes. Conversely, any area inside the base utilised for screening persons, or meetings with the civil community need to be near the main entrance and away from vital points within the base. Access to site plans and building sketches should be restricted to those who have a need to know.

06020. To prevent unauthorised helicopter landings, sentries should be briefed on how to determine whether a helicopter is hostile once their suspicions have been aroused. Wire could be strung across areas where an unauthorised helicopter landing could take place. Where an airfield is to be protected these precautions would need to be expanded to include anti aircraft weapons, internal vehicle patrols, the use of dogs and contingency plans prepared for parachute, helicopter and micro-flight activities.

06021. Commanders will need to revise and change their security plans the longer the base is maintained. Changing exits and entrances, altering the pass systems and improving the emergency back up procedures can all help.

06022. **Review of defence precautions**. It is always prudent to regularly review its the security and re-examine the defensive arrangements around and within the base. This would normally be done in reference to the most up-to-date IPB. This will also need to address the risk of fire and the close protection of particularly important items of equipment or ammunition. Contingency plans to improve or strengthen the defences around the base if the political and security circumstances for the military forces deteriorate should be made. If hostile parties have access to weapons or technology previously not considered within the threat assessment for the base a review of overall security would immediately be necessary.

06023. **Improving base security**. If a new or improved base is arranged which requires some form of building construction work it will be necessary to prepare a defensive plan so that construction can be achieved rapidly without any loosening of overall security. Factors which could affect this defensive plan may include:

a. **Secure environment**. A secure environment will normally be achieved by controlling all roads leading to the construction site with permanent VCPs augmented by satellite patrols to give depth and create unpredictability. Random searches of personnel entering the secure area and internal patrols by search aware soldiers will help to identify suspicious objects. Temporary cover to protect workers from casual observation may achieve a more secure environment.

b. **Sustainability**. Construction operations may be lengthy and monotonous and can be conducted under uncomfortable conditions. To ensure efficiency and to avoid overstretch it is essential that there are sufficient troops and logistic support for the task. A reserve will provide the ability to rotate patrols through the various tasks.

c. **Community relations**. Sealing roads for a long period will create disruption to the local community. Briefing of troops and of the local population (when conditions allow), forward planning and courteous behaviour are essential to

minimise the problems which can, if allowed to grow unchecked, attract unwanted attention and possible disruption.

d. **Command and control**. Construction operations will often take place within an established area of operations and will invariably require assistance from an outside unit. To avoid conflicts of interest, distinct arrangements for command and control have to be made which will normally entail creating a small area of operations within the established operational boundaries.

Section III - Guidance for Guard Commanders and Sentries

06024. **Guard Commanders.** The following topics should be included in any written orders for a guard commander. A guard commander should be briefed verbally on the same topics before taking up the duties. Duties/Orders, see below;

GUARD COMMANDER	SENTRIES
• A detailed description of the location to be guarded (any special features).	• The scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, positions of safety or change lever.
• Tasks, including:	• Checking of passes, specimens of which should be issued
(1) Specific entrances etc. to be guarded.	• The use of any other specific equipment or observation devices.
(2) Specific vulnerable points inside and outside the area which have to be protected at all costs.	• Searching persons and vehicles.
(3) Contingency Plans such as:	• The use of minimum necessary force.
• Action to be taken against unauthorised persons or a hostile crowd.	• Opening fire.
• Action to be taken if there is a danger of damage, looting or arson.	• The method of calling for assistance
• Instructions on his legal powers, which should include the use of minimum necessary force, the circumstances when special riot control weapons may be used, when small arms fire may be opened, and how such fire is to be controlled.	Action against people taking photographs.
• Guidance on replies to be given to any persons who ask the reason for the guard.	
• Liaison with police including instructions regarding searching of vehicles and persons entering or leaving the installation.	
• List of employees and authorised visitors, together with specimen passes and photographs.	

• Reinforcement plan.	
• Communications, and the times at which reports must be made by radio and telephone.	
• Action against people taking photographs.	

Section IV - Dealing with explosive devices

06025. **General**. Explosives are one of the earliest manifestations of any serious disturbance. Training will make troops aware of the threat, recognise explosive devices and know what to do when one is found or suspected.

06026. **Types of device**

a) Those thrown by hand.

b) Those projected by some other means.

c) Anti personnel mines.

d) Anti vehicle mines.

e) Incendiary devices.

f) Booby-traps.

g) Improvised weapons (including, chemical or biological devices).

06027. **Targets for explosive devices**

The following categories have been defined:

Categories	Targets	Remarks
Tactical Targets	Direct attacks on the PSO forces.	Includes those tasked to carry out EOD. May include hoaxes to study the reaction of the PSO forces.
Government and Commercial Targets	Attacks on important officials, government buildings, vital commercial installations or infrastructure (bridges, reservoirs, pipelines, railway lines). Sites containing toxic material.	Recognises the fears of the population and helps to bring about the climate of collapse to destroy the confidence of PSO operation.
Indiscriminate Terror		

06028. **Methods of attack and protection measures.** Protection against the methods of attack outlined below may be a combination of the following:

a) **Physical security measures at security bases**. Physical measures such as obstacles to unauthorised access, deterrents such as fences, lights, locks, alarms, use or passes, guards and dogs, etc. Reinforcing bases by the construction of concrete walls, dividers, and sandbags should be considered, as should surveillance equipment.

b) **General preventive measures**. These include combat measures such as the blocking of culverts to prevent the placing of explosives and the construction of protective screens to minimise the effects of projected explosive devices.

c) **Personnel security**. Vetting is essential for all employees who, because of the nature of their employment, are able to act as saboteurs or pass information about targets suitable for sabotage.

d) **Active security measures**. Patrols, searches, screening persons, and snap checks are all positive measures to reduce or curtail the potential for attack.

e) **Contingency planning**. Contingency planning for action to be taken in the event of an attack and for the repair, replacement or provision of other services or supplies is necessary.

f) **Legal measures**. If an installation is important enough, legal powers should exist to prohibit entry and confer the right of search, detention or arrest.

g) **An education campaign**. A campaign to make the both security forces and public aware of the threat and of simple actions they can take.

h) **Security of information**. Information on EOD tactics and reasons for device failure also has an important contribution to make in restricting the ability of an insurgent to learn from past mistakes.

06029. **Categories of EOD incident**. EOD incidents are categorized on command decisions according to their potential threat. Potential targets should be pre-categorized whenever possible. The four categories of EOD incidents are:

a. **Category A**: Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute a grave and immediate threat. Category A incidents are to be given priority over all other incidents, and disposal operations are to be started immediately regardless of personal risk.

b. **Category B**: Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute an indirect threat. Before beginning EOD operations, a safe waiting period is normally observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel.

c. **Category C**: Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute little threat. EOD personnel will normally deal with these incidents after Category A and B incidents, as the situation permits, and with minimum hazard to personnel.

d. **Category D**: Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute no threat at present.

06030. **Tasking**. There must be one tasking authority through which all EOD requests are passed. Theatre SOPs should include a tasking format which should include:

a. Location of the explosive device, and a sketch map of the area.

b. What it looks like, shape, size, and estimate of weight and type of container.

c. The time it was found.

d. What warning was given.

e. What witnesses are available.

f. Whether any suspects are available at the scene.

g. Who is securing the area and which safety measures already have taken.

h. Route to the scene.

i. RV for the EOD Team.

j. Any hostile activity such as sniping or rioting crowds.

06031. **Procedure at the incident**. The incident commander is the senior officer, or, possibly a police representative, in whose tactical area of responsibility the incident takes place. He is responsible for obtaining all the information available and for making required any preliminary arrangements. He will be advised on any additional precautions required by the EOD team when it arrives such as:

a. Evacuating and cordoning an area to a safe distance, normally of at least 100 metres, which for large devices and cars should extend to 200 metres and for very large vehicles, to 400 metres.

b. Seeking the assistance of an EOD team and providing some or all of the background information about the incident.

06032. **Guidance for those involved in an EOD incident**. Some useful tips for those involved with EOD incidents are:
DO NOT:

a. Touch or approach an explosive device.

b. Assume that an explosion means the area is safe, there may be another device.

c. Permit persons to approach sites until declared safe by an EOD team leader.

d. Urge the EOD operator to get on with the task.

e. Allow the media to harry or distract the EOD operator.

f. Reveal the EOD operator's name, or permit photographs, which would allow him to be identified.

g. Talk about the construction of the device.

h. Give reasons for failure to ignite if this is appropriate.

i. Describe techniques used to disarm the device.

06033. The general public may become familiar with threats and explosions and begin to display indifference to the potential hazard. Nevertheless they have to be treated with firmness and courtesy and encouraged to co-operate in minimising the danger to life.

06034. **Evaluation by the EOD Operator (Team Leader)**. On arrival at the incident area the EOD operator should be met and briefed by the Incident Commander. The following points should be considered:

a. The category of the incident.

b. The circumstance surrounding the incident.

c. The questioning of any witnesses, where this is applicable.

d. The need for any additional safety measures.

e. The need for special services such as gas, electricity, fire and ambulance services.

f. The formulation of a render safe plan.

06035. **Action by the EOD Team**. The EOD team are responsible for dealing with the device, and they will tackle it in accordance with its category; taking only such risks as are required by the category. No pressure should be put on them to take short cuts. - or reduce the various time intervals which are necessary for their personal safety. The following are the main options for rendering safe an explosive device:

a. **Neutralisation**. This is achieved by disruption or dismantling techniques and will be the primary aim of the EOD team.

b. **Removal to a Safe Area**. As a last resort usually, the device may be removed remotely, usually into a prepared area, where its explosive effects can be contained or accepted.

c. **Removing the target**. The device may be allowed to function as designed or be destroyed ‘in situ’, preferably by remote means, after removal of the target.

d. **Destroying the device ‘In Situ’**. This may be deliberately destroyed ‘in situ’, preferably by remote means.

e. **Allowing the device to function**. A device may be allowed to function where it does not hinder operations or where no risk to life or property is evident.

Clearance of an Explosive Device

06036. **The Four Cs Drill**. Before clearance action can start experience has shown that on finding an explosive device, the techniques and procedures to adopt are based on the application of the 4Cs in strict sequence - even if an explosive device has functioned these techniques and procedures should be applied. The sequence of the 4Cs is as follows:

a. **Confirm**. Confirmation can be obtained as follows:

(1) Device thrown or launched but fails to function.

(2) By information from reliable witnesses.

b. **Clear**. When evacuating an area:

(1) Clear from the danger area outwards.

(2) Clear from out of line of sight.

c. **Cordon**. Select cordon locations at the correct safety distance and out of line of sight.

d. **Control**. Ensure all cordon locations are manned to prevent access into the danger area.

Reaction to Finding an Explosive Device

06037. **Sequence of action**. The military reaction to finding an explosive device follows the same stages as the reaction to any other incident. Particular points are:

a. **Danger areas**. A rule of thumb guidance could be:

(1) Hand delivered explosive device -100 m.

(2) Larger device, including cars - 200 m.

(3) Mortar baseplate and proxy bomb - 200 m.

(4) Mortar flight path - 100 m each side.

(5) Very large vehicle bomb - 400 m.

b. **Final clearance**. Final clearance starts at the danger area and works outwards.

c. **Quick Reaction Force (QRF)**. If there is a large area to clear and cordon the QRF, if available, may be required, therefore a suitable initial re-entry vehicle (RV) will have to be selected early.

d. **Responsibilities**. The EOD operator is responsible for rendering the device safe. Other agencies have specific responsibilities, for example an engineer Search Advisor and Search Team may be tasked to provide safe access to the device and ensuring that its immediate surrounds are free from other devices and outside influences. Clearance operations present a particularly serious risk and all involves must maintain a high level of alertness during the operation.

06038. **Types**. There are two general types of EOD operation:

a. **Direct task**. The EOD team is tasked directly to the incident and carries out threat assessment, access and render safe procedures as rapidly as possible. Direct tasks are not discussed further.

b. **Planned operations**. The EOD team is warned, with other agencies, of an impending EOD operation. The operation is then carefully planned and information and intelligence is assembled prior to deployment. The planning can take several days and the operation several days more. Planned operations are mounted in situations of high threat and where, with regard to the device, time is not a limiting factor.

06039. **Location**. The precise location of the target device may be ascertained by remote controlled equipment or it may have to be done manually on a one man risk basis.

06040. **Final approach**. Once the target device has been located, a safe access and working area around it is established and marked. Where possible, remote controlled equipment is used, to locate and approach the target device.

06041. **Render safe**. The EOD operator then carries out his detailed procedures to render the device safe. The process can take many hours and the detail is not recorded here.

After Actions

06042. **Subsequent procedures**. Once the target has been rendered safe, evidence gathering agencies may need to approach it under the control of the EOD Operator, which could mean that:

a. The EOD operator requests the Search Advisor to expand the marked safe area to allow more space for examination.

b. The IEDD Operator requests the Search Advisor to search the remainder of the area that has been isolated, to ensure that there are no subsidiary devices.

06043. **Action on further finds**. The action taken, when a find, other than the original find is made, depends on the situation and type of find. The EOD operator in conjunction with other agencies as required, will take the necessary action.

06044. **Final action by the Military Commander**. No withdrawal activity should start until the EOD operator is satisfied that the target area is properly clear of all devices. The cordon remains intact until full clearance has been confirmed. The EOD operator will then formally declare the area clear.

Section V - Mine Awareness

06045. The proliferation and relatively easy access to all types of mines and booby traps ensures that soldiers will continue to be exposed to this growing threat while on PSO. The following guidelines have been prepared to assist soldiers in avoiding this potential threat.

06046. **Areas in which mines should be suspected**. All soldiers should be aware of the possibility that mines would be laid in the following places:

a. In bottle necks and defiles especially if recovery, clearance or bypass of damaged vehicles would prove difficult.

b. In potential ambush areas both for foot and vehicle patrols.

c. In verges where grass and debris can be used for concealment and anywhere on unpaved roads where concealment is easy.

d. In rubble, mud or debris on an otherwise clear route.

e. Blockage of routes by apparently harmless obstructions which forces traffic onto a verge or diversion which may then be mined.

f. In and around demolitions including craters and roadblocks. AP mines are likely.

g. Around abandoned equipment.

h. In buildings likely to be selected as command posts, shelters, rest areas and protection.

i. In damaged roads and railways to delay repair.

06047. **Indications of possible mining activity**. Obvious signs of mining activity can be observed in the following way:

a. Disturbance of the surface looses spoil scattered over an area.

b. Trampled earth or vegetation, foot marks or marks of wheeled vehicles in a pattern.

c. Damaged or cleared areas in bushes, hedge or scrub.

d. Blast signatures from mines may indicate other mines in the area.

e. Empty containers, packing materials, clips, pins or mine debris.

f. Animal carcasses or abandoned bodies.

g. Areas that local people avoid (use local knowledge).

06048. **Movement in areas which may be mined**. When moving, either on foot or in vehicles the following guidelines should be adopted:

a. Stay alert to the threat and treat with suspicion any object, natural or artificial, which appears out of place.

b. If you see a mine or mine sign/indication or an object that is suspicious, carry out the mine drill.

c. Never move over the most obvious and easiest ground without first searching it. Minimum remote recce then move, stay aware of the threat from mines as you move.

d. In the event of a casualty occurring follow the correct drill.

e. Be most careful when tired.

f. Never pull a slack wire or cut any wire whether it is taut or slack. Try to re-route your extraction if you encounter a trip-wire. Never touch it. Expect buried AP mines, especially under or near the wire. Do not tie anything to trip-wires to mark them.

g. On foot, keep to hard surfaces and follow somebody else.

h. Drive in the centre of the road well clear of the verges.

i. Avoid turning in gateways or areas, which have not been checked for mines.

j. Stay on the road at halts or stops.

k. Off hardstandings do not trust following in old vehicle tracks. They may have, been mined after the passage of the previous vehicles.

l. Expect frequent changes in techniques employed.

06049. **The mine or suspicious object drill**

a. STOP all movement- stand still.

b. WARN all others in the area - shout "Stand Still - Mines".

c. REPORT your situation by radio.

d. ASSESS your situation then:

e. ACT on your assessment either:

(1) REMAIN STILL and WAIT for help to arrive, or

(2) EXTRACT, leave the area exactly at the same way you entered.

f. Mark the route to the nearest safe area.

g. Mark and avoid any mines, unexplosive ordnance (UXO) or trip wires.

06050. **Casualty Drill**.

a. STOP, do not rush to the casualty. REPORT and ASSESS the incident. Request mine clearance and medical assistance (as required).

b. If mine clearance aid is not available within ten minutes one person clears a route 0.6m wide to the casualty. Movement should be either by crawling on hands and knees or on the stomach - NOT standing. Others can clear a route to a safe area concurrently.

c. Mark the route as it is cleared (one side or both sides).

d. Mark and avoid mines/trip-wires encountered.

e. Clear the area immediately around the casualty.

f. Administer first aid as required.

g. Move the casualty down the cleared route to a safe area. Safety distances are 20m crawling or 50m walking.

h. CASEVAC as soon as possible.

06051. **Actions on vehicle mine strike**. This sequence of drills should be followed:

a. STOP all movement, ASSESS the situation, and consider casualties, options and safe locations. The safest location may well be the vehicle you are in (DO NOT LEAP OUT).

b. Administer immediate first aid (if required).

c. REPORT the incident call for mine clearance and medical assistance.

d. If forced to evacuate the vehicle, use one person to clear a route 0.6m wide to the best safe area. Progress should be either by crawling or on the stomach NOT standing.

e. Mark the route as it is cleared (one side or both sides).

f. Administer full first aid and CASEVAC (if required).

06052. **Supply of up to date information**. All units in the theatre of operations should keep an up to date record of known minefields, marking systems, types of mine used in the area and other associated details. Information from any source about mines should be noted and checked where possible. Further suggestions for dealing with mines should be passed to higher formation for rapid promulgation (as appropriate) around the theatre of operations.

Section VI - Convoys and Escorts

Small Road Convoys

06053. **General**. Small road convoys may be required to position and relieve small isolated detachments, and for local administration. There is always a danger of establishing a regular pattern of movement. It has to be a matter of discipline to maintain constantly an irregular pattern in the routes followed, in convoy or vehicle speeds and timings. Failure to do this places lives and equipment at risk and may give any hostile party successes, which they would otherwise find difficult to achieve. Air observation should be a normal feature of all convoys en route. If the threat is high consideration should be given for an FAC to be deployed in a helicopter, in which case close air support should be available.

06054. **Size**. A small convoy is normally composed of packets. Large convoys are normally split into packets and columns, allowing one of these to act as a reserve or strike group if conditions warrant this precaution. A very small party should move with never less than two vehicles each with their own communications and personal weapons.

06055. **The Lead Group**. The task of the lead group is to clear the route of any obstruction, and give warning to the main group of any danger. It should travel far enough ahead to enable small obstructions to be cleared without getting the main group involved. The group may include engineer or Assault Pioneers trained to recognise potential mined or booby trapped areas.

06056. **The Main Group**. This should ideally be composed of armoured reconnaissance vehicles and infantry in armoured or soft skinned vehicles particularly if there is a potential threat. A typical order of march could be as follows:

a. Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles.

b. Convoy/VIP car.

c. APC/IFV containing the column commander.

d. Mounted infantry.

e. Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle.

06057. **The reserve or Strike Group**. This should move far enough behind the close protection group to allow freedom of action if the latter is held up or attacked. A helicopter borne QRF may be tasked as a Reserve Force. Ideally this should be composed of at least two helicopters to allow for greater flexibility of movement and action.

06058. **Command and control**. The column commander commands the column from his position in the convoy. Good secure radio communications throughout the column are therefore essential, together with a working link to the local security force commander in case the convoy requires help.

06059. **Liaison**. The staff responsible for the arrangements for a move has to agree with local commanders the measures, which are to be taken to protect the convoy as it passes through their areas. This includes the means of travel, the route, timings and the size of the escort and the presence of soft skinned vehicles if there is a risk of incident.

06060. **Aviation support** Helicopters may be used to reconnoitre the proposed convoy route and for flank protection. Prior to vehicle movement, road security can be examined for hostile activity. During movement of the convoy, aviation can provide flank guard and reconnaissance ahead to check for potential incidents, hold ups, or attack positions.

06061. **Preparation of vehicles**. When operating vehicles in a PSO consideration should be given to adopting one or more of the following points about protection:

a. Any restricting superstructure should be removed to give troops a clear field of fire and observation, and the freedom to dismount quickly. The use of sandbags may reduce casualties from mines/booby traps, in unarmoured vehicles.

b. Tailgates should be down or removed.

c. All transport should be fitted with towing hooks, and have adequate tool kits and tow devices. Mine detectors and strong cordage should be available for clearing obstacles.

d. Mounts for machine guns should be fitted to unarmed transport.

e. High wire cutters should be fitted to the front of vehicles. A metal grid can also be fitted to the front of a vehicle to enable light barricades to be pushed aside.

f. The soldiers in the back of a troop carrying vehicle should be seated facing outwards and to the rear with any stores or packs stacked centrally.

06062. **Action if attacked**. If the convoy is attacked, an immediate action drill, which must have been practised repeatedly, should be applied automatically. When troops in vehicles are caught and forced to stop inside the danger area of an ambush, the immediate drill might be:

a. Smoke dischargers are fired and sentries throw smoke grenades and engage the ambush party, while the remainder debuses and move to a rallying point in the direction ordered, followed finally by the sentries.

b. Simultaneously, the commanders orders direction in which troops are to move on debussing

c. As soon as the troops have assembled, and the commander has located the ambushers, an immediate counter-attack should be launched.

d. There must be no wild and indiscriminate firing at any stage, particularly where there may be innocent bystanders.

Large Road Convoys

06063. **General**. A column of vehicles is a particularly attractive target especially close country, in remote areas. Hostile parties may attack a road convoy by either ambushing or placing a device on or by the road. A large convoy is one where the column is sub-divided into more than one packet. Many of the principles already described for small convoys apply, particularly the need for meticulous planning and briefing and air observation during the movement of the convoy:

a. Precautionary measures designed to forestall attacks, or to minimise their effect.

b. Tactical grouping within convoy’s protection by armour and, if the situation demands, artillery and air aviation supports.

c. The immediate availability of a mobile reserve which could be an Airmobile Reaction Force (ARF).

06064. **The need to know principle**. Plans should never be divulged in advance to anyone who does not have a need to know them, and deception measures should always be considered. Where a route is in regular use, precautions may have to be taken which would not be necessary on a route, which is used irregularly.

06065. **Intelligence and reconnaissance**. Intelligence on potential hostile activity astride the proposed route should be obtained, and there must be careful reconnaissance carried out with suitable deception measures to ensure preservation of secrecy. Aerial imagery and photographs can assist this process, without risk to personnel or compromise. This reconnaissance should include:

a. Identification of bottlenecks and possible ambush sites.

b. Assessment of the escort requirement and task organisation required.

c. The need for any special preparations such as picketing, clearance of roadside cover, patrolling of particularly dangerous areas etc. Use of aviation fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft are invaluable to conduct photographic surveillance or video footage of the proposed route. This would also be useful for briefing vehicle commanders.

d. All possible diversions and alternative routes.

e. The command and communications problem.

f. Recovery needs and medical support assets.

06066. **Organisation of a convoy**. The following terms are used:

a. **Escort**. The force detailed to provide protection: it has its own escort commander.

b. **Vehicle Column**. The column of vehicles being protected: the column commander commands it.

c. **Convoy**. The vehicle column plus the escort: the overall commander is the convoy commander.

06067. **Strength of escort**. The strength and composition of the escort will depend upon the threat, the size of the vehicle column and the forces available. The ideal is a

mixed escort comprising armour and infantry, possibly with aviation. An armoured reconnaissance unit is well suited for providing the armoured element of an escort, and infantry should be mounted in APCs. Engineers should be included to make minor repairs to bridges and roads, to detect and lift mines and to remove obstacles.

06068. **Grouping**. A convoy should be divided into packets each with its nominated commander. The interval between packets being adjusted so as to minimises the number of vehicles, which can be caught in any one ambush. The interval between vehicles within a group will depend on the closeness of the country, the speed of the convoy and the need to maintain control.

06069. **Organisation of the escort**. The escort is usually composed with advanced patrol, close protection group and a reserve or strike group. The strength of the escort will depend on the threat and terrain.

06070. **Mobile reserve**. A mobile reserve, separate from the convoy, should be available to intervene immediately should the convoy be ambushed: it will normally consist of helicopterborne infantry on immediate standby. Planning for intervention by the mobile reserve should include the co-ordination of infantry and aviation, and the provision of air and possibly artillery support. If the risk is great or an ambush seems imminent, the mobile reserve may have to be kept airborne for a limited period. An alternative means of moving the mobile reserve must be planned in case bad weather grounds the aircraft.

06071. **Recovery and repair of vehicles**. Plans should exist for the prompt recovery and repair of vehicles. Recovery vehicles should be included in any large convoy, and there should be vehicle mechanics in each group. The recovery and repair policy has to be included in convoy orders; normally a packet will halt long enough to take a broken down vehicle in tow, or for it to be handed over to a recovery section travelling with the convoy. There may, however, be circumstances when it will be necessary to abandon a vehicle rather than hold up the convoy.

06072. **Medical assistance**. Plans should exist for prompt medical assistance. Medical vehicles should be included in any large convoy, and there should be medical personnel in each group. The medical policy has to by included in the convoy orders. In case of emergency, evacuation by helicopter (MEDEVAC) should be possible.

06073. **Communications**. Radio communications are essential between all packets within the convoy and with the mobile reserve, supporting artillery, aircraft and other security forces operating on or astride the route. Light signals and coloured smoke grenades may also be used to a prearranged code for passing information and for indicating targets.

06074. **Conduct and sequence of movement in very difficult circumstances**. Where a large convoy has to move through country in which strong hostile parties are active, the sequence of action set out below may have to be used. In less severe conditions, precautions can be progressively relaxed in relation to the threat.

a. **Stage 1**. Secure a firm base near the convoy starting point, and deploy artillery in support. Establish continuous airborne FAC and artillery observation over the first 10-15 kilometres of the route and assemble the mobile reserve. Armed helicopters may also be deployed.

b. **Stage 2**. Secure second firm base with infantry moved by helicopter or vehicle. This should be followed by moving some artillery to the second firm base, either by helicopter, or by road with armour and infantry protection.

c. **Stage 3**. By now artillery will be in position ready to fire from both bases and the mobile reserve on standby in the first firm base. The convoy should now move in the tactical grouping previously described with the point troop supported by FAC (ideally an airmobile FAC), artillery observer and possibly armed helicopters moving well ahead by bounds, in order to clear the route.

d. **Stage 4**. Assuming that the convoy has reached the second firm base, artillery should move there from the first base, either by air or by road, with the protective force, which was originally established at the first firm base. The mobile reserve would also move to the second firm base, before the whole procedure is repeated over the next 1- 15 kilometres.

06075. **Action if ambushed**. That part of the convoy that attacked should conduct the same contact drills as indicated in paragraph 06062. Additional points could be:

a. Concurrently with the above, if appropriate, artillery and air support is requested.

b. The strike group moves forward to counter-attack or outflank hostile parties.

c. The mobile reserve is called in to assault the position or to block their escape route, in conjunction with the strike group.

06076. **Command and control**. The anti-ambush drill has to be understood by the - commanders of each group and by all vehicle commanders so that in a well spread out convoy there is always someone available to take appropriate action if the convoy commander is too far away to take local control. The command and control arrangements should, therefore, be devised so that there is always a nominated commander on the spot with the necessary communications to call for supporting fire and air support.

Picketing a Route

06077. **General**. Picketing is the means of securing a road or track by dominating the route for a limited period to allow the safe passage of a convoy. It is expensive in manpower and time, and should only be carried out when there is a grave threat of ambush, and when other methods of protecting the route are impracticable.

06078. **Deployment of pickets**. Pickets should, where possible, be positioned by helicopter or by deploying a picketing force. The picketing force is made up of an advance guard, a main body and a rear guard: the advance guard clears the axis by bounds, the main body establishes the pickets, and the rear guard calls in the pickets when the convoy has passed. Such a force could move on foot or in vehicles, depending on the terrain and the nature of the convoy and may need to include armour, mortars and artillery to support pickets into position and cover their withdrawal.

06079. **Distance between pickets**. The initial task of a picketing force will be to ensure that there is no ambush in position. Thereafter the distance between pickets will be dictated by the nature of the terrain. While all intervening ground should ideally be covered by fire, in some close country this may be quite unrealistic. It may be necessary to picket only certain parts of the route or selected features. Although in this case there has to be a risk that an ambush can be set up in an intervening position, the existence of pickets and uncertainty amongst an ambush party as to their whereabouts is an important deterrent. The distance at which pickets are established from the convoy route also depends on the nature of ground and on the time available. They

should ideally be sited at such a distance as to prevent direct fire from small arms and hand held anti-tank weapons being brought to bear on the convoy.

06080. **Size of pickets**. The size of pickets should be related to the threat and the type of terrain.

06081. **Use of forces operating in the area**. If forces are already operating in the area through which a convoy route passes, they may be used to picket the route. The method of their deployment will depend on their current positions. Such a picketing force is still required to ensure that no ambush has already been established, and for this purpose they may need to clear the sides of the convoy route. Close liaison and good communications are particularly important between such a force and the convoy.

06082. **Communications**. Communications are particularly important in close country where there is an obvious danger of confusion should a hostile force evade the pickets and succeed in attacking a convoy. Each picket must have a radio or be in direct contact by hand, voice or light signals with a post, which does have a radio. In this way the progress of the convoy can be made known to the pickets, and either the pickets or the convoy as being friendly or suspicious can readily identify any activity on or beside the route. Where the picketing force is provided by a unit different to that escorting the convoy, there must be a liaison officer with radio from the picketing force to the escort commander. Light signals can usefully be employed to recall pickets. Coloured flags and panels are useful for identifying vehicles packets.

Section VII - Protection of Air and Rail Movement

06083. **Air movement**. Should the operational situation allow, movement of troops and some freight may be conducted by aircraft and helicopter - indeed this is the preferred method of movement where this is feasible. Protection of airfields or terminals may not be possible or appropriate, but protection of aircraft/helicopters on the ground at airfields is vital. Security of landing strips/sites is also necessary and clearance parties should check the site well before landings take place and secure the area until all arrivals and departures have been completed.

06084. **Rail movement**. Railways may be used to move essential military reinforcements and supplies. In a PSO situation an adversary will undoubtedly make use of any suitable railway service to move about the area, to transport equipment and to hijack passengers and staff where necessary.

06085. **Protection of military trains**. The close escort for a train should travel in a special carriage fitted with mountings for machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers, and protected from mines and small arms fire by sandbags and armour. In addition to the escort, there should be OPs at other parts of the train. The escort carriage should preferably be attached near the rear of the train, and it should not be adjacent to any ammunition or POL carrying wagons. There are two aspects of rail movement.

a. **Movement of troops and stores**. The movement of military personnel and equipment by rail is less easily concealed than it is by road. The route is predictable, and loading can seldom be accomplished out of the public eye. Opportunities for deception are limited, and physical protection becomes all important. Safeguarding rail movement is therefore expensive in manpower; trains should only be run through dangerous country when there is a real need, and then they should be used to capacity in order to take full advantage of all the measures, which have to be put into effect to protect them.

b. **The protection of civil trains**. The difficulties of protecting civilian trains derive from their frequency and the need for patrols to avoid patterns despite the linear nature of this task. These problems are aggravated when an

international frontier is involved, for patrols have to be mounted at likely hijacking points without themselves being set up as targets.

06086. **Precautionary measures**. While the timing and the load of a military train should never be divulged except to those who have to know, it will be difficult to conceal the running of a train except on a fairly busy civil line. Precautions should therefore be directed towards:

a. Ensuring the line is free of obstructions or explosives. Employing search teams to check vulnerable parts of the line can do this.

b. Taking anti-ambush precautions.

c. Making it clear that attacks at the military train will inevitably result in a quick and efficient manner.

d. Patrolling in the area of the railway line so as to locate and deter possible attacks.

e. Clearing undergrowth from beside the track.

f. Picketing, as for road movement, particularly on crossing sites.

g. Proving the track ahead of the train.

h. Utilising helicopters to provide observation and to carry a mobile strike force if the train is attacked.

06087. **Pilot trains**. Pilot trains are used to prove the line against sabotage, obstructions and pressure mines. They cannot guard against command detonated mines or against ambushes, but they are a useful extra patrol in this context, and the escort should be alert and looking out for any signs of such activity. A pilot train usually consists of a locomotive pushing one or more unoccupied wagons which should be weighted with ballast, and pulling a coach or wagon, which should be protected against mines and small arms, carrying an armed escort. More than one pilot train should, if possible, precede a military train to provide additional chances of detecting mining or ambush preparations and to confuse saboteurs as to whether an approaching train is their target.

06088. **Protection of other trains**. In some situations armoured trains may be useful for patrolling sections of railway line where hostile activity is expected in order to protect all types of rail movement. They should be operated tactically under orders of

the local military commander, and be manned either by specially selected railway employees or by a military crew if this is feasible.

06089. **Sector control**. The signalling system on railways relies on sectors into which trains are only allowed when the preceding train is clear. These sectors may be a suitable basis for ensuring that any train which is ambushed can reverse out of the ambush onto a clear line or be reinforced: the sector system in use should be examined with this in mind and revised if necessary.

06090. **Deception measures**. In a busy line, or on one, which carries even a small number of scheduled services, it may be possible to run a military train instead of a civil train at the same time as in the schedule. On the less busy lines, it may be possible to conceal the time of departure of a train if rolling stock can be kept waiting, perhaps for days, or if it can be rapidly assembled, loaded and despatched. Communications on railways have to be good, and if a hostile sympathiser has access to them acquiring information on train movement and passing messages is easy

06091. **Anti-Hijacking measures**. Covert anti-hijacking parties may be used as a last resort because of the difficulties of recognition of friend or foe and of engaging hijackers within the confined space of a railway carriage without risk to passengers. Trains, which cross an international border will cause a particular problem since hijackers, may be able to board from within their sanctuary. Every effort has to be made to engage the co-operation of security forces across the border. More effective measures may be:

a. The screening of boarding passengers and their baggage.

b. The random patrolling of trains between intermediate stops.

c. Patrols by air OPs.

06092. **Command**. Control of a moving train rests with the crew. Security forces on the train can of course engage ambush parties while it is moving. If a train is immobilised, the escort commander, or senior military member aboard if there is no escort as such, must assume command. The aim will then be to defend the train, the goods it is carrying, its passengers and crew. Troops must be positioned in or near the front and rear carriages to keep the commander in touch with the situation by radio.

06093. **Communications**. Radio communications have to be available to call for assistance, in addition to the communications required within the train. If military or police forces have been deployed to protect the railway line, their communications should be compatible with any train radios. Planned light signals can also be employed to supplement radio communications, and coloured panels should be carried in case it becomes necessary to mark certain coaches in an engagement.

Section VIII - Operations Security (OPSEC) Measures

06094. **Definition**. OPSEC is defined as the process which gives a military operation appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny any hostile forces knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of those conducting the operation. (AAP-6)

06095. **The threat to security**. OPSEC is a Force-wide process which addresses the overall security of the whole operation in the light of the adversary's known or suspected Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. OPSEC does not address:

a. **Security procedures**. Security procedures that raise and lower the normal security alert states to counter specific threats.

b. **Specific security measures**. Such as arrangements for the secure storage of arms.

06096. **OPSEC planning**. Each planned operation should be examined in its entirety from the adversary's point of view, including rear area activity, lines of communication, air and naval support and all communications networks. As it is not possible to conceal every military action in support of an operation, OPSEC concentrates on those activities, which could indicate the existence of an impending operation, or reveal security vulnerabilities. OPSEC is particularly relevant to those operations, where the element of surprise is vital to success. It is not possible, for instance, to conceal a major cordon and search operation, but an effective OPSEC plan can deny the adversary sufficient information to predict the timings and precise target of the operation - thus the intended target may remain in the area instead of moving. Equally, most patrol activity is overt but OPSEC will deny the adversary the knowledge of the timings, routes and strengths of patrols to avoid confrontation.

06097. **OPSEC measures**. These fall under four broad categories:

a. **Defensive measures**. The aim of defensive OPSEC measures is to counter the adversary's ISTAR assets and abilities. Examples include:

(1) Security of Personnel.

(2) Physical Security (locks, walls, wire, mines and fields of fire).

(3) Document Security.

(4) Emissions Control (EMCON).

(5) Camouflage and Concealment (including the use of civilianised military vehicles).

b. **Active measures**. Active measures include the disruption of the adversary's ISTAR capability by:

(1) Increased military activity to counter surveillance by the adversary, seal borders and areas.

(2) Direct observation and disruption of known adversary locations.

c. **Deception**. Deception can be used to lead hostile parties to believe that, for instance, only routine activity is taking place.

d. **Psychological operations (PSYOPS).** PSYOPS can be used to influence an adversary's perceptions of security forces moves and intentions.

e. **Change of plan**. Move timings, locations, and units, to disorientate and confuse an adversary.

06098. **Application**. The level of OPSEC appropriate for the setting will depend on the type of PSO. For instance the need for operational OPSEC has to be balanced with the need for transparency as the basis for trust and legitimacy in the community or theatre of operations.

Section IX - Guidelines for Tactical Deception Measures

06099. **General.** The principle of transparency is vital in PSO, which requires that a force's activities should be manifestly "above board" and not be vulnerable to accusations of pursuing an illicit agenda. Deception operations are likely to be incompatible with this principle.

06100. **Guidelines**. There are seven main guidelines to utilise when planning successful deception measures at all levels of combat. These guidelines are not prescriptive and consideration should be given to ensuring that deception measures constantly reviewed in order to remain credible.

a. **Centralised Control**. The headquarters of the formation within which all deception measures will be carried out must control deception tasks.

b. **Preparation**. Success pre-supposes detailed prior knowledge of an adversary and his procedures and some calculation must be made of his reaction to each activity or phase of activity.

c. **Credibility**. The adversary has to be capable of believing the deception story, which should be within capabilities and compatible with doctrine. The deception story should reinforce his expectations.

d. **Collaboration**. The deception story has to be fed to the recipient through 2 or more independent sources. Sources or personalities which could compromise elements of the deception plan should be neutralised, e.g. by temporarily detaining the individuals concerned.

e. **Flexibility**. In one sense flexibility is essential to take advantage of the recipient's reactions, both predicted and unforeseen. In another sense, in the event of the deception's failure, or only partial success, flexibility is required either to abandon or change the plan without revealing its original aim.

f. **Timing**. The recipient has to be given time not only to notice, interpret and react to false information but also insufficient time to analyse it so thoroughly that the deception and its purpose become apparent.

g. **Security**. Deception plans must be kept secret and only disseminated to the minimum numbers on a strict 'need to know' basis.

06101. **Changing techniques and procedures.** There are many minor ways in which changing techniques and procedures within tactical operations can help to deceive an adversary about military activity and its target. These complement and provide collateral to the more important guidelines given above and are the essences of keeping others guessing about military activity. Patrolling is probably the biggest single activity in any PSO activity and examples of elementary deception in patrolling activity are given below:

a. Take additional numbers out on patrol, e.g. female searchers or dog handlers.

b. Use mid-patrol moves by helicopter, both day and night. This acts as a force multiplier as the same patrol can cover 2 widely separated areas.

c. Deploy on a long-term operation with only normal patrol equipment, then have extra equipment /stores brought out by helicopter or vehicle.

d. Task helicopters to carry out dummy drop-offs and pick ups when in transit.

e. Deploy 4 teams from the base, one secures exit point for the remainder who deploy on patrol before returning to base.

f. Cross-terrain patrolling over the ridges, road, or rivers rather than moving parallel to them.

g. Deploy urban patrols by helicopter to the edge of the urban area and move back in.

h. Deploy on a night patrol in the evening without night viewing devices fitted; these can then be fitted after last light.

06102. Similar elementary tactics and precautions can be taken in other military activity which can all be designed to keep others guessing about actual intentions in the next few days ahead.

Section X - NBC and Toxic Chemical Protection

06103. **General.** Servicemen are trained in protection procedures for the NBC hazard during operations in combat. Experience has indicated that some of these hazards - most notably the chemical, biological and radiological hazards could be present in

PSO and hence the need to be properly trained in all aspects of NBC protection both for individuals and for units. Decontamination drills are also particularly relevant.

06104. Many states now pocess industrial chemical production facilities where the release of toxic chemicals could be a hazard, either from military operations, an industrial accident, sabotage or insurgency action. The information and instructions in this section is designed to help both commanders and individuals to plan for and protect themselves against this type of hazard.

06105. **Identification of hazardous facilities**. Some chemical equipments and transportation facilities may be marked with international HAZCHEM symbols. These signs have the form of a diamond and are colour coded with supporting words and symbols. HAZCHEM decode booklets should be issued in theatre.

06106. **Siting of positions**. Most of the industrial chemicals that could be released into the environment would initially appear as liquids or powders, subsequently turning into vapour either through evaporation or fire. These vapours would tend initially to concentrate in low-lying area and positions (valleys, ravines, cellars, dug outs etc.) and would form the strongest concentrations when confined by buildings, woods, tree lines or other obstructions. Subsequent hazard travel would be determined principally by the surface wind. Subject to overriding operational requirements, troops should therefore seek to occupy positions which are:

a. At maximum elevation.

b. On open ground.

c. Upwind of possible sources of hazards.

06107. Commanders should be aware of the prevailing winds in the area. However, it will also be necessary to monitor continuously actual conditions and for that reason some units should be provided with wind speed and direction measuring devices.

06108. **Personal protection**. Most of the chemical vapours of concern smell strongly and some but not all cause immediate irritation to the breathing passages and eyes. Some, though not all, might be visible to the naked eye. Two possible hazard substances are of particular concern because of their high toxicity and the difficulty in detecting them via the human senses. Each has a faint smell, though this could be masked by the smoke from an accompanying fire; these agents are:

a. Phosgene - smells faintly of new mown hay.

b. Hydrogen Cyanide - smells faintly of bitter almonds.

06109. The standard service respirator provides full protection against both these agents.

06110. **Immediate action (IA) drills**. The defence against all the hazards which might result from an incident involving industrial chemicals is to comply with the following drill:

TOXIC HAZARD FIRST AID DRILL

If a chemical-industrial equipment, pipeline or road/rail tanker in your area is subjected to bombardment, catches fire, sustains damage in any form, or if unprotected civilians, birds or animals show sudden signs of physical distress:

IMMEDIATELY

Put on your respirator.

Warn those around you, where possible using the toxic alarm provided.

Scrupulously avoid contact with any leaking liquids or powders.

On command, move upwind and uphill of the point of chemical release.

06111. **Whole body protection**. Unless there is immediate risk of coming into contact with chemical in liquid or powder form it will only be necessary to use the respirator for immediate personal protection. The NBC suit, boots and gloves will not be required. If, however, there is a delay in withdrawal from the area of chemical release even briefly (for instance to rescue casualties) then an NBC suit should be worn. Note that the standard respirator and NBC suit is designed to defend against war-gases and droplets only. They are NOT to be used in an attempt to protect against sustained exposure to industrial spillage: early withdrawal from the hazard area will always be required. Personnel equipped with decontamination suits worn over the standard NBC suit if ordered and essential should accomplish re-entry into an area of gross contamination. Decontamination suits will be issued in theatre.

06112. **Unmasking**. Once clear of the immediate hazard area (i.e. upwind and uphill of the point of release) the local commander may order unmasking if:

a. A test has been carried out with negative result.
AND EITHER

b. Unprotected civilians, birds or animals in the area are seen to be unaffected.
OR

c. A two-men ‘sniff-test’ has been completed without ill effect.

06113. **Decontamination**. Persons or equipment that may have been contaminated with chemicals in liquid or powder form are to be decontaminated using copious quantities of cold soapy water. These persons should then be referred for medical examination. Contaminated clothing is to be discarded and sealed by burial or enclosing in polythene bags. Burial of contaminated waste is subject to the host nation environmental laws. Burial is a preferred option and marking and recording of the burial site and contents will be critical. In the case of contaminated equipment that has to be re-used (e.g. vehicles) it must first be cleansed with copious quantities of water and then be marked with the standard gas warning symbol. Thereafter crews wearing full individual protection (respirator, NBC suit, gloves and boots) may only operate it.

06114. Under no circumstances is contaminated clothing or equipment to be taken into any building or left upwind of any location occupied by unmasked personnel.

06115. Respirator canisters are to be changed on command after each period of exposure. Discarded canisters are to be damaged beyond repair (e.g. with a hammer) to prevent inadvertent re-use and disposed of as hazardous waste.

First Aid Guidance for Toxic Hazards

06116. **Medical assistance.** Although first aid guidance is given below in all cases of suspected exposure to toxic chemical hazards qualified medical assistance should be sought as soon as possible.

06117. **Prevent further exposure**. By moving away from the danger area. Aim to and up on high ground that is not downwind of the hazard source. The respirator should be removed, but see treatment for hydrogen cyanide.

06118. **Eye injury**. Is treated by flooding with a gentle stream of water for about 10 minutes. A saline drip is ideal (1 litre for each eye) but any source of water will do. Remember to pull the eyelids apart and if possible get the casualty to move the eyeball during insertion of water. Only in this way will the eyeball be properly flushed.

06119. **Skin contamination**. Can result in burns or allow absorption of the chemical. Drenching with water and the careful removal of contaminated clothing is essential. All chemicals should be regarded as hazardous unless proven otherwise and if doubt exists drench immediately. Soapy water helps to remove the last remnants of skin contamination. Chemically burnt skin should be thoroughly washed, then simply be covered with a loosely applied sterile dressing taking care to handle the area as little as possible to reduce the risk of infection.

06120. **Inhalation**. Toxic gases are often acutely irritating to the respiratory tract. This property and any odour can act as a warning limiting exposure. In all cases removal to fresh air is essential. Provided the casualty is still breathing and is conscious, little else need be done - simply monitor his condition. If breathing has stopped, administer artificial respiration until it resumes naturally or medical help becomes available. If the casualty is unconscious, he must be placed in the recovery position. The casualty should be rested, as exertion may make later respiratory complications worse.

06121. **Ammonia**. Is a colourless gas with a pungent odour. It intensely irritates the eyes, respiratory tract and skin. Treatment consists of washing followed by despatch to further medical help.

06122. **Benzene and Toluene**. Are both clear liquids with characteristic smells. They irritate the eyes and respiratory tract. Systemic absorption can cause headache, dizziness, lack of co-ordination, staggering, collapse and coma. Treat the eye and inhalation injuries as above. Soapy water is best to decontaminate the skin and to reduce systemic absorption.

06123. **Chlorine Gas**. Irritates the eyes, respiratory tract and, in high concentrations, the skin. There is usually a delay between exposure and first symptoms, so early eye irritation and skin washing is essential in suspected cases followed by removal to medical help in case later respiratory complications occur.

06124. **Hydrogen Chloride**. Fumes in moist air with a pungent suffocating smell. It causes severe eye and skin burns and irritates the respiratory tract. Treatment for eyes, skin and inhalation injury is as above.

06125. **Hydrogen Cyanide**. Vapour is invisible and has a faint odour of bitter almonds or peach kernels. People react differently to the same dose. Inside the body it prevents

the cells and tissues using oxygen. The first priority is to remove the casualty from the hazard. Decontamination after vapour exposure is not necessary. Mild cases may develop only headache, vertigo and nausea but a severe exposure will cause dramatic air hunger and death. Any casualty who is fully conscious and breathing normally more than 5 minutes after presumed exposure will recover and does not require treatment, as cyanide is very rapidly detoxified in the body. If treatment is required, this should preferably be with the drug Amyl Nitrate. The contents of one ampoule of Amyl Nitrate are dabbed on the face near the nose and the respirator replaced to ensure the maximum amount of its vapour is inhaled. If the drug is not available administer artificial respiration while arranging for emergency evacuation to a medical facility.

06126. **Maleic Anhydride**. Vapour fumes are intensely irritating to the eyes and lungs. The cornea of the eye may ulcerate and asthma like condition may develop. Copious irrigation of the eyes is needed and the casualty's respiration should be closely monitored.

06127. **Mercury Vapour**. When inhaled can cause headache, shortness of breath, tight chest, cough, nausea and vomiting. Treatment involves irrigation of the eyes and washing the skin. Note: Mercury has a long-term cumulative effect.

06128. **Methyl Isocyanate**. Vapour is highly irritant to the eyes and respiratory tract and high concentrations will irritate the skin. It decomposes in water to a harmless product, hence treatment consists of washing. On burning it produces oxides of nitrogen. The treatment is the same as for skin and eye contamination.

06129. **Nitrous fumes**. (Oxides of Nitrogen) are usually red/brown in colour and in high concentrations can irritate the eyes and respiratory tract. The greater risk is from respiratory failure from asthma like condition. If the casualty is conscious he should simply be observed. A worsening situation will require artificial respiration. In many cases there are no immediate respiratory effects but the casualty should be moved to medical help anyway because respiratory failure from lung oedema may occur hours later.

06130. **Phosgene**. (Odour like new mown hay) is a vapour above 8°C and a liquid below that temperature, although evaporation will occur. It may cause coughing, choking, tight chest and nausea soon after exposure in some people although sometimes symptoms do not occur for several hours. Many will suffer lung oedema.

The casualty should be rested and taken to further medical help. Decontamination is not required except in very cold climates.

06131. **Polyurethane**. On burning produces a wide range of toxic chemicals including hydrogen cyanide, oxides of nitrogen and isocyanates.

Section XI - Protection of High Risk Persons

06132. Prominent citizens, government officials, members of the armed forces, may all be at risk from hostile action by bombing, shooting or kidnapping. The scale and extent of precautionary measures have to be related to the threat, but contingency plans should always be prepared in case this should increase. This section deals with the guidelines for personal conduct and for the movements of individuals and small bodies of troops or civilians outside safe areas. ,

06133. **Assessing the threat**. Prominent individuals are usually classified as VIPs within the theatre of operations. Threat assessments against such persons, and recommendations for their protection are the responsibility of the security staff (normally military and police) drawing upon information, experience and a regular review of the overall assessment from their own and other reliable sources.

06134. **Planning Protective Measures**. The cost, in terms of manpower and special equipment, of protecting high-risk personnel has to be carefully balanced against the advantage to an adversary of a successful attack. Security staffs are responsible to the operations staff, after full consultation with all other branches likely to be involved, for the planning and co-ordination of suitable security measures to be adopted.

06135. **Protection**. Trained and equipped bodyguards normally carry out the close protection of VIPs. Only the general protective arrangements that would be necessary for those persons who are designated as VIPs are dealt with here. Some VIPs may have special medical parties available to them, but if this is not the case then a suitable medical plan should be prepared to cater for any emergency.

06136. **Movement of VIPs by Air**. The movement of VIPs into and around areas where the risk of hostile activity is high can cause additional security problems. The quickest and often the safest method of moving one or more VIPs, is by helicopter, and this should always be considered in preference to road movement. Security measures are needed for helicopter movement, and include protection of take off and landing points and clearance of booby traps or mines from them. This is based on the assumption that the risk of attack from the air is very slight, - although it should not be entirely discounted. Most hostile parties have precluded the use of air as a medium in which to attack specific targets, probably for practical reasons. The risk normally lies

in the ability of any hostile party to mount attacks on aircraft/helicopters from the ground with small deception covering the movement of VIPs.

06137. **Alternative travel plans**. Where weather or lack of suitable aircraft prevents movement by air, the choice for moving a VIP then turns on the use of a small convoy, or the prospect of using unmarked vehicles and a suitable escort. The senior security force commander should make the final decision for movement based on the prevailing security threat and then take all the subsequent precautionary measures to ensure safe travel. This could include searching part of the route if necessary.

Section XII - Individual Security when off Duty

Individual Troops Off Duty

06138. Movement off duty may need to be restricted in order to:

a. Avoid casualties.

b. Prevent hostages being taken by kidnapping.

c. Avoid incidents provoked with the intention of involving off duty servicemen.

06139. Precautionary measures should be designed both to reduce the danger to off duty troops and to enable prompt action to be taken should troops be overdue in returning from any off duty activity. Such measures might include:

a. Proper booking in and out procedures.

b. Restrictions on the size and number of parties of troops allowed out of safe areas.

c. Whether or not plain clothes are permitted or are compulsory.

d. Provision of special patrols in shopping or recreation areas.

e. Guarding of sports fields etc. while games are being played.

f. The arming of all or of a specified number of troops in each group: troops carrying arms should never move singly.

g. Restriction of movement to particular areas.

h. Placing certain areas or establishments out of bounds. In times of social disturbance any political or sectarian meetings or demonstrations should also be placed out of bounds.

i. Imposition of a military curfew.

j. Avoidance of any regular pattern of movement.

k. Guarding of all military vehicles in car parks, and control of parking.

l. Restrictions on the use of public transport and trains.

Guidelines for Individual Security

06140. **Locks and keys**. Attention should be paid to the following points:

a. Keep a strict check on house keys.

b. Do not allow duplicate keys to be made without permission.

c. If a key is lost in suspicious circumstances, it is better to have a new lock fitted.

d. Working keys should never carry any form of written identification. If keys need identifying, a system of colour coding could be used.

e. Never leave keys under the mat or in other obvious hiding places.

f. Spare keys should be held in a central location not normally accessible to visitors.

06141. **Doors and windows**. Points to note are:

a. Keep any possible access windows locked at night or when out.

b. Make a safety check each night before retiring to ensure that doors and windows, particularly on the ground floor, are properly closed and locked.

c. After dark, keep curtains or blinds closed. Remember to close curtains before switching on lights and to switch off lights before opening curtains, in order to avoid being silhouetted at windows.

d. When answering the door, do not automatically open it. Try to check who is there by observing through an adjacent window, or by using a door viewer or entry-phone, if installed.

e. When answering the door, do not put the hall light on. Do not stand behind the door when trying to ascertain whom the caller is. Stand to one side.

f. If you have glass panes in a door, consider preventing observation by the fitting of a thick curtain.

06142. **Garden, garage and outbuildings**. Particular points are:

a. Doors and windows of garages and outbuildings should be kept locked, except for specific access.

b. Doors and windows of garages and outbuildings should always be checked for signs of unauthorised access before entering.

c. Bushes, trees and undergrowth providing cover, especially close to the house, footpaths or driveways, should be removed or trimmed to make it more difficult for an intruder to operate or to conceal an explosive device. Make occasional checks of any flower beds for disturbed/new earth.

d. If possible, dustbins should be kept in an enclosed area.

e. A clear, tidy area is a help in identifying unusual or suspicious objects.

f. Do not handle anything suspicious - call the authorities.

g. Remove, or lock away, anything that may be used as a climbing aid, especially ladders.

06143. **Telephone**. Some useful points are:

a. Site your house telephone in such a position that you cannot be observed through windows or doors. Consider an additional handset in the bedroom.

b. If your telephone is out of order, report is immediately and be especially vigilant until it has been repaired.

c. Keep a list of emergency numbers and a pen and paper near the telephone.

d. The caller should be asked to identify himself first. No information should be given concerning anybody's whereabouts, movements or future appointments, unless the identity of the caller is clear to you. If in doubt, the caller's name, address and telephone number - should be taken so that you can return the call.

e. Have telephone numbers recorded ex-directory, or ensure ranks etc. are not shown in directories.

f. Anonymous Calls/Telephone Threats.

(1) These are usually intended to lower morale. An accurate analysis of the call often provides valuable clues on which to base recommendations, action and subsequent investigation.

(2) The natural reaction to such a call is to terminate the conversation immediately. The following action should be taken if possible.

(a) Keep the caller talking.

(b) Try to identify the voice by sex, age, accent etc.

(c) Try to assess the mental state of the caller.

(d) The caller may provide clues as to intention or may make a specific threat.

(e) Write down details immediately to assist the authorities later, e.g. date, time, coinbox /private telephone.

(f) Listen for background noise, which may provide valuable information, e.g. railway station, sounds, industrial noises, machinery, music, animals etc.

(g) On termination of the call, notify the authorities immediately.

06144. **Lighting**. Guidelines could include:

a. The utility of keeping at least one strong external courtesy light burning in the area of the front door during hours of darkness. It is then possible to identify callers without turning on a light.

b. If out at night, leaves a light burning in the house in a regularly used room - not the hall light.

c. Always have some reserve lighting to hand - torches, candles or lamps.

06145. **Visitors and tradesmen**

a. All visitors should be positively identified before being granted admission.

b. Arranged fixed times for workmen to call. Check their identity and do not leave them alone in the house unless they are well known to you and trusted. If they are unexpected but can prove their identity, check back with their employer.

c. Very late callers, whether known or unknown, should be treated with suspicion.

d. Deliveries by Tradesmen.

(1) Do not accept presents from unknown persons, or parcels, which have not been ordered.

(2) Discourage the leaving of parcels or bags on windowsills or at the door.

(3) Check deliveries carefully before accepting them and detain the person making the delivery until satisfied that all is in order.

Section XIII - Personal Security when travelling

06146. **General.** Ensure that someone in the house or place of work knows your route and the time you expect to arrive. Always arrange for someone to report to the appropriate authorities if your time of arrival is unreasonably overdue. Vary routines and routes to and from work and avoid setting patterns. Be aware of locations to be avoided and carry a map in the event of detours becoming necessary.

06147. Never make a journey or keep an appointment without informing colleagues of the following:

a. Destination.

b. Person to be visited.

c. Method of travel.

d. Expected time of arrival.

e. Expected time of return.

06148. Never allow yourself to be driven by anyone who is not known to you. Be alert for the unusual or out of place at the beginning and end of a journey. Check the driveway and road before leaving home. Be alert to suspicious or unaccountable conduct by persons in the vicinity of the home or place of business. Be particularly aware of manned vehicles, people tinkering with vehicles and innocent-seeming workmen. Restaurant, hotel and travel reservations should be made without reference to rank or title.

06149. Avoid travelling, working or staying overnight in conditions which involve isolation from persons able to give or summon assistance. Always have to hand or in mind a ready means of communication or other way of attracting attention. If using a civilian vehicle, which may have been used elsewhere be aware of its history. It may have been compromised in particular localities.

06150. **Staying at hotels.** If you have to visit an area frequently, avoid the use of the same hotel on each visit. When staying away from your home, never see visitors in your room who are unknown or not vouched for. Meet them in a public room where others will be present.

Section XIV - Security Measures for Drivers

06151. **The threat**. The military driver, the vehicle and passengers, are susceptible to a variety of potential attacks particularly when the passengers are VIPs. The threat will vary with time and place. It is up to each driver to ensure that he/she knows and understands what is required.

06152. **Types of attack**. The determined assailant is extremely difficult to combat. However, for the attack to be totally successful the target vehicle needs to be encouraged into a pre-arranged position. If the driver by his security awareness, alertness and preparation can keep his vehicle and occupants out of such a position, then the attack will be unsuccessful. The type of attack could vary considerably; the following are the most likely forms of attack:

a. **Explosive Devices**. Fitted to or thrown into the vehicle or placed close to it, when it is static or on the move, in order to injure or kill the occupants or to immobilise the vehicle to allow kidnapping.

b. **Ambush/Hijack**. Leading to kidnapping or assassination.

c. **Shooting**. Either when stationary or on the move with the intent to kill.

d. **Mines**. Mines may be used as part of an ambush but can also be left unattended to kill or injure military personnel. Drivers need to be aware of the mine threat and to remain mine-aware.

06153. **System of driving**. In addition to good driving technique the driver should employ the following:

a. Maximum concentration at all times.

b. Detailed, accurate and extensive observation.

c. Correct and immediate reactions to the changing condition.

d. A deliberate and well-defined plan to meet any situation.

06154. **Counter measures and prevention**. Absolute protection is impossible. However, the aim should be to minimise the chances of a successful attack by the application of well-practised principles and procedures.

06155. **Personal security**. At the beginning of a journey unusual cars and strangers nearby should be regarded with suspicion. Special attention should be paid to park cars containing occupants.

06156. **Passengers**. The following action should be taken with regard to passengers:

a. Unknown passengers should always have their identity verified.

b. Check the ownership of all luggage's prior to loading.

c. Avoid any stops en-route if at all possible.

06157. **Vehicle security**. To ensure the security of both passenger and vehicle the following should be adhered to:

a. The vehicle should never be left unattended in an insecure area if at all possible.

b. Always check around the vehicle when it has been left unattended.

c. Avoid parking on soft ground or close to objects that could be useful to an attacker.

d. Secure all doors, windows, the boot and bonnet.

e. Search the car regularly and learn to recognise the underside of the vehicle as well as the engine.

06158. **Vehicle search**. The vehicle must be searched systematically using a methodical sequence to ensure that no part is not searched.

06159. **Checking vehicles**. Suspicion should be aroused by the following:

a. Unusual objects on or around the vehicle.

b. Objects out of place on the vehicle.

c. Outward signs of tampering.

d. Loose wiring, tape or string on or near the vehicle.

e. Disturbed ground near the vehicle.

06160. **Action on suspicion**. If suspicion is aroused by any of the items listed in Paragraph 9 or for any other reason, the following action should be taken

a. Do not touch the object or vehicle.

b. Evacuate the immediate area.

c. Carry out the initial precautionary actions for handling a suspected explosive device.

06161. **Route selection and planning**. All routes should be reconnoitred whenever possible. There will be occasions when passenger movements may not be known, in which case it may be necessary to use a map (perhaps concealed in a newspaper). The principles of route selection are:

a. Avoid routines/regular routes.

b. Insist on accurate timings.

c. Select routes that allow the maximum safe speed possible.

d. Select routes that offer the best possible security.

e. Reveal dates, timings, route and destination on a need to know basis.

06162. **Potential danger areas**. The following areas are potential danger points:

a. Unlit areas at night.

b. Road works and diversions.

c. Bridges, culverts and tunnels.

d. Mandatory/likely stopping points, e.g. roundabouts, traffic lights, level crossings etc.

e. Passenger drops off/pick up points.

06163. **Preventive measures**. The following preventive measures should be carried out as a matter of routine:

a. Doors should be kept locked.

b. Windows should not be open more than a few inches.

c. Avoid regular routes.

d. Do not drive too near the kerb.

e. Drive in the lane nearest to the centre of the roadway.

f. Avoid being boxed in. Leave enough room to turn around or manoeuvre around blockages, particularly at traffic lights or street junctions.

g. Do not stop unnecessarily.

h. Approach normal holds ups slowly to avoid stopping if possible.

i. Regularly check mirrors for following vehicles.

06164. **Following vehicle**.

a. Note the particulars of the vehicle.

b. Slow down or accelerate suddenly.

c. If confirmed:

(1) Use car telephones or radio to alert police.

(2) Drive to a police station, fire station or military unit.

(3) Flash lights and sound horn to attract attention.

(4) Carry out evasive driving techniques.

06165. **Evasive action**. Listed below are action to be taken in the case of attack:

a. **Road blocked -** attempt to drive around, U-turn or reverse.

b. **Fired upon by moving vehicle -** sudden accelerations or braking.

c. **Ambush -** drive through, U-turn or drive around.

06166. **Evasive driving**. The driver should remember the following when considering what action to take in a given situation:

a. Control of the vehicle must be maintained at all times, avoid excessive speed.

b. Keep passengers informed of what you are about to do, if possible, before carrying out any sudden manoeuvres.

c. Ramming should be employed as an evasive technique only as a last resort. If this tactic has to be used, always try to ram with the non-engine and of your vehicle.

d. The safety of the passenger and vehicle are more likely if another vehicle can be kept between you and the pursuer.

06167. **Suspected compromise**. If a driver considers that a vehicle's identity has been compromised it must be reported immediately in order that suitable action can be taken promptly.

Chapter 7

Crowd Control

Section I - Introduction

0701. **General.** Belligerent and hostile crowds may assemble in spite of measures adopted to prevent this. Although the restoration and compliance of law and order is, in principle a responsibility of the local authorities and CIVPOL, the civil authorities may be unable to cope. Military assistance may be needed as long as the mandate permits action and the ROE specify the use of crowd control means. It is most important that a commander should select the method of dispersing a crowd most appropriate to the circumstances. On the one hand a relatively amiable crowd may be inflamed by an ill judged show of force, while on the other an underestimate of the hostile intent of a crowd and the deployment of an inadequate number of troops could be equally disastrous. The tactics outlined in this section should be used as a guide; the military commander on the spot has to use his own judgement as to how to deal with any particular situation. In the emotive situation of dealing with hostile crowds it is necessary to cover, generically, the various types of crowd situation that may develop. These range from that of minor, and possibly, routine aggressive behaviour of crowds towards patrolling, to the larger and more potentially serious situations when hostile assemblies, prison riots, or anti authority demonstrations may occur.

0702. Concerns over causing casualties to innocent civilians, the detail of International Humanitarian Law, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the presence of the media, and the potentially negative effects of inappropriate tactical actions upon any political (peace) process will have a major impact upon the conduct of operations in urban areas. In the conduct of operations amongst the people, it is particularly important that military commanders at all levels, ensure that their tactical actions are consistent with political goals. Legal, political and humanitarian constraints will shape the conduct of security force operations in urban areas, both military and police, in a way that is unlikely to happen is less densely populated areas such as jungle or desert terrain.

0703. **The Nature of Crowds**. The emotional state of a crowd may or may not be indicative of that of the rest of the population. In addition, the size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude and just as the general population will consist of different elements, so will the crowd. A crowd will often consist of many more peaceful citizens and sightseers than troublemakers, and women and children may be present in large numbers. However, when people are closely grouped in crowds, their behaviour becomes more volatile and susceptible to manipulation. In the extreme, non-hostile members of the

crowd may be used as cover or shields from behind which hostile elements may engage the security forces. A crowd that has confined itself to shouting slogans and making a noise can quickly become violent if it is joined be violent elements or provoked by an injudicious use of force. The tactics used against a crowd should be selectively targeted against different elements within the crowd and not universal. The aim being to isolate and neutralise those determined to cause trouble and use violence, from those who wish to protest legally or are simply there as spectators. The mood of any potential gathering should be a priority information/intelligence requirement, but will broadly reflect the more general situation. However, the presence of the following can indicate impending trouble:

a. Gatherings of known subversives, agitators and criminals.

b. Gangs of youths usually lightly clothed and possibly armed with sticks, stones or bottles, which may be used as petrol or acid bombs. They are likely to be organised and even paid to provoke trouble to spark off anti-authority or fractional feeling by using hit and run tactics. They may be scattered in loose formation within a crowd, or combined in gangs that may be numbered in hundreds.

c. Reports of gunmen within the crowd or in the surrounding buildings and side streets: their aim may be not only to cause casualties, but also to provoke the security forces into firing at the crowd. In extremis, hostile elements may even attack the crowd, if they think that the security forces will be blamed.

d. Women and children, or large bodies of school children, either used separately or as a shield to the crowd. Once again the main aim is provocation, in the hope that there will be over-reaction on the part of the security forces, which can subsequently be exploited.

0704. **The role of the civil police**. First and foremost it is the role of the police to maintain law and order. However, those police forces based upon the constabulary function, i.e. policemen acting as individual law enforcement agents, may have difficulties producing the formed units necessary to confront hostile crowds. The role of the civil police in countering crowd violence varies according to their competency and the policy on their employment. An armed police force with a military capability such as Carabinieri, Gendarmerie or Koninklijke Marechaussee is likely to be both well-prepared and trained in riot drills. The military force is therefore not likely to be asked

to intervene until rioting has reached serious proportions. On the other hand, an unarmed force, not used to operating in formed units will be less well able to deal with hostile crowds and may seek military assistance at a comparatively early stage. In this case the military should be trained accordingly.

Section II - Preparations for Dealing with Crowd Disorders

0705. **The Role of the Civil Authority**. The civil authorities, even in a PSO situation, are primarily responsible for dealing with crowds, large assemblies, marches, industrial action and other similar disturbances to public good order. There may well be situations when the scale of civil and public disturbances gets beyond the capabilities of the local police forces. In this case the civil authorities, normally in the form of the senior police representative present, requests the military authorities to take over certain police duties which could include crowd control.

0706. **The Role of the Military Authority**. As a preliminary to such a request it is probable that troops will already have been positioned at strategic points. It will, however, be exceptional for them to be called to the actual scene of a disturbance until a decision has been taken at the appropriate level to employ military forces for the dispersal of crowds. Once the troops have been called in it is still the military commander's responsibility not to use more force than is necessary and reasonable. Whether or not he takes action is likely to depend on the information and the advice of the civil authorities. While these authorities will normally guide him, he has to make his own judgement of what military assistance is both requisite and appropriate, and he remains accountable for his actions. In some PSO situations it is possible that no police or civil authorities are present at the scene of the incident (for whatever reason). While this does not absolve the military commander from taking suitable corrective action, this should be tempered by the criteria covering:

a. The safety and security of his own troops.

b. The protection of innocent persons.

c. The prevention of real damage to state property and sites of special cultural and historical significance.

d. The long-term consequences of the use of force.

0707. **Military Restraint**. The military commander should not use force if the civil authorities are still in control and have not asked for help in the particular incident in question or if crowds can be dispersed without the use of force.

0708. **Planning**. As soon as disturbances are expected which may require military assistance, contingency plans must be made which should cover:

a. The establishment of joint police and military operational headquarters where this is appropriate.

b. The preparation of a full intelligence collection plan and an estimate of the overall situation and mood of the people.

c. An assessment of the different types of disturbances likely to develop, their probable locations and the strengths and action needed to control or suppress them and any likely tasks or roles the military forces may have.

d. An assessment of the troops which will be required for each locality, and the earmarking of troops for each task.

e. The arrangements for representatives of the civil authorities, who may be police officers, to join the troops.

f. Joint reconnaissance, if possible down to platoon or squad level.

g. The channels through which requests for military help should be made.

h. An assessment of critical areas and centres of communication which must be securely held.

i. The collection of evidence by photographic means or by written or tape recorded eye witness accounts.

j. The preparation of any special stores likely to be needed, e.g. public address equipment, barbed wire, knife rests, sandbags, fire fighting equipment and emergency lighting.

k. The reception, accommodation and administration of troops and reinforcements.

l. The rehearsal of procedures and the testing of communications. In all areas where operations are likely there should be specific military frequency allocations so that radio can be used immediately on arrival.

m. Provision of equipment, riot control agents and maps for reinforcing units.

n. Maintenance of up to date briefs to hand to commanders of reinforcing units on arrival.

o. Plans to divert civil traffic, which should include provision for maintaining cleared routes for use by military reinforcements.

p. The use of interpreters during deployment.

0709. **Preliminary military action**. Before trouble breaks out, the military commander has to decide, in conjunction with the local authorities, whether and where his troops should be concentrated, where they should move to if disturbances occur, and whether or not they should be seen to be available. It will often be prudent to move close to the scene of an anticipated disturbance, both to ensure that troops are readily available and to enable commanders to keep in touch with the situation. A commander must not, however, allow his forces to be scattered, and should keep a reserve under his control. A joint police and military headquarters, where this is applicable, should be set up during this preliminary stage and the military and civil authorities must either be together in it or in close personal or radio contact.

0710. **Information required from the Civil Authorities**. When the senior civil representative at the scene of the disturbance decides that he is unable to deal with the crowd he will call for reinforcements. If the reinforcements are military he must give the following information which should be based on a common format:

a. The overall intelligence situation and, the tasks that the military are to perform.

b. Command, control and co-ordination responsibilities, arrangements, and other friendly force locations.

c. Nominate a rendezvous, near to the scene of the incident.

d. Indicate the best route to the rendezvous to ensure arrival from the right direction without interference; this route should be kept open by the civil authorities, if possible.

e. The nature of the disturbance and if a crowd is involved, an estimate to the size of the crowd, its intentions and temper.

f. Any relevant topographical details including lighting problems at night.

g. The direction in which the crowd should be dispersed.

0711. **Continuing role of the civilian police**. When the PSF are dealing with crowd control a civil police representative must remain with the military commander. Possible tasks for civilian police forces are:

a. Follow up quickly after the troops have used special equipment, should the crowd show signs of wavering, thus re-establishing police control.

b. Cover the troop’s rear, by blocking side streets.

c. Make arrests and take into custody those held by the military forces.

d. Handle evidence for subsequent prosecutions.

e. Re-assurance operations, including the re-imposition of the rule of law.

0712. **Final planning**. This stage and liaison with the civil authorities established should have completed certain preliminary planning. Final planning is now needed to decide:

a. The route and direction by which troops should arrive.

b. Whether the move should be ostentatious, with a planned show of force, or unobtrusive.

c. The tactics and weapons needed on arrival.

d. A rendez-vous where the military and local commanders can meet: it must be well clear of the crowd but with a view of the scene of the disturbances.

e. Preliminary orders for troops involved.

0713. **Move of military forces into the area**. The decision whether to move troops openly or unobtrusively will depend on the cause and degree of the disturbance. When it is of a minor and local nature, and particularly when violence has not yet occurred, the appearance of troops may have a calming effect, but if the disturbance is more serious and widespread, it may be wise to move in troops unobtrusively. If the situation is serious and the local authorities are rapidly losing or have lost control, troops must be moved in by the most direct open route. The preliminary reconnaissance should have identified all the likely routes, and civil action should be planned to speed movement by such measures as manual overriding of automatic traffic lights etc. It is essential that the move in is orderly, decisive and deliberate because when tension is running high this will have a steadying effect. Local guides and traffic escorts should be provided if available. Troops must move in formed bodies, neither men nor vehicles must be employed singly, and sentries or look-outs should be posted in pairs.

0714. **Arrival of military forces**. Troops should be prepared to intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance so that the situation does not deteriorate through unnecessary delay. They must therefore have a well-rehearsed deployment drill. This does not mean that troops must always be used at once; and it is particularly important that armoured vehicles should not make a premature appearance, which may rob a commander of the advantage he would gain later from the shock effect of their sudden intervention. Troops should never be brought to the scene of a disturbance until their

intervention is required. If they arrive too early and then have to stand about waiting to be committed, the crowd may either find their presence provocative, or it may get used to them and be encouraged to think that no stronger measures will be used.

0715. **Transport**. The following points should be noted:

a. **Debussing point**. If the military force moves to the scene of the disturbance in transport it should normally debus away from the area, unless armoured or special vehicles are in use and it is considered advantageous to debus close to the crowd. Troops must debus quickly to a practised drill with all their equipment, and form up at once.

b. **Soft skinned transport**. Transport should be left under guard well clear of the incident, except for one vehicle which can be used to carry a small party including a policeman, to deal quickly with any specific diversions such as a splinter crowd setting fire to property, looting or attacking an individual. This vehicle can also carry wire or other barriers to block off side streets, entrances to building etc., and is useful when dominating the area afterwards. It should, if possible, be fitted with protection kits and fire proofs canopy, and may carry a powerful public address system and searchlights.

c. **Armoured vehicles.** If the APCs or tanks are employed, the commander may allot them tasks in the forward areas dependent upon the local situation. When APCs and tanks are used in a hostile environment they will need close protection from infantry and should be kept out of direct fire range of anti-tank weapons, if the threat exists.

0716. **Action on arrival**. There can be no categoric sequence of events, and some of the actions listed below may have to be carried out during earlier stages of preparation and planning. Once troops have arrived at the scene of disorder, certain preparations must, however, either have been made, or put into effect at once. These are:

a. Information on the situation must be obtained from local police, roof-top standing patrols and helicopters.

b. An assessment must be made of the best direction in which to disperse the crowd; some factors affecting this would be the mood of the crowd and its intentions, the existence of attractive targets and of other crowds, and alternative dispersal routes.

c. The method of handling the various elements in the crowd must be decided; Except in the most hostile circumstances it should not be bottled up but given time and room in which those non-violent elements can be separated from trouble makes and dispersed as appropriate.

d. The process for co-ordination with the local authorities must be established.

e. Deployment plans must ensure all round protection to prevent rioters from encircling security forces. It must be decided whether there will be a deterrent value in arresting ring-leaders.

f. The value of warning and persuasion, without the use of force, particularly when directed at community leaders is important, and the use of minimum necessary force must always be borne in mind.

0717. **Stopping a moving crowd**. It will be usual to deploy troops to halt the progress of a crowd, and such deployment focuses the attention of the crowd, thus distracting attention from other moves by the security forces. It establishes a base line from which:

a. OPs are established and ground reconnaissance carried out.

b. Every effort is made to identify individuals in the crowd, especially ringleaders, using photography if possible. At night, lights will be necessary.

0718. **Communications**. Whenever troops are called to aid the local authorities it is the responsibility of the military commander, not the local forces, to see that they can communicate with each other. Even though this may be achieved by the provision of a radio set on the local net for use by the military, or by attaching a liaison officer, it is still a military responsibility to see that it is done.

0719. **Use of aircraft and helicopters**. Depending on the threat posed, aircraft, particularly helicopters, may be employed on the following tasks:

a. Reconnaissance to give early warning of crowd assembly and movement: aerial television can relay pictures direct to a ground headquarters.

b. Dominating a crowd by flying or hovering overhead and drowning any speakers who may be addressing the crowd.

c. Dropping riot control agent if necessary and reasonable to do so.

d. Acting as an airborne command post or radio relay station.

e. Positioning OPs on high buildings or lifting troops to the roofs of those occupied by crowds or snipers.

f. Public address by means of loudspeakers.

g. Night illumination.

h. Photography.

i. Deployment of quick reaction forces, including search and rescue.

0720. **Military records**. Military action in support of the civil authorities may be the subject of subsequent enquiry. It is therefore essential to be able to establish what happened, and a complete record must be kept of all events as they occur. The use of a pocket tape recorder can eliminate the need for laborious note taking and provides a convincing record for subsequent use. Commanders at all levels must arrange for a diary to be kept in which are noted such things as:

a. Important events in chronological order.

b. Brief details of any orders received and issued, either in writing or orally.

c. The names of civil representatives or police officers with whom the commander has consulted.

d. Brief details of any requests, proposals and advice given by the civil authorities.

e. Reasons for decisions, subsequent action taken and results.

0721. **Photographs**. Photographs form a valuable record of events, but a hand held video recorder provides a more effective and immediate record of events with dates and times superimposed, and may be used for retrospective arrest operations and convictions. Both cameras and video recorders should be available to cover any event where trouble is anticipated. Helicopters can easily be employed to record events, by camera or video, for the commander on the ground. The use of the media to obtain suitable photographs, video film shots and other associated evidence should also be considered. It may be appropriate for the superior HQ to monitor and record the international TV and media outlets if the incident has attracted such attention.

0722. **Political/Religious leaders**. The role and potential participation of political or religious leaders in large assemblies needs careful advance consideration and the

options available to the military commander discussed and cleared at the appropriate level before action (if any) takes place.

0723. **Crowd control equipment**. There is a wide array of non-lethal weapons available for crowd control. Commanders should be aware of what is available and plan accordingly, bearing in mind the requirement to use only the minimum amount of force that is necessary to achieve objectives. The escalation and de-escalation of protective states of readiness and personal protection can be a useful means of communicating intent and confidence.

Section III - Dispersing Crowds and Riots

0724. **General**. A crowd nearly always includes innocent people, caught up in it through circumstances or idle curiosity; it may also shelter agitators, well aware of the capital to be made out of the spilling of innocent blood, who will seek to provoke the security forces into ill considered, hasty action. It is therefore important that no more than the minimum necessary force is used to disperse a crowd, and that the methods employed are appropriate to its mood and the local situation. The commander must consider which method of crowd dispersal best fits the situation. The measures, which can be used, short of opening fire, are described in this section.

0725. **Persuasion**. Attempts by the civil authorities should always be made to persuade crowds to disperse peacefully if possible. This would normally be the responsibility of the police. Military forces should normally only be called in when the situation has gone beyond this point. Nevertheless some of the methods available are:

a. **Voluntarily**. As a first step and one which may often be the most effective and the least provocative, unobtrusive discussion with the leaders involved may lead to the orderly dispersal of a crowd. Moreover, this dispersal will appear to be voluntary rather than enforced by the security forces.

b. **Verbal or visual persuasion**. The crowd may be addressed by loud hailer or by some other form of amplified system, which may be hand held or mounted on a vehicle or aircraft. Someone should always prepare announcements with knowledge of local affairs that can advise on the most persuasive approach; an announcer with a local accent may also be effective and an interpreter may be needed. If no expert is available then a commander may have to extemporise; it is always most profitable to address responsible members of the crowd and rely on them to influence the remainder. When adopting any of these methods some pitfalls which should be avoided are:

(1) **Pleas**. Pleading from a position of moral or physical strength may be a logical and productive stage in the process of dispersal; however it is more likely than not that pleas from a position of weakness will produce an adverse effect.

(2) **Promises**. While promises may produce an immediate and positive result, the longer term results of rash promises made without due authority will be inevitably negative and damaging to the security forces.

(3) **Threats**. Any attempt to force a crowd to disperse by threat of the use of force, which cannot be justified legally in the circumstances, may provoke the crowd and discredit the security forces.

c. **Observation and containment**. There are numerous occasions when to contain, observe a crowd should be enough to achieve objectives. The lack of a suitable target, in the shape of the security forces, may cause the crowd to disperse from fear or boredom. The ringleaders may have particular difficulty in inciting the crowd if there is no suitable target for them to attack.

d. **Show of force**. This may be ostentatious, which can be provocative or it may be conducted more circumspectly. An ostentatious display of force may be very effective on those drawn into the crowd more by curiosity than conviction: if however, it inflames feelings the situation may get rapidly worse. Less provocation can be achieved by posting OPs, particularly on roof-tops and high buildings where they can be seen, so that the crowd becomes aware of a military presence, and individuals may begin to fear being surrounded and decide to leave. Their departure can be infectious and the crowd should be allowed to melt away. While an open show of force may require that all troops available be seen, a more unobtrusive approach should always be backed up by a reserve. This may be needed should an isolated detachment be attacked or surrounded.

The Components of a Force

0726. **General**. Whether directly in support of the civil authorities or working independently, the military force should generally be made up of the following four components. The strength of each component in relation to each other will depend entirely on the situations and the role allocated to the military force.

a. Baseline Forces

b. Manoeuvre (reaction forces) and arresting forces (snatch squads) where appropriate.

c. Anti-sniper and over-watch forces.

d. A reserve

0727. **The Baseline Force.** A series of baselines may be established to contain the disturbance and to provide launch pads for arrest and other manoeuvre operations. Each baseline is a barrier from which offensive action may be taken against crowds and behind which reorganisation and preparation can take place. In armed actions the baseline force may be positioned defensively in buildings. In less violent environments, however, it will usually consist of a combination of vehicles and soldiers on foot carrying a mix of weapons, including and shields. The line should be able to move forwards or backwards whilst retaining a blocking capability. There may be occasions, however, when the aim of the baseline is to remain static, and in such instances it could employ some form of barrier, other than in-place vehicles. Baselines will invariably be established as the first stage of controlling a crowd and serve as the mainstay of dispersal or containment operations. Possible uses are as follows:

a. Dispersal.

(1) Holding ground while the arresting force in the form of snatch squads operates either through it or around its flanks.

(2) To move forward as an entity and in conjunction with non-lethal impact munitions and snatch squads, disperse the crowd, by forcing it back.

b. Containment.

(1) Holding ground on flanks and side roads while manoeuvre forces carry out blocking or dispersal operations in the area of maximum trouble.

(2) Acting as a back up to the police and moving forwards or backwards behind the police while they disperse crowd in front of the baseline. In this instance, the baseline will also act as a line behind which the police can fall reorganise before recommencing offensive operations.

c. Composition. It should be noted that the actual strengths and mix of weapons will depend on each situation and should be decided upon at the planning stage.

0728. **Baseline Composition**. A suggested organisation for a platoon sized baseline is:

a. Two teams as shield men carrying shields and batons. They should wear helmets with visors down.

b. One team equipped with non-lethal weapons for the shield line.

c. One team providing close anti-sniper protection and lookouts for acid, petrol and blast bombs.

d. One team as snatch squad (or if provided from elsewhere the team can be used as extra baton or shield men).

e. One Team (Commander's Team) including platoon commander and platoon sergeant with 2 soldiers to put out soldiers on fire, splash down acid bomb victims with water. They may also be used to escort anyone arrested cell.

0729. **Manoeuvre and arrest forces**. Manoeuvre forces may be specifically designated or drawn from the reserve in the case of an emergency. Manoeuvre forces should be prepared to leapfrog and/or replace baseline forces, act as mobile deterrent forces, conduct close patrols within the wider framework operation or more specifically conduct arrest operations. The military forces may be required to make arrests when acting in direct support of the police and will almost certainly find it essential to make arrests when working in isolation, as arrests are the only really effective means of dispersal. There are five aspect to making arrests that should be considered:

a. **Arrest**. Snatch Squads should be nominated to make arrests, with the actual number of snatch squads and composition of each dependent on the situation and the number of troops available at the time.

b. **Escort**. An escort with a rifle may also be nominated as additional anti-sniper comer in exceptional circumstances. Such cover would normally be provided within the overall area plan for protection.

c. **Snatch squads**. These should be carefully briefed on the following points:

(1) Faultless arrest procedures to ensure conviction.

(2) The further forward they move from the baseline – the more vulnerable they become. A limit of exploitation should be given.

(3) Arrest only one individual at a time: the squad commander should make the selection.

(4) The dangers of splitting up

(5) Speed of Action.

d. **Processing arrested persons**. In addition to the snatch squads, it may be necessary (if this is not being handled by the police) to have an arrest cell to process arrests. Whilst correct procedures and continuity of evidence are essential; all involved must be aware of the necessity to move arrested persons to police custody as soon as possible.

e. **Retrospective arrests**. Finally, and especially if the police are not present, full use should be made of video and photography for retrospective arrests.

0730. **Anti-sniper and over-watch screen**. The military force will almost certainly be requested to provide anti-sniper cover and over-watch for the whole operation, possibly from the air or a combination of air and land elements. This may need to include technical over-watch, including artillery and mortar locating radars. Cover can be provided by mobile patrols of overt observation posts supported by covert teams. Whatever its composition, the plan should be developed on an area basis and cover not only the baselines and forwards, but also the flanks and rear. Because such cover may have to be provided from high ground remote from the main position it is essential that communications are effective.

0731. **Reserves**. As in any military operation, a reserve is essential to afford flexibility to the commander. The reserve should be positioned centrally, and must be prepared for any task from thickening up the Baseline to providing extra anti-sniper cover or additional snatch squads. It must be mobile and equipped to cover any eventuality.

0732. **Dispersal measures**. Ringleaders in a crowd, or small parties of hooligans throwing stones or other missiles are usually bent on creating trouble without being caught. If they think they are likely to be arrested they usually move to another area. The incitement of the crowd or stone throwing may be an end in itself, or it may be only the first phase of a plan to cause major widespread trouble or to draw troops into an area where they can be ambushed with firearms. Surprise moves will catch them before they can move away or put the next stage of their plan into operation. The aim of the military forces is to disperse the crowd. It is important to select dispersal routes, which will be attractive to the crowd, namely those leading to their homes, and to keep these exits clear as the crowd starts to disperse. There are a number of tactics which may prove successful:

a. Assault from an unsuspected direction such as the flank or rear of the crowd. It may be possible to move over roofs or through top storeys, through

gardens or even by underground routes if these are well known to the security forces. Routes for such moves must be clear, or the outflanking party may get involved in a running fight with parts of the crowd and surprise will be lost. Standing patrols on high buildings or other suitable positions should usually cover flanking moves.

b. When the crowd is in the open, it may be possible to use speed to achieve surprise by moving vehicles rapidly into the area of the crowd from the flanks or rear.

c. A surprise frontal assault may be successful.

d. Withdrawal of the baseline will usually draw the crowd forward and expose its flanks to propositioned arrest squads, which can quickly move in on the ringleaders.

e. Special weapons can be useful in dispersing a crowd.

0733. **Use of riot control weapons**. The decision as to witch weapons may be used is the responsibility of each NATO country, according to its own legislation. Weapons for use in riot control situations will rarely be decisive in themselves. They may, however, give the security forces a temporary advantage, which must be quickly exploited, perhaps by the use of arrest squads. In the early stages of operations in any area, it is preferable to precede their use by a warning to the crowd. The most usual weapons currently available are:

a. **Prodders and pushers**. These can be either hand held or mounted on vehicles. When vehicle mounted they can be wired to give a small electrical shock; they may be difficult to manoeuvre where there are obstructions such as palings, lampposts, telephone boxes etc. Hand held devices can be improvised to move a crowd back slowly and steadily by a line of soldiers or bounced in front of soldiers can be effective. Hand held devices could rarely be used against an aggressive crowd, which is hurling missiles.

b. **Water under pressure**. Water under pressure can be projected from water cannons or fire hoses. Water cannons should operate in pairs so that one can be away filling up. They are large vehicles, which may be difficult to manoeuvre in narrow streets, and they must be escorted to and from the area and protected while in operation. Fire engines and fire hoses will become targets for violence once they have been used to quell disturbances, and this

and the possible urgent need for them in their conventional role should be taken into account before sanctioning their use. The ways in which water can be used are:

(1) **As a douse**. This may be the most humane way of dispersing a crowd with a high proportion of women and children, especially in cold weather.

(2) **As a jet**. This can temporarily neutralise a rioter and even knock him over, at ranges of less than five metres the jet must be aimed at the feet not the body. CS in solution in the jet will enhance the effect.

(3) **To spray dye**. This helps in the subsequent identification of rioters who, fearing arrest, may therefore disperse. The presence of dye on a person is not in itself sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction on the charge of unlawful assembly.

c. **Non-lethal impact munitions**. These are non-lethal projectiles, which may be accurate at short ranges. Specific ROE for each type must govern their use.

d. **Riot Control Agents**. There are a number of chemical riot agents, which causes watering and irritation of the eyes, choking and coughing. The effects usually disperse in five to ten minutes. Riot control agents can be delivered by riot gun, pistol or by grenade. A commander must take the following into account before using such agents.

(1) The size, temper and composition of the crowd. Agents may induce panic in a tightly packed crowd.

(2) Whether wind conditions will allow the speedy build-up of an effective concentration.

(3) The downwind hazard to uninvolved persons or traffic.

(4) The need to avoid agents entering confined spaces such as the interior of buildings, as the smoke can be dangerous in a confined space.

(5) Whether the reduction in visibility caused by the use of agents will hamper the arrest of ringleaders.

(6) The most appropriate means of delivery taking account of these factors, safety and the achievement of the aim.

(7) The degree of protection of security forces.

0734. **Use of dogs.** Trained dogs provided by the PSF or the civilian police can be used for crowd control when available.

Section IV - Other Measures to Contain Riots

0735. **Countering hostile action**. A determined and experienced insurgent organisation will be able to anticipate the usual security force deployment drills, and a crowd may be assembled with the intention of drawing forces into a selected area where they can be ambushed. A commander should be alert to this, and some precautionary measures are:

a. The deployment of a force of such a size that any ambush party is likely to be surrounded or taken in the rear before it can act.

b. The use of armoured vehicles to carry troops through dangerous areas.

c. Caution in following a retreating crowd, and the use of cover when doing so.

0736. **Guarding against being outflanked**. A sub-unit that is outflanked by a crowd may either have to fight its way out or it may be necessary to divert troops from other tasks to rescue it. In either case the credibility of the troops as an effective force will be reduced. Outflanking can be prevented by:

a. Not allowing small sub-units to become detached and unsupported.

b. Constant monitoring of crowds by roof-top OPs, patrols and helicopters.

c. The sealing of flank approaches; this could well be a suitable task for the civil police, particularly if they have been withdrawn into reserve.

0737. **The use of APCs**. APCs provide protection from small arms fire, give extra mobility to a force and a firm communications base; they do, however, need to be protected from anti-armour weapons. They may be useful to:

a. Mount a surprise attack.

b. Surmount or break barricades or force an entry into a building.

c. Provide illumination with spotlights: these can also be used to dazzle rioters at night.

d. Act as a crowd barrier, for which purpose they can be electrified: they can also be used as a screen between opposing factions.

e. Clear a large crowd if several APCs are used in line abreast.

f. Evacuate casualties and detainees under fire.

0738. **Dealing with women and children**. Women and children are often involved in disturbances for publicity purposes, as well as being used as cover for hostile groups, the aim being to provoke the security forces into taking harsh action which can subsequently be used as hostile propaganda:

a. Because women and children are exploited for their propaganda value, the less made of any incident the better. If possible the incident should be handled by police making full use of women police if arrest becomes necessary.

b. It is often possible to play on the emotional factors, physical lack of endurance, and dislike of discomfort of women and children. Marches and sit-downs can some times be permitted to continue under control until boredom and personal hygiene has brought the demonstration to an end.

c. If force becomes necessary, the less the degree of such force used the less will be the adverse propaganda value. The following factors apply:

(1) The level of force, which may be the minimum necessary against a man or youth, could be excessive or unreasonable in the case of a woman or child.

(2) Not all-special weapons are appropriate for use against women and children non-lethal impact munitions are an example. The water cannon in the dousing role is most suitable, causing discomfort and loss of dignity but no injury.

(3) Close physical contact with women and children to force them away may be justified, but it must be remembered that they, too, are quite capable of using knives and other weapons. The use of vehicle mounted barriers may achieve the aim with less risk, provided always that their use is the minimum necessary force reasonable in the circumstances.

(4) The sooner arrested women and children are handed over to women police military or civil, the less scope there is for a smear campaign against security forces.

d. Despite the involvement of women and children in incidents for publicity and diversionary reasons it should be noted that all modern insurrections have included women who are just as committed to insurgency as their male counterparts, and who have carried out assassinations, bombings and other

insurgent activity. It follows that a soldier is just as much entitled to use force even lethal force, to prevent a woman or child causing death or serious injury when they are illegally involved in an attack. It is always a question of what in the circumstances is necessary and reasonable. Every case must be dealt with on its own merits, using a combination of firmness and common sense.

0739. **Crowd dispersal in open spaces**. Dispersing a crowd in a large open space may be more difficult because:

a. Larger crowds can assemble.

b. Their direction of movement is less easy to anticipate and, subsequently, to canalise: the security forces can therefore be more easily enveloped or outflanked.

c. It may be difficult to establish a baseline.

d. Some special weapons are less effective because their results can more easily be avoided.

e. **Variations**. Some adjustments have to be made to the techniques already described, and in general terms these are:

(1) Decide where the crowd can be allowed to go and deploy accordingly.

(2) Employ an adequate number of troops, with a large mobile reserve.

(3) Consider the use of armoured vehicles and special weapons. The use of area weapons may be less restricted than in built-up areas and in close proximity to innocent non-involved persons.

(4) Maintain continual observation on the crowd to detect any change in its mood or objective. Over-watch should be easier in the open than in confined built-up areas, which provide cover from view and fire.

0740. **Handling of a dispersing crowd**. Once a crowd has started to disperse it may occasionally be necessary for troops to advance to keep it on the move in the right direction. Troops advancing and driving a crowd before them should remember that the pace would be that of those furthest away. A crowd on the move in the right direction should not be hurried. Those able to see the troops will no doubt be going as fast as they can and not nearly so fast as they would wish. On no account should the crowd be encircled so that it is unable to disperse.

0741. **Subsequent domination of the area**. An operation does not end with the dispersal of a crowd, which must not be given the opportunity to reassemble. A joint plan must be made by military and police for patrolling the area after the dispersal of a crowd, and for removing any barricades erected by it. If possible local residents should be persuaded to remove the barricades themselves or at least assist in doing so. Only when the military and police commanders are both satisfied that the crowd is not reassembling, or that the police alone can handle the situation, should the troops be withdrawn.

Glossery of Abbreviations

AD	Air Defence
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
AO	Area of Operations
AOCC	Air Operation Co-ordination Centre
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOS	Area of Separation
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ARF	Airmobile Reaction Force
Bde	Brigade
BZ	Buffer Zone
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CFL	Cease-Fire Line
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-operation
CIS	Communication and Information System
CIVPOL	Civil Police
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
CS-gas	Teargas
C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
DDT	Defence Debriefing Teams
Div	Division
DZ	Demilitarised Zone
EMCON	Emission Control
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FSCC	Fire Support Co-ordination Centre
HNS	Host Nation Support
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HQ	Headquarter
ICRC	International Commission of the Red Cross
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

JFIT	Joint Forward Interrogation Teams
JSIO	Joint Services Intelligence Organisation
LO	Liaison Officer
MC	Military Committee
Media Ops	Media Operations
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OP	Observation Post
OPSEC	Operational security
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDSS	Persons of Designated Special Status
PE	Peace Enforcement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PK	Peace Keeping
PSF	Peace Support Force
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSPA	Peace Support Psychological Activities
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RV	Re-entry Vehicle
SA	Surface to air missile
SCEPC	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TAOR	Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMO	United Nations Monitor
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VCP	Vehicle Check Point
WEU	Western European Union

WF	Warring Faction
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZOS	Zone of Separation

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Glossary of Terms and Definitions

In general, the glossary contains only those terms and definitions not found in AAP-6 "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions".

Buffer Zone
A defined area controlled by a PSF from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.

Cantonment area
A location for the temporary housing, disarmament and demilitarisation of the parties' forces (within the framework of a demobilisation operation).

Check Point
A point on a road or route at which personnel and/or vehicles are checked in order to prevent the passage of arms, wanted persons etc. A check point will usually include the ability to search vehicles and personnel. Civilian police may also be in attendance.

CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation)
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well a international, national and non-governmental organisations or agencies. (AJP-09 final draft)

Conflict Prevention
Activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally conducted under chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventative deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

Control Point
A point on a road or route at which foot and/or vehicle movement is controlled. Civilian police may also be in attendance. This includes the prevention of passage of certain people/vehicles. A control point may control movement in one or both directions.

Debriefing
Debriefing is used to extract information from a willing person, such as an expatriate worker who is familiar with the theatre of operations.

Demobilisation
Demobilisation consists of those activities that are undertaken by a PSF to reduce the number of factions' forces and their equipment in the area of operations to the levels as agreed in the peace settlement. See Demilitarisation and Disarmament.

Demilitarisation
Demilitarisation means that military personnel and equipment are withdrawn from their military function. See demobilisation and disarmament.

Demilitarised zone
A defined area in which the stationing, or concentrating of military forces, or the retention or establishment of military installations of any description, is prohibited.

Disarmament
Disarmament is a sub-process of demilitarisation. It means the (controlled process) of taking weapons away from military forces. Demilitarisation and disarmament usually take place within the framework of demobilisation operations. See Demobilisation and Demilitarisation

Displaced Person
A person forced to leave their home but not their parent country

Evacuee
A person who has been ordered or authorised to move from a place of danger by competent authorities, and whose movements and accommodation are planned, organised and controlled by such authorities. (AAP-6)

Find
An item of explosives, weapons, or other terrorist, insurgent or military equipment found either during a planned search or during other operations.

Humanitarian Relief
Activities conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian relief may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations.

Internally Displaced Person
A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpected as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (AAP-6)

Interrogation .
Interrogation is used to extract information from an unwilling person, normal conducted by “specific specialist agencies”.

Non-Governmental Organisation
Non-Governmental Organisation is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN charter. As the term implies, NGOs are private (primarily non-commercial) organisations generally motivated by humanitarian or religious values.

Peace Building
Peace building covers actions that support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support

Peace Enforcement
Peace Enforcement (PE) operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping (PK) operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.

Peacemaking
Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

Private Voluntary Organisation
Private, non-profit humanitarian assistance organisations involved in development and relief activities. PVO is often used synonymously with the term NGO.

Refugee
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (AAP-6)

Road Block
A point on a road or route at which action is taken to restrict or prevent foot and/or vehicle movement. Road blocks will often be manned, but to be effective must always be observed.

Rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

Route checks
Route checks may be undertaken by a foot patrol. As the name implies, they only provide a quick inspection of the route, paying particular attention to the vulnerable points. There is no guarantee that the route checked is clear of explosive devices.

Route searches
Route searches are detailed searches carried out by qualified search teams.

Social patrols
This is a way of patrolling in PSO when the situation in the area is stabilised and there is no direct danger for the forces. The patrol is recognised as a unit of the PSF. The intention is to show the local people that forces are in the area and are alert. The patrol is armed; to the local people the patrol is acting friendly and at a frank way but is alert. The patrols are carried out by daylight.

Weapon holding area/site
A location for the temporary or (semi-) permanent storage of weapons and/or other military equipment of the parties' forces (within the framework of a demobilisation operation).

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