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II. Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba

Presented below is a summary of information on the subject which has been assembled by the staff in a chronological arrangement of selected excerpts of data received from intelligence community sources and from public sources. The chronology is somewhat incomplete because it does not include: (a) the all source, all community review which the DCI is making at the request (11/14/62) of the Board, (b) significant information in the files of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group on intelligence and covert actions relating to Cuba, and (c) all of the information believed to have been submitted to the White House during the period of the military buildup in Cuba.

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1. 1/2/59 - Castro proclaims provisional Government headed by Urrutia as President.
2. 1/7/59 - U.S. recognizes the Castro Government . . . expresses the sincere good will of the Government and people of the U.S.
3. 12/31/59 - Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement under which Cuba is to sell Peiping 50,000 tons of sugar.
4. 2/4/60 - Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition. On 2/13/60, Fidel Castro and Mikoyan sign a joint Soviet-Cuban communique describing their conversations as "carried out in an atmosphere of frank cordiality."
5. 2/13/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign trade and economic aid agreement.
6. 2/20/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with East Germany.
7. 3/31/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with Poland; with Czechoslovakia on 6/10/60; with Communist China on 7/23/60; with Hungary on 9/15/60; with Bulgaria on 10/7/60; and with Rumania on 10/26/60. During this period Cuba established diplomatic relations with these countries and with North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and Outer Mongolia.
8. 7/9/60 - Khrushchev stated that the USSR is "raising its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba . . . Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."
9. 7/10/60 - Guevara stated that Cuba is defended by the Soviet Union, "the greatest military power in history."
10. 7/21/60 - The Cuban press reported Raul Castro's statement in Moscow that Cuba is grateful for political and moral support from the USSR.

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11. 8/24/60 - Castro charged the U.S. with supporting counter-revolutionaries, and stated that Cuba would be friends with the Soviets and Chinese Peoples Republic.

12. 11/18/60 - U.S. stated that at least 12 Soviet ships have delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since July 1960, and that Soviet bloc arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons.

13. 12/19/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign joint communique through which Cuba openly allies itself with the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

14. 1/2/61 - Cuba holds military parade displaying bloc arms, including tanks, assault guns and field guns. Castro said this represents only a "small part" of the arms which Cuba had received from the bloc.

15. 1/3/61 - The United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.

16. 2/23/61 - Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declared that the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machine guns.

17. 3/24/61 - In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Juan Bosch of New York City (former Minister of Finance of Cuba prior to the Batista Administration) stated that: "Just recently I have received confidential information that in the western part of the island of Cuba, specifically in the vicinity of the town of Soroa, Province of Pinar del Rio, an installation is being finished that has required hundreds of tons of portland cement, and has led observers to conclude that a rocket-launching pad is being prepared for use by the Soviet Union. Many reports of other secret military installations are being received continuously in my office. Do the American people not realize that these installations may be used to pinpoint atomic destruction to any part of the United States, and that a military base in Cuba would be invaluable to the Soviet Union, not only because of its military value as a base at the very back-door of the U.S., but also because of the prestige that this would give the Russians?"

18. 4/3/61 - The U.S. Department of State stated that since mid-1960 over 30,000 tons of arms valued at \$50 million had arrived in Cuba from the bloc; the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the Soviet bloc for their armed power; Soviet and Czech military advisers and technicians had accompanied the flow of arms; Cubans had gone to Czechoslovakia and the USSR for training as jet pilots, ground maintenance crews, and artillerymen; and that, except for the U.S., Cuba had the largest ground forces in the hemisphere -- at least 10 times as large as those maintained by Batista's and other previous Cuban Governments.

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19. 4/17-19/61 - The CIA-directed effort against Castro met with disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

20. 4/20/61 - President Kennedy stated that any unilateral American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to abandon Cuba.

21. 4/20-12/1/61 - CIA relaxed its intelligence collection and covert action efforts against Cuba, according to the oral report made to the Board on 6/26/62 by CIA Deputy Director Helms.

22. 6/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-15s and MIG-17s in Cuba.

23. 7/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-19s in Cuba.

24. 12/2/61 - Castro declares himself a bona fide Communist. "I believe absolutely in Marxism . . . I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life." He admits that he hid his true political ideology during his revolutionary struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength, had been known as people of very radical ideas, unquestionably all the social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so from that time on."

25. 1/31/62 - The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este, declared that because of its public alignment with international communism, the present Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is excluded from participating in the Inter-American system.

26. 2/3/62 - In a Proclamation by the President an embargo was placed on trade with Cuba.

27. 3/7/62 - Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3, entitled "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," provided guidance to the intelligence community on its intelligence collection effort. This guidance included the following:

"First Category: Objectives of such vital importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort . . . B. Present and prospective Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities for nuclear attack on the U. S. . . ."

"Second Category: Objectives of such critical importance as to require an intensive intelligence effort . . . F. Present and prospective Soviet, Chinese Communist, Satellite, and Cuban capabilities and intentions to initiate, conduct, and support

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(27. 3/7/62 Continued)

"internal warfare in countries on the periphery of the Sino Soviet Bloc, and in Africa and Latin America."

"Third Category: Objectives of such great importance as to warrant a major intelligence effort Z. The stability, internal policy, and international relations of the Castro regime in Cuba; the locus of power within the regime; the progress of its reorganization of the economy, the political structure, and the military establishment; its capabilities to control the population and to defend itself against internal and external attack; the extent and nature of popular disaffection and of organized internal resistance; the regime's economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet Bloc and with Communist China; its subversive capabilities and activities in Latin America."

28. 3/15/62 - According to a CIA memorandum of 11/16/62, the intelligence community established on 3/15/62 an interagency refugee interrogation center (Caribbean Admission Center) at Opa-Locka, Florida, manned by 40 personnel representing CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, USIA and VOA. Cuban refugees were arriving at Miami at the rate of 1400 per week. On arrival, male refugees were screened at the Center for intelligence and counter-intelligence potential. From 3/15 to 10/23/62 (the date on which civil air travel was suspended), 10,000 refugees were interviewed at the Center, and 5608 intelligence reports were disseminated to the community.

According to the 11/14/62 CIA Chronology: "On 15 February, 1962 an interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected from them The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation -- such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited . . ." (See Items Nos. 54 and 59, infra).

(NOTE: As reflected in Item No. 134, infra, a somewhat different CIA assessment of the reports appears elsewhere in the CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 wherein it is stated that CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before January 1, 1962, all of which were either totally false or misrepresentations by the observer of other kinds of activity. The CIA Chronology adds that CIA analysts had come to view such reports with suspicion.)

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29. 3/21/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba". It stated that Cuban military capabilities are "essentially defensive" and that "we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate (the next two years). This attitude would

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(29. 3/21/62 Continued)

"not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units." A foreword to the above estimate states that "Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some matters, it is seriously inadequate. . . . In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate."

30. 3/27/62 - The U.S. stated that the Sino-Soviet bloc has furnished \$100 million worth of military equipment and technical services to Cuba, and that several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc. "Arms include 5 to 75 MIG jet fighters; 150 to 250 tanks; 50 to 100 assault guns; 500 to 1000 field artillery; 500 to 1000 antiaircraft artillery; 500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases or bombers." (Source: Chronology prepared by the State Department at the request of Senator Morse.)

31. 4/11/62 - DIA initiated meetings with JCS and CIA personnel to discuss refugee interrogation guides for use at the Opa-locka center and to review intelligence requirements on Cuba. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

32. Spring of 1962 - "The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962 and preparations within the USSR must have been under way from that time on. There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, in particular, reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these operations which can be found is a single intercepted personal message (4/11/62) addressed to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged important enough to warrant inclusion in current intelligence publications." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

33. May 1962 - A Cuban "Indications Center" was established at CINCLANT on the recommendations of DIA and NORAD. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

34. 5/31/62 - On this date the NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports dealing with NPIC's evaluation, from a photographic standpoint, of refugee and agent reports on Cuba. Between 5/31 and 10/5, NPIC examined 138 refugee and agent reports. The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 stated that only three of these reports cited missile activity which could not be linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments, and "NPIC's evidence negated these three." Elsewhere in the CIA Chronology it is stated "CIA current intelligence was ordered on 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of

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(34. 5/31/62 Continued)

"missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC." Between 14 August and mid-October one CIA office sent NPIC 13 memoranda "asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding."

35. 6/1/62 - DIA issued intelligence requirements regarding the missile buildup in Cuba including missiles of intermediate range. These requirements were described by General Carroll as detailed and comprehensive and as including suggested clandestine intelligence requirements for CIA.

(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

36. 6/26/62 - At the PFIAB Meeting on this date, Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, reported that CIA relaxed its intelligence and covert action efforts against Cuba following the abortive invasion in April, 1961; that since December 1961 CIA has mounted a major intelligence effort against Cuba; that there have been weekly U-2 overflights of Cuba; that an interrogation center has been set up at Opa-locka, with Defense participation, where 1600 Cuban refugees a week are interrogated with 250 weekly intelligence reports resulting therefrom; that such intelligence reports are coordinated with U-2 photography as the basis for disseminating intelligence data on the status of the military situation in Cuba; that CIA is operating intelligence agents in Cuba; that some intelligence is also received from [redacted] and other governments still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba; that the Cubans are credited with being stronger militarily than any other Latin American country, but that the Cuban ground forces do not represent an offensive capability; that they have no guided missiles; and that no nuclear weapons are known to have been supplied to Cuba by the USSR. 12

37. July 1962 - According to the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62, "intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focusing during July on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in the Escalante affair."

38. 7/4/62 - The President's Intelligence Checklist, prepared by CIA, referring to Raul Castro's visit to Moscow, noted that Raul was probably seeking more Soviet military aid such as MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR was already providing to Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq.

39. 7/19/62 - CIA's President's Checklist noted that the fact that Raul left Moscow without publicity indicated that this was a "pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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40. 7/19/62 - The NSC Special 5412/2 Group (and later the President) approved a proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba "be continued at their current level of two a month". This recommendation was based on a memo from the DD/I to the DCI following a request made of the DCI on 7/10 by General Taylor who had asked for a comprehensive review of all aerial photography activities. The justification advanced for the DCI's proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba be "continued at their current level" was (1) that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false", and (2) that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

41. 7/26-29/62 - Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel for the Soviet buildup in Cuba first began arriving at Cuban ports. ". . . evidence gradually accumulated that the behavior pattern of these ships was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from the Baltic rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships, and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward Cuba on an unprecedented scale. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use . . . this paper stated on August 1, that 'at least some if not all of the ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba'. This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's comment on the same information, i.e., that it tended to corroborate a report [redacted] in Havana (earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war materiel. . ."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

42. August 1962 - ". . . It should be noted for the record that CIA was in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting difficulties in coordination of items for the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first item on this subject in that publication. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said that 'The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba . . .' There were further difficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Washington."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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43. 8/1/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-2-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", which stated that the capabilities of the Cuban armed forces "have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities however are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the bloc will station in Cuba bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate." (The estimate was "over the next year or so".) With respect to this estimate CIA reported that "The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62 . . . as the intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

44. 8/4/62 - CIA's President's Checklist ("not being under a requirement for USIB coordination was able to report the accumulating information fully to the President") stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such a delivery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half of 1962". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

45. 8/5/62 - "The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized for August was flown on August 5, probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment entering the island at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

46. 8/8/62 - "Observations (in reports later reviewed) at the port of Mariel suggest that preparations for construction of the Guanajay MRBM sites were being made in early August. Prefabricated concrete slabs up to 12x4x2 feet in size and more than thirty dark colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet long and 10 feet in diameter were off-loaded about 8 August. Tubular and semicircular shaped concrete forms arrived in Mariel during the same period. Similar items have been photographed at the IRBM sites in the Guanajay-Bauta area. One source reported that this material was designed for use in building missile bases, and that some of the cargo was delivered to the Bauta area. . . ."

"Concrete forms similar to those observed at Mariel were off-loaded at the port of La Isabela (in the Remedios IRBM site area) during August" (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

47. 8/8/62 - "The DCI briefed the Republican Policy Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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48. 8/9/62 - CIA's President's Checklist for this date said "Soviet ships have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe that there are any combat troops among them." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

49. 8/10/62 - At a MONGOOSE meeting, the DCI stressed the importance of intelligence received on the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians in Cuba. The DCI "raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel, and said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of U. S. missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

50. 8/14/62 - There arrived in Havana the first shipment of KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba -- each carrying two homing missiles with a range of 10 or 15 nm and carrying 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARS were transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. By 10/20 there were a total of 12 KOMAR craft in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

51. 8/14/62 - "CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of missile bases until they had been checked out with NPIC -- this instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to later restrictions (see Item No. 152, infra) Between 14 August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

52. 8/15/62 - On this date, in an effort to supply guidance and requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked NPIC to conduct a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been obtained with respect to three particularly suspect areas in Cuba. On 8/17 photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of these three suspect areas, although there was no evidence of their deployment. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, on 11/9/62)

53. 8/15/62 - "Construction material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August minor activity of an indefinite type was noted there in the 29 August photography, and major construction had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction

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(53. 8/15/62 Continued)

"of a fixed site.) It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

54. 8/18/62 - CIA's President's Checklist reported that "There are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that the shipments have included quantities of electronic, transportation and construction equipment, some of it similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets are construction personnel . . ." (The CIA Chronology at this point states that "Soviet operations in August involved primarily the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled and fragmentary, enabled its (CIA's) analysts to pinpoint areas of construction and identify some of the equipment coming in.") (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

55. 8/20/62 - "The COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

56. 8/21/62 - At a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office (attended also by Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and Mr. McGeorge Bundy) the DCI said that "information available since 10 August indicated the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installations or missile sites, probably ground-to-air." "The possibility of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was again raised by the DCI, which developed a discussion of possible U.S. courses of action . . . It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would discuss the situation with the President on 23 August." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

57. 8/23/62 - A meeting was held with the President with Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone in attendance. This meeting resulted in the issuance of NSAM (National Security Action Memorandum) #181 dated 8/23/62, reflecting that "The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba . . .

"2. What information should be made available in the United States and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in Cuba?"

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(57. 8/23/62 Continued)

"4. The line of activity projected for operation MONGOOSE PLAN B PLUS should be developed with all possible speed."

"5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the United States."

"6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the United States."

"7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack on the United States. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counterforce attack, and outright invasion?"

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond the MONGOOSE B PLUS, in the context of an aggravated Berlin Crisis."

NSAM No. 181 indicated there would be a further meeting with the President about 9/1 to review progress on the above items and that in the event of important new information an earlier meeting would be called. The NSAM concluded with the statement "The President emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions."

58. 8/23/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 referring to the meeting with the President, which resulted in the issuance of NSAM #181, states: ". . . Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore, the President had taken action on the intelligence received. There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed -- in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR -- but the possibility had been discussed by the President and his advisers."

59. 8/23/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Most of our information from within Cuba on the influx of Soviet equipment and technicians has come from Cuban sources. We now have several reports from [redacted] whose people have been out looking."

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"They have spotted at least one camp southwest of Havana, where the number of vehicles suggested the presence of 'many' more than the 200 presumed young Russians they did see, and where a radio antenna field had already been erected. This they think could be connected with radio monitoring."

"Their information on the equipment coming in--some hard, some not--leads them to suggest that an expert might consider the possibility of antiaircraft rockets and radar."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

60. 8/24/62 - On the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62 Senator Engle stated that "On August 24 the Department of State gave a background press and radio news briefing" on the subject of Soviet activities in Cuba. The Senator then quoted a number of articles from various U.S. newspapers dated from 8/24 to 8/26/62, which Senator Engle summarized as follows: "All these stories contain the same set of facts. All of them mention 3000 to 5000 Soviet technicians. All of them mention the strengthening of coastal and air defenses . . . All of these articles relate that the information came from U.S. officials." (Source: Congressional Record)

61. 8/27/62 - In a memorandum of this date, General Carter reported to Mr. Bundy on actions taken in response to NSAM 181: (a) Task Force "W" would look into the possibility of removing the restrictions on the mounting of clandestine operations out of Guantanamo, (b) the Board of National Estimates would "establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis" of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel and equipment entering Cuba and its probable use, and of all construction, particularly missile sites, (c) the Board of National Estimates would assess the physical and psychological dangers to the U.S. and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba, (d) a daily CIA "Cuban Highlights" memorandum would be published for distribution to the President and others, (e) CIA would arrange intelligence collection overflights "as frequently as the situation demands," and (f) Task Force "W" would prepare a plan of operations for "MONGOOSE B PLUS." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

62. 8/27/62 - On this date, pursuant to NSAM 181, OCI of CIA began publishing a daily paper, "Cuban Highlights," using a "philosophy and format similar to the (President's) Checklist." It was to include current intelligence estimative assessments and press coverage -- for distribution to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and the Attorney General. (A few officials were later added to the distribution.) "It was discontinued on 19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban reporting in regular intelligence publications." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

63. 8/27/62 - "Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Group pinpointed four farms in (the Sagua La Grande) area as suspect missile sites." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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64. 8/29/62 - The State Department briefed a bipartisan group in the House of Representatives, according to Senator Engle's statement on the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62. He said that the statement which had been supplied to the House of Representatives by the Department of State on 8/29 read as follows: "Soviet Military Aid to Cuba. After a lull since early 1962 the Soviet Union resumed large-scale military deliveries to Cuba in the last week in July. Since then, Soviet ship movements to Cuba have totaled at least 25, including at least 5 passenger ships. This is in addition to normal tanker and cargo movements. The shipments contained both military and economic goods and personnel. Although full details are not yet available on the contents of the ships, nor of the breakdown "between military and nonmilitary, information to date indicates the following:

"Cargo: Military cargo, perhaps as much as half of the total, included large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications vans, radar vans, trucks, and mobile generator units. Much of the equipment is likely to go into the improvement of coastal and air defenses. The size and shape of some of the boxes delivered suggests that it is possible they could contain ground-to-air missiles for antiaircraft use, but we have no information on that as yet. These missiles are not adaptable for nuclear use.

"Nonmilitary cargo, roughly half of the total, consists of deliveries, already behind schedule, of industrial and agricultural equipment under aid and trade agreements.

"Personnel: A large number of additional Soviet specialists arrived in Cuba in the same period. With the recent arrivals, the total number in Cuba or on the way, both military and nonmilitary may be as high as 5000. The breakdown between military and technical personnel is not known, but the additional numbers of military specialists are not incompatible with the training and setting up of the complex military equipment which has arrived. There is no evidence of the arrival of Soviet combat troops from other Soviet bloc countries.

"The shipments consist of both economic goods and defensive military goods. They appear designed to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an internal threat, and to increase the effectiveness of the Cuban military establishment for possible internal use. Information to date indicates that the shipments will not improve significantly the very limited offensive capabilities of the Cuban armed forces.

"The recent shipments indicate a significant increase in Soviet involvement in Cuba. The increased amount of military assistance accompanies stepped-up Soviet economic aid to try to relieve Cuban shortages. The shipments must have been planned several months ago to have arrived when they did. The Cuban regime, facing economic deterioration and rising popular discontent, probably hopes to strengthen its internal position through new demonstrations of Soviet support." (Source: Congressional Record)

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65. 8/29/62 - SAM sites in Cuba were "first observed" as the result of the U-2 photographic mission flown on this date. On this date 8 SA-2 sites were identified. (Three more were observed on 9/5 -- one on 9/26 -- one on 9/29 -- 1 on 10/5 -- 6 on 10/7 -- 2 on 10/14 -- 1 on 10/15 -- 1 on 10/17 -- Total 24 sites). (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62, Table 3)

66. 8/29/62 - Referring to results of the 8/29 U-2 mission, the CIA Chronology states "Read out of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there" (i.e., the pinpointing of four farms in the Sagua La Grande area as "suspect missile sites," referred to in Item No. 63 above) . . . "the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have lead analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MREB activity as part of the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

67. 8/29/62 - A DIA study of the 8/29 U-2 photography and a study of refugee reports, suggested some sort of clandestine activity in progress in the San Cristobal area. This prompted the DIA to request additional photographic coverage of this area, but such coverage was not accomplished until 10/14 for a variety of reasons including poor weather and the requirement that the U-2 not overfly SA-2 installations. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

68. 8/29/62 - The minutes of the USIB meeting on this date show that Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba. The paper requested by Mr. Hilsman and the Board of National Estimates memorandum already requested by the DD/I (on 8/24) were combined.

" . . . Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available after 29 August. At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write such a paper were deferred until 19 September, by which date the new information could be digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September"

At the USIB meeting on this date, two other subjects were discussed:

- (1) the question raised by General Carter and Mr. Cline of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships, and
- (2) the action which General Carter had taken on 8/27/62 in asking General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft -- to which General Lemnitzer had replied that "something could be dug up." (This action by General Carter in calling General Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI who had left Washington on August 23 for the West Coast, then left the country on August 30 for the Riviera, and returned on September 23. The DCI "was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather."). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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69. 8/29/62 - CIA's President's Checklist contained the report that:

"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.

"By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships under Communist charter.

"We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

70. 8/30/62 - At a meeting of the Special Group, General Lemnitzer told the Group of his discussion with General Carter who had on 8/27 asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft. The Special Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and "reopen it when specific targets and information needs could be identified." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

71. 8/30/62 - A draft prepared by the JCS on 8/30 in response to NSAM 181 of 8/23/62 presented to the White House "a study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action in the context of aggravated Berlin crisis". The following are selected highlights from the draft:

In NSAM 109 of 10/23/61, the President described the four phases into which he expected progressive U.S. and Allied military action to fall, in meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the Western powers out of Berlin.

"The JCS are of the opinion that positive action of oppose communist aggression in any geographical area will be evidence of the determination of the United States and will influence the Berlin decision. However, they consider that actions outside of Germany should be complementary to, and not substituted for, actions to be taken in Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent denial of access."

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated repeatedly that the United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist government in Cuba and that the requirement to remove the communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities."

"Conclusions": (a) a blockade would be an act of war (b) the undertaking of the liberation of Cuba by invasion during a period of aggravated crisis in Berlin is militarily sound -- contingent upon the call-of of substantial additional forces to active duty and a firm preparedness to execute full mobilization if necessary, and

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(c) other actions (such as covert measures to eliminate Cuban nuclear launch installations) would be less effective than full scale military intervention and would produce only partial or temporary results.

Military Alternatives

The JCS draft also included a section ("Item 7") in response to the provision of Par. 7 of NSAM 181 which called for a Department of Defense study of "the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U. S. . . . (for example, (a) pinpoint attack (b) general counter-force attack, (c) outright invasion).

In a preface to this study the JCS pointed out that (1) although the current evaluation of reported SAM sites in Cuba is that they are for defensive purposes and designed for air defense, if these sites are effectively used to derogate U.S. aerial reconnaissance the Cubans will have an opportunity to develop such offensive capabilities as missile launch sites and submarine bases (2) a Cuban offensive capability would fill gaps in the Russian missile coverage of the U.S. and also provide the Cuban Communist government with a means of countering future U.S. actions against Cuba through blackmail, and (3) continued development of Cuban capabilities would increase U.S. defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

The JCS analysis of alternative U.S. military actions was then set forth in essence as follows:

a. Pinpoint attack (i.e., a localized attack against a specific facility followed by planned withdrawal . . . This might be done by pinpoint air attack, or by covert commando-type raids (not recommended) on targets adjacent to coastal areas). Advantages: economical in force applied . . . minimizes U.S. and Cuban casualties, and pre-attack publicity. Disadvantages: eliminates nuclear launch capability only on a temporary basis . . . no less belligerent than any other act of war . . . even if covert will brand U.S. as aggressor . . . affords Cuba with outcry before international organizations and a legal justification for retaliatory attacks on the U.S. . . . gives USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S. installations on periphery of Bloc . . . little or no effect on Cuban Communist regime or other Cuban military forces.

b. General counter-force attack (i.e., an attack designed to destroy or neutralize Cuban nuclear capability installations or areas, through air attacks, naval gunfire, or possible overt airborne or amphibious assaults with or without immediate subsequent withdrawal). Advantages: moderately economical in use of U.S. forces if adequate air and naval support . . . fewer U.S. and Cuban casualties than if a full scale invasion. Disadvantages: same as disadvantages of "Pinpoint attack", above, and also . . . could lead to invasion of extricate U.S. forces . . . gives USSR precedent for reprisal against U.S.

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installations on periphery of Bloe, Formosa, etc. . . . affords USSR with opportunity for stepped-up military material and technical buildup.

c. Outright invasion (i.e., would be accomplished through execution of existing U.S. military contingency plans with full preparation for positive and effective overt U.S. intervention). Advantages: permanent elimination of Cuban facilities having present or potential capability to launch nuclear attack on the U.S. . . . would eliminate Communist government in Cuba and expel direct Soviet influence . . . is equally effective against coastal or inland target areas, whether missile sites, airfields or potential submarine bases . . . would clearly establish that the Monroe Doctrine is effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy . . . would reassert U.S. determination to maintain integrity of Western Hemisphere and reaffirm principle of government by self-determination . . . would restore U.S. prestige, world-wide. Disadvantages: would reduce in some degree U.S. capability to react in other contingency areas during the operation.

JCS conclusion: ". . . the advantages of a decisive execution of an outright invasion, together with the many disadvantages of any lesser alternative, conclusively indicate that this is the only course of action which should be adopted in order effectively and permanently to accomplish the mission.

"Accordingly, it is recommended that in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S., only overt full-scale military action should be considered. Further, noting the increasing complexities attending the delay of U.S. intervention in Cuba, a previous recommendation is reiterated, that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States."

72. 8/30/62 - The following excerpt from the President's press conference of 8/30/62 was reported in the Congressional Record on 9/5/62:

The President: "We have no evidence of troops . . . In response to your specific question, we have no information that troops have come into Cuba . . . the main thrust of course is assistance because of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy . . . However, we are continuing to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention and will respond to -- will be glad to announce any new information if it should come immediately."

Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if a distinction could be made with respect to the troops in Cuba. Some of us were told at the State Department the other day that there is Russian military personnel in Cuba, that these are military technicians, and that they are people who are going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike missiles. . . ."

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The President: "I don't know who told you that at the State Department, that they are going to operate Nike missiles, because that information we do not have at this time. There certainly are technicians there and they may be military technicians. We don't have complete information about what's going on in Cuba, but since the word 'troops' has been generally used they had a military advisory commission there for a long period of time, so there may be additional military advisory personnel or technicians. But on the question of troops, as it is generally understood, we do not have evidence that there are Russian troops there. There is an expanded advisory and technical mission. That is correct."

Question: "Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped to Cuba?"

The President: "We have no information as yet . . . that does not mean that there have not been, but all I am saying is that we have no such information as yet."

73. 8/31/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Preliminary information from the 30 (sic) August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island. Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops. We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.

"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indication that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7)

74. 8/31/62 - Par 5 of NSAM 181 called for an analysis (by the White House, consulting with State, Defense and CIA) of "the probable military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S." Accordingly, such an analysis was made and set forth in a memorandum (labelled "Top Secret and Sensitive") signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy under date of August 31, 1962. There follows a summary of selected highlights from that memorandum, under the topic headings set forth therein:

"1. Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba"

"The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the introduction of SA-2 missiles." Preliminary photo

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interpretation shows 7 SA-2 sites in early stages of construction . . . a modern first-line AA missile with an engagement range of 30 miles and high reliability from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet . . . probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence that the Soviet Government has ever provided nuclear warheads to another state, and it seems unlikely that such a move is currently planned -- although there is little reason to suppose that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 miles to 2000 miles (the Soviet MRBM), which would be of little value without nuclear war heads. Longer range surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial installations -- shorter range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction . . . As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960's, it will be progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba light-weight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.

"2. Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba:"

"A. Surface-to-air missiles"

Extensive deployment of SA-2s would make reconnaissance overflight and other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous, and would substantially increase the problem of neutralizing air defense in event of open conflict . . .

"B. Surface-to-surface missiles"

SSMs with nuclear warheads would be a very significant military threat to the U.S. . . . It appears probable that on military grounds alone the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

It may well be that the introduction of nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line than introduction of any given class of missiles as such -- but the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very hard to detect.

Attention should also be given to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to set up a submarine missile base in Cuba.

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"3. Political and psychological impact of a Soviet missile establishment in Cuba"

In supplying Cuba with missiles of any sort, the Soviet Union is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western hemisphere . . . the delivery of MIGs a year ago did not greatly disturb American or hemisphere opinion, but missiles are something else again . . . and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely distinguish between aircraft missiles and a direct threat of missile attack on the U. S.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's "softness" on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place.

" . . . There will be a distinct difference in impact between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use against the United States . . . international acceptance of action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the U. S. . . ."

In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile installations in Cuba (no matter what kind) will be substantial . . . the missile sites would be seen as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba . . . in the absence of prompt and effective U. S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay . . . in the Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more U. S. support against Castro's subversion . . . other Latin American states would be more than ever inclined to accommodate to Cuba . . . and all this would accentuate inter-American strains.

"SUMMARY: In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them."

75. 8/31/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating included the following in his remarks on the floor of the U. S. Senate:

" . . . I am reliably informed--when I say 'reliably informed,' I mean that has been checked out from five different sources, and I am certain I can state it as a fact--that between the dates of 8/4 and 8/15, 10 or 12 Soviet vessels anchored at the Marante dock area at Mariel. The dock area previously had been surrounded by the construction of a high cinder-block wall. The Soviet ships unloaded 1200

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"troops. Troops is what I mean, and not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.

"On August 13 five Soviet torpedo boats unloaded from Soviet ships, and are now moored at La Base. There is every indication that the naval complement to handle these boats disembarked at the same time.

"Again let me emphasize that these could not reasonably be called technicians.

"On August 13, 1,000 non-Cuban personnel in fatigue uniforms were seen working in the area near Finca La Guatana, in all probability on or near a missile base located in that area.

"On August 3 a large convoy of military vehicles manned by Soviet personnel was observed on the highway in Las Villas Province. The convoy moved in military order and contained the first amphibious vehicles observed in Cuba; also jeeps, 6x6 trucks, and tracked trucks.

"On August 5 there was a movement seen of a 64-vehicle convoy heading west on Carretera Central. The convoy was moving in military order. It included tanks, cannonlike trailers, and flatbed trailers.

"On August 8 there was observed a night movement of a convoy on Carretera Central. Flatbed trucks were observed transporting concave metal structures supported by tubing. The convoy included a number of closed vans. The convoy appeared to be moving toward an installation 4 to 5 kilometers from Canimar in a closely restricted area believed to contain a rocket installation.

"There have been other observations of activities there, which have been confirmed.

". . . Since July the Soviet Union has greatly stepped up shipments of men and equipment. More than 20 cargo ships have arrived from Communist ports in the last few weeks. Many have been unloaded under maximum security. Between three and five thousand so-called 'technicians' have arrived in the course of the past year. Soviet statistics reveal that by the end of the year the Soviets will have shipped nearly \$1 billion of goods and equipment to Castro. Cuban trade with non-Communist countries will be down to about 30 percent next year and Cuba will be virtually isolated from the free world--a Communist enclave within the free world where the Soviets can operate unchecked and to a large extent unobserved.

". . . More ominous reports suggest that the Soviets are constructing missile bases and sending over technicians and experts to man them. In this way the Soviets could expect to discourage determined refugees of other nations of this hemisphere from any kind of concerted attack on the Cuban dictatorship. They could also strengthen Castro to resist increasing internal dissatisfaction against his

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"regime. That supposition, which our Government has never openly admitted or discussed, is a source of serious concern to the people of all the Americas. It should be fully aired. The dangers inherent in the situation should be known and appreciated by all the people of this hemisphere, and particularly by those nations which so far have actively blocked measures to combat the menace of Castroism.

"Another very real possibility and, in my judgment, a probability that should be a source of even greater concern to the U.S. and which has so far not been openly discussed at all in this country is that the Soviets are deliberately taking advantage of the proximity between Cuba and Cape Canaveral to conduct other activities. There is no question at all of the possibility of interference with American space flights by sensitive equipment mounted in Cuba and operated by Communist experts. . . ." (Source: Congressional Record)

76. 8/31/62 - In retrospect "a thorough review of refugee reports concerning the general areas now containing IRBM and MRBM sites has produced some probable indicators of scheduling. This collateral information indicates that plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba were being implemented by the end of August. Site locations apparently had been selected and the surveys for the initial IRBM installations were probably completed by that time. IRBM site construction was apparently under way in September and preceded the MRBM sites. This sequence is also indicated by the photography."

"Reported activities indicate that probably all of the San Cristobal sites were selected by MRBM deployment in August since an area which includes some of the sites was made a restricted zone during late August-early September."

"Refugees had also reported "about August 22 the owner of a farm, now the location of San Cristobal MRBM Site 3, was evicted and the secondary road to the farm was improved by 24 August . . . (A Soviet survey team was reported in the vicinity of San Diego de los Banos, a village about 4 miles west of Site 1, on 5 September)".

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62, Supp. 4)

77. 8/31/62 - CIA distributed a raw intelligence report which was based on information acquired in the U.S. on 8/23/62 (presumably from refugee sources) and which stated in part "A platoon of Soviets who are specialists in rocketry and atomic arms is assigned to the Ministry of the Cuban Armed Forces".

78. 8/31/62 - Information received by an American correspondent in Mexico from a prominent Cuban exile and reported to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City: ". . . Soviet military presence in Cuba was a fact . . . among the thousands of Soviet technicians who recently arrived on the island, many appeared to be between 18 and 20 years of age, too young to acquire any technical experience to impart to the Cubans . . . these young Russians dress in sports clothes but give the appearance of having only recently completed their military training . . . two sites with antennae, presumably used for monitoring activity at Cape Canaveral, will be converted into missile bases . . ." (Source: State Department Airgram from Mexico City No. 737.00/8-3162, dated 8/31/62)

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79. 8/31/62 - A column by Henry J. Taylor (date and newspaper not identified) was inserted into the Congressional Record of 8/31/62 page A6569, by Congressman William C. Cramer:

" . . . we help Cuba mightily by having no policy at all. Admittedly, enemy rocket sites are available there from which to reach Miami, Cape Canaveral, and even Washington (only 1,139 miles), New York (1,317), Boston (1,801), Chicago (1,333), Kansas City (1,497), Denver (1,819), Los Angeles-San Diego (2,299), and easily as far as Seattle (2,843) on a pinpoint basis. Why does the administration consistently pooch-pooch and soften the indications these rocket sites are being built? It you were Khrushchev wouldn't you build them? Disliking the inevitable does not make it less inevitable . . ."

80. 9/1/62 - In response to NSAM 181 the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, submitted to the Secretary of State and the White House a paper analyzing the meaning of increased Soviet aid to Cuba including an analysis of Soviet and Cuban motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba. This analysis stated in part: "In addition to training and arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba. But we believe at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities . . . More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future. In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time." The State Department analysis stated at this point "It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clear cut evidence."

81. 9/4/62 - The White House issued the following Presidential Statement: "All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached the Government in the last 4 days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft missiles with a short range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute -- approximately 3,500 -- is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make

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"information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified. There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba, from any Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to (sic) Russia, of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence of ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it otherwise, the greatest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to peace It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere"

82. 9/4-5/62 - "General Carter briefed a number of Congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees". (CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

83. 9/5/62 - This was the first U-2 mission for September (of the two which had been authorized "as a routine matter" by the Special Group on July 19 -- based on the DCI's recommendation that "U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month"). This flight (and the August 29 flight) covered areas which in retrospect are known to have been the sites of MRBM and IRBM installations -- but the September 5 photography "gave no recognizable evidence that any construction was then under way, although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on August 29. In fact there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

84. 9/5/62 - On this date photograph: of the Remedios IRBM site was negative, but road improvements began shortly thereafter, and a flow of construction from the port of Isabel, on the north coast "the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable. The estimated date for the beginning of major construction is about 1 October". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

85. 9/5/62 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-21s in Cuba. (Source: NPIC)

86. 9/5/62 - Senator Keating, speaking on the floor of the Senate in response to Senator Engle's earlier remarks that day (see Items 60 and 64, above):

" I have said that the whole story has not been told the American people. That is still the case even after the latest White House announcement yesterday.

" I apologize for the embarrassment I am about to cause the Senator from California. On the 14th day of August, in an effort to get some official information, I wrote to the Department of State to ask them about Cuba and the buildup there. Sixteen days later on

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August 30th, the Department wrote a letter to me which arrived at my office just today (9/5/62) . . . This letter -- an incredible letter in the light of what has happened since August 30, and indeed what had happened before that -- reads in part as follows:

'Several Soviet passenger and cargo ships arrived in Cuba during late July and early August carrying large quantities of technicians of various kinds.

'The Department has established that personnel landed from approximately five of the ships. We have no specific information about the number of persons.

'We have no information that any Soviet-bloc troops have landed in Cuba. Although the full significance of these developments is not clear, there is no evidence that supplies and technicians have arrived in Cuba in such numbers as to provide support for external aggression from Cuba against other countries.' (Source: Congressional Record)

87. 9/6/62 - "After further analysis" (of the August 29 flight) there appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September the information which had previously been included by the CIA in the President's Checklist of August 31, 1962, regarding photography of the August 29 flight which disclosed SA-2 sites in Western Cuba, plus KOMAR-class PT-boats and tanks. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

88. 9/6/62 - By this time "more detailed readout of the 29 August mission had . . . led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site -- possibly surface-to-surface -- at Banes, on the northeast coast. General Carter so informed the President on September 6. (For this reason the information was never included in the Checklist)" -

Programs were then set in motion to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles at Banes: On 9/9/62 at the request of the Secretary of State, COMOR reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes. On 9/10 General Carter sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requesting necessary actions, including Special Group approval, to provide for "tactical-type reconnaissance" of the Banes area, when directed by higher authority. On 9/14 a Special Group meeting was briefed by JCS on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba -- but the Secretary of Defense did not want the operation considered further until there were available the results of further U-2 reconnaissance which had been decided upon at a White House meeting of 9/10.

(On September 18 the CIB reported the results of a further CIA study of the 9/5 U-2 photography, namely, the conclusion that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile.)

"One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield along

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(88. 9/6/62 Continued)

"with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist but was reported in the CIB of 8 September. Actually, these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the CIB of 27 September -- with DIA withholding concurrence -- that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

89. 9/6/62 - "Mexico City, September 4. -- A detailed report on distribution of nearly 20,000 Russian, Chinese, Algerian and African military men, naval and air bases and guided missile launching pads was released here today by a Cuban student exile office . . . One missile station is being installed near the port of Bahia Honda and another near Varadero Beach in Matanzas Province . . . More than 3000 Russians were landed at Bahia Honda for work on a launching pad. . . the statement said." (Source: Congressional Record)

90. 9/7/62 - On this date the DCI (who was on the Riviera and was being kept informed by CIA cable) sent a cable to General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U.S. and possibly Caribbean areas." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

91. 9/7 (or 8)/62 - "The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR on the ship "Omsk" which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

92. 9/8/62 - The CIB on this date included a report on results of the 9/5 photography which disclosed the presence of one assembled and several crated MIG-21s at Santa Clara airfield. Apparently information on the presence of MIG-21s in Cuba was not reported in the President's Checklist until 9/27/62. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

93. 9/8/62 - DIA reported that the scope of Soviet Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests motives going ~~beyond~~ the lending of support and encouragement of the Castro regime. (Source: DIA report to Board on 11/9/62)

94. 9/9/62 - COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State, reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes (as the result of U-2 photography of 9/5 indicating the possible presence of an SSM site at Banes). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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95. 9/10/62 - Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated in the Senate:

"I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public . . .

"The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive." (Source: Washington Evening Star - 10/24/62)

96. 9/10/62 - Upon instruction of the President, General Carter briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation". (The DCI briefed General Eisenhower again on 10/3.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

97. 9/10/62 - On this date the DCI sent a second cable to General Carter from the Riviera stating: "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba . . . appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National Estimates study motives . . ." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

98. 9/10/62 - In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, General Carter requested "necessary actions (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise missile site at Banes. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

99. 9/10/62 - CIA reports that on this date a meeting took place at the White House attended by Secretary Rusk, Messrs. Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, and Generals Carter and Lansdale. The purpose of this meeting was to make "a full review of the overflight program for Cuba," and it was prompted by "the results of the 29 August and the 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites,

CIA reports that the factors involved and the decision reached at this White House meeting were as follows:

(1) Because of the Soviet protest of the August 30 U-2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, and because of the September 8 shutdown of a U-2 over Communist China, the participants at the meeting "were naturally reluctant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational."

(2) The hard intelligence thus far received on the presence of SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in NIE 85-2-62 of August 1 and had subsequently been fully reported. Therefore, the hard intelligence "was not such as to produce a sense

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(99. 9/10/62 Continued)

"of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required confirmation came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately it may have even served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decision of 23 August, the known usually being less alarming than the unknown The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions (of August 29 and September 5)."

(3) "Finally, the participants (at the meeting) were operating in the atmosphere of the time The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention on Berlin throwing up a diplomatic smokescreen Furthermore, they (the participants at the White House meeting) must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Administration in the election campaign then beginning."

(4) The CIA proposed two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the August 29 and September 5 missions. "The Secretary of State objected" and insisted that "coverage of the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory."

(5) "To meet (the Secretary of State's) wishes, the program was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peripheral". The overflights were to be: (a) over the Isle of Pines, and (b) over the east of Cuba to cover Guantanamo and Banes. The peripheral flights were to be: (a) over the North coast of eastern Cuba, and (b) the south coast. All four flights were to be designed for maximum safety, and the overflights were to be quick "in-and-out" operations. In obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that there would not be flights over known SA-2 sites.

"The President approved this program" for four flights in September. "Thus the record shows that the President authorized everything the Special Group requested." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

100. 9/11/62 - Senator Tower, speaking in the U. S. Senate: "Russian tanks, rockets, military planes and high velocity artillery have been brought into Cuba. They threaten the entire U. S. east of the Mississippi. Pads for light rockets have already been built in Cuba by Russians and Chinese. . . . I am reliably informed that launching pads for medium rockets with a 1500-mile-plus range can be built in under 4 days"

(Source: Congressional Record)

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101. 9/11/62 - Senator Humphrey, speaking on the floor of the Senate said: ". . . I think it is ridiculous and insulting to the American people for grown men to wring their hands publicly about Cuba's being a military threat to the United States . . . I do not underestimate the fact that there are missiles, intermediate and short range. But I do know . . . that we have it within our capacity without even so much as violently flexing a muscle, to destroy every single military installation in one day. So I do not want the people of my state to lose a single night's sleep worrying about the might of Cuba" (Source: Congressional Record)

102. 9/12/62 - General Carter briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "on the Cuban situation". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

103. 9/12/62 - A Cuban National being processed at the Refugee Center at Opa-locka, Florida, reported that on this date he observed 20 Soviet-driven trucks pulling 4-wheel double axle trailers from 65 to 70 feet in length; that these trucks were observed driving from Havana to Camp Libertad; that the beds of the trucks were loaded with black crates; that the trailers were loaded with what the source believed to be large canvas-covered missiles; that there were 4 fins at the trailing edge of each missile. The source of the information drew sketches of the missiles and these missiles resembled surface-to-surface MRBMs.

CIA disseminated this information to the intelligence community on 9/21/62.

104. 9/13/62 - "On 13 September a source was informed by a resident of the general area that a rocket base was being constructed by the Soviets at a location now identified from photography as Remedios (IRBM) Site 1. A second base was also reported, but a missile site has not yet been found in photography although new road construction exists in that area." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

105. 9/13/62 - On this date the DCI sent a third cable to General Carter from the Riviera "repeating these premonitions" which he had set forth in cables to CIA on 9/1 and 9/10 regarding the possibility of Soviet introduction of MRBMs into Cuba. (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

106. 9/14/62 - At the Special Group meeting, a JCS representative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba. However, "the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting to have the operation considered further until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (at the White House meeting on that date)." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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107. 9/14/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12, but the likelihood that others are under construction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

108. 9/15/62 - Major construction at the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites "had probably begun by 15 September" (the construction equipment and material having arrived at Mariel beginning "about mid-August").

"It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

109. 9/15/62¹⁶ - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "A message [redacted] on a net serving [redacted] called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba'. We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another [redacted] referring to the isolation of 'volunteers'. If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62) 16

110. Mid-September, 1962 - At this time there was first noted a high frequency circuit in operation between Moscow and Havana relayed through [redacted]. The fact that manual operations and [redacted] are used argue against [redacted] for this link. It is believed that this link was established to meet a requirement for additional back-up communications. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62) 16

111. 9/16/62 - On this date, the DCI sent a fourth cable to General Carter regarding the possibility of a ballistic missile buildup in Cuba, stating: "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter, but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

112. 9/17/62 - The second shipment of equipment for the MRBM sites at San Cristobal arrived at Mariel on 9/17/62 on the ship "Poltava" (the first shipment had arrived on September 7 or 8). "This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

113. 9/18/62 - There appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin on September 18 a report on the September 5 photography which reflected the presence of a surface-to-surface, short-range, coastal defense missile site. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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114. 9/18/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Province." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

115. 9/19/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational."

"The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

116. 9/19/62 - (USIB Meeting) - "As a result of the DCI's pressure (presumably his cables to General Carter from the Riviera from 9/7 to 9/20/62) there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs). On September 19 at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to see RF-101's over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding that 'we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

117. 9/19/62 - USIB issued SNIE 85-3-62 on "The Military Buildup in Cuba". Among the key findings of the SNIE were the following: (1) "We believe that . . . the main purpose of the military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and Soviets conceive to be a danger that the U.S. may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose; (2) (the Soviets) are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue; (3) the establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far . . . however, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture, and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of displaying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency

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(117. 9/19/62 Continued)

"must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy; (4) Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles; (5) the establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory . . . the Soviets might think (it) would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it, however, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous U. S. reaction; and (6) although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba, as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action . . ."

* * * * *

CIA's retrospective comments on SNIE 85-3-62: (1) the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error and the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment (2) the deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was unprecedented (3) while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba between 9/7-15/62, the first reports by ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 9/19/62, and there was no evidence that MRBMs were on the way (4) the estimate failed to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel (5) the community was still thinking in terms of rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR, Iraq and Indonesia, and for Cuba in the 1960-1962 period, but there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern (6) also the Indonesian situation had broken the Soviet pattern only a month before when the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk "for the sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests" (7) the USSR had shown in the Indonesian affair that it was "willing to take some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albeit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cuban venture, and (8) ". . . For the record, there is no evidence that the existence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later decisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argument against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the continuing validity of standing estimates". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

118. 9/20/62 - CIA disseminated an agent report quoting Castro's personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, who said on 9/9/62: "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air. . . . There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets. . . ." This report was considered "too general to be used in the process" (in which CIA analysts made up target cards). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

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119. 9/20/62 Intercepted messages (COMINT) indicated the presence in Cuba on this date of Lieutenant General Pavel B. Dankevich. Dankevich is believed to have held a command in Vinnista probably as late as November, 1961. Vinnista is the location of a probable Soviet MRBM command and the headquarters of a Long Range Air Army. It is not known how long Dankevich may have been in Cuba prior to September 20, 1962. The intelligence publications available to the Board fail to reflect that any particular significance was attached to Dankevich's presence in Cuba until after the President made his public address relative to MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On October 27 CIA distributed a memorandum stating that Dankevich's presence in Cuba "indicates the high priority assigned by Moscow to the missile bases in Cuba." (Source: CIA memorandum of 10/27/62; DIA Intelligence Summary 10/27/62; Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

120. 9/20/62 - On this date the DCI sent a final cable to CIA from the Riviera, commenting to General Carter on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3 of 9/19 which had been cabled to the DCI. The DCI's cable expressed reservations on the SNIE conclusions and stated "As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position." These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates. (We have no evidence that the intelligence community was informed of the views expressed by the DCI in his several cables from the Riviera. The State and DIA members of USIB advised the Board on 11/9/62 that they had not been informed of the DCI's views.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

121. 9/20/62 - The Defense Intelligence Agency on this date attempted to obtain broad area coverage of Cuba through CORONA. On that date the DIA member of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Chairman of COMOR with the request that COMOR recommend the programming of an engineering pass of the CORONA vehicle over Cuba "where the western end of the island is, temporarily at least, off limits and where we need to know if any other SA-2 sites have been constructed . . ."

122. 9/21/62 - An article in the Washington News by Virginia Prewett under date of 10/31/62 entitled "Why Didn't JFK Act Earlier?" stated that a report made by Miami's Cuban Student Directorate on 9/21/62, stated that: "One of the European Ambassadors in Havana recently reported to his respective country 'that if the countries of this hemisphere do not take military action against Castro immediately, or at least before the next six months, Cuba will possess Russian missile bases armed with atomic and nuclear weapons capable of destroying in a few minutes the most strategic zones in the United States. Besides, it is known that the construction will be carried out secretly, with this end in view--that while the work continues, the American government will go on believing that the military installations are purely defensive measures.'"

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123. 9/21/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that: "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before. The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

124. 9/22/62 - "The most likely ship to have carried the large items (of equipment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites) is the Kimovsk which docked (at Casilda, on the south coast) on 22 September. This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of September, and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

125. 9/27/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"Photography snapped earlier this month show at least two Soviet ships delivering 22, perhaps more, MIG-21s. We now estimate there are 25-30 aircraft of this type in Cuba." (This paragraph was quoted in the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 but not in the revised Chronology of 11/14/62.)

"Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were carrying military hardware."

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

126. 9/27/62 - On this date CIA received a report of an observation made on 9/17/62 of a convoy moving toward San Cristobal. This report dovetailed with the earlier report of the 9/12/62 sighting of MRBMs near Havana (Item 103, above). "The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage. This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight. It read as follows: 'Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4 Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the following four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and Las Pozos (8317N/2230W). Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile construction, with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

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127. 9/27/62 - " At some point, probably just after 27 September, an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because there was an injunction not to do so (see Item No. 51, above). It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on reporting in late September and October if the other ban had not been in effect (i.e., the USIB restriction -- see Item 152, infra) is difficult to determine. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist, but the Checklist writers drew . . . largely on the Cuban Daily Summary, published by CIA. Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons. Moreover, neither the Checklist group, nor any other current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President and his advisors more than a month earlier (see Item No. 57, above). In other words, the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by time and bureaucratic processes that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that establishment of such a base was most improbable (see Item No. 117, above).

05 "It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the political impact of the reports they were receiving In addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR -- Special Group organization for collection and the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had [redacted] clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had requested would not soon be forthcoming, and they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.

"Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunction against publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary, which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite possible -- but by no means certain -- that they would have been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal slightly more than a week before he apparently did.

"In sum, the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 October (see Item No. 143, infra) when it ordered a U-2 mission which covered the area.

"The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and the Special Group Meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was

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designed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the early history of the U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

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128. 9/28/62 -- At the Board's 9/28/62 meeting the DCI indicated he did not believe that offensive, strategic missiles had been installed in Cuba, but he considered this a possibility at some future time, but only after Cuba's defensive capability was such as to deny Cuban airspace to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The DCI reported that "our intelligence collection on Cuba has improved since the first of the year" and that "CIA now has 45 third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting throughout Cuba."

129. September 1962 - "Offensive missiles identified: Western Cuba: Two launch sites consisting of 8 field-type launchers and 16 1020-nm MRBMs (SS-4) . . . these missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September."
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report of 10/18/62, prepared by GMAIC/JAEIC/NPIC)

130. 9/29-10/2/62 - Pursuant to the 9/20/62 request of DIA, a pass over Cuba was made by the Corona vehicle launched on 9/29/62. The resulting photography was good by Corona standards but not of sufficient quality to reflect significant photographic intelligence on MRBM or IRBM developments on the island. When this CORONA photography was checked against the photography obtained from the SAC-operated U-2s it was possible to relate some of the earth scratchings appearing in the CORONA photography to the construction at some of the long range missile sites which were detected beginning October 14. Without the U-2 photography however, these scratchings could not possibly be identified as being associated in any way with MRBM or IRBM construction. The photographic interpreters at the Strategic Air Command believe that if all nine sites had been completed at the time of the CORONA pass, the CORONA photography might have resulted in the identification of the IRBM sites but not of the MRBM sites.

Dr. Charyk, in commenting on this subject to Board Member Gray, noted that this experience makes it obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence; and that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography seeking evidence of missile installations in the USSR.

131. 10/1/62 - A memorandum prepared on this date in DIA by a DIA analyst, on the subject "Analysis of SAM Sites," dealt with the 15 confirmed SA-2 sites in Cuba and the discernible pattern which was developing from their location:

(1) In Oriente Province, the 3 SA-2 sites form a triangular pattern around the new military airfield at Holguin which will probably soon be operational . . . no MIGs there now but the MIGs believed to be stationed at Camaguay airfield will probably be moved to Holguin when Holguin becomes operational. (No SA-2 sites identified at Camaguay.)

(2) 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military airfield near Santa Clara in the Central Army area -- where MIGs have been for several months, and also the field on which the first MIG-21 was identified.

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(131. 10/1/62 Continued)

(3) In the Western Army area, the 3 (possibly 4) SA-2 sites form a linear pattern for the defense of the military airfield at San Antonio de los Baños and the Havana-Mariel complex (San Antonio is headquarters for the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force and the assembly point for all MIGs except MIG-21s).

(4) Further west, in Pinar del Rio Province, a triangular pattern of SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation. There are 2 underground facilities within this triangle whose use and purpose are unknown. One of these 3 SA-2 sites is located very near to the San Julian military air base, but this is a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of this air base. "Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused as to the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba."

(5) In the north central portion of Pinar del Rio Province is a trapezoid-shaped restricted area (15-20 miles on a side) controlled by Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba . . . no known military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area . . . Cuban refugees arriving in Miami say all Cubans have been evacuated from the area. Purpose of this restricted area is unknown.

(6) Information on the deployment of Soviet military personnel and "technicians" in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources. A plotting of all reported locations indicates that there is a definite correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or missile activity. Significantly, the greatest concentration of Soviet personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of Cuba indicating a greater interest by the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in other Provinces.

(7) The source of an unevaluated report says that on September 12 he saw some 20 SS-4 (or possibly SS-3) missiles in the vicinity of Campo Libertad (a small airfield on the western edge of Havana). This report is unconfirmed and there are no other reports of such missiles. However, it is significant to note that by taking the approximate center of the trapezoid-shaped restricted area previously referred to, as the point of origin for a radius of 1100 nm (range of an SS-4 missile) the arc includes Philadelphia, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Mexico City, all Central American capitals, the Panama Canal, and Venezuelan oil fields. "The presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset."

Based on the foregoing, DIA on 10/2/62 proposed to the COMOR Working Group that the Pinar del Rio search area be included in COMOR's reconnaissance objectives for Cuba. (This was done at the October 4 COMOR meeting and the objective was incorporated in the reconnaissance objectives list.) (Source: Letter to Coyne from Director, DIA, 11/13/62)

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132. 10/1/62 - According to reports subsequently reviewed, "On October 1 explosions were reportedly occurring at a highly secure construction project at a location now identified from photography as Site 1 (Sagua La Grande area). Material delivered to the project included lumber and pre-fabricated concrete forms. This suggests that site construction was under way at that time." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

133. 10/1/62 - This is the estimated date for the beginning of major construction on the Remedios IRBM site. ". . . the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

134. 10/1-3/62 - CIA reports that during this period CIA prepared a new target card which was in effect a requirement for photographic coverage of the San Cristobal area (see Item No. 126, above), and that in spite of time lags involved in receiving reports of refugees and CIA agents, "Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested. This represents a considerable technical achievement. . . . the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile installations in Cuba CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 January 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion By September, the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed. During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only a small publishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site. This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

(NOTE: The fact that CIA considered San Cristobal as a suspect MRBM site was not included in any of CIA's current intelligence publications until after photographic confirmation was obtained in mid-October.)

135. 10/2/62 - CIA distributed to the White House and other recipients a raw intelligence report, based on information acquired in Cuba on 10/1/62 which stated in part that on 9/19/62 large intercontinental rockets more than 67 feet long were unloaded in Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province and that the rockets were on long trailers when unloaded from the ship. In distributing this report CIA Headquarters appended the comment "It is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being off-loaded".

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136. 10/2-3/62 - The Final Communique of the Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in Washington, 10/2-3/62 stated in part that "The Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions" and it called for "the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective". The communique observed that "it is desirable

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(136. 10/2-3/62 Continued)

"to intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere."

137. 10/3/62 - The President signed Senate Joint Resolution 230 which had been adopted in the Senate and House of Representatives during September. The Joint Resolution expressed the determination of the United States to (1) prevent by necessary means, including use of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities in this Hemisphere; (2) prevent in Cuba the creation or use of externally supported military capability endangering U.S. security; and (3) work with the OAS and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

138. 10/3/62 - The DCI briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation" (the General had previously been briefed by CIA on 9/10). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

139. 10/3/62 - On this date the DIA member of COMOR submitted to the Chairman of COMOR a memorandum which (1) noted the concerns of the Sec/Def and JCS about the (insufficient) amount of intelligence on Cuba that was being made available to responsible decision makers in Government; (2) noted that certain portions of the island, notably the western end, had not been seen since August 29; (3) expressed the view of DIA and J-2 that the best way of collecting intelligence on Cuba under the present circumstances was by resuming frequent and regular U-2 overflights and that coverage on the order of once a week was essential; and (4) proposed that COMOR send to the USIB a draft "intelligence justification" which had been prepared by the DIA as the basis for authorizing frequent and regular U-2 flights over Cuba.

The DIA "intelligence justification" pointed to the buildup of SAM sites, and "SSM" sites which had been observed in eastern and western Cuba, and on the Isle of Pines. The DIA proposal called for U-2 coverage to meet requirements for up-to-date intelligence on (a) the location of SA-2 sites; (b) confirmation or negation of reports from reliable sources concerning the sightings of SS-4 missiles in Cuba; (c) the number of KOMAR class PGMs in service; and (d) the number of MIG-21s in Cuba.

The intelligence justification drafted by DIA gave recognition to the increased risk to U-2 aircraft in the light of SA-2 and MIG-21s present in Cuba. Nevertheless, this recognition of risk was followed by the statement: "But it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

The DIA memorandum to COMOR also included a proposed list of target objectives in Cuba to meet the intelligence requirements which DIA had outlined.

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(139. 10/3/62 Continued)

With few changes or omissions, the DIA's 10/3 draft of the intelligence justification for revised overflights of Cuba was forwarded by COMOR on 10/5 to the USIB for consideration and approval. Similarly, on 10/6 COMOR sent to the Director of NRO, at his verbal request, the intelligence justification and statement of target requirements for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba (with copies also being sent by COMOR to the USIB for information and any comments prior to the Special Group meeting on 10/9/62.)

In summary, the intelligence justification, and the listing of requirements and specific objectives, which went forward to NRO from COMOR on 10/6 included the following:

(1) A statement of the pressing need for photographic coverage of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, particularly with regard to (a) SA-2 sites, (b) possible MRBMs, (c) MIG-21 aircraft, and (d) tanks, artillery, and other conventional weapons and equipment "which are arriving in large quantities."

(2) SIGINT coverage to obtain up-to-date intelligence on the Soviet-furnished air defense buildup in Cuba which is known to include (a) radar -- EW, GCI, HF, MC, AQ and FC; (b) missile systems consisting of 3 confirmed and 1 probable cruise-type coastal defense short range missile sites, 15 SA-2 sites, and missile storage and support facilities; (c) MIGs -- 60 MIG-15/17/19 and 36 MIG-21s estimated; and (d) a general dispersal throughout Cuba of 30mm, 37mm and 57mm AAA to defend airfields, ports and military installations. ("... a two-fold collection program is necessary: first, a continued coverage of the [redacted] and communications networks which is now adequately covered by peripheral air, shipborne and ground efforts; second, overflight missions by a vehicle capable of [redacted] the readiness and effectiveness of weapons can be determined.")

(3) Conclusions: "Some of these requirements are currently being met by peripheral means. However, only overflights will permit the accomplishment of all objectives. COMOR will provide a continual review and up-dating of requirements."

(4) Recommendation: "It is recommended that reconnaissance programs be initiated to satisfy these requirements."
(Source: DIA letter to Coyne, 11/13/62)

140. 10/4/62 - The Director, DIA, established a Cuba "Situation Room" operated on a 24-hour basis.

141. 10/4/62 - On this date at a meeting of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the DCI noted that U-2 flights were now restricted by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of Cuba. The DCI questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational. The

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(141. 10/4/62 Continued)

Special Group then directed the NRO to prepare an over-all program for reconnaissance of Cuba for presentation at the Special Group meeting of 10/9/62.

142. 10/9/62 - NSA units in [redacted] and on the USS Oxford detected for the first time the Cuban [redacted] On October 27, 1962, this net shifted from an experimental to an operational status. [redacted]

The Russians are employing the [redacted] in Cuba. (The first time it has ever been detected outside of the Bloc except on Soviet ships in certain instances.) NSA has reason to believe that the Russians are possibly employing [redacted]

(Source: Deputy Director, NSA, 11/7/62)

143. 10/9/62 - NRO (Dr. Charyk) made a presentation to the Special Group of an over-all program for reconnaissance of Cuba. This presentation was based on the DIA-recommended, COMOR-proposed submission of a paper on "Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflights of Cuba."

"At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recommendation was 'A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits.' This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal . . . The operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly operational. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. NRO's second recommendation was therefore conditional: 'If there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits.' (There were also certain other recommendations for low level, oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

"The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended to the President that he approve it. The President gave his approval -- presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time -- and the mission was immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from 10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC by direction of the President in a meeting with the Deputy SecDef and the DCI. There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the primary mission was accomplished." (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)

NOTE: This is an error. See Item 143-a, next page.

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143-a. (See Item 143, above.) On 12/7/62 SAC representatives exhibited to a Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board the plan for and actual flight track of the 10/14/62 U-2 mission over Cuba, as laid out by SAC. The material shown to the Board Panel reflects that the pilot flew the mission precisely as prescribed.

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(143. 10/9/62 Continued)

Prior to this decision, CIA had operated 21 U-2 missions over or peripheral to Cuba during 1962. The dates of these 21 missions are listed below:

1/19/62	5/2/62	6/29/62	9/5/62
2/2/62	5/22/62	7/8/62	9/17/62
2/21/62	6/6/62	7/12/62	9/26/62
3/15/62	6/15/62	8/5/62	9/29/62
4/1/62	6/18/62	8/29/62	10/5/62
			10/7/62

(Source: NPIC)

144. 10/9/62 - The DCI briefed Congressman Cannon "on the Cuban situation." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

145. 10/9/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

"Mr. President, the President of Cuba, like a two-bit Khrushchev, has disgraced the name of the United Nations . . .

"Cuba represents a new and menacing shift in the world balance of power . . . I trust that all of us, regardless of party, are united in the hope that this Nation, through its chosen leaders and in cooperation with its allies, will progress resolutely toward the stern decisions which may be necessary to deal with the Soviet cloud now darkening our national horizon . . .

"Late in August I called attention to the Russian arsenal in Cuba . . .

"My first suggestion, made August 31, called upon the Administration to tell the American people all of the facts about the island buildup. Reliable information had reached me concerning the number of ships, types of armament, and Soviet troops arriving in Cuba . . .

"On August 29, just 2 days earlier, the President told a reporter that he had no information that Russians were sending Nike-type missiles to Cuba, after the reporter cited a State Department source to that effect. Following my revelations on the Senate floor, on August 31, the Administration first declared, through a Senator on the other side of the aisle, that Senator Keating was 'misinformed'. Nevertheless, there followed from other quarters an effort to make it appear that the information I had reported had been released earlier by the State Department.

"On September 4, however, the President conceded that Nike-type missiles had been delivered to Castro and confirmed in almost every detail the facts I had stated 4 days earlier. The President characterized the buildup as 'defensive'. This in my view was a tremendous error and a serious concession to the Soviets. That was their line. It should not be ours.

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(145. 10/9/62. Continued)

"... Under Secretary of State Ball now admits that 85 ships have delivered troops and war goods to the island. He admits that 15 missile sites have been established, and it is estimated that the total will eventually reach 25. This knowledge has been possessed for a long time by many of us. Under Secretary Ball said... that four missile sites of different types have been identified. He said that these sites are similar to known Soviet defense missile sites which are believed to contain anti-shipping missiles having a range of 20 to 25 miles. The significant sentence, rather buried away, is that several more such sites will be installed.

"Many other facts have been stated which have been known to some of us but which have not been publicly stated before. The statement was made that 4,500 troops are stationed in Cuba. It will be remembered that the first figure given was 3000. I stated that there were at least 5000. The first figure given by the President was 3000. That was advanced to 4200. It has now been advanced to 4500. I stand on my statement that more than 5000 troops are stationed in Cuba. Five thousand is a modest figure. But I commend the Under Secretary of State for revealing these additional facts..."
(Source: Congressional Record)

146. 10/10/62 - USIB discussed the COMOR submission on "Intelligence Justifications and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba", in response to the Special Group's request of 10/9 for USIB opinion regarding the COMOR-approved paper, especially as regards frequency of coverage for the various groups of objectives and targets proposed by COMOR. After discussion USIB agreed that the DCI should express to the Special Group USIB's view that (a) the targets in Groups II and III should be surveyed as promptly as possible and that the results of such initial surveillance should determine the subsequent frequency of coverage to be recommended, (b) COMOR submit for USIB consideration at its 10/17 meeting a specific list of those priority targets in Group IV which should be covered.

Group II and Group III listed "those targets for which surveillance is desired primarily to provide order of battle and operational status information. Ground resolution of 2-5 feet or better will suffice for this purpose. Group II includes targets for monthly coverage; Group III includes targets for weekly coverage."

Because the records of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group have been unavailable thus far to the Board's staff we are not clear as to what action was taken by the DCI on the basis of the USIB discussion of 10/10/62. (It may be that by this time, or shortly thereafter, action on the USIB decision was overtaken by decisions at higher levels in Government including the decision of the President to transfer from CIA to SAC responsibility for operation of U-2 missions over Cuba.)

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147. 10/10/62 - On this date CIA received Navy photographs taken of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba, showing clearly identifiable IL-28 crates which later showed up in U-2 photography of 10/17 at San Julian airfield -- "along with a number of others which must have come in on unphotographed ships."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

148. 10/10/62 - The DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee "on the buildup, including the IL-28s. He also commented on MRBMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice, adding that there were many experts who did not believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next day or so."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

149. 10/10/62 - On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Keating declared that:

"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles. Intelligence authorities must have advised the President and top Government officials of this fact, and they must now have been told that ground-to-ground missiles can be operational from the island of Cuba within 6 months.

"My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100 percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely.

"The fact of the matter is, according to my reliable sources, that six launching sites are under construction - pads which will have the power to hurl rockets into the American heartland and as far as the Panama Canal Zone."

(Source: Congressional Record)

150. 10/11/62 - On this date CIA reported in the President's Checklist the information from Navy photography of 10/10 showing IL-28 crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

151. 10/11/62 - On this date General Carter said to Senator Saltonstall "much the same thing" that the DCI had said on the preceding day to the CIA Appropriations Subcommittee of the House, i.e., that he differed with experts who were of the view that the Soviets would not place MRBMs in Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

152. 10/11/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 indicates that the "USIB principals . . . aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that 'leakage' of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, would seriously limit the President's freedom of action in dealing with what might become a major international crisis, they had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such information. Analysis would continue and senior policy

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(152. 10/11/62 Cont'd)

"officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intelligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals. These instructions were first issued orally, (CIA does not say when) and later on October 11, 1962 formalized by USIB in the [redacted] system. The key passages in USIB's order were 'such information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President have a need to know', and 'there is no intent, hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process.' "

(Despite the advisory role to the President which is supposed to be performed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the latter Board was not included as one of the approved recipients for [redacted] reports. Accordingly, the Board received its first official notification of offensive missiles in Cuba when the President made his address on 10/22. The Board thereafter requested the restricted [redacted] intelligence reports which were made available to the Board by CIA on 10/29/62.)

153. 10/13/62 - General Carter of CIA addressed a letter to Mr. McGeorge Bundy requesting reconsideration of the Presidential decision to transfer from CIA to SAC operational responsibility for U-2 missions over Cuba. Mr. Bundy acknowledged General Carter's letter, stating in essence that the decision had been made and that it would stand. During the period immediately preceding and following the Presidential decision, CIA personnel expressed considerable concern relative to the transfer on the ground that SAC did not have capability or experience to effectively operate such U-2 photographic missions.

(The following resume of SAC U-2 operations is pertinent to the question raised by CIA as to SAC's competence to conduct overflights of Cuba: SAC established the 4080th Wing in May 1956, and U-2 aircraft began to arrive in June 1957. Thereafter, the 4080th operated from a variety of locations in [redacted] and

the United States. The 4080th flew peripheral photographic reconnaissance against the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian land mass in the East Siberian Sea, and the Laptev Sea area of Russia, obtaining thereby the first photographs of these areas available to Air Force planners. The 4080th has flown under every conceivable weather condition including snow, ice, fog and desert. In addition to photographic missions, it has flown U-2 ELINT missions during 1961 and 1962 in the Far North and Far East areas. Further, it has flown about 3500 sampling sorties since 1957 in support of the national effort. The 4080th's crews average 3500 hours, of which 600 hours is in U-2 aircraft. The 4080th has flown about 1500 overseas sorties. Since its establishment six years ago, eight crews have been lost by accidents (one RAF, seven USAF). During the period from October 14 through November 5, 1962, the 4080th had flown 36 U-2 sorties over Cuba, with the loss of one aircraft which was shot down on October 27, 1962.)

(Source: SAC, as provided to Coyne by Generals Power and Smith)

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154. 10/14/62 SAC flew its first U-2 mission over Cuba. This mission produced the first photographic identification of MRBM launch sites at San Cristobal No. 1. (This area had last been covered by a CIA U-2 flight on August 29.)

From 10/14/62 through 11/8/62 SAC flew 43 U-2 missions over Cuba:

October 14 - 1	October 19 - 3	October 25 - 1	November 5 - 5
October 15 - 2	October 20 - 3	October 27 - 1*	November 6 - 3#
October 17 - 6	October 22 - 3	November 3 - 1	November 7 - 2
October 18 - 2	October 23 - 3	November 4 - 5	November 8 - 2

TOTAL: 43

During the period October 23 through November 8, the Navy flew 54 F8U low-level (Blue Moon) photo flights over Cuba. In the same period the Air Force flew 52 low-level photo missions over Cuba.

*this mission was lost
#aborted.

155. 10/14-17/62 - During this period SAC U-2 missions identified 9 MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba. The dates of identification and the dates of the last previous CIA U-2 coverage of these sites follow:

	<u>Site Identified</u>	<u>Last Coverage Prior to Site Location</u>
San Cristobal #1	14 Oct	29 Aug
San Cristobal #2	"	"
San Cristobal #3	"	"
San Cristobal #4	"	"
Sagua La Grande #1	17 Oct	05 Sep
Sagua La Grande #2	"	"
Guanajay #1	15 Oct	29 Aug
Guanajay #2	"	"
Remedios	17 Oct	05 Sep

156. 10/15/62 - In the early evening the read-out of SAC's initial U-2 mission over Cuba first became available. It reflected identification of an MRBM site in the San Cristobal area. The Director, DIA, notified a number of key civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense of this fact on the night of October 15, 1962. Similarly, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, notified Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Hilsman (who notified the Secretary of State). The following morning the President was notified.

157. 10/15/62 - Following SAC's flight the previous day, a meeting was held at the White House attended by Messrs. Bundy, Gilpatric, Johnson, McCone, Scoville, Charyk and General Taylor, and by General Kompton - SAC's Director of Operations, and General Smith - SAC's Director of Intelligence. Messrs. McCone and Scoville were

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(157. 10/15/62 Continued)

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critical of SAC's ability to fly U-2 missions. At the meeting, Mr. Bundy reaffirmed the decision made on 10/12 and indicated that SAC should continue to fly these missions. Mr. Scoville was critical of SAC's flight plans for upcoming missions, and he complained that his office had not received the ELINT take from the first SAC mission of 10/14. Subsequent inquiry reflected that the ELINT take had been delivered to CIA immediately following its receipt, but that it had become bogged down in CIA's message center resulting in delay in its delivery to Mr. Scoville.

158. 10/15/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of crated IL-28s at San Julian.

158-a. 10/15/62 - General Carter briefed Senator Stennis ("before the photography of the previous day was available") along the same lines of his answer to Senator Saltonstall's question, four days earlier, about Senator Keating's charges of known MREM sites in Cuba -- i.e., "General Carter said that there were refugee reports but no hard evidence". (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)

159. 10/17/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of uncrated IL-28s at San Julian.

160. 10/18/62 - Gromyko talked to President Kennedy at the White House, saying that he was instructed by the Soviet Government to state that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba".

161. 10/18/62 - There was initiated the daily issuance of Joint Evaluation Reports on the Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba -- prepared jointly by GMAIC, JAEIC, and NPIC, based on photographic, ELINT, COMINT, and other sources. These reports were cumulative beginning 10/18. (See Item 152, above)

162. 10/19/62 - The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

163. 10/19/62 - [redacted] from Cuba [redacted] was intercepted, possibly emitted from [redacted]. This was a [redacted] indicating that the USSR has committed its most recent version of the [redacted]. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

164. 10/19/62 - "There are several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic confirmation thus far". (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

"Photography (Mission 5012 of 10/25) confirmed the presence of a FROG missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios . . . a tactical unguided rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, similar to the U. S. Honest John". (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

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165. 10/21/62 - This was the arrival date in Cuba of a TU 114 CLEAT transport. The unusual circumstance of KRUG flight tracking, normally reserved for especially important flights, suggests that high ranking Soviet command personnel may be among the 140 passengers aboard. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

166. 10/22/62 - By this date seven Soviet ships identified as possible ballistic missile carriers (having cargo hatch openings of at least 75 by 15 feet) had made a total of 13 trips to Cuba since "late July." These ships were the KASIMOV, KIMOVSK, KRASNOGRAD, OKHOTSK, OMSK, ORENBURG and POLTAVA.

As of 10/22 the KIMOVSK, OKHOTSK and POLTAVA were en route to Cuba. Two of these, the KIMOVSK (en route from the Baltic) and the OKHOTSK (from the Black Sea) "are among seven ships which were contacted by individual cipher messages from Moscow six hours after the President's public statement." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

167. 10/22/62 - The President made his radio-TV address to the Nation, reporting unmistakable evidence of a series of offensive missile sites in Cuba and noting that "the first preliminary hard information of this nature" was received by him at 9:00 A.M., on 10/16/62.

168. 10/23/62 - The President issued a Proclamation asserting that (1) world peace and U.S. security had been endangered by the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles (2) in a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress and approved on 10/3/62, it was declared that the U.S. was determined to prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering U.S. security, and (3) that the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on 10/23/62 had recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including armed force, deemed necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies threatening the peace and security of the Continent, and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent.

Therefore, the President proclaimed that the forces under his command were ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M., on 10/24/62 to interdict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, specifically: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support

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or operate the above items; and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of effectuating this Proclamation.

The President authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ the land, sea and air forces of the U.S. (in cooperation with any forces made available by other American States) to carry out this Proclamation.

Further, the President authorized the interception of vessels or craft proceeding toward Cuba and the taking into custody of any vessel or craft failing to comply with directions to identify itself and submit to visit and search -- with force to be used only to the extent necessary.

169. 10/23/62 - A message passed within Cuba from Las Villas to Placetas suggested an intent to conceal "equipment" and "fuel station" in a railroad tunnel in an area south of the Remedios IRBM site. The message read: "Today situate equipment in the railroad tunnel of Placetas. Also situate the fuel station in this place." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

170. 10/23/62 - The Director, DIA, initiated the issuance of daily shipping reports and of a summary of Soviet ship movements.

171. 10/24/62 - On this date Khrushchev "categorically stated" to American businessman W. E. Knox, in a conversation held in the Kremlin, that "the weapons which the Soviet Union had furnished to Cuba included antiaircraft missiles and ballistic missiles with both conventional and thermonuclear warheads." Khrushchev added that "even the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over thermonuclear devices to them." (Source: N.Y. Times Magazine, 11/18/62)

172. 10/25/62 - The DIA initiated the issuance of a Special Intelligence Summary on Cuba.

173. 10/26/62 - James Reston, writing in the New York Times, stated: "Privately, there are several misgivings. First, many people find it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend. Accordingly, there is considerable suspicion either that the official's intelligence was not as good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts."

174. 10/28/62 - [redacted] communications were established between the USSR and Cuba. "We consider these links as the best candidates identified to date for Soviet [redacted] in Cuba." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/28/62) 16

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175. 10/28/62 - Until immediately prior to the President's statement of this date welcoming Khrushchev's decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union, it appears that in Cuba the Soviets continued at feverish pace with the construction and camouflaging of their MRBM and IRBM bases in Cuba.

176. 10/29/62 - By this date, accumulated evidence showed that the Russians had put first-line modern equipment in Cuba, including such items as FRUITSET radar with C-Band, armored personnel carriers, etc.

177. 10/30/62 - Senator Scott of Pennsylvania, appearing on the CBS radio program "The Leading Question" on the night of 10/30/62, said that he and other Republicans had "very hard information early in September that the Russians were building missile bases in Cuba." Senator Scott said, "We knew it began early in September and any information we had we knew was available to the administration and to the President." Referring to President Kennedy's radio-television broadcast of 10/22 in which the President said that he received the first preliminary hard information of the offensive missile buildup on Tuesday, 10/16, Senator Scott declared, "You don't build a missile site in a week. Those missile bases were there a long, long time before the President spoke." Senator Scott further stated, "On September 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony before the Armed Services Committee admitted that a Soviet arms build-up was going on in Cuba." He added, "I think the only conclusion can be that the President himself may not have received the information -- there may have been a failure of intelligence. On the other hand, there may have been a cautious reluctance to move which is understandable but was not shared by the Republican Party or the American people." (Source: Washington Evening Star, 10/31/62)

178. 10/31/62 - Writing in the New York Times under the heading "An Intelligence Gap" Hanson Baldwin stated "The effectiveness of the country's intelligence organization is again in question as a result of the Cuban Crisis."

"Considerable mystery, in the opinion of some members of Congress and military men, still surrounds the Administration's sudden decision to impose a blockade of Cuba after a missile buildup that must have started weeks or months ago. The questions being asked are primarily these: Was the nation's factual information about the Communist military buildup in Cuba adequate in quantity and quality, and was there a long delay after the missiles actually arrived?"

"Were the interpretation and evaluation of this information influenced by policy considerations; in other words, were the estimates tailored to fit top policy beliefs? Or did Administration officials, until action was finally taken, reject the intelligence estimates as erroneous?"

"Has the marked centralization of intelligence activities in the two years of the Kennedy Administration improved or hampered the production of objective, nonpartisan intelligence analyses?"

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179. 11/5/62 - Dr. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, expressed to Board Member Gordon Gray the opinion that the following lessons were learned from the Cuba situation:

(1) There is a need for a group at the policy level, having access to all pertinent intelligence, which can perform the task of rapidly identifying intelligence requirements and objectives. (Dr. Charyk believed that in this instance USIB did not perform the function he had in mind.)

(2) There is need for a focal point to ensure the availability of intelligence-related resources for use in contingency situations (e.g., film for photographic reconnaissance purposes).

(3) Comparisons of CORONA and U-2 photography of Cuba reveal significant instances where U-2 photography was positive, whereas CORONA photography of the same targets had been interpreted as negative. Dr. Charyk felt that based on this experience it is obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence. He observed that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography for evidence of missile installations in the USSR. (Dr. Charyk added that recent satellite photography shows a new missile site at Tyura Tam which is not served by rail facilities heretofore noted as an identifying characteristic of this type of missile installation -- suggesting the possibility that our readings of satellite photography have failed to locate other missile sites because of the absence of rail or other characteristics we have assumed for them.)

180. 11/6/62 - The Washington Star of this date records the report of Fernando Garcia Chacon, a Havana lawyer and an agent of the Students Revolutionary Directorate, that Soviet missiles have been placed in seven caves and other underground installations in Cuba. (At Hershey, Victoria, Fenon, Sierra de Cubitas, Las Villas Province, Oriente Province and Pinar del Rio Province.) Garcia reported that the underground sites are strongly guarded by Russians and that no Cubans have been allowed to approach them since the sites were completed. Garcia's student group issued a statement in Miami claiming that "The free world is on the verge of being a victim of a new swindle of the Soviet Union. We have in our hands sufficient information that there exist on Cuban territory bases of missiles like the ones that have caused the present crisis and some of even greater range in subterranean installations that cannot be photographed by reconnaissance aircraft.

"The photo planes have localized on Cuban territory nearly 30 launching pads while our information assures us that there are many more missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on Cuban territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent."

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181. 11/6/62 - (IL-28s) As of this date photographic evidence reflected the following regarding IL-28 medium jet bombers in Cuba:

9 already assembled or in the process of assembly at St. Julian
 20 packaged in crates at St. Julian
 9 packaged in crates at Holguin
 4 packaged in crates at a point near Holguin
 TOTAL: 42 IL-28s in Cuba.

182. 11/9/62 - When the DCI met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on this date, he reported that from France he had protested, without success, the conclusions reached by USIB in the SNIE on the Soviet buildup in Cuba, and in commenting upon the lessons to be learned from the recent developments pertaining to Cuba, the DCI (1) expressed the belief that "we were too timid with respect to the conduct of surveillance operations over Cuba in September;" (2) expressed concern because of the lack of weight given to refugee reports by the intelligence analysts; (3) expressed the view that a state of mind had developed in the intelligence community to the effect that the Soviets just simply would not undertake an offensive ballistic missile buildup in Cuba; (4) reported that CIA has been operating ██████████ rather ineffective intelligence teams in Cuba but that they have not produced hard intelligence on the subject because they have been occupying themselves mainly with staying alive; (5) advised that there were approximately ██████████ third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting from foreign embassies in Cuba but that CIA "obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup;" (6) advised that from the standpoint of reasonable and proper UN verification we do not have satisfactory coverage of Cuba, and that "we have little unofficial on-site information;" and (7) stated that currently CIA "is not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means."

183. 11/9/62 - When the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, met with the Board on this date, he expressed the view that there was danger in placing undue reliance on photography in seeking answers to questions that plague us from the standpoint of intelligence. He noted that DIA received no significant information from agent sources concerning the Soviet missile buildup. He suggested that the Army should play an increasing role in terms of clandestine intelligence penetration of Cuba. He also noted that an additional important lesson to be learned was that there must be provided to the Washington area a first class photo processing facility if we are to be prepared adequately for similar Cuban situations in the future.

184. 11/9/62 - When Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, met with the Board on this date, he identified the following areas as warranting further examination: (1) The need for establishing an improved capability for the evaluation of indicators as distinguished from the process of preparing intelligence estimates; (2) The need for getting across to top level officials the full brunt of such indicators. (Hughes noting that this did not happen in State, and in fact that State received some of the refugee indicator reports as much as two months after they had

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been prepared.); (3) The need for clandestine intelligence collection. (Hughes noting that we do not have espionage agents on the ground in Cuba providing significant data.); (4) The need for a better warning mechanism; (5) The need for registering with USIB views such as those expressed by the DCI from the Riviera. (Hughes noting, as did the Director, DIA, that the DCI's dissent was registered internally within CIA, but was not communicated to USIB until after the Cuban crisis broke.)

185. 11/14/62 - The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, following its preliminary review of the subject on 11/9/62 requested the DCI for "a review on an all-source, all-agency basis of the actions taken and results obtained within the intelligence community in providing intelligence coverage, reporting and estimates on the developing buildup." The Board requested that the report setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review include: (a) an identification of the requirements levied on intelligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the intelligence information obtained from such sources as foreign diplomatic personnel, Cuban refugee interrogations, in-place agent reports, COMINT, and ELINT, (c) the scope of distribution given such information to higher authority and laterally within the intelligence community, and (d) the extent to which such information was reflected in reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.

186. 11/21/62 - The Minutes of the USIB Meeting of this date reflect the following entry: "Noted a view expressed by General Carter in related discussion of the Cuban situation that, for intelligence planning for the future, Cuba should be considered as a satellite of the USSR."

187. 11/23/62 - The DIA Summary of this date contains a detailed analysis of Soviet military forces in Cuba as of 11/23. In summary the analysis states "Soviet military forces in Cuba are now believed to number about 16,000, including some 4,000 ground combat troops, 3,000 IRBM and MRBM personnel, 7,800 in air defense and air force elements, and 1,200 naval personnel."

188. 11/24/62 - Broadcasting from Havana on this date Allen Oxley stated (heard on CBS in New York) that "there is now no doubt that not all the Russian missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba. While the Russians have removed 42 missiles it is known that others remain and one type - a rocket with a range of about 25 miles - is believed to be controlled by the Cubans." Information received from Mariel and Bayia Onde, the two main seaports of the Province of Pina Del Rio reveals that at least 88 medium and long range missiles were unloaded there from Russian ships; 36 in the month of September and 52 in October. In addition a large number of short range rockets arrived . . . There are unconfirmed reports of missiles remaining in Cuba

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"which have been hidden underground in concrete shelters where American reconnaissance planes cannot detect them. The island is alive with rumors, and it is difficult to sift the facts out of the stories of the big Russian military buildup still going on. Some of these stories tell of big concrete constructions in the wooded countryside and underground rocket bases still being built by the Russians in the mountains. . . ."

189. 11/26/62 - At Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, the President commended the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command for the photographs which they had taken "which first gave us conclusive proof of the build-up of offensive weapons in Cuba." The President noted that: "the work of these two units has contributed as much to the security of the United States as any unit in our history, and any group of men in our history."

On the same date at Key West, the President commended the Navy stating: "We express particular thanks to you for your work of the last five weeks. The reconnaissance flights which enabled us to determine with precision the offensive build-up in Cuba contributed directly to the security of the United States in the most important and significant way."

190. 12/4/62 - In a briefing provided to Messrs. Gray and Coyne, the Director, DIA, advised that photographic intelligence identified 33 MRBMs in Cuba; that it subsequently identified 42 MRBMs on board ship departing Cuba; that the Soviets removed either partially or totally the canvass covers on 36 of the 42 outgoing MRBMs (the Soviets refused to exhibit 6 of them) and in all instances the skins of the missiles were in no way removed; that no IREMs were detected entering, in, or exiting Cuba; that the intelligence community estimates that the IREMs had not yet been introduced into Cuba but may have been on some of the ships which turned back at the time the quarantine was declared; that the 9 known MRBM-IREM bases in Cuba have been dismantled; that no evidence has been developed reflecting the existence of nuclear warheads in Cuba; that it would be relatively simple to introduce such warheads with little likelihood of detection; that "black boxes" were employed with negative results in an endeavor to detect nuclear emanations from the ships exiting Cuba with the MRBM.

The Director, DIA, also reported that photographic evidence reflected that at least 42 IL-28s had been introduced into Cuba; that as of this date three of the IL-28s have been put aboard a Soviet vessel which has exited Cuba; that assembly of other IL-28s has apparently ceased; and there are indications that the remaining IL-28s may be in the process of being readied for shipment out of Cuba.

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