Google Searches: Useful Operators

Google Searches: Useful Operators

Add the following operators (examples given) to your search terms to make Google searching more focused and effective:

allinurl: google faq – find website associated with that name (example yields www.google.com/policies/privacy/faq/)

define: life – dictionary definition of word “life”

filetype:ppt – find PPT on your topic (also find doc, pdf, xls). [Short form: ext:]

info:cfc.dnd.ca – shows information about cfc.dnd.ca home page. (Can help to check authenticity of websites)

site:forces.gc.ca – a useful way to search sites and entire domains (.gov, .ca), often better than the search engines provided with the site (e.g., forces.gc.ca) (note: omit the www at the front end of URLs)

Also:

-“not this expression” – makes sure the expression is not included in the search e.g., Terminator -3

+2 – the + makes sure the term is included

For more options, see http://www.google.com.au/advanced_search

Within Google News, you can specify the news source, e.g., source:new_york_times

Cyberpeacekeeping: New Ways to Prevent and Manage Cyberattacks


Cyberpeacekeeping: New Ways to Prevent and Manage Cyberattacks

A. Walter Dorn and Stewart Webb 

Published in International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT) 9(1) (2019). (pdf)

 

ABSTRACT

Cybersecurity is coming to the forefront of the concerns of nations, organizations and individuals. Government agencies, banking systems and businesses have been crippled by criminal and malicious cyberattacks. There are many examples of cyberattacks in regions of tensions and armed conflict. There are no impartial international means to investigate the claims and counter-claims about cyberattacks. The international community more broadly lacks a way to deal with cyberattacks in a concerted manner. A new approach and capability should be considered for certain circumstances: cyberpeacekeeping. Peacekeeping has proven effective in physical space, and many of the same principles and methods could also be applied in cyberspace, with some adjustments. It could help prevent global attacks, and if an attack were to be successful, it could assist with recovery and conduct impartial investigations to uncover the perpetrators. The possibilities of a cyberpeacekeeping team at the United Nations to make cyberspace more secure are well worth exploring.

Keywords
Cyber Operations, Cyberpeacekeeping, Cyberterrorism, Peacekeeping, Tallinn Manual

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Challenge

The world is ever increasingly reliant on internet-connective technology. Computers permeate almost every facet of human life in most parts of the world, connecting people in ways that could not have been imagined, with the developing world becoming connected at the fastest rate. The level of technology and global integration is staggering even compared to just 20 years ago. This interconnectivity is a cause not only of celebration but also of deep concern for security, as what makes human life easier and more efficient also gives rise to significant vulnerabilities and threats, even the potential for a massive downfall.

Attacks on global interconnectivity have become a reality. Deliberate attacks are conducted by states or state-sponsored entities or groups or non-state and criminal actors who seek to infiltrate and bring down sites and alter the instructions that computers give to industrial machinery, such as centrifuges, dams and even electric power grids (United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2018; Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, 2016). Already we have seen the internet, including the parts of the deep/dark web, used to incite riots and even to influence the course of national elections. For instance, new evidence is continually emerging of Russian attempts to interfere in numerous elections, including those of the United States and France (Greenburg, 2017; Pope, 2018). Shortly before Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it launched a barrage of Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack, making Georgian military movements and operations so much more difficult and dangerous (Markoff, 2008). The United States and Israel likely introduced malware to cause breakdown in Iranian centrifuges at Natanz. These examples show how cyberattacks have translated into kinetic damage. One problem is that, despite the effects, attribution is difficult and international means for impartial investigation are lacking. Examples of attacks are plenty, but effective responses are few and modest.

At present, the world relies on national security services and commercial companies to handle national cybersecurity, and there is no international body to provide some form of international cybersecurity. While a few countries are developing advanced cybersecurity measures, they still remain vulnerable and most countries of the world have limited capacity to respond to cyber threats. Moreover, there has not been a coordinated international effort to address cybersecurity or create measures of common or collective security in global cyberspace. With many cases of international and intranational conflict, cyberattacks have the potential of unsettling an already fragile peace. This paper seeks to explore new means of addressing cybersecurity, building on the characteristics and successes of peacekeeping in physical space. The paper proposes that the establishment and activities of a UN cyberpeacekeeping unit could lessen the threat of conflicts, help recovery, maintain balance and improve cyber relations in a wide range of scenarios. Examples from the past threats can help illustrate the threats and the types of cases where cyberpeacekeeping could help.

2. EXAMPLES AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSES

In 2007, the Estonia case demonstrated how extensively cyberattacks could affect an entire country. The attack was likely in response to the removal of a Soviet-Era statue of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. This showed how actions in physical space can have ramifications in cyberspace. The removal of the statue represented the shift away from Estonia’s recent Russian history and domination. Russia not only protested but, in all likelihood, supported a massive cyberattack. An impartial determination of responsibility was lacking, and Russia could easily dismiss and ignore the allegations. But it could increase its threatening power from the suspicions while also punishing Estonia severely.

The widespread and large-scale DDOS attack campaign was unleashed. Banks were shut down, government employees were unable to send emails to one another and the media found it difficult to publish stories. Regular life in Estonia turned to confusion, probably with a few final strokes of a keyboard far away. Only after much effort were computer services restored.

In consequence Estonia, which had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, offered to host a new NATO cyber defence centre. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) was established in 2008 as a multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyber defence expertise based in Estonia’s capital, Tallinn.1 Although the centre was created to help meet the collective defence needs for its NATO members, the NATO CCD COE developed the world’s first, and most in-depth, analysis on the international law applicable to cyberattacks in an armed conflict situation.2 Despite the important commentary in the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyberwarfare (henceforth Tallinn Manual, currently in version 2.0), the legalities of what constitutes a cyberattack and appropriate responses have not been fully flushed out yet. And the NATO COE cannot be considered an impartial investigator or upholder of any international cyber law, especially since it is biased in favour of NATO and Western countries.

A small but more important legal step had been made earlier in Europe. The Council of Europe drew up in 2001 the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first international treaty regarding cybercrime. The Budapest Convention was the first international attempt of outlining the legal definitions concerning cybercrimes, which included illegal access, interception of data, data interference, computer-related fraud and forgery and other offences. An Additional Protocol to the Convention entered into force in 2003, adding the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material to the list of cybercrimes (Council of Europe, 2003). The glaring criticism with the Budapest Convention is that it has not been continually updated to keep up with evolving threats and technology (Celik, 2017, p. 106). In order for the Convention to be effective, there needs to be an evaluation schedule so new threats and technology can be added.

The Tallinn Manual does not have the legal stature of the Budapest Convention but it does deal with a wider range of cyberattacks and cyberwarfare issues. It is an authoritative but not a unanimous legal interpretation when it comes to the definitions and limitations on cyberwarfare. Within five years of the Tallinn Manual 1.0, a second version was published and addressed some concerns raised after the publication of the first Manual (Jensen, 2017, p. 738). Eventually many of the rules explored in the manual will need to be translated into precise legal instruments.

The consequences of cyberattacks can be dire, even crippling for an attacked state. And they are happening against NATO member states. But because of the lack of an immediate physical threat, NATO is wary of triggering the organization’s Article 5, which calls for NATO members to come to the collective defence of one or more members when are under attack. So, cyberattacks on NATO countries and more generally have become a more subtle way of causing havoc without much chance of retaliation (Mustonen, 2015). This, of course, is the challenge of maintaining, or building, peace and law enforcement between to states. Impartial investigation and prosecution followed by enforcement is lacking.

Other regional organizations are wrestling with means to secure the cyber domain, and small steps have been taken. In 2004, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution titled “The Inter-American Integral Strategy to Combat Threats to Cyber Security,” which placed cybersecurity under the realm of the OAS’ Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and called for greater regional cooperation (Organization of American States, 2004). The OAS created Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) that handle “alert, watch, and warning” responsibilities in each member state (OAS, 2018). Similarly, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is comprised of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan, aims to improve the political, economic and security relations, including cyber security, amongst its members. In 2009, the SCO came to an “Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security” (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2008). This Agreement lays the foundations for the SCO to counter destructive cyberattacks on one of its member states. Once again, it is not an impartial international body but a grouping of states, heavily influenced by regional political agendas and seeking some measures for cyber defence.

Though not approaching the problem globally or impartially, the incorporation of cyber defence in such multilateral alliances highlights the seriousness of cyberthreats. In fact, small cyberattacks might even cause wider cyberwars, if the attacks escalate to alliance-level responses. There is also the real possibility that a major cyberattack could incite a conventional military response in the physical world, particularly in cases where cyber-kinetic weapons like Stuxnet (W32.Stuxnet, 2017) are deployed. Means and models for cyber-de-escalation need to be considered. Undoubtedly, some of the lessons and practices from conflict management between nations and between armed parties can apply in cyberspace. One proposal to explore is peace operations in cyberspace or cyberpeacekeeping.

3. KEEPING THE PEACE IN CYBERSPACE

Cyberpeackeepers, possibly working for the United Nations or mandated by it, could patrol and act in cyberspace in a similar fashion as current UN peacekeepers patrol and act in selected conflict zones of the world. Cyberpeacekeepers could investigate major attacks and hacking events in accordance with their specific mandates –– narrow or broad. Like their current physical counterparts, they could be tasked to reduce tensions between specific nations or other conflicting parties, prevent escalation of cyberwars, and help catch global cybercriminals. They could even assist with rebuilding governmental computer systems or critical infrastructure, such as financial and media services, after a damaging attack. Eventually, international action could be taken to help enforce new cyber rules after impartial determinations of the sources or modes of an attack are made. All these means are currently lacking in the weakly protected cyberspace.

The proposal is relatively new (Dorn, 2017)3 but there was already some movement in this direction at UN headquarters. In 2013, the UN General Assembly examined the increasing security risk of information and communication technologies (ICT) affecting the security environment (United Nations General Assembly, 2013). Also in 2013, the Chief Executives Board for Coordination adopted seven principles to help member states “respond to cybercrime and cybersecurity needs in the Member States” and “focus on assisting the Member States to take evidence-based action” (Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2014).4

The UN’s Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) created in 2016 a “Digital Blue Helmets” (DBH) unit to “enhance cybersecurity preparedness, resilience and response,” mostly for protection of the United Nations and its agencies (United Nations, 2017a). The OICT conducted research into possible cyber threats to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. It has envisioned DBH centres to provide the necessary “interdisciplinary cyber-security support and teaching centres [to] bring together specialists from around the globe to address a variety of IT-related issues” (United Nations, 2017b). With the DBH name incorporating the term “Blue Helmets” (i.e., an informal name for peacekeepers), it foretells of possibility that the unit could possibly prevent, mitigate and deal with global cyberattacks in the future.

The DBH has not yet assisted governments to investigate cyberattacks or help prevent attacks but it has helped make UN peacekeeping operations more secure and helped certain UN agencies, such as UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Establishing an international cyber forensics team is necessary for the cyberpeacekeeping concept. It could be based on the DBH team that is now gradually developing more expertise. Many attacks are done through hackers who may or may not have formal affiliations with governments and those hackers often mask or change their IP address, which makes it harder to identify them. As Brenner (2007, p. 420) asserts, determining where cyberattacks originate “can take months or even years when digital evidence is fragile and can disappear by the time the investigators obtain the assistance they need.” The DBH team could undertake a role that would help with the investigation of a cyberattack when requested. This could follow the example of other governmental organizations such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSG) in the UK, or Europol’s EC3. The newly formed Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) may also be a potential model where the CCCS collaborates not only with the private sector, but also those in academia (Communications Security Establishment, 2018). These governmental organizations provide support for cybercrime investigations.

As outlined by Robinson, et al (2018, p.3), a future DBH team could be comprised of personnel assigned by Cyber-Contributing Countries (CCCs), Cyber-Contributing Organizations (CCOs), volunteer experts and UN cyber staff. This mix of cyber staff loaned and vetted from various countries, international organizations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and academia could engage in selected projects according to their expertise and impartiality. Although the pool of potential personnel may appear large, finding well trained, and specialised staff from countries and organizations may be a challenge. However, the United Nations has overcome such problems in the past when assembling peacekeeping operations, fact-finding missions and inspection bodies.

In the future, as cyberpeacekeepers gain experience and help from advanced cyber nations (including experts on loan, as is done in physical peacekeeping), they could help in real-time to stop cyberattacks, mitigate the impact of such attacks and assist in re-establishing normalcy by reversing the effects of the attacks. Cyberpeacekeepers could also monitor their cyber area of responsibility to the extent possible to promote a lasting cyber peace between two countries (Robinson, et al., 2018, p. 6). The UN cyber rescue crew could help members of the international community in times of urgent need.

The UN would have to define the parameters of the cyberpeacekeeping force and its cyber areas of responsibility, which could change with demand. It would have to define the how the cyberpeacekeeping unit “could operate in conflict and non-conflict areas in cyberspace” (Akatyev & James, 2017, p. 33). The UN cyberpeacekeeping force could be expanded to investigate mass botgenerated propaganda. In any case, the force would need the cooperation of key UN member states and national organizations.

There could also be a research and development dimension. Exploits and malware seek weaknesses within code and even with human nature — for instance, simple cases of not updating software and website plugins, or even clicking on an attachment in an e-mail without thinking of the risks. One possibility would be to assist in the development of cyber protocols for government, and other sectors. This could start simply with seminars on straightforward measures in ensuring that a potential outbreak can be contained. It will take time for the UN and the international community to create binding global standards and rules, starting though declarations and resolutions and moving on to treaties, to make certain cyberattacks illegal globally.5 In addition, cyber security measures could be taken between states bilaterally or in small groups, with cyberpeacekeepers playing a role in the implementation.

Of course, one of the limitations of the international order, and an avenue that needs to be developed further, is enforcement. A defensive cyber force would require rules of engagement that may or may not be limited to the digital realm. A defensive action could be to simply block attacks coming from a certain IP address or groups of IP addresses, but it could also mean dealing with the attackers in cyberspace or even the physical seizure of their computer equipment through national law enforcement agencies after determining the attack’s point of origin. An overview of the potential range of cyberpeacekeeping tasks is given in Figure 1.

A cyberpeacekeeping operation could be approved by the Security Council, just as the Council approves a peacekeeping operation in the physical domain. In addition, a cyber operation can be approved alongside a physical operation or be a part of it, particularly if the physical conflict includes cyberattacks. If the conflict is entirely in the cyber realm, a purely cyber mission could be instituted. While UN action against major powers is unlikely, due to their veto, there have been important cases where they have called for UN assistance to resolve disputes between them, e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (Dorn and Pauk, 2009). Moreover, there are cases in conflict regions and even current peacekeeping operations where a cyberpeacekeeping initiative is needed. The prevalence of these cyberattacks in the present-day world also provides incentive for the affected countries to seek out assistance from a cyberpeacekeeping third party.

Figure 1. Possible UN cyberpeacekeeping activities [see original publication (pdf)]

4. CYBERATTACKS IN CONFLICT REGIONS

If we look at the attacks of the past, we can see cases where a cyberpeacekeeping capability would have been useful. For instance, North Korea is believed to be behind cyberattacks directed at banks in at least 18 countries, according to the Russian firm Kaspersky (Pagliery, 2017), which itself is suspected of being under the influence, if not control, of an authoritarian state (Robertson & Riley, 2017). So, once again, an impartial means of investigation would be helpful to examine the preliminary data and investigate further. Just as physical peacekeeping uses soldiers borrowed from nations, the cyberpeacekeeper teams could consist of cyber-warriors and experts draw together from nation states for a particular mission or time period.

A UN cyberpeacekeeping force can assist in tracking down the vectors of attack and even point of origin and create the framework for legal or diplomatic action. The threat, and reality of, cyberattacks are a global threat and reality. States should bear a degree of responsibility if an international cyberattack, like any attack, originates from their state (Couzigou, 2018). But great expertise is needed to pinpoint the course of attacks.

Israel was targeted in a cyberattack in 2009 during its offensive in the Gaza Strip. It is believed that it was carried out “by a criminal organization from the former Soviet Union, and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah” (Pfeffer, 2009). But these are simply allegations, ones that need to be investigated and verified. Particularly, if the allegations are used to launch military attacks, it is important to have some international verification process. Such a verification process needs to be independently run by an impartial body, such as the United Nations, even if it relies of inputs from member nations.

Cyber incidents can also affect countries that host UN peacekeeping missions. For instance, cyberattacks started in the late 1990s between India and Pakistan, which host in Kashmir a UN observer mission (Vatis, 2001), which itself must be protected. The attacks between the nations in the 1990s may be simple and crude compared to what is happening now globally, but Indian and Pakistani hackers have continued to hone their skills. In January 2017, Indian hackers are believed to have attacked Multan International and Karachi airport websites and even installed ransomware, a malware that encrypts a computer’s hard drive until a ransom is paid, usually in bitcoins or other digital currency (Shekhar, 2017). This should cause concern, because if an international airport were to be locked out of their computer servers it would cause havoc and increase significantly the chance of casualties. Then both the physical and the cyber peacekeeping force would need to act in a concerted fashion. In addition, a peacekeeping mission could also find itself subject to attack, so a staunch cyber defence will be needed.

One of the main concerns of politicians and security officials is a major cyberattack that cripples the country’s power grid, causing many additional catastrophes. A glimpse of this was seen in December 2015, when a cyberattack on Ukrainian utilities resulted in a power outage that affected more than 225,000 customers. The US government later concluded that the power grid shutdown was a cyberattack. iSight partners, now FireEye, concluded that it was carried out by a Russian group, Advanced Persistent Threat, referred to by the cybersecurity community as “Sandworm” (Volz, 2016). A study done by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (2016, p. 5) concluded that the perpetrators “perform[ed] long-term reconnaissance operations required to learn the environment and execute a highly synchronized, multistage, multisite attack.” This attack was planned for some time before it was executed. Regardless, the verification process of which actor carries out these, or future, cyberattacks is essential.

As mentioned, the verification of the attack’s point of origin can be a starting point for the local and international authorities to act against such perpetrators—provided it was not sanctioned by a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council. But even that state’s veto of a cyber investigation could point to its involvement or patronage. And if the cyberattack was sanctioned by another state or a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group, additional actions can be taken to mitigate or punish this activity.

Unfortunately, the global cyber threat is unlikely to diminish, but will increase with time in both the quantity and complexity of attacks, unless some means are found to prevent it. This is especially true for the volatile Middle East and for the ongoing (and deepening) conflict with Iran.

5. STOPPING ESCALATION TO A FULL CYBERWAR

Many became aware of the cyber threats against nations after the attack on Estonia in 2007. The world’s attention was refocused in 2010 on targeted attacks by what would otherwise seem to be an inert virus – Stuxnet that targeted Iran’s nuclear programme at the Natanz facility. This virus spread itself to several countries, but if an infected computer was not the target, it would do nothing. Stuxnet targeted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) which are usually used for industrial purposes (W32.Stuxnet, 2017). The prevalence of the concentration of the malware in Iran and how the malware targeted PLCs built by the German company Siemens demonstrated that this malware was a surgical weapon to cripple Iran’s nuclear program by going after the centrifuges at one of the country’s nuclear facilities. Stuxnet can be seen as an improvement or complement to conventional attacks due to the precision and reduction of human casualties. After hundreds of Uranium centrifuges were damaged, suspicions arose that the United States and Israel were behind the Stuxnet attack (Katz, 2010). In any case, forces from within Iran initiated attacks of their own.

In 2012 and 2013, two major attacks seem to have originated from Iran, signalling that the country developed its own cyberwarfare capability in the wake of the Stuxnet attacks. In 2012, over 35,000 computers of Saudi Arabia’s Armaco company had their data partially wiped or destroyed (Mount, 2012). Then in a separate attack in 2012, half a dozen American banks were targeted, and their customers were unable to log into their accounts online (Perlroth, 2012). In 2013, hackers were able to gain access to command and control system of a 20-foot flood-control dam on the Blind Brook in Rye Brook, New York (Thompson, 2016). The hacking of this dam would not have caused sizeable damage if the dam waters were to have been released, but it did raise concerns in the United States government about the potential ramifications if a hacker were to seize control of a larger, more critical infrastructure – something similar to what occurred in Ukraine two years later, when a sizeable portion of Ukraine’s power grid was shut down because of successful hacking.

Although nations rarely admit to carrying out cyberattacks, the above gives a glimpse of what a full cyberwar could entail. When the sources of attacks can be identified, or at least evidence gathered, by an impartial actor, the chances of an attack and of escalation would be less. And the possibilities for international intervention would be greater. There may be situations where intervention is essential, such as a full-scale cyberattack on a country’s cyber-linked infrastructure, e.g., power plants, air and road traffic controls, flood defence controls and the financial sector.

Cyberattacks carried out in the Middle East could possibly escalate to a possible point of no return. The United States and Israel, with Iran in opposition, could have targeted sensitive and critical infrastructure in a series of additional cyberattack exchanges. The mitigating force in this was the restraint demonstrated by the three countries. However, what happens if the states involved in the next exchange of cyberattacks do not demonstrate the same level of restraint? A future exchange could become the cyber equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that crisis, the intervention of the United Nations proved crucial to non-violent conflict resolution (Dorn & Pauk, 2009).

Unfortunately, it is not just state actors that can drag two or more states into a cyber conflict; hacker groups can destabilize the international cyber order by carrying out attacks on infrastructure during times of heightened tensions between two states. This might be mitigated by a cyberpeacekeeping force as it will provide assurances to the international system that there is a check and balance to these attacks and an avenue to pursue, and help for victims of cyber attacks. It can provide mechanisms that can identify a threat and possibly mitigate, and repair, damage that was done.

6. WHAT WOULD SUCH A FORCE LOOK LIKE?

The UN cyberpeacekeeping force must be malleable and be able to solve a variety of the world’s cyber defence issues, not merely one malware or virus at a time. Especially when UN member states further codify a legal set of rules that clearly define what a cyberattack looks like, cyberpeacekeeping could help enforce those rules. For example, the cyberpeacekeepers could help verify that, in times of peace, no state attacks the infrastructure of another and that national enforcement measures are taken by a state if a citizen within the state is found to be the culprit hacker. To further the point: if a Russian hacker is found to be attacking the US government, the Russian government could provide verifiable assurances to the United Nations that the culprit would be arrested and duly processed through the legal system. The United Nations could then verify if this has occurred. This will, at least, put more pressure on governments to hold hackers accountable. Of course, it will need the support of many other governments to apply pressure, as the United Nations seeks to do in many areas, such as human rights, democracy and support of peace processes.

Cyberpeacekeeping can be done in conjunction with regional groups that have cyber defence initiatives. Through the cooperation of these regional initiatives, such as those done by regional organizations, the United Nations can outline what an aggressive cyberattack in peacetime is on a global level. This would assist the international legal framework to define a cyberattack and then help implement international responses.

7. OBSTACLES

The prospect for a UN cyber defence initiative depends on UN member states. They must ask for it. But national cyber defence and offence are closely guarded domains of intelligence and military agencies. By sharing cyber defensive strategies and codes with other members of the international community, the United Nations might make perpetrators more aware of those measures. The same goes for identifying attacks: there will be adaptation. Some member states might not want the United Nations to have the power to launch investigations into cyberattacks and espionage activities as they
would be at risk of being uncovered.

One of the fundamental problems is that there are millions of cyberattacks a month and it would be difficult to prevent many of those attacks because of the sheer number. However, the UN cyber defence initiative would only be one actor to serve as a watchful guardian in cyberspace. There could be partnerships with other cyber defenders, though this might face obstacles. For one, a partnership with certain states may not be fruitful since for instance, China, Russia and the United States would be hesitant to share cyber secrets or even alert the UN of cyberattacks that they carry out in most circumstances. However, the UN cyber defence initiative could seek out partnerships with multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the response teams created by the OAS. When it comes to partnerships with industry, this also may be fraught with concerns over state influence as we have seen with Kaspersky Labs (Robertson & Riley, 2017). Still, there would be plenty of opportunities to explore partnerships with the wide range of actors and nations, gradually building a network of trusted expertise.

The United Nations has attempted to define what cyber norms should be for the world stage, but those efforts have not been entirely fruitful. For years, the United States hoped that the efforts that it had put in place would be sufficient as a set of norms for the governance of the cyber domain (Grigsby 2017, pp. 111-112). Russia argued that new technology, such as the internet, should require a new treaty, but the United States opposed that position (p. 112). Neither country trusts the other with their cyber intentions. In 2013, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) put forward a number of cyber norms, for example that in peacetime no country should carry out cyberattacks on another and that such activity should be reported (GGE, 2015, p. 2). It is obvious that a body needs to be created to whom such reports can at least be sent.

The creation of a cyberpeacekeeping unit at the United Nations would mean that countries seeking ways to de-escalate a cyber conflict would have a means to verify an agreement or international standards. The GGE, after several landmark reports, was unable to reach consensus in June 2017 but, in 2018, the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation was established (United Nations, 2018). This panel also aims to improve digital cooperation amongst countries, private enterprise and other stakeholders. Cyberattacks will undoubtedly be an issue for this panel and cyber peace operations could serve as part of the solution.

More generally, nations have ceded part of their sovereignty to the United Nations when they signed the UN Charter. The Security Council has been given the legal right and responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council, and to a lesser extent the UN General Assembly, has often responded to world crises with various types of peace operations. The first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force, was created to respond to the 1956 Suez Crisis, which it helped resolve. Already for many years previously, the international community and the proposers of UNEF had wrestled with how to apply military force under international control. Similarly, deliberations for a cyberpeacekeeping role can allow the avenues to be explored before the crisis or conflict cries out for a UN role. A cyber peace operation (cyberpeacekeeping) may serve as the tool in a world increasingly defined by cyber interactions.

As we have seen with the creation of regional cybersecurity initiatives in regional organizations, cybersecurity is recognized. But they are regional attempts, not global ones. Having a UN cybersecurity peacekeeping force may seem to be a huge leap, but can easily be a simple step toward ensuring international peace and cyber security.

8. CONCLUSION

There are numerous avenues for the nations of the world to collectively engage in cyber defence. The United Nations, as the world organization responsible for international peace and security, could be pivotal. Even though the concept of digital peacekeeping is new and not fully developed, the United Nations can have a role to motivate member states to look at collective cyber action through the world organization. Cyberattacks are not going away, but they will continue and evolve in sophistication and damage. These attacks have already crippled Estonia in 2007 and a litany of widely ranging attacks have occurred in India, Israel, and Pakistan, to name only a few. Similarly, the United Nations will need to evolve its approach to current and near-future cyberattacks. No longer can peacekeeping operations in the physical space ignore cyber threats against the missions or against the conflicting parties on the ground whom the United Nations seeks to moderate. The safety of the international personnel in foreign lands could be at stake as these cyberattacks become more sophisticated. Similarly, the nations of the world would be wise to explore UN action in cyberspace to protect themselves collectively and thus make the peoples of the world safer.

REFERENCES

Akatyev, N., & James, J. I. (2017). Legislative Requirements for Cyber Peacekeeping. Journal of Digital Forensics. Security and Law, 12(3), 23–38.

Brenner, S. (2007). At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare. The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 97(2), 379–475. Retrieved from https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol97/iss2/2

Celik, M. 2017. Cyber War: An Expected Apocalypse or a Hyped Threat? In U. Tatar, Y. Gokce & A.V. Gheorghe (Eds.), Strategic Cyber Defense: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (pp. 101-110). Amsterdam, IOS Press.

Chief Executives Board for Coordination. (2014, January 13). Summary of Conclusions, Second Regular Session of 2013. UN Doc. CEB/2013/2. Retrieved from https://www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/Chief%20Executives%20Board%20for%20Coordination/Document/REP_CEB_201311_CEB2013-2.pdf

Communications Security Establishment. Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2018). Government of Canada. Retrieved from https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/backgrounder-fiche-information

Council of Europe. (2003, January 28). Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of the acts of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. European Treaty Series.

Council of Europe. (2017). Details of Treaty No. 185 – Convention on Cybercrime. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185

Couzigou, I. (2018). Securing cyber space: The obligation of States to prevent harmful international cyber operations. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 32(1), 37–57. doi:10.1080/13600869.2018.1417763

Cybersecurity. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.sites.oas.org/cyber/en/pages/default.aspx

Dorn, A. W. (2017). Cyberpeacekeeping: A New Role for the United Nations? Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18(3), 138–146. doi:10.1353/gia.2017.0046

Dorn, A. W., & Pauk, R. (2009). Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Diplomatic History, 33(2), 261–292. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00762.x

Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid. Retrieved from https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf

Greenburg, A. (2017, May 9). The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election “Infrastructure.” Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-french-electioninfrastructure/

Grigsby, A. (2017). The End of Cyber Norms. Survival, 59(6), 109–122. doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1399730

Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. (2015, July 22). Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security A/70/174 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174

Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. (2016). Year in Review FY 2016 Pie Chart. Retrieved from https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Reports/Year_in_Review_FY2016_IR_Pie_Chart_S508C.pdf

Jensen, E. T. (2017). The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 48(3), 735-778. Retrieved from https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2018/05/48-3-The-Tallinn-Manual-2.0.pdf

Katz, Y. (2010, December 24). Stuxnet may have destroyed 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz. Jerusalem Post. Retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/Defense/Stuxnet-may-have-destroyed-1000-centrifuges-at-Natanz

Markoff, J. (2008, August 12). Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html

Mount, M. (2012, October 16). U.S. officials believe Iran behind recent cyber attacks. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/15/world/iran-cyber/?iid=EL

Mustonen, T. (2015, January 6). DefRep Analysis: NATO’s cyber shift may not link to Article 5. DefenceReport. Retrieved from http://defencereport.com/defrep-analysis-natos-cyber-shift-may-not-link-to-article-5/

NATO COE CCD. 2017. Tallinn Manual Process. Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html

Organization of American States. (2004, June 8). Adoption of a Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to Combat the Threats to Cybersecurity: A Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity. Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/xxxivga/english/docs/approved_documents/adoption_strategy_combat_threats_cybersecurity.htm

Pagliery, J. (2017, April 4). North Korea-linked hackers are attacking banks worldwide. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/world/north-korea-hackers-banks/index.html

Perlroth, N. (2012, September 30). Attacks on 6 Banks Frustrate Customers. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/business/cyberattacks-on-6-american-banks-frustrate-customers.html

Pfeffer, A. (2009, June 15). Israel Suffered Massive Cyber Attack During Gaza Offensive. Haaretz. Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/israel-suffered-massive-cyber-attack-during-gaza-offensive-1.278094

Pope, A. E. (2018). Cyber-securing our elections. Journal of Cyber Policy, 3(1), 24–38. doi:10.1080/23738871.2018.1473887

Robertson, J., & Riley, M. (2017, July 11). Kaspersky Lab has been working with Russian Intelligence. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-11/kaspersky-lab-has-been-working-withrussian-intelligence

Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H., & Maglaras, L. 2018. Developing Cyber Peacekeeping: Observation, Monitoring and Reporting. arXiv:1806.02608

Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 2018. Agreement between the Government of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (Unofficial English Translation). Retrieved from http://www.ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/SCO-090616-IISAgreement.pdf

Shekhar, S. (2017, January 2). The India-Pakistan cyber war intensifies as retaliatory ransomware attack cripples websites of Islamabad, Multan and Karachi airports. Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4082644/The-India-Pakistan-cyber-war-intensifies-retaliatory-ransomware-attackcripples-websites-Islamabad-Multan-Karachi-airports.html

Thompson, M. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Time Magazine. Retrieved from http://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/

United Nations. (2017a). Cyber Risk. Retrieved from https://unite.un.org/digitalbluehelmets/cyberrisk

United Nations. (2017b). Digital Blue Helmets: Research. Retrieved from https://unite.un.org/digitalbluehelmets/research

United Nations. (2018). Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/digital-cooperation-panel/

United Nations General Assembly. (2013, June 24). Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. 68th Session. Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-130624-GGEReport2013_0.pdf

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A

Vatis, M. A. (2001). Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis. Hanover, New Hampshire: Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA395300&Locat

Volz, D. (2016, February 25). U.S. government concludes cyber attack caused Ukraine power outage. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity/u-s-government-concludes-cyberattack-caused-ukraine-power-outage-idUSKCN0VY30K

W32. Stuxnet. (2017, September 26), Symantec. Retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/security_response/
writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99

ENDNOTES

1 Estonia was a willing host after it suffered a massive cyberattack in 2007 on its websites and cyber infrastructure. The NATO COE was set up to “provide a capability to assist allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack” (NATO summit communique, Bucharest, April 2008). The COE role is to: improve cyber defence interoperability; develop policies, concepts, doctrine, and standards; enhance information security and cyber defence education; provide cyber defence support for experimentation. It also provides cyber defence subject matter experts (SMEs) to NATO, especially for cyber defence testing and validating.

2 The COE led and facilitated the drafting of the influential Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (version 2.0, Cambridge University Press, 2017). For more information, see: NATO COE CCD. “Tallinn Manual Process.” Accessed February 8, 2017. https://ccdcoe.org/tallinnmanual.
html

3 See: Nikolay Akatyev and Joshua I. James, “Cyber Peacekeeping,” in Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime, ed. Joshua L. James and Frank Breitinger (Cham: Springer, 2015), 126-39. Michael Robinson, Helge Janicke, and Kevin Jones, “An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping,” Computers and Society, October 2017. Accessed at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.09616v1.pdf. Dorn, A. W. 2017. Cyberpeacekeeping: A New Role for the United Nations?. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18(3), 138-146. doi: 10.1353/gia.2017.0046

4 The seven principles can be paraphrased as follows: (1) Cyberincidents should be dealt with in a holistic manner through criminal justice and international cooperation; (2) UN entities should aim to respond to cybercrime and cybersecurity needs in Member States within their respective mandates. (3). All UN programming should respect the principles of the rule of law and human rights; (4) UN programming should focus on assisting Member States to take evidence-based action; (5) Programming should foster a “whole-of-government” response. (6). Support to Member States should aim to strengthen international cooperation; (7) Programming should include efforts to strengthen cooperation between government institutions and private-sector enterprises.

5 The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks. It deals with things like “infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security.” It has some early indications of
enforcement power through and search procedures of computer networks and interception. See: Council of Europe. “Details of Treaty No. 185 – Convention on Cybercrime.” accessed June 12, 2017 http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185.

 

Peacekeeping Training Materials

Peacekeeping Training Materials

 

United Nations (http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community)

Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM): http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017

         Videos: http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017/CPTMVideos

Courses: news; list at national/internationa training institutions (pdf)

Resources (training): http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/resources

Specialized Training Materials (STMs): DAG Repository

Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Training Materials (CPOC)

 

 

 

 

 

MFA Mandate Letter 2015

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter (15 November 2015)

 

(Emphasis added in bold for part on UN peace operations)

 

Dear Mr. Dion: 

As Minister, your overarching goal will be to restore constructive Canadian leadership in the world and to advance Canada’s interests. This renewed leadership will serve our security and economic interests, but it will also support the deeply held Canadian desire to make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world.

You will be the leader of a strong team of Ministers, supported by the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie.

In particular, I will expect you to work with your colleagues and through established legislative, regulatory, and Cabinet processes to deliver on your top priorities:

 Improve relations with the United States, our closest ally and most important economic and security partner, and strengthen trilateral North American cooperation with the United States and Mexico. This would include working with the relevant Ministers to:

     o work with the United States to make substantial progress on reducing impediments to trade and commerce between our countries, including by improving border infrastructure and security, streamlining cargo inspection, and facilitating the movement of people. This should include increased engagement with provinces on border and regulatory issues; 
     o work with relevant ministers, including the Ministers of International Trade and Environment and Climate Change, to prepare for the North American Leaders Summit in Canada; 
     o develop a North American clean energy and environment agreement; and o support the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship in lifting the Mexican visa requirement.

 Ensure a close link between defence policy, foreign policy and national security.

 Revitalize Canada’s public diplomacy, stakeholder engagement, and cooperation with partners in Canada and abroad.

 Reenergize Canadian diplomacy and leadership on key international issues and in multilateral institutions. This would include:
     o in collaboration with the Minister of Environment and Climate Change, making Canada a leader of international efforts to combat climate change;
     o working with the Minister of National Defence, to increase Canada’s support for United Nations peace operations and its mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts;
     o working with the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, to champion the values of inclusive and accountable governance, peaceful pluralism and respect for diversity, and human rights including the rights of women and refugees; and
     o acceding to the Arms Trade Treaty.

 Increase Canada’s educational and cultural interaction with the world. This would include:
     o supporting the Minister of Canadian Heritage to restore the Promart and Trade Routes International cultural promotion programs, update their design, and increase related funding.

 

————————

Common Message and Instructions to All Ministers  (November 15, 2015)

We have promised Canadians a government that will bring real change – in both what we do and how we do it. Canadians sent a clear message in this election, and our platform offered a new, ambitious plan for a strong and growing middle class. Canadians expect us to fulfill our commitments, and it is my expectation that you will do your part in delivering on those promises to Canadians.

We made a commitment to invest in growing our economy, strengthening the middle class, and helping those working hard to join it. We committed to provide more direct help to those who need it by giving less to those who do not. We committed to public investment as the best way to spur economic growth, job creation, and broad-based prosperity. We committed to a responsible, transparent fiscal plan for challenging economic times.

I expect Canadians to hold us accountable for delivering these commitments, and I expect all ministers to do their part – individually and collectively – to improve economic opportunity and security for Canadians.

It is my expectation that we will deliver real results and professional government to

Canadians. To ensure that we have a strong focus on results, I will expect Cabinet committees and individual ministers to: track and report on the progress of our commitments; assess the effectiveness of our work; and align our resources with priorities, in order to get the results we want and Canadians deserve.

If we are to tackle the real challenges we face as a country – from a struggling middle class to the threat of climate change – Canadians need to have faith in their government’s honesty and willingness to listen. I expect that our work will be informed by performance measurement, evidence, and feedback from Canadians. We will direct our resources to those initiatives that are having the greatest, positive impact on the lives of Canadians, and that will allow us to meet our commitments to them. I expect you to report regularly on your progress toward fulfilling our commitments and to help develop effective measures that assess the impact of the organizations for which you are answerable.

I made a personal commitment to bring new leadership and a new tone to Ottawa. We made a commitment to Canadians to pursue our goals with a renewed sense of collaboration. Improved partnerships with provincial, territorial, and municipal governments are essential to deliver the real, positive change that we promised Canadians. No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples. It is time for a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.

We have also committed to set a higher bar for openness and transparency in government. It is time to shine more light on government to ensure it remains focused on the people it serves. Government and its information should be open by default. If we want Canadians to trust their government, we need a government that trusts Canadians. It is important that we acknowledge mistakes when we make them. Canadians do not expect us to be perfect – they expect us to be honest, open, and sincere in our efforts to serve the public interest.

Our platform guides our government. Over the course of our four-year mandate, I expect us to deliver on all of our commitments. It is our collective responsibility to ensure that we fulfill our promises, while living within our fiscal plan. Other issues will arise or will be brought to our attention by Canadians, stakeholders, and the public service. It is my expectation that you will engage constructively and thoughtfully and add priorities to your agenda when appropriate.

As Minister, you will be held accountable for our commitment to bring a different style of leadership to government. This will include: close collaboration with your colleagues; meaningful engagement with Opposition Members of Parliament, Parliamentary Committees and the public service; constructive dialogue with Canadians, civil society, and stakeholders, including business, organized labour, the broader public sector, and the not-for-profit and charitable sectors; and identifying ways to find solutions and avoid escalating conflicts unnecessarily. As well, members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, indeed all journalists in Canada and abroad, are professionals who, by asking necessary questions, contribute in an important way to the democratic process. Your professionalism and engagement with them is essential.

Canadians expect us, in our work, to reflect the values we all embrace: inclusion, honesty, hard work, fiscal prudence, and generosity of spirit. We will be a government that governs for all Canadians, and I expect you, in your work, to bring Canadians together.

You are expected to do your part to fulfill our government’s commitment to transparent, merit- based appointments, to help ensure gender parity and that Indigenous Canadians and minority groups are better reflected in positions of leadership.

These priorities draw heavily from our election platform commitments. The government’s agenda will be further articulated through Cabinet discussions and in the Speech from the Throne when Parliament opens.

I expect you to work closely with your Deputy Minister and his or her senior officials to ensure that the ongoing work of your department is undertaken in a professional manner and that decisions are made in the public interest. Your Deputy Minister will brief you on issues your department may be facing that may require decisions to be made quickly. It is my expectation that you will apply our values and principles to these decisions, so that issues facing your department are dealt with in a timely and responsible manner, and in a way that is consistent with the overall direction of our government.

Our ability, as a government, to successfully implement our platform depends on our ability to thoughtfully consider the professional, non-partisan advice of public servants. Each and every time a government employee comes to work, they do so in service to Canada, with a goal of improving our country and the lives of all Canadians. I expect you to establish a collaborative working relationship with your Deputy Minister, whose role, and the role of public servants under his or her direction, is to support you in the performance of your responsibilities.

In the coming weeks, the Privy Council Office (PCO) will be contacting you to set up a meeting with PCO officials, your Deputy Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office to further discuss your plans, commitments and priorities.

We have committed to an open, honest government that is accountable to Canadians, lives up to the highest ethical standards, and applies the utmost care and prudence in the handling of public funds. I expect you to embody these values in your work and observe the highest ethical standards in everything you do. When dealing with our Cabinet colleagues, Parliament, stakeholders, or the public, it is important that your behaviour and decisions meet Canadians’ well-founded expectations of our government. I want Canadians to look on their own government with pride and trust.

As Minister, you must ensure that you are aware of and fully compliant with the Conflict of Interest Act and Treasury Board policies and guidelines. You will be provided with a copy of Open and Accountable Government to assist you as you undertake your responsibilities. I ask that you carefully read it and ensure that your staff does so as well. I draw your attention in particular to the Ethical Guidelines set out in Annex A of that document, which apply to you and your staff. As noted in the Guidelines, you must uphold the highest standards of honesty and impartiality, and both the performance of your official duties and the arrangement of your private affairs should bear the closest public scrutiny. This is an obligation that is not fully discharged by simply acting within the law. Please also review the areas of Open and Accountable Government that we have expanded or strengthened, including the guidance on non-partisan use of departmental communications resources and the new code of conduct for exempt staff.

I know I can count on you to fulfill the important responsibilities entrusted in you. In turn, please know that you can count on me to support you every day in your role as Minister.

I am deeply grateful to have this opportunity to serve with you as we build an even greater country. Together, we will work tirelessly to honour the trust Canadians have given us.

Yours sincerely, Justin P.J. Trudeau

Prime Minister

 

Source: http://www.davidmckie.com/Ministers%20Mandate%20letters%20Consolidated%20with%20Index%20Nov%2016%202015.pdf

MFA Mandate Letter 2017

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter (February 1, 2017)

 

Source: https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter (copied 18 Feb 2019, emphasis added in bold for peace operations provisions)

 

Dear Ms. Freeland:

I am honoured that you have agreed to serve Canadians as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

We promised Canadians real change – in both what we do and how we do it. Canadians sent a clear message in the last election, and our platform offered a new, ambitious plan for a strong and growing middle class. Canadians expect us to fulfill our commitments, and it is my expectation that you will do your part in delivering on those promises to Canadians.

We made a commitment to grow our economy, strengthen the middle class, and help those working hard to join it. We committed to provide more direct help to those who need it by giving less to those who do not. We committed to public investment to spur economic growth, job creation, and broad-based prosperity. We committed to a responsible, transparent fiscal plan for challenging economic times.

I expect Canadians to hold us accountable for delivering these commitments, and I expect all ministers to do their part – individually and collectively – to improve economic opportunity and security for Canadians.

It is my expectation that we will deliver real results and professional government to Canadians. To ensure that we have a strong focus on results, I will expect Cabinet committees and individual ministers to: track and report on the progress of our commitments; assess the effectiveness of our work; and align our resources with priorities, in order to get the results we want and Canadians deserve.

If we are to tackle the real challenges we face as a country – from a struggling middle class to the threat of climate change – Canadians need to have faith in their government’s honesty and willingness to listen. I expect that our work will be informed by performance measurement, evidence, and feedback from Canadians. We will direct resources to initiatives that have the greatest, positive impact on the lives of Canadians, and that allow us to meet our commitments to them. I expect you to report regularly on your progress toward fulfilling our commitments and to help develop effective measures that assess the impact of the organizations for which you are answerable.

I made a personal commitment to bring new leadership and a new tone to Ottawa. We made a commitment to Canadians to pursue our goals with a renewed sense of collaboration. Improved partnerships with provincial, territorial, and municipal governments are essential to deliver the real, positive change that we promised Canadians. No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples. It is time for a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.

We have also committed to set a higher bar for openness and transparency in government. It is time to shine more light on government to ensure it remains focused on the people it serves. Government and its information should be open by default. If we want Canadians to trust their government, we need a government that trusts Canadians. It is important that we acknowledge mistakes when we make them. Canadians do not expect us to be perfect – they expect us to be honest, open, and sincere in our efforts to serve the public interest.

Our platform guides our government. Over the course of our four-year mandate, I expect us to deliver on our commitments. It is our collective responsibility to ensure that we fulfill our promises, while living within our fiscal plan. Other issues will arise or will be brought to our attention by Canadians, stakeholders, and the public service. It is my expectation that you will engage constructively and thoughtfully and add priorities to your agenda when appropriate.

As Minister, you will be held accountable for our commitment to bring a different style of leadership to government. This will include: close collaboration with your colleagues; meaningful engagement with Opposition Members of Parliament, Parliamentary Committees and the public service; constructive dialogue with Canadians, civil society, and stakeholders, including business, organized labour, the broader public sector, and the not-for-profit and charitable sectors; and identifying ways to find solutions and avoid escalating conflicts unnecessarily. As well, members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, indeed all journalists in Canada and abroad, are professionals who, by asking necessary questions, contribute in an important way to the democratic process. Your professionalism and engagement with them is essential.

Canadians expect us, in our work, to reflect the values we all embrace: inclusion, honesty, hard work, fiscal prudence, and generosity of spirit. We will be a government that governs for all Canadians, and I expect you, in your work, to bring Canadians together.

You are expected to do your part to fulfill our government’s commitment to transparent, merit-based appointments, to help ensure gender parity and that Indigenous Peoples and minority groups are better reflected in positions of leadership.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, your overarching goal will be to restore constructive Canadian leadership in the world and to promote Canada’s interests and values. This renewed leadership will serve our security and economic interests, but it will also support the deeply held Canadian desire to make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world.

You lead a strong team of Ministers, supported by the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie.

In particular, I will expect you to work with your colleagues and through established legislative, regulatory, and Cabinet processes to deliver on your top priorities:

  • Maintain constructive relations with the United States, Canada’s closest ally and most important economic and security partner, and lead efforts to deepen trade and commerce between our two countries. You will lead a whole-of-government approach and strategy to the relationship, working with the relevant ministers to advance the common goal of growing the middle class by:

    • ensuring border security and facilitating the movement of people, goods and services. This should involve increased engagement with provinces and territories on border and regulatory issues;
    • continuing joint efforts to address global security threats, combat terrorism, and defend our continent;
    • cooperating on energy security and energy infrastructure; and
    • advancing shared action on environmental issues and climate change, including through collaboration on clean technology development and innovation.
  • Strengthen trilateral North American cooperation with the United States and Mexico. This will involve working with the relevant Ministers to enhance North America’s global competitiveness and facilitate trade and commerce within the continent, including with respect to the North American Free Trade Agreement.
  • Expand Canadian diplomacy and leadership on global issues and in international institutions. This includes:

    • strengthening relationships with key bilateral, regional and multilateral partners;
    • working with the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, the Minister of International Trade, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Status of Women and other relevant ministers to champion the values of inclusive and accountable governance, including by promoting human rights, women’s empowerment and gender equality, and peaceful pluralism, inclusion and respect for diversity;
    • in collaboration with the Minister of Environment and Climate Change, make Canada a leader of international efforts to combat climate change;
    • working with the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, to increase Canada’s support for United Nations peace operations and its mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts;
    • seeking leadership opportunities for Canada and Canadians in multilateral institutions; and
    • acceding to the Arms Trade Treaty.
  • Ensure a close link between foreign, defence, development and trade policy.
  • Work with the Minister of National Defence to ensure that any deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces aligns with Canada’s national interest, our multilateral commitments and the government’s policy objectives.
  • Continue the revitalization of Canada’s public diplomacy, stakeholder engagement, and cooperation with partners in Canada and abroad.
  • Increase Canada’s educational and cultural interaction with the world. This includes:

    • supporting the Minister of Canadian Heritage in restoring the Promart and Trade Routes International cultural promotion programs, updating their design, and increasing related funding.

These priorities draw heavily from our election platform commitments.

I expect you to work closely with your Deputy Minister and his or her senior officials to ensure that the ongoing work of your department is undertaken in a professional manner and that decisions are made in the public interest. Your Deputy Minister will brief you on issues your department may be facing that may require decisions to be made quickly. It is my expectation that you will apply our values and principles to these decisions, so that issues facing your department are dealt with in a timely and responsible manner, and in a way that is consistent with the overall direction of our government.

Our ability, as a government, to successfully implement our platform depends on our ability to thoughtfully consider the professional, non-partisan advice of public servants. Each and every time a government employee comes to work, they do so in service to Canada, with a goal of improving our country and the lives of all Canadians. I expect you to establish a collaborative working relationship with your Deputy Minister, whose role, and the role of public servants under his or her direction, is to support you in the performance of your responsibilities.

We have committed to an open, honest government that is accountable to Canadians, lives up to the highest ethical standards, and applies the utmost care and prudence in the handling of public funds. I expect you to embody these values in your work and observe the highest ethical standards in everything you do. When dealing with our Cabinet colleagues, Parliament, stakeholders, or the public, it is important that your behaviour and decisions meet Canadians’ well-founded expectations of our government. I want Canadians to look on their own government with pride and trust.

As Minister, you must ensure that you are aware of and fully compliant with the Conflict of Interest Act and Treasury Board policies and guidelines. You will be provided with a copy of Open and Accountable Government to assist you as you undertake your responsibilities. I ask that you carefully read it and ensure that your staff does so as well. I draw your attention in particular to the Ethical Guidelines set out in Annex A of that document, which apply to you and your staff. As noted in the Guidelines, you must uphold the highest standards of honesty and impartiality, and both the performance of your official duties and the arrangement of your private affairs should bear the closest public scrutiny. This is an obligation that is not fully discharged by simply acting within the law. Please also review the areas of Open and Accountable Government that we have expanded or strengthened, including the guidance on non-partisan use of departmental communications resources and the new code of conduct for exempt staff.

I know I can count on you to fulfill the important responsibilities entrusted in you. In turn, please know that you can count on me to support you every day in your role as Minister.

I am deeply grateful to have this opportunity to serve with you as we build an even greater country. Together, we will work tirelessly to honour the trust Canadians have given us.

Sincerely,

Prime Minister of Canada signature

 

Rt. Hon. Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

MND Mandate Letter 2015

Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter (November 12, 2015)

 

Source: https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter (copied 18 Feb 2019, emphasis added in bold for peace operations provisions)

 

Dear Mr. Sajjan:

I am honoured that you have agreed to serve Canadians as Minister of National Defence.

We have promised Canadians a government that will bring real change – in both what we do and how we do it. Canadians sent a clear message in this election, and our platform offered a new, ambitious plan for a strong and growing middle class. Canadians expect us to fulfill our commitments, and it is my expectation that you will do your part in delivering on those promises to Canadians.

We made a commitment to invest in growing our economy, strengthening the middle class, and helping those working hard to join it. We committed to provide more direct help to those who need it by giving less to those who do not. We committed to public investment as the best way to spur economic growth, job creation, and broad-based prosperity. We committed to a responsible, transparent fiscal plan for challenging economic times.

I expect Canadians to hold us accountable for delivering these commitments, and I expect all ministers to do their part – individually and collectively – to improve economic opportunity and security for Canadians.

It is my expectation that we will deliver real results and professional government to Canadians. To ensure that we have a strong focus on results, I will expect Cabinet committees and individual ministers to: track and report on the progress of our commitments; assess the effectiveness of our work; and align our resources with priorities, in order to get the results we want and Canadians deserve.

If we are to tackle the real challenges we face as a country – from a struggling middle class to the threat of climate change – Canadians need to have faith in their government’s honesty and willingness to listen. I expect that our work will be informed by performance measurement, evidence, and feedback from Canadians. We will direct our resources to those initiatives that are having the greatest, positive impact on the lives of Canadians, and that will allow us to meet our commitments to them. I expect you to report regularly on your progress toward fulfilling our commitments and to help develop effective measures that assess the impact of the organizations for which you are answerable.

I made a personal commitment to bring new leadership and a new tone to Ottawa. We made a commitment to Canadians to pursue our goals with a renewed sense of collaboration. Improved partnerships with provincial, territorial, and municipal governments are essential to deliver the real, positive change that we promised Canadians. No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples. It is time for a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.

We have also committed to set a higher bar for openness and transparency in government. It is time to shine more light on government to ensure it remains focused on the people it serves. Government and its information should be open by default. If we want Canadians to trust their government, we need a government that trusts Canadians. It is important that we acknowledge mistakes when we make them. Canadians do not expect us to be perfect – they expect us to be honest, open, and sincere in our efforts to serve the public interest.

Our platform guides our government. Over the course of our four-year mandate, I expect us to deliver on all of our commitments. It is our collective responsibility to ensure that we fulfill our promises, while living within our fiscal plan. Other issues will arise or will be brought to our attention by Canadians, stakeholders, and the public service. It is my expectation that you will engage constructively and thoughtfully and add priorities to your agenda when appropriate.

As Minister, you will be held accountable for our commitment to bring a different style of leadership to government. This will include: close collaboration with your colleagues; meaningful engagement with Opposition Members of Parliament, Parliamentary Committees and the public service; constructive dialogue with Canadians, civil society, and stakeholders, including business, organized labour, the broader public sector, and the not-for-profit and charitable sectors; and identifying ways to find solutions and avoid escalating conflicts unnecessarily. As well, members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, indeed all journalists in Canada and abroad, are professionals who, by asking necessary questions, contribute in an important way to the democratic process. Your professionalism and engagement with them is essential.

Canadians expect us, in our work, to reflect the values we all embrace: inclusion, honesty, hard work, fiscal prudence, and generosity of spirit. We will be a government that governs for all Canadians, and I expect you, in your work, to bring Canadians together.

You are expected to do your part to fulfill our government’s commitment to transparent, merit-based appointments, to help ensure gender parity and that Indigenous Canadians and minority groups are better reflected in positions of leadership.

As Minister of National Defence, your overarching goal will be to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces are equipped and prepared, if called upon, to protect Canadian sovereignty, defend North America, provide disaster relief, conduct search and rescue, support United Nations peace operations, and contribute to the security of our allies and to allied and coalition operations abroad. It will be important that you ensure a close link between defence policy, foreign policy, and national security. I also ask you to work closely with your colleague, the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence, to ensure a seamless transition for Canadian Forces members to the programs and services of Veterans Affairs.

In particular, I will expect you to work with your colleagues and through established legislative, regulatory, and Cabinet processes to deliver on your top priorities:

  • Work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to end Canada’s combat mission in Iraq and Syria, refocusing Canada’s efforts in the region on the training of local forces and humanitarian support.
  • Ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces have the equipment they need. This includes:
    • working with the Minister of Finance to maintain current National Defence spending levels, including current planned increases;
    • working with the Minister of Public Services and Procurement to launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that match Canada’s defence needs; and
    • working with the Minister of Public Services and Procurement to invest in strengthening the Navy, while meeting the commitments that were made as part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.
  • Work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to renew Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations. This includes:
    • making Canada’s specialized capabilities – from mobile medical teams, to engineering support, to aircraft that can carry supplies and personnel – available on a case-by-case basis;
    • working with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to help the United Nations respond more quickly to emerging and escalating conflicts and providing well-trained personnel to international initiatives that can be quickly deployed, such as mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units; and
    • leading an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations, while insisting that any peacekeepers involved in misconduct be held accountable by their own country and the United Nations.
  • Maintain Canada’s strong commitments to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
  • Conduct an open and transparent review process to create a new defence strategy for Canada, replacing the now-outdated Canada First Defence Strategy.
  • Renew Canada’s focus on surveillance and control of Canadian territory and approaches, particularly our Arctic regions, and increase the size of the Canadian Rangers.
  • Work with senior leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces to establish and maintain a workplace free from harassment and discrimination.
  • Work with the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence to reduce complexity, overhaul service delivery, and strengthen partnerships between National Defence and Veterans Affairs.
  • Support the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a review of existing measures to protect Canadians and our critical infrastructure from cyber-threats.
  • Work with the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence to develop a suicide prevention strategy for Canadian Armed Forces personnel and veterans.

These priorities draw heavily from our election platform commitments. The government’s agenda will be further articulated through Cabinet discussions and in the Speech from the Throne when Parliament opens.

I expect you to work closely with your Deputy Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff, who has direct responsibility for the command, control, and administration of the Canadian Forces, and their senior officials to ensure that the ongoing work of your department is undertaken in a professional manner and that decisions are made in the public interest. Your Deputy Minister will brief you on issues your department may be facing that may require decisions to be made quickly. It is my expectation that you will apply our values and principles to these decisions, so that issues facing your department are dealt with in a timely and responsible manner, and in a way that is consistent with the overall direction of our government.

Our ability, as a government, to successfully implement our platform depends on our ability to thoughtfully consider the professional, non-partisan advice of public servants. Each and every time a government employee comes to work, they do so in service to Canada, with a goal of improving our country and the lives of all Canadians. I expect you to establish a collaborative working relationship with your Deputy Minister, whose role, and the role of public servants under his or her direction, is to support you in the performance of your responsibilities.

In the coming weeks, the Privy Council Office (PCO) will be contacting you to set up a meeting with PCO officials, your Deputy Minister, and the Prime Minister’s Office to further discuss your plans, commitments, and priorities.

We have committed to an open, honest government that is accountable to Canadians, lives up to the highest ethical standards, and applies the utmost care and prudence in the handling of public funds. I expect you to embody these values in your work and observe the highest ethical standards in everything you do. When dealing with our Cabinet colleagues, Parliament, stakeholders, or the public, it is important that your behaviour and decisions meet Canadians’ well-founded expectations of our government. I want Canadians to look on their own government with pride and trust.

As Minister, you must ensure that you are aware of and fully compliant with the Conflict of Interest Act and Treasury Board policies and guidelines. You will be provided with a copy of Open and Accountable Government to assist you as you undertake your responsibilities. I ask that you carefully read it and ensure that your staff does so as well. I draw your attention in particular to the Ethical Guidelines set out in Annex A of that document, which apply to you and your staff. As noted in the Guidelines, you must uphold the highest standards of honesty and impartiality, and both the performance of your official duties and the arrangement of your private affairs should bear the closest public scrutiny. This is an obligation that is not fully discharged by simply acting within the law. Please also review the areas of Open and Accountable Government that we have expanded or strengthened, including the guidance on non-partisan use of departmental communications resources and the new code of conduct for exempt staff.

I know I can count on you to fulfill the important responsibilities entrusted in you. In turn, please know that you can count on me to support you every day in your role as Minister.

I am deeply grateful to have this opportunity to serve with you as we build an even greater country. Together, we will work tirelessly to honour the trust Canadians have given us.

Yours sincerely,

 

Rt. Hon. Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

cyberpeacekeeping bibliography

Cyberpeacekeeping Bibliography

Compiled by Walter Dorn (annotations to come)

 

Chronological listing

Cahill, T. P., K. Rozinov, and C. Mule (2003), “Cyber Warfare Peacekeeping,” in Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance (New York: IEEE, 2003), 100.

Kleffner, Jann K., and Heather A. Harrison Dinniss (2013), “Keeping the Cyber Peace: International Legal Aspects of Cyber Activities in Peace Operations,” Int. Law Stud. 89, no. 1, (2013): 512-35.

Karlsrud, John (2014), “Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media and Cyber-technology,” in Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges, ed. Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Muller (Cham: Springer, 2014), 141-60.

Akatyev, Nikolay, and Joshua I. James (2015), “Cyber Peacekeeping,” in Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime, ed. Joshua L. James and Frank Breitinger (Cham: Springer, 2015), 126-39.

Akatyev, N., & James, J. I. (2015), Cyber Peacekeeping. In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST (Vol. 157, pp. 126–139). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25512-5_10

Dorn, Walter (2017), Cyberpeacekeeping: A New Role for the United Nations? Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2017) (html: walterdorn.net/257, pdf).

Akatyev, N., & James, J. (2017). United nations digital blue helmets as a starting point for cyber peacekeeping. In European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS (pp. 8–16). Dublin: Academic Conferences International Limited. https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.04502.

Akatyev, N., & James, J. I. (2017). Legislative Requirements for Cyber Peacekeeping. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 12(3). Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol12/iss3/4/

Robinson, M., Jones, K., & Janicke, H. (2017). An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09616.

Dorn, Walter (2018), “Cyberpeacekeeping: the Challenge,” Peace Magazine, vol. 34, no. 1, p.27, 30 (January–March 2018). http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v34n1p27.htm

 

 

 

Websites

Cyberpeacekeeping.org, developed by researchers Nikolay Akatyev and Joshua I. James at the suggestion of W. Dorn.

 

Peacekeeping-promises-Kept-or-broken?

Peacekeeping Promises: Kept or Broken?

Walter Dorn

Originally published in John Trent (ed.), The United Nations and Canada: What Canada Could and Should Do at the United Nations 2018: A Question of Leadership, World Federalist Movement – Canada, 2018. (unitednationsandcanada.org) (pdf: complete booklet, Dorn chapter extractDorn chapter 8.5″x11″ size)

Upon election in 2015, Justin Trudeau promised that Canada would re-engage in UN peacekeeping, after it had reached historically lowest levels of participation under the government of Stephen Harper. The new Prime Minister gave explicit instructions to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in the minister’s Mandate letter to provide the UN with specialized personnel and capabilities, to help the United Nations respond more quickly, and to lead an international effort in training.

The government then made specific pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in London, UK, in September 2016 for “up to” 750 uniformed personnel (600 military and 150 police). Then, while hosting the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver in November 2017, the Prime Minister elaborated on the London pledge of 600 military, which was to take the form of Tactical Airlift Support, an Aviation Task Force, and a Quick Reaction Force. In Vancouver, Canada’s new pledge was not for additional personnel but the promotion of women’s participation in peacekeeping (the “Elsie initiative”) and a pledge to help with UN training.

Have these sizeable and impressive promises been fulfilled? As the Trudeau government enters the last quarter of its current term of office, has Canada really “re-engaged” in UN peacekeeping?

To answer, we have to look at each type of pledge: personnel, capabilities, women, and training. For the personnel pledge, the number deployed provides one countable way to check on the promises. Until the mission in Mali finally got on the ground in July 2018, the deployment numbers did not increase at all, but actually fall to the lowest number of uniformed personnel since 1956. In May 2018 the figure was a mere 19 military deployed! This is less than half of what the Harper government had provided. With the Mali task force being approximately 250, the total military contribution will be under 300. Thus, Canada is at less than half of the number of military personnel it suggested at the London ministerial.

For police, the figures are even worse. The number deployed has dropped significantly under the Trudeau government. The Conservative government, before it left office, had 89 police deployed. The Liberals have brought that number down to 22 (31 July 2018), mostly due to the end of the Haiti peacekeeping mission. So the police component is far from being at the pledged 150; it is only 15% of that. And, even more startling, this is less than a quarter of the police officers that the Conservative government had deployed. The Trudeau government pledged in Vancouver that “new police missions [were] being examined” but no announcement has been made.

Canada sought to be a champion of the participation of women in UN peacekeeping. But Canada has not reached the UN’s target of 15%. As of 31 July 2018, military women were only 8% (12 of 156 military personnel). For police, the picture was better: 32% (7 of only 22 police). But Canada’s support, done through the “Elsie Initiative”, to help other nation’s deployment of women into UN operations has been minimal. Canada has yet to provide any of the promised funds ($15 million) or turn its rhetoric into action.

In his mandate letter to the defence minister, the Prime Minister requested that Canada provide “mission commanders” for UN operations. The Trudeau government has not yet done so. Canada lost the opportunity to provide the Force Commander for the Mali (MINUSMA) mission in January 2017 when it dithered and delayed in offering a force package for the mission. Canada had provided seven mission commanders in the 1990s, but none since.

Canada made its first “smart pledge” in Vancouver: Tactical Airlift Support. A C-130 was to be based in Entebbe, Uganda, to serve multiple missions. But this seemingly innovative plan is in limbo after discussions with the UN in New York showed that this pledge might not be so “smart” after all, with UN needs being elsewhere.

The other pledges in Vancouver were for an Aviation Task Force, the one pledge that Canada has fulfilled. The Task Force in Mali includes an important aeromedical unit, three heavy transport Chinook Helicopters with five Griffon helicopter for escort duty, proving very useful. However, the Quick Reaction Force, also pledged, is nowhere to be seen. If and when it does eventually materialize, it will have been an exceedingly slow deployment of a Quick Reaction Force to a mission.

The Vancouver pledge included “Innovative Training” but Canada has still not significantly improved its own training for peace operations. It carries out less than one quarter of the training activities that it did before the Harper government came to power in 2006. Furthermore, the envisioned “Canadian Training and Advisory Teams” to train foreign military forces have yet to materialize.

So the government’s declaration that its renewal of peacekeeping commitments is “Underway – on track,” is inaccurate at best, or outright false at worst. The Canadian government has yet to match its words with deeds. In 2018, the defence minister exhorted the UN Security Council with good advice: “The time for change is now and we must be bold.” If only the Canadian government could practice what it preaches. All the promises on peacekeeping, except one, remain broken promises. And time is running out to make good on them.

 

Peace Operations: Terms & Definitions

Peace Operations: Terms & Definitions

Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor of Defence Studies,
Canadian Forces College and the Royal Military College of Canada[1]

Brief prepared for the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, 11 May 2018 (pdf

 

Many terms and concepts exist to label international operations designed to support peace. These include peacekeeping (a more traditional term, which gained popularity in the late 1950s and remains popular and is still used by the UN), peace support (a term adopted by NATO and the Canadian military in late 1990s that includes peacekeeping as a component), and peace operation (the broadest term, which is used by the UN to include both peacekeeping and special political missions[2]; the term was also adopted by the US military).

Other types of operations/activities that can run concurrently or be part of a peace operation include: conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and peacemaking.

For many of these terms, national militaries and international organizations have developed doctrines to help clarify the concepts and provide robust definitions. Unfortunately, the doctrines of the UN, NATO, Canada and the US differ on these terms and concepts. Fortunately, they differ only in minor ways and are roughly compatible, though the nuances can be important. A list of definitions from the doctrines of these organizations and countries is provided in Annex 1. A caution: the Canadian doctrinal manual on “Peace Support Operations” (PSO) is quite old (2002) and is long overdue for a re-write. Furthermore, NATO has shifted away from the term “Peace Support Operation” and uses the more generic term “Peace Support” efforts or force, with various types of operations included. These types of operations or roles are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Types of activities and operations designed to support peace (see pdf)
Adapted from Peace Support Training Centre, Canada, EO 401.02.

 

The term peacemaking in all the doctrines examined herein (UN, NATO, Canada, US) is based on the idea of bringing the conflicting parties to an agreement, e.g., for an immediate ceasefire or a long-term peace agreement. In colloquial language, however, the term is sometimes used to mean action on the opposite side of the force spectrum: using force to impose an agreement, as in the expression: “If peacekeeping does not work, then peacemaking must be used.” But that meaning should be avoided, since it confuses discussion and another term (peace enforcement) conveys a similar meaning of imposing peace.

Peacebuilding is the effort to develop the infrastructure (political, economic and social as well as physical) for a sustainable peace.

The term humanitarian assistance is self-defining. In practice, it means helping people stay alive so that they can one day return to their normal self-reliant lives and societies.

The term peacekeeping is the one that causes the most difficulty. It implies that a ceasefire is established and is usually associated with the military function of observing and reporting or acting as a buffer or separates armed parties. It carries with it the historical baggage of operations that were common during the Cold War: soldiers patrolling buffer zones between two conflicting but stationary forces during a ceasefire, long or short. While such UN operations are still ongoing, only very few new traditional ones have even been created (such as in Ethiopia-Eritrea mission 2000–2008). The United Nations still uses the term peacekeeping at the insistence of the Non-Aligned Movement, but the organization often distinguishes between the traditional operations and the multidimensional peacekeeping (see Annex 1 endnotes). Almost all operations in the new century have been multidimensional. They may include some traditional roles such as cease-fire monitoring and reporting but they also have more ambitious mandates such as security sector reform, disarmament, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and the protection of civilians (POC). They may use armed force at times in defence of the mandate, in addition to self-defence.

When a recalcitrant or non-compliant party continues to violate the terms of a peace agreement or the norms of humanity, despite repeated warnings to stop, then peace enforcement can be taken against the party through coercive, forceful action. But peace enforcement should only be taken by peace operations as a last resort, when other means have failed. There is much academic and practical debate about whether peace enforcement action can still adhere to the three principles of peacekeeping (namely: consent, impartiality and defensive use of force only). I am of the view that operations doing peace enforcement can still adhere to the trinity, just as the police forces nationally (e.g., in Canada) should, in principles, have gained strategic consent (though democracy), act impartiality (no one is above the law) and act primarily in defence of the law, undertaking offensive operations only under extreme circumstances. In “pure” enforcement operations (such as the Korean War or Gulf War I), there is obviously no consent from the punished party but this would not be “peace enforcement” but simply international law “enforcement,” done under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

  

Stabilization/stability operations

A final area of frequent confusion is the term “stabilization” or “stability” operation. Many UN peace operations include the word in their names, e.g., the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and similarly for the UN missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and D.R. Congo (MONUSCO).[3]

The term stabilization operation is currently much used in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), though doctrine under this term is not yet available, despite efforts to develop and procure it. The Canadian doctrine on “Peace Support Operations” does not mention “stabilization operations,” though the goal of creating stability is mentioned several times. Surprisingly, the very extensive NATO Glossary of Terms (2017) does not include “stability operations.”

The NATO-led Afghanistan operation is sometimes viewed as having been a “stabilization operation,” though its name was the “International Security Assistance Force.” Its role changed over time from support for the new Afghan government in Kabul (2002–2005), which originally resembled peace operations (but limited to the Kabul area), to one that increasingly involved counter-insurgency (2006–2014) or “COIN” and elements of counter-terrorism, alongside the US-led counter-terrorism “Operation Enduring Freedom” (2001–2014). A peace operation (UN or other) was never tested in Afghanistan because a viable peace process was never adopted by the parties. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a Special Political Mission (SPM) that existed alongside ISAF and focused on peacebuilding and diplomatic efforts. But it had very few military personnel (maybe a dozen, who were only in administrative/staff positions). Even now, UNAMA has no forces or military units on the ground. Perhaps in the future, a large peace operation could be deployed, but the troops on the ground should be mainly from Muslim-majority countries, in my opinion, in order to gain greater local acceptance.[4]

The notion of stability operations is compatible with peace operation but stability operations set a much less ambitious goal. Stability can be obtained without addressing the underlying or root causes of conflict. Stability can be achieved without democracy, e.g., by dictatorship, autocracy or imposition. The stability might also be short-lived. The term peace operation is preferred because it includes and extends to efforts to address conflict at a deeper, long-term level. Here peace should be interpreted both as “negative peace”, meaning the absence of violent armed conflict, and “positive peace,” being the presence of harmony, the just rule of law, and democratic rights.

  

Conclusion

Given the wide range of operational types, my view is that the best term to cover the broad gamut is “peace operation.” The term includes the vital word, peace, which is the objective of such operations. It does not get weighed down in the simplistic argument over whether there is “a peace to keep.” It includes peacekeeping as one of the potential activities, when more traditional activities by military personnel are carried out.

The terms “peacekeeping” and “peacekeeper” are still important, not only because they resonate in the public imagination and because of their easy alliteration, but because they are still part of the lexicon of the major organizations (like the UN and NATO) and major nations (like US, UK and Canada). More importantly, the term peacekeeping suggests an effort to “keep” or preserve whatever level of peace that may exist in the nation or region. The only condition where it would not apply is the case of total war and chaos, where there is absolutely no peace to keep. Peace operations need to expand the level of peace in fragile or conflict-affected areas, whatever it might be, to the level enjoyed by peaceful nations like Canada – and even here a perfect peace has not been attained.

Of course, more important than terminology is the commitment of nations to support the UN with these challenging operations, however they may be labelled, to advance the cause of peace effectively.

 

 

Annex 1. Definitions from the doctrine of selected organizations and governments. (French version: pfd)
(Compiled by Walter Dorn and Danielle Stodilka[5])

TERM UN NATO CANADA US
Humanitarian assistance / operation

Humanitarian assistance: “Material or logistical assistance provided for

humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises. The

primary objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering

and maintain human dignity.”

Humanitarian assistance: “As part of an operation, the use of

available military resources to assist or

complement the efforts of responsible

civil actors in the operational area or

specialized civil humanitarian

organizations in fulfilling their primary

responsibility to alleviate human

suffering.”

Humanitarian operation: “An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering in an area where the civil actors normally responsible for so doing are unable or unwilling adequately to support a population.”

Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. They may be conducted independently or during a PSO.” (210.1)

Humanitarian Assistance: “refers to

efforts that relieve or reduce human suffering,

disease, hunger, or privation in an impartial manner.

While HA is provided ideally by civilian

organizations without military involvement,

military forces and other security units may be

mandated or tasked to support humanitarian actions.” (p.xiii)

Peacebuilding

“Measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing

into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management,

and laying the foundations for sustainable peace.”

“A peace support effort designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the underlying causes of the conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. Note: Peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment and may run concurrently with other types of peace support efforts.” “Peace building involves actions that support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability.” (206.1) “Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society’s institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict.”
Peace Enforcement

“Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international

peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined

the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”

“A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Note: Peace enforcement is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.”

Not used. “The term peace enforcement has muddied the understanding of

when the UN actually carries out a pure enforcement action.” (2.a)

“Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”

Peacemaking “Action to bring hostile parties to agreement.” “A peace support effort conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.” “The activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a peaceful settlement.” (205.1) “The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it.”
Peace operation(s)

“Field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or

resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence.”

Not in NATO Glossary; see “Peace Support Force” See Peace Support Operation and peacekeeping “Multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.”

 

Peace Support

Force / Operation (PSO)

Not defined/used

Peace support:

“Efforts conducted impartially to restore or

maintain peace.

Note: Peace support efforts can include

conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace

enforcement, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding.”[6]

Peace support force:

“A military force assigned to a peace

support operation.”

Not defined. See peacekeeping.

“PSOs include conflict prevention, peacemaking, traditional and

complex peacekeeping and peace building. Related operations can be conducted concurrently,

complementary or independently: humanitarian and enforcement operations.” (201.1)

Not defined/used
Peacekeeping

“Action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where

fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved

by the peacemakers.”

It is divided into traditional peacekeeping and multidimensional peacekeeping, also defined.[7] So is robust peacekeeping.[8]

“A peace support effort designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. Note: Peacekeeping is conducted with the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.”

No definition provided but breaks down into:

Traditional peacekeeping and Complex peacekeeping.[9]

“Military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term

political settlement.”

Preventive action/diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy: “Diplomatic efforts to avert disputes arising between

parties from escalating into conflict.”

Conflict Prevention: “A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.”

Conflict prevention involves a range of preventive actions used to monitor and identify causes of conflict and timely action taken to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities.” (204.1)

Conflict Prevention: “A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.”
Doctrine used
(full source references below)
UN, 2008, pp.95-99 NATO, 2017

2002, pp.2-3 to 2-5.

No definitions section. Descriptions given.

US, 2018, GL-3 to GL-5, and xiii.

Note: French definitions can be found in the French versions of the doctrines of Canada, NATO and the UN (see links below), though not for the US doctrine.

 

Translation of terms (NATO, 2017)

English French
Humanitarian assistance / operation Assistance / opération humanitaire
Peacebuilding Consolidation de la paix
Peace enforcement Imposition de la paix
Peacemaking Rétablissement de la paix
Peace operations Opérations de paix

Peace Support

Peace Support Force

Soutien de la paix

Force de soutien de la paix

Peacekeeping Maintien de la paix
Preventive action/diplomacy Prévention de conflits

Doctrinal Sources Used

Canada: Department of National Defence (DND), “Peace Support Operations,” Joint Doctrine Manual, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, 6 November 2002. (pdf: EnFr)

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French),” AAP-06, 2017 (pdf, 2.7 MB); same definitions are also included in “Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support,” Edition A Version 1, Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.4.1, December 2014.

UN: United Nations (UN), “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” (Capstone doctrine document), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf, 2008. (pdf, 450 KB, fr: pdf, 529 KB)

US: United States, “Peace Operations,” Joint Publication 3-07.3, 1 March 2018 (pdf, PKSOI)

 

Online terminology databases

Though not consulted for the table in this analysis, these databases can be useful to view how various terms have been defined and used in the past.

Canada: “TERMIUM Plus: The Government of Canada’s terminology and linguistic data bank,” www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca.

NATO: “NATO Term: The Official NATO Terminology Database” (En and Fr)

UN: “UNTERM: The United Nations Terminology Database,” https://unterm.un.org (includes both older and newer definitions from many UN documents)

  

  

Endnotes

 

[1] Dr. Dorn teaches the only course on peace operations in Canada offered at the Command and Staff level. DS526 “Peace and Stabilization Operations: An Evolution of Practice” (DS 526) is offered most years at the Canadian Forces College to officers of rank Major to Lieutenant Colonel.

[2] Special Political Missions are smaller UN missions or offices, led by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, that are primarily involved in political and social discussion or negotiations, and do not typically deploy armed units.

[3] MINUSCA stands for “United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic” and MONUSCO stands for “United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

[4] My proposal for a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, which I call UNAMA 2, was: A. Walter Dorn, “Give Peacekeeping a Chance in Afghanistan,” Esprit de Corps, Vol. 16, Iss. 11 (Dec 2009), p.12.

[5] Dr. Stodilka is a Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council. She suggests that the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations and Canada’s National Action Plan for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 would benefit from clarity on terms and definitions similar to those proposed herein.

[6] The new NATO doctrine does not include “Peace Support Operation” as it once did.

[7] “Traditional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict, usually States, in which ‘Blue Helmets’ monitor a truce between warring sides while mediators seek a political solution to the underlying conflict.” “Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: United Nations peacekeeping operations comprising a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace.” (UN, 2008)

[8]Robust Peacekeeping: The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process.”

[9]Traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the high level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the PKF’s authorization to use force only in self-defence. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement so that diplomatic negotiations can seek a comprehensive political settlement.” (207.1) “Complex peacekeeping operations (CPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the PKF’s broader authorization to use force. These operations are often initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation.” (208.1) (Canada, 2002)

Protecting civilians with force UN in Haiti

Protecting civilians with force:
Dilemmas and lessons from the UN stabilization mission in Haiti

A. Walter Dorn

 Originally published as Chapter 6 in The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping (Peter Nadin, ed.), Routledge, London and New York, 2018. © W. Dorn (pdf)

 

The United Nations takes on the gangs in Haiti

• Collateral (civilian) damage and aftermath

• Ethical dilemmas and challenges explored

• Mandates—set not too high, not too low, but just right?

• Conclusion

 

Peace operations are the UN’s main conflict-management tool in the field. They have evolved considerably over time. The first missions, established shortly after World War II, were observer missions that deployed only unarmed soldiers. The United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) focused their efforts on activities of the opposing armies who were subject to a ceasefire.1 The observers could play a constructive role only when the parties wanted to oblige, but UNMOs felt helpless and hapless in the face of deliberate violence against civilians or large-scale blatant aggression. Observing and reporting were important, but far from sufficient, functions.

The first UN peacekeeping force was created in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis. Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian External Affairs minister, wanted to give muscle to his proposed “international peace and police force.”2 So instead of unarmed UNMOs on an individual basis, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was composed of armed and pre-formed national units (battalions) under the operational control of the UN Secretary-General. In this new form of peacekeeping, the weapons proved useful, mostly as a deterrent, as the soldiers separated armies and took control of the no-man’s land in between. But the forces were not given a mandate to prevent violence against civilians.

After the Cold War, the UN found itself with the great challenge of managing internal conflicts, particularly internecine civil wars. Faced with armed resistance from the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, ethnic forces in the former in the former Yugoslavia, rival clans in Somalia, and a genocidal government in Rwanda, the UN had its baptism by fire in conflict management within states. No longer were UN forces simply deployed in the buffer zone between organized armies; UN peacekeepers were widely dispersed across vast territories and concentrated in population centers where fighting was widespread. The nature of the predominant conflicts had changed, so the nature of peacekeeping had to change as well, as summarized in Table 6.1. Peacekeeping needed to become multidimensional to effectively contribute to societal peace, nation building, and stability. As the UN quickly realized they also needed to be more robust. But that proved to be an immense challenge.

During the 1990s, the UN had successes without recourse to much force in many of its multidimensional missions, including in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala), Africa (Mozambique and Liberia), the Balkans (Macedonia), and Asia (Tajikistan and Timor-Leste). UN efforts to use force, however, faced significant challenges and suffered many setbacks. Several UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Bosnia, weakly defended or not at all, were overrun with horrendous results. The massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995 was the one of the most horrendous events; over 8,000 men and boys were killed in cold blood after the peacekeepers failed to protect them. As with the failures to stop clan warfare in Somalia in 1993 and genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the UN struggled to deal with attacks against civilian populations, especially in internecine or ethnic conflicts where the differences between civilians and combatants were blurred.

Only at the end of the 1990s did the UN Security Council seek to deal systematically with the challenge of civilian protection. In 1999, at the urging of Canada, the Council requested a study from the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians (POC).3 In his report, Kofi Annan acknowledged past problems and apportioned some blame to the Council when “mandates were insufficiently clear or inadequate resources were assigned to the task” of civilian protection.4 While the Security Council did not pledge to include POC in its future mandates, this practice was, in fact, adopted. All the multidimensional operations created in the twenty-first century were given mandates to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within [the mission’s] capabilities and areas of deployment.”5 A few missions were even resourced for such an ambitious mandate, but most remained hobbled. As the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) struggled to implement the almost-impossible mandates, it commissioned a detailed study on the protection of civilians.6 A POC “operational concept” and an outline for POC strategies were drafted in 2010 but are far from being operationalized, given the immensity of the task.

Table 6.1 Shift in conflict type and resolution mechanisms at the end of the Cold War (see pdf)

This chapter outlines some of the challenges and dilemmas that the world organization faced as it struggled, with some success, to deal with civilian protection through the use of armed force. The UN mission in Haiti provides an excellent case study of efforts to protect civilians through combined international military and police operations. The study shows how the United Nations, under a Brazilian Force Commander, dealt with the dilemmas and challenges in the hostile environment of Haiti in late 2006 and early 2007 to defeat armed gangs while minimizing civilian collateral damage. Local government support for UN operations was crucial but only came after several years and a successful election. The United Nations had to tolerate the brutal gangs until it had government authorization, daring mission leadership at the military and political levels, and a robust but sensitive military posture.

 

The United Nations takes on the gangs in Haiti7

In the slums of Haiti, pistol- and machete-wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, especially after President Jean Bertrand Aristide was forced from office in February 2004 in the face of a bloody rebel force on the doorstep of Port-au-Prince. After a short US-led intervention, a UN peacekeeping mission was created to establish law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) entered a violence-ridden country with a daunting task.

The Security Council’s 2004 mandate for the mission included the task: “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities.”8

Improving security for the Haitian population was the top priority for MINUSTAH. The capital, Port-au-Prince, was a hotbed of instability, threatening the transitional government with renewed violence and widening bloodshed. Gangs set up chokepoints along several main roads, including the strategic Route Nationale 1, extorting bribes from cargo trucks, taxis (“tap-tap” vans) and passing cars. Gangs also kidnapped Haitians, especially from the middle and upper classes, to extract ransoms. Politically motivated murders were widespread. The UN mission was hamstrung in taking action against the gangs because the transitional government lacked legitimacy and was dysfunctional, especially its notoriously corrupt and widely derided police force. The problem of gang warfare grew, especially in pro-Aristide areas where the population generally rejected the US-backed government that had replaced the Aristide regime.

The largest and most powerful gangs were based in the Cité Soleil slum of Port-au-Prince. With a population of some 300,000, Cité Soleil had been carved into separate fiefdoms by gang leaders.9 They controlled the food and water distribution, imposed “taxes” on street vendors, and terrorized the citizens with their “soldiers.” Hundreds of shots could be heard daily in Cité Soleil and dead bodies were often found at daybreak on the streets of the slum. The national police had been unable for several years to even enter Cité Soleil to carry out investigations or arrests. After Jordanian peacekeepers were shot dead in exposed positions in 2005, members of that contingent would not dismount from their armoured personnel carriers (APCs) during patrols, afraid to help the people they were assigned to protect. In the weapons-flush mini-city of narrow streets and gang checkpoints, the United Nations was unable to secure even its own freedom of movement. Gang members used “fire and run” tactics with UN troops, escaping through the labyrinth of alleyways between the rows of shacks. The situation became both frustrating and embarrassing for MINUSTAH as the mission could not put a cap on the violence.

The United Nations attempted to challenge the gangs in 2005. Comprehensive plans were developed to overwhelm the main strongholds in Cité Soleil, but the gangs were often forewarned, sometimes by corrupt Haitian police. Plans for a major operation, “Iron Fist,” had to be scaled back because a simultaneous attack against all major gangs was deemed too ambitious for the UN force. The new goal was set: the capture of the “number one” gang leader, Emmanuel “Dred” Wilme, a voodoo practitioner living in the northern neighbourhood of Bois Neuf in Cité Soleil. The operation was a mixed success. On 6 July 2005, the notorious gangster and several bodyguards were killed while repelling an attack on their compound. However, rather than setting the stage for new victories, the death of the gang leader initially led to more setbacks.

Several large protest demonstrations, one involving a thousand citizens, ensued in Cité Soleil. And there were even greater problems for the United Nations. First, evidence of potentially significant “collateral damage” emerged. Several Haitian and US human rights groups even claimed that the United Nations had committed a “massacre.”10 The exact number of fatalities could not be confirmed. According to UN reports, the gang leader and four of his associates were killed. The mission’s Chief of Operations in 2005 denies MINUSTAH directly caused any civilian fatalities during Operation Iron Fist. He claims that the collateral damage was probably due to “clashes in disguised form during the evening of that day between groups of gangs in retaliation for those who betrayed, presumably, Dread Wilme.”11 He states that MINUSTAH Forces were not involved and continued to patrol the area as normal. Even so, the collateral damage caused by gangland firefight as a result of a UN operation created a moral dilemma, particularly if such fatalities could have been foreseen.

A second problem after Iron First was that the other gang leaders physically reinforced their positions and gained psychological dominance by referring to the UN troops as “foreign occupiers.” Third, gang killings and organized crime actually increased. When the aid group Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, aka Doctors without Borders) reopened its hospital in Cité Soleil in August 2005, it treated about a half-dozen gunshot victims a day, almost half of them women and children.12 Fourth, and more generally, in 2005, kidnapping, which had not previously been prevalent in Haitian society, became systematic.13 The gangs now posed an intolerable threat to the peace and stability of the country. Fifth, the mission suffered another setback when its force commander committed suicide in January 2006.14 In some circles, the word failed was beginning to be associated with the mission, just as it had been applied to the 1990’s UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.15

The UN received a large boost, however, in February and April 2006 with UN-supported elections, which brought to power President René Préval, a protégé of Aristide. The new head of state tried for several months to negotiate with the gangs, promising them funding and skills training in exchange for the surrender of armaments. But the gangs rejected the offers, increased their demands, including immunity from arrest for their past deeds, and widened their illegal activities. After many school children were kidnapped and killed in early December 2006, the population demanded action. President Préval gave the green light to the United Nations to intervene forcefully in gang strongholds.16 This time the UN force, under new leadership, was prepared.

The UN employed well-planned and well-executed intelligence-led operations from December 2006 to March 2007, achieving the desired effect, despite initial setbacks.17 The operations were guided by the principle of “overwhelming force” for psychological advantage.18

Other guiding principles were gaining the element of surprise, using diversionary tactics to create confusion among the gangs, superior mobility, and quick repair of any physical damage. Minimization of collateral damage was declared the commander’s intent. Intelligence driven planning was the key. The gangsters worked out of relatively fixed locations and precise information was gathered on their positions, movements, and defensive measures. After the gangs dug deep holes designed to stop UN armored personnel carriers (APCs), UN military engineers were tasked to fill those holes quickly during operations.

To minimize civilian casualties, MINUSTAH also made use of night operations. In fact, the Force Commander, Major General Carlos dos Santos Cruz from Brazil, preferred night over day operations because there were fewer people on the streets and less chance of collateral damage.19 In addition, the UN enjoyed a huge technological superiority at night with their headgear equipped with image intensifiers and their rifles with night-sights, along with infrared devices to detect heat. The gangs were practically blind in comparison.

The UN mission deliberately sought to draw fire from the gangs by establishing “strong points” in their territories, knowing that the gangsters’ pride would force them to retaliate, thus allowing the UN to return fire from relatively safe positions. In this way, fatalities during this intense period were kept low and were mostly limited to gang members, though not all fatalities could be confirmed.

One strategically important point was the “Blue House”—named for its blue exterior—in the notorious “Boston” district of Cité Soleil. The house served as a staging base for the most wanted and most feared of the gang leaders, Evens Jeune, who sometimes went by the pseudonym “Big Boss” or “Ti Kouto,” Creole for “little knife.”20 The solidly constructed four-story building overlooked the shantytown from its eastern edge on Route Nationale 1, which crosses Port-au-Prince and leads from the sea port terminal to the airport. Evens regularly erected checkpoints on the road outside to extort money from passing traffic. An intelligence analysis suggested the seizure of this redoubt would deny Evens territory and influence. The Blue House, with its commanding view, would also give the United Nations control over a major auto route and the main entrance to Cité Soleil, permitting it to restrict movements of gang forces.

Careful monitoring of Blue House provided the intelligence needed to determine the optimal time to take action, when resistance would be minimal. Operation Blue House began, as planned, at dawn on 24 January 2007, by diverting the gang members’ attention from the intended target. UN troops from South America first cordoned off large sections of Boston, in part to reduce collateral damage, and then launched a feint attack from the opposite side of the neighborhood to draw the gang members in that direction. This allowed the United Nations to strengthen its defensive positions near the Blue House in case of an opposed entry. The empty house was easily taken. Then angry gang members repeatedly hit the building with sustained bursts of automatic rifle fire. However, the soldiers inside had quickly erected strong defensive positions (e.g., sandbagging the walls of the multi-storey building in 15 minutes). UN soldiers met the attacks with deadly responding fire. MINUSTAH commanders positioned snipers on the roof of Blue House and on top of a tall concrete water tower nearby. Both edifices were riddled with bullets, but no peacekeepers were killed.21

Having gained the Blue House, the UN forces decided on a more substantive goal: to seize Evens’ main stronghold, known as “Jamaica Base,” and gain control over the entire Boston neighbourhood. In preparing for attacks on the bandit’s strongholds, the UN studied the defences and tactics of the gang, particularly in relation to civilians. Evens possessed “robust networks of lookouts using cell phones, rooftop snipers, and gunmen who [used] women and children as human shields.”22 Evens’ gang members were known to set tires on fire to create smoke screens and to throw Molotov cocktails at UN positions, though these proved ineffective from a distance. After the UN seized Blue House, Evens expelled people living nearby with the intention of setting fire to their houses so that the resulting fire and smoke might force the Brazilian soldiers to leave their post. Fortunately for the neighborhood and the UN, this plan was not carried out.

The largest combat operation of the period, Jauru Sudamericana, involved over 700 UN soldiers. These were drawn mostly from South American countries: the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT) in whose area of responsibility (AOR) the operation was carried out, an Andean Task Force (Peru, Bolivia, and Chile) and soldiers from Paraguay, Uruguay, and Jordan.23 UN police (UNPOL) and the Haitian National Police (HNP) also played a significant role by carrying out arrests and controlling crowds. Several rehearsals were staged beforehand in similar environments because of the need for exact synchronization among the “blue” UN players. Hundreds of leaflets were dropped over Boston from a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to inform the population that the United Nations did not seek to harm innocent civilians and that UN operations were solely aimed at defeating the gangs.24 One of the flyers used by MINUSTAH was directed at gangmen: “If you are armed, show yourself and hand over your weapons. Turn yourself in. Your rights will be respected.”

The mission also carried out street cleaning in nearby areas using brooms, trucks, and excavators in order to show support for the population and to clear roadway access for future operations. Intelligence and familiarity with the neighborhood could also be gained by such activities, though some intelligence was embarrassingly inaccurate.25

At 0300 hours on 9 February 2007, Operation Jauru Sudamericana was launched in Boston. Multiple points were attacked at the same time in order to confuse the defenders. But the main attack on Jamaica Base resulted in a sustained firefight.

The commander’s intent was to seize the objectives while avoiding “to the maximum extent the possibility of collateral damage.”26 The United Nations exercised restraint in its fire; Evens’ gang did not. Bullets easily penetrated though the thin wall of surrounding shacks. After several hours of intense fighting, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) requested a temporary ceasefire to permit humanitarian relief, including the rescue of any injured civilians.27 Despite the logic of continuing the military momentum of the attack, the Force Commander quickly agreed to this unanticipated request. A safe corridor was established.

Gang members took advantage of this development by organizing demonstrations to protest and impede MINUSTAH’s actions. Fortunately, two of the mission’s Formed Police Units (FPU), composed of about 200 UNPOL officers from Pakistan and Nigeria, were on standby at the outer perimeter. They performed crowd control functions, effectively removing the threat of aggression by civilian crowds and the potential use of human shields by gang shooters. Soon thereafter, the military operation restarted and it lasted until the objectives were attained later that day. The New York Times headline described the method of the operation: “UN Troops Fight Haiti Gangs One Street at a Time.”28

A number of prominent Evens’ gang members were arrested by the HNP with the help of UNPOL, though Evens himself escaped and was not captured until a month later.29 The Evens base of operations was seized, uncovering over 5,000 rounds of ammunition, machetes, and a gas mask (probably to handle tear gas). The Force Commander commented later: “This operation may be seen as the point at which the MINUSTAH forces gained superiority over the gangs in the Cité Soleil area.”30 Indeed, gang resistance subsided almost immediately. The UN easily established new strong points and started patrolling previously inaccessible routes in Boston. The joint patrols of UN police, HNP, and MINUSTAH soldiers secured the district.

MINUSTAH then launched several operations to extend the UN- controlled territory in Cité Soleil, notably through Operation Nazca on 20 February and Operation Lot Nivo on 28 February. In Operation Nazca, after encircling the district of Belecour, the United Nations broadcast a repeated message from loudspeakers on a moving Brazilian Army APC urging the bandits to surrender, which many of them did.31 After the Jauru Sudamericana operation on Jamaica base, the gangs avoided direct contact with MINUSTAH forces and fled their strongholds when attacked. Obviously the UN had proven itself a superior opponent. Finally, after three months of operations, Cité Soleil was entirely taken back from the gangs with no UN fatalities; only a few UN and civilian casualties are recorded. By July, over 800 gang members had been arrested.32 The UN, in conjunction with the Haitian government, gained control of all sections of the capital.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Edmond Mulet of Guatemala, was able to triumphantly walk in Cité Soleil to interact with jubilant crowds celebrating the end of the gang stranglehold. Mulet later said it was the most satisfying moment of his service as head of mission in Haiti.33 (Mulet was to reassume the post of SRSG after the death of his successor, Hédi Annabi, in the earthquake of January 2010.)

The United Nations, especially the Brazilian contingent, was quick to repair the damage done to the neighborhood during combat operations. “Immediate Impact Projects,” even more ambitious than the UN’s traditional “Quick Impact Projects,” helped provide basic necessities to the locals at a moment when they needed rapid assistance and reassurance. These projects also helped replace the services the gangs had provided and fostered goodwill among the population.

 

Collateral (civilian) damage and aftermath

In operations designed to protect civilians, it is important to assess the number of civilian casualties. The figures for the 2006–2007 operations caused are difficult, if not impossible, to estimate and not available. The allegations and rumours are many. Freelance writer Ben Terrall alleged that one operation on 22 December 2006 in the Bois Neuf and Drouillard districts of Cité Soleil “claimed the lives of dozens of Port-au-Prince residents.”34 He further alleges that in the same area UN “peacekeepers” had killed up to 60 civilians on 6 July 2005 (Op Iron Fist). Another NGO report lists four fatalities from Operation Jauru Sudamericana of 9 February 2007.35

Most reports state that MINUSTAH took great care to minimize civilian casualties. The Force Commander later said that during the intense period of operations he tried to keep the casualties down to “several a day,” below the threshold that would raise media attention.36 A UN officially reported 11 confirmed fatalities from December 2006 to June 2007, seven of them known gang members.37

Local and international media coverage was generally positive,38 unlike during the 2005 operation in Bois Neuf some 18 months earlier.39 While the exact civilian fatality count cannot be confirmed, the whole mission had the stamp of “success” because it had neutralized the gangs and restored peace and order.

The UN was making good progress in nation building in Haiti when the earthquake struck on 12 January 2010. The repercussions for the United Nations were horrendous, in addition to the humanitarian disaster itself. Some 4,000 prisoners in the national penitentiary escaped. Former gang leaders sought to reclaim their old turf. To compound the tragedy, the United Nations lost over 100 of its own staff in the quake, including 10 Brazilian soldiers in the collapsed Blue House.40 This natural disaster caused the largest loss of staff in a single day in UN history. Nevertheless, the United Nations regained its footing. It had previously shown that it was capable of restoring law and order and could do so again. The Security Council authorized an additional 2,000 soldiers and 1,500 police to join the 7,000 soldiers and 2,000 police already in the mission.41 In 2017, as things had calmed down, the mission was converted to a police and justice operation (MINUJUSTH). The experiences of 2006–2007 provided valuable lessons for the United Nations, as it struggled for years in the aftermath of the quake. These lessons, particularly those with an ethical dimension, are worth examining not only for this mission but also for all UN missions.

 

Ethical dilemmas and challenges explored

Robust peacekeeping, where armed force is applied, as in Haiti, raises challenges and ethical dilemmas for the UN, including the following.

Gathering intelligence

Intelligence gathering was taboo, if not prohibited entirely, in traditional peacekeeping, mostly because it was perceived as a breach of sovereignty. But in the more complex and challenging environments where the UN must use force, intelligence is essential. Intelligence allowed MINUSTAH to minimize collateral damage and maximize the chances of success for its operations. Fortunately, Haiti was, like many UN conflict zones, a human-intelligence (HUMINT) rich environment. The UN was able to tap into the wide-ranging disaffection with the gangs in order to procure plenty of actionable information. Persons close to the gang leaders (including lovers) would sometimes voluntarily offer incriminating evidence and give time/place information to help with arrests. In addition, the very low income of people in Haiti (where more than half the population lived on less than one dollar a day42) meant many would gladly offer information for modest compensation. Unusual for peacekeeping missions, MINUSTAH had special funds to build such relationships. Of course, it did not endorse theft, extortion, or elaborate deceptions that are antithetical to UN standards. The mission also stopped short of employing signals intelligence, such as eavesdropping on the cell phone communications of gang members, though some soldiers considered this a significant drawback.

Paying informants posed an ethical dilemma for the United Nations, which has always striven to keep its “hands clean,” while avoiding practices commonly associated with national intelligence agencies.43 In addition, the use of paid informants could be hazardous. Haiti was (and is) filled with false rumors, so the United Nations had to constantly verify and cross-check information received. Informants might offer unverified or false information to receive payment, to incriminate people they do not like, or even to deliberately embarrass the UN. Also, gang chiefs were known to funnel false information through informants.

In 2006–2007, the main MINUSTAH unit for soliciting and collecting information, including from field “assets” like paid informants, was the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). It had been created in 2005, at the urging of the UN Security Council, as an integrated unit of military officers, police, and international civilians. Despite initial opposition within the mission to the JMAC, it soon produced actionable intelligence that helped the mission leadership to plan intelligence-led operations and to better control the “battle space.”

During Operation Jauru Sudamericana against Evens’ base, JMAC used inhabitants of the district to identify the targets (gang members) for the UN forces. Such informants were sometimes dressed in UN military uniforms with their faces shielded or covered so they could point out suspects without being identified themselves. While the international personnel were not disguised, even the use of disguised informants presents a dilemma for the United Nations, but it proved a tactical necessity in this case. Target information from informants was passed to the Intelligence Advisor of the Force Commander who was in the Command Post nearby. For instance, during Op Jauru Sudamericana these sources forewarned MINUSTAH of Evens’ effort to create a civilian demonstration designed to protest and stop the UN operation. The United Nations was able to see through that ruse and deal with the crowds through concerted police action.

Similarly, aerial observation helped avoid a disaster that day. During the UN’s unilateral humanitarian ceasefire, Evens placed white sheets on the streets next to his compound ostensibly to affect a surrender. But observers in UN helicopters spotted Evens’ snipers moving into positions to shoot at UN soldiers who might have moved in to accept the surrender. Aerial information proved essential.

There was always the problem of information leaks, especially from turncoat HNP officers. The UN mission, therefore, often limited the information available to the officers, even if joint activities necessitated their participation as the government’s police authority with powers of arrest. In some joint operations, the Haitian police officers did not

learn of the intended targets or areas of search until the operations were well underway. MINUSTAH team leaders sometimes insisted that HNP officers hand over their cell phones before the start of an operation to ensure the targets were not alerted of their pending capture. The use of force required information compartmentalization. The mission made effective use of intelligence, even though its technological means were modest and did not include signals interception. The “whole of mission” concept, practiced by the JMAC, proved central to coordinated action.44

Smart and smooth power through military–police–civilian coordination

The military is a forceful hard-power instrument that should not be used against unarmed civilians. Otherwise, the United Nations might be acting against international legal norms and risking its image and credibility. If civilian crowds or individuals need to be handled during a peacekeeping operation, this should be generally done with the softer instrument of police power. While UN police cannot escalate to high-intensity combat in the same way as the military, they can perform some tasks better, such as crowd control and working with the local police. In Haiti, the HNP alone had powers of arrest, and so UN police provided a key to success in UN operations.

Some police tasks cannot be effectively completed by individual police officers seconded from many countries who meet for the first time in the mission. Formed police units (FPUs) were requested from nation states, with proper pre-deployment training and sent to the mission with 100–200 police officers in each unit. Such units provided cohesion and could be assigned more difficult tasks. For instance, during MINUSTAH operations, FPUs were used to ensure limited movement of civilians into and out of the areas of military operations. Police were used to identify and apprehend gangsters posing as innocent civilians, trying to escape the military’s cordon and search efforts.

Overwhelming force

The force commander argued that deploying overwhelming force would lead to fewer casualties. This may appear opposed to the principle of proportionality, which states that level of military force actually used should proportionate to the crimes committed and not be excessive. But displaying large amounts of firepower up front, the hope was the other side would fold earlier. On the other hand, if the other side stood fast, the unleashing of this firepower might cause significant

civilian casualties. Fortunately, the gangs could not sustain many hours of combat and usually gave up without a fight; Evens, for one, could not outlast Operation Jauru Sudamericana, which was the longest lasting operation at 13 hours. It was also the largest operation, with the deployment of 717 troops, 44 APCs, and a helicopter for aerial observation. Some officers complained that the UN was hobbling itself by not using aerial firepower. The United Nations should, they argued, make use of “the third dimension” of space, especially after rooftop snipers killed peacekeepers trying to take back a police station in 2005. But UN headquarters feared aerial firepower might lead to greater civilian casualties, so the helicopters were kept unarmed. Soldiers in Operation Jauru Sudamericana expended some 10,000 rounds, a rather modest amount, given that one automatic rifle can fire over 500 rounds a minute; this amounts to an average of 13 rounds fired per soldier, or 1 round fired per soldier/per hour.

The ethical application of force

The use of armed force in 2006–2007 seems ethically justified. But by what standards and criteria should such actions be judged? More generally, when should armed force be used? This age-old question can be addressed using the most enduring and convincing of standards: Just War theory (JWT).45 To what extent were the JWT provisions applied in MINUSTAH’s rules and engagements?

As in almost all military operations, the soldier’s rules of engagement (ROE) describe when force, including deadly force, can be used. The JWT criteria for the ethical application of force can be found in UN ROE, though both are subject to some degree of interpretation. MINUSTAH’s ROE, abbreviated in the “Soldier’s Pocket Card” (2004), clearly parallels on the tactical level the JWT criteria of just cause, last resort, legitimate authority, proportionality, and non-combatant distinction.

Corresponding to the “just cause” category, the MINUSTAH ROE spell out reasons to use force, including: self-defense and defense of UN/international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent (defined as “imminent” use of force); protection of civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance.”46 This principle was mandated at the strategic level, as well as the tactical one. The UN mission in Haiti applied force in 2006–2007 for the protection of civilians, particularly in Cité Soleil in accordance with Security Council resolutions.

The “last resort” criterion of Just War theory is also well represented in the ROE. The term is explicitly mentioned and the ROE card elaborates: “Every reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of using force, including personal contact and negotiation.”47 At the strategic level, negotiations and incentives were offered to the gangs in 2006 but these were rejected. On the ROE card, a possible list of tactical measures short of the use of force is offered: voice and visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, maneuvres, charging of weapons, and warning shots. Before opening fire, soldiers are instructed to give a final warning:

“Nations Unies—Arretez ou je tire”
(United Nations, halt or I will fire)

The ROE permit a “necessity” argument for the immediate use of force, “if an attack is so unexpected, that a moment’s delay could lead to death or grievous injury to oneself or other designated personnel.”

The “proportionality” criterion of JWT at the individual level is also covered. It is explicit in the first line of the card: “The principle of minimum force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances.” The minimum use of force is one of the basic principles of military operations, but applied with greater rigour in peacekeeping.48

The proportionality principle is further described: force must be “commensurate with the level of the threat.” The ROE specify: “If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill.” This is not common in many military ROE, but is reflective of the other-than-war conditions in peacekeeping.

The “legitimate authority” is described in a rule: “The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order.” The commander gains his authority through the chain of command of the UN mission, which is not always solid and is often bifurcated with separate national and mission commands. Nevertheless, the authority comes from the force commander, who in turn is responsible to the mission head (the SRSG in the case of MINUSTAH) who reports to the DPKO chief in New York and thus ultimately to the UN Secretary- General. The UN SG has been given “operational control” of the national contingents by the host nation (through a Memorandum of Understanding) and has been given responsibility over the UN mission by the Security Council. Ultimately, it is the UN Charter, signed by the 193 UN member states, that provides the formal basis in international law for the use of force.

A further rule on the use of proper force is: “Fire must be aimed and controlled.” Finally, the simple exhortation “avoid collateral damage” is non-descript but should be obvious to soldiers on UN missions.

Thus the rules reflect most of the ethical provisions of just war theory. Missing criteria, usually applied at the strategic level, are: net benefit and probability of success. Though JWT criteria are usually applied at strategic level by senior decision makers, they can apparently be scaled down to the tactical level, as evidenced here in MINUSTAH’s ROE.

 

Mandates—set not too high, not too low, but just right?

There is a great danger of over-committing in peacekeeping, promising too much and being unable to deliver in war-torn countries. A dramatic example occurred after the Security Council gave a series of unrealistic mandates to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia through over 70 resolutions during the period 1992–1995. The overwhelmed peacekeeping force was unable to execute most of these assigned tasks, including providing for the safety of civilians in a few of the declared UN “protected” areas. More generally, when a mission arrives with an ambitious mandate to war-torn areas, it raises great expectations. The locals are often doomed to disappointment, though still grateful for the mitigating influence of peacekeepers.

On the other hand, the mission may occasionally find itself in the untenable position of deploying soldiers to stop violence against civilians but unable to justify the action legally without a suitably robust mandate, as General Roméo Dallaire found out in Rwanda. Hence, the Security Council must find a balance point. The current POC language in Security Council resolution contains the caveats that protection is subject to the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment. Also the Council tries to put the onus on the host state as having the primary responsibility for security. This is reasonable. But in most cases, the state is not capable by itself to stop violence, and the missions need extensive resources to carry out a POC mandate. Though the peacekeeping budget has risen to over $7 billion a year from less than $2 billion in 2000, the resources provided are still no match for the expanded mandates.

 

Conclusion

The UN properly emphasizes a wide range of means to protect civilians aside from force: training the host nation’s security sector (e.g., promoting human rights; monitoring, reporting, and denouncing human rights violations; arresting criminals; protecting convoys and UN humanitarian activities; fostering reconciliation; and improving security generally. These important activities may, in the end, be more important than the use of armed force, but situations may necessitate a show of force and/or the actual use of force. When force becomes necessary, serious ethical dilemmas must be faced. Intelligence gathering must be increased, the acceptable levels of force decided upon, in accordance with high ethical standards and principles, such as the criteria presented in Just War theory. The Security Council needs to provide the mission with clear and achievable mandates and resources to give the mission a real ability to protect civilians. But the United Nations should not over-promise and under-deliver.

UN peacekeepers may still find themselves in untenable positions in many conflicts, unable to stop or prevent violence against civilians, but they are now better equipped with resources and mandates than in the twentieth century. International norms have improved, though the means have yet to bridge the yawning commitment-capability gap. Nevertheless, peacekeepers should be able to sleep a little easier because of the more robust mandates now given to multidimensional missions. Yet, the remaining concern in peacekeeping is that the means are not yet commensurate with the mandates. More robust forces are necessary and to be deployed with a keen sense of proper conduct. The UN has shown that it is capable adopting an evolving its peacekeeping practice. As shown in MINUSTAH, it has proven capable of the proper application of force.

 

Notes^

1 Though the United Nations considers the first peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established in 1948, there were previous missions with observers in Greece, Indonesia, and Korea. These are not included in the UN list since the missions were not under the operational control of the UN Secretary-General but reported directly to the Security Council.

2 Lester B. Pearson, Speech to the UN General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assembly, ES-1, 561st meeting, 2 November, para. 299. (New York: United Nations).

3 Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/1999/6, 12 February 1999. The council welcomed the Secretary-General’s report in Security Council resolution 1265, 17 September 1999.

4 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Security Council document S/1999/957), 8 September 1999.

5 The current peacekeeping operations created in the twenty-first century that have the protection mandates from the UN Security Council are the missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004–), D.R. Congo (MONUC, 1999–), Darfur/Sudan (UNAMID, 2007–), Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–), Liberia (UNMIL, 2003–), Southern Sudan (UNMIS, 2005–).

6 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (New York: United Nations, 2009).

7 Parts of this section draw upon an earlier publication, where more details can be found: A Walter Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 6 (December 2009): 805–835.

8 Security Council resolution 1542, 30 April 2004.

9 The main regions in Cité Soleil and the nicknames of the gang leaders in these regions were as follows: Belecour (Amaral), Bois Neuf (Beloney), Boston (Evens), Brooklyn (Ti Bazile).

10 The Cité Soleil Massacre Declassification Project provides cables from the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince that give indications of “numerous civilian deaths,” though the government documents do not use the term massacre or bolster the allegation in the title of the project. A July 26 cable accused Marguerite Laurent of the Haitian Lawyer’s Leadership Network of taking “the lead on spreading massacre rumors on the internet.” The cables are available at www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/cite_soleil.htm.

11 Major General Ricardo Toro (MINUSTAH Deputy Force Commander in 2008 and Chief of Operations in 2005), Electronic correspondence with author, 14 April 2009.

12 Ginger Thompson, “Fear and Death Ensnare UN’s Soldiers in Haiti.” The New York Times, 24 January 2006.

13 Ginger Thompson, “A New Scourge Afflicts Haiti: Kidnappings,” New York Times, 6 June 2005.

14 UN News Centre 2006, “Death of UN Force Commander in Haiti Ruled Suicide,” www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=17143.

15 Ibid. See also Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince [Special Report 208], (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008).

16 President Préval gave a televised speech to the nation issuing an ultimatum to the gangs to either “surrender or die.” This was echoed by his Prime Minister in a speech to the Haitian legislative assembly on 10 August 2006. See The Globe and Mail, “Surrender or Die, Haiti Tells Armed Gangs,” 11 August 2006, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/surrender-or-die-haiti-tells-armed-gangs/article18170703.

17 MINUSTAH received an early embarrassment on 21 December 2006 during Operation New Forest in Bois Neuf, when the BELONY gang gained a “tactical victory” by taking possession of a Uruguayan APC with its “organic armaments,” i.e., a heavy machine gun and a sniper rifle. The APC was recovered three days later and the machine gun shortly thereafter. Fortunately, the gangs were not able to use the machine gun because the Russian electronics proved too sophisticated. “DFC [Deputy Force Commander] Uruguayan After Action Report on Op Lot Nivo,” undated MINUSTAH document. The sniper rifle was recovered only on March 21.

18 The largest operation (Jauru Sudamericana, with 720 troops) expended 10,000 rounds while the earlier and smaller operation (Iron First in 2005) expended over 23,000 rounds.

19 Major General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, Interview with author at MINUSTAH Headquarters in Port-au-Prince (Christopher Hotel), 18 December 2008.

20 Marc Lacey, “UN Troops Fight Haiti Gangs One Street at a Time,” New York Times, 10 February 2007.

21 A tour of the AOR was provided to the author on 20 December 2008 by senior MINUSTAH officials who were involved with the 2007 operations, including the Force Commander. Many details of the operation were learned at that time. The walking tour covered Strong Point 16, the Blue House, and the general Boston neighborhood. The bullet holes from the operations were still evident in some buildings like the Blue House and nearby water tower.

22 MINUSTAH, After Action Report on Operation ‘Jauru Sudamericano,’ 1.

23 MINUSTAH (press release) 2007, Haïti: Opération Sécuritaire de la MINUSTAH dans un Quartier de Cité Soleil, http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb. nsf/db900sid/EGUA-6Y9PG4?OpenDocument.

24 This UAV, or “Veículo Aéreo Não-Tripulado” (VANT) in Portuguese, was shot in its wing with one round while dropping leaflets at low elevation, but it was not seriously damaged. In Operation HUMAITÁ of 31 January, 400 pamphlets were launched by VANT of “Jauru Air Force” in four overflights of the Bois Neuf neighborhood. (BRABATT SITREP, 31 January 2007).

25 Some UN intelligence estimates declared that Evens was building a “prison” where detainees were tortured. These were small cubicles were later discovered to be latrines built by NGOs. But this only became apparent after UN combat operations. The gang leaders must have been mystified why the UN was concentrating such firepower on latrines! After the battle, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General insisted on visiting the site of the alleged torture chambers, only to see for himself that it was a serious case of misinformation. Source: High-level UN official, meeting with the author in New York, 29 January 2015.

26 MINUSTAH, After Action Report on Operation ‘Jauru Sudamericano,’ unpublished and undated but likely to be 1 March 2007, 19. (In English, the operation is titled ‘Jauru Sudamiercana.’)

27 Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince [Special Report 208], 5.

28 Marc Lacey, “UN Troops Fight Haiti Gangs One Street at a Time.”

29 Agence France Press 2007, La Police Haïtienne Arrête un Important Chef de Gang, www.minustah.org/blogs/129/La-police-haitienne-arrete-un-important-chef-de-gang.html; and United Nations (press release) 2007, Fugitive Haitian Gang Leader Sought in UN-backed Crackdown on Crime is Captured. UN Helps Haitian Police Transfer Gang Leader, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21859&Cr=Haiti&Cr1=&Kw1=MINUSTAH&Kw2=&Kw3

30 MINUSTAH, After Action Report on Operation “Jauru Sudamericano,” 45.

31 The announcements, made in Creole, can be translated as “Bandits! Lay down your weapons and surrender. We will not hesitate to use the necessary force to place you under arrest. Turn yourselves in now. If you do not surrender, you will certainly be taken by force. Lay down your weapons, put your hands on your head, get out of the house quietly. You bandits: it is not our intent, but we will shoot if it is necessary. Turn yourselves in now.”

32 Henry L. Stimson Centre, Peace Operations Fact Sheet Series: MINUSTAH, 16 July 2008, 2.

33 UN Department of Public Information, video on MINUSTAH. Also a personal remark made to the author on 6 March 2009, in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

34 Ben Terrall 2006, UN Troops in Haiti Continue Military Operations, Killing Scores of Civilians, www.haitisolidarity.net/article.php?id=148.

35 See Nick Whalen 2007, UN Cracks Down on Gangs, Residents Demand Peace, www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/un_cracks_down_on_gangs_reside.html.

36 Major General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, Conversation with author at Miami airport, 23 December 2008.

37 UN Official (active in MINUSTAH in 2006), Electronic Correspondence, 25 January 2009.

38 See Lacey for the New York Times coverage. Brazilian media (e.g., Correio Brasiliense and Folha de São Paulo) were also positive, given the major role that Brazilian troops played. The local population also gave MINUSTAH a resounding 97 percent approval for cracking down on the gangs. See Dziedzic and Perito, 5.

39 A list of alleged 19 fatalities due to an earlier UN operation on 22 December 2006 is provided in Kevin Pina 2007, The UNspoken Truth About Gangs in Haiti, http://haitiaction.net/News/HIP/2_15_7/2_15_7.html.

40 Bruno Waterfield, “Haiti Earthquake: Police Face Return of Gangs in Port-au-Prince,” The Telegraph, 19 January 2010. Haitian authorities conceded they had lost their battle to maintain order in Port-au-Prince after the leaders of the city’s crime gangs were freed when the national prison collapsed.

41 Security Council resolution 1908, 19 January 2010.

42 Thompson (op. cit.) cites UN estimates that “Fifty-five percent of Haiti’s 8.5 million people live on less than a dollar a day” and Cité Soleil is one of the poorest neighborhoods of the country.

43 Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld is known to have used the expression “clean hands” in describing the activities of the UN, especially in the Congo in 1960, and the reasons why the world organization could not engage in traditional intelligence activities. Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).

44 More details on MINUSTAH’s intelligence activities can be found in Dorn, Intelligence-led Peacekeeping, http:// http://walterdorn.net/pdf/Intelligence-LedPkg-MINUSTAH_Dorn_INS_Dec2009.pdf.

45 Although there is no single definitive source for a statement of the Just War tradition, the principal elements are described in Greg Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

46 MINUSTAH, Rules of Engagement as abbreviated in the “Soldier’s Pocket Card” of the mission (2004).

47 Ibid.

48 The other commonly cited principles of peacekeeping are deployment of the mission with the consent of the main parties to the conflict (spoilers not included) and impartiality, in which the UN treats the parties equally. See Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008).